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CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 
IN THE FAR EAST 



CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 
IN THE FAR EAST 



BY 

STANLEY K. HORNBECK, B.A. (Oxon.), Ph.D. 

r 

ASSISTANT PBOFESSOB OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN; SOMETIME INSTHUCTOB 

IN THE CHEKIANQ FBOVINCIAL COLLEGE AND IN' THE FENOTIEN (mUKOEN) LAW 

COLLEGE 




D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

NEW YORK LONDON 

1919 






Copyright, 1916, by 
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 



Printed in the United States of America 



TO 

MY FATHER 



PREFACE 

Twenty years ago the oldest, the largest, the most populous 
country in the world — a huge continental empire long accus- 
tomed to esteem itself the sole repository of national strength 
and substance — was defeated in war and invaded by the armed 
forces of a little insular neighbor. In the treaty which fol- 
lowed, the partitioning of China was begun. 

Japan's success in dealing with China encouraged European 
governments to press demands for territorial and other priv- 
ileges, and there ensued the "scramble for concessions" which 
marked the years 1894-1898. One after another the leading 
European powers acquired material "compensations" and 
staked out "spheres of influence" at China's expense. 

In 1899 the Government of the United States, departing 
from the theoretical dictates and traditions of American for- 
eign policy, asserted its practical interest in what was occur- 
ring in the Far East by coming forward as the champion of 
the "open door" policy. 

Writing just after the issuing of Secretary Hay's "open 
door" notes and just on the eve of the Boxer uprising. Dr. 
Paul S. Reinsch, then a professor at the University of Wiscon- 
sin, and now American Minister to China, said : "The sudden- 
ness with which the entire perspective of the political world 
has been changed by recent developments in China is unprece- 
dented. That country, without question, has become the focal 
point of international politics. Vast interests are there under 
contention — even the very composition of the world civilization 
of the future is at stake upon the issue. Rarely have states- 
men been under a graver responsibility than are the ministers 
in whose hands are the threads of Chinese politics, for they are 
in a position to determine the future course of history in such 



vIII PREFACE 

measure as they understand and intelligently influence the 
forces there at work." * 

The events of 1900 drew the attention of the whole world to 
China. Two years later the consummation of the first alliance 
between a Western and a Far Eastern state, whereby England 
formally recognized the wonderful progress which Japan had 
made during the preceding fifty years, gave Japan a new im- 
portance and new strength. Forthwith the statesmen and 
soldiers of this rising Oriental empire challenged a great 
European power to battle, and in the ensuing war they achieved 
a victory which won for their country a ranking among the 
major nations. 

The failure of the Boxer uprising accelerated for China, and 
the success of the Russo-Japanese war encouraged for Japan, 
new developments and new activities destined to be of momen- 
tous consequence. China turned her back on the old regime 
and set herself to the task of adopting modern methods. 
Within a decade she had discarded a dynasty, undertaken the 
establishing of a new system of government, and embarked 
upon a gigantic program of social and economic readjustment. 
During the same period Korea had been removed from the roll 
of nations. Japan, with the sapience of an old and the 
strength of a young nation, appropriated for the exercise 
of her energies all of what had been Korea, and has so extended 
her authority that South Manchuria is within her grasp, while 
China has had to take orders from Tokyo. 

During the past year there have occurred in the Far East 
events no less important than were those of 1894-1898, 1900, 
1904-1905, and 1911-1912, but, so fully has the great war in 
Europe occupied the attention of the Western world, most of 
us have given little thought to the affairs of China and Japan. 
The significance and the effect of these developments will in 
time be more widely realized. 

There are many reasons why we in the West should study 
the Far East. We forced ourselves upon Asia. We compelled 

*Reinsch: World Polities, p. 85. 



PREFACE ix 

China and Japan to open their doors; we made them accept 
relations with ourselves ; and we have driven them to adopt, if 
only in self-defense, instruments and policies patterned on ours. 
The present problems of the Far East are as much of our mak- 
ing as of Chinese and Japanese making. There is, just now, 
some inclination among Americans to accept the subtle sugges- 
tion that these problems do not and need not concern us. "Let 
the Chinese and the Japanese settle their problems for and 
between themselves." Or, with even less consideration, "Let 
Japan settle the problems of the Far East." This might be 
all very well, if the problems could be thus disposed of. The 
error of those who assume this indifferent attitude lies in their 
failure to look far enough either into the past or into the 
future. They are endeavoring to solve problems by ignoring 
them, to avoid issues by deferring them, to meet obligations 
by repudiating them. The United States, for instance, has 
responsibilities in the Far East ; we have an interest in the fate 
and fortunes of its peoples ; and we have a right to a share in 
the commercial future of the Pacific. No amount of present 
indifference will alter the fact that some day we shall insist that 
our wishes as to political settlements and commercial oppor- 
tunities in the Pacific be given due consideration. We have 
not yet officially repudiated the "open door" policy. Do we 
intend to? We have recently intimated that it is our intention 
to establish the independence of the Philippines. Shall we carry 
out this plan.f* We have a "Japanese problem" as a part of 
the question of our immigration policy. This problem and that 
of our Far Eastern policy are intimately connected. The suc- 
cess or failure of our Far Eastern policy cannot but have its 
effect upon the problem of maintaining or discarding the prin- 
ciples upon which we base that part of our South American 
policy which falls within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. 
What do we intend to do with these questions ? Have we — and 
if we have not, is it not time that we plan to have — a reasoned 
and consistent foreign policy.'' Can we avoid facing these 
questions .'' 



X PREFACE 

To understand these problems and the questions to which 
they give rise, some study of the underlying facts, some knowl- 
edge of the nations, the institutions and the situations involved 
are necessary. 



There have been written within the past twenty years scores 
of books on Japan, many on China, and not a few on the Far 
East in general. Most of these books are either very broad or 
very special in their choice and treatment of subjects. Few 
have been devoted exclusively to politics. There is not one, so 
far as the writer knows, which has undertaken to give within 
a single cover a brief account of Chinese politics, of Japanese 
politics, and of some of the outstanding features of the inter- 
national situation in the Far East. This the present book 
attempts to do. 

Seven years ago the writer went to China to observe at first 
hand certain institutions and movements in which he had long 
been interested. He lived, traveled and studied in the Far 
East for five years. His own experience in endeavoring to 
acquire a working knowledge of the instruments, motives and 
forces which underlie and contribute to or make the problems 
of Far Eastern politics, together with experience in attempting 
to answer a variety of questions which are asked in this coun- 
try with regard to these problems, has convinced him that an 
effort to make available within one volume concise accounts of 
a considerable number of related phenomena such as form the 
subjects of the following chapters should serve a useful pur- 
pose. By giving historical resumes; by describing constitu- 
tions and constitutional theories; by explaining the genesis 
and programs of political parties, and the origins, objects, 
accomplishments, and apparent tendencies of various policies, 
he has sought to construct a book of facts which will con- 
tribute to an understanding of certain institutions, lines of 
development and problems of the present moment. 

It is not the purpose of the book to pass judgment upon 



PREFACE XI 

policies or to offer possible solutions for problems ; the task 
in hand is that of setting forth facts. To this end, subjects 
and materials have been chosen and handled with a view to 
anticipating in some measure the demands of at least three 
classes of readers: the student, to whom these matters may be 
new and who requires both background and detail; the well- 
informed reader, who, with an already established familiarity 
with the past, wishes arrangement, a record, and an account 
of recent events ; and the general reader, who, with a constantly 
increasing interest in Chinese and Japanese politics, finds it 
difficult, without searching widely, to discover what are the 
forces and instrumentalities which occasion and determine the 
developments to which he sees current reference. It is thus 
hoped that the book will prove useful to students, of some 
value to specialists, and not without interest to the casual 
reader. 

While the chief concern of this study is with contemporary 
politics, nevertheless it has appeared advisable to include his- 
torical sketches and some non-political data as introductory 
to or having a direct bearing upon current political develop- 
ments. Those who have studied Far Eastern politics will 
appreciate the necessity for elaborating at certain points and 
will make allowance for the exclusion at others of details which 
might be interesting but are not essential to the account. Con- 
siderations of space, chiefly, are responsible for the absence of 
chapters on certain special subjects — such as Russo-Chinese 
Relations, Mongolia, Tibet, Railways and Loans, Tariffs, and 
so forth — a series of which, particularly adapted, to special 
studies, may be left to another volume. 

It has seemed convenient to follow the topical rather than 
the chronological method, but the arrangement has been made 
essentially cumulative, everything which precedes preparing 
the way for what appears in the last few chapters. Thus the 
first two sections, dealing with politics in China and in Japan, 
stand as units devoted to their respective subjects; but they 
serve also to establish a background for the study of matters 



xii PREFACE 

of broader general interest in the field of foreign relations, 
treated in the chapters which follow. 

Well aware of the great differences of opinion which prevail 
with regard to many matters in the field of Far Eastern pol- 
itics, and believing that personal opinions, affected as they 
must be by personal sympathies, experiences and predisposi- 
tions, are all too frequently given undue emphasis, the writer 
has chosen in the preparation of this book to give first place 
to statements of fact, to quote from documents, to cite the 
opinions of other authors, to refrain from extensive comment, 
and to make suggestions more frequently than positive asser- 
tions at points where conclusions are to be drawn. 

In presenting this volume the author takes pleasure in 
acknowledging his indebtedness for especially valuable assist- 
ance to Mr. Harold S. Quigley, Fellow in Political Science at 
the University of Wisconsin ; to Mr. Ping-song Ho, for several 
years a student in his classes in China and later at the Univer- 
sity of Wisconsin ; to Mr. Feng-hua Huang, now a student at 
the University of Wisconsin; and to many other friends who 
have contributed information, suggestions and help. He begs 
also to acknowledge his indebtedness to former instructors and 
to many authors upon whose works he has relied and from 
whom he has freely drawn, and to express his appreciation of 
the courtesies of several editors and of his publishers. 

Stanley K. Hornbeck. 

Madison, Wisconsin, 
January 1, 1916. 



CONTENTS 

BOOK I 

POLITICS IN CHINA AND IN JAPAN 

China 

CHAFTEB PAGE 

I. China: The Revolution 3 

II. China: Organization and Government Under 

THE Old Regime 18 

III. China: Reconstruction and Rebellion. Steps 

Toward a Constitution 38 

IV. China: Provisional Constitution .... 48 
V. China: Political Parties and Party Politics 66 

VI. China: The Return to Monarchy .... 87 

Japan 

VII. Japan: The Rise of Japan as a Modern Power 103 

VIII. Japan: Constitution and Government . . . 128 

IX. Japan: Political Parties and Party Politics 147 

X. Japan: Count Okuma and the Present Regime 171 

BOOK II 

CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS: CHINA, JAPAN, AND 
THE UNITED STATES 

The Recent Past 

XL Japan: Steps on the Road to Empire. The 

Passing of Korea 195 

XII. The Opening of China and the Scramble for 

Concessions 216 



v/ 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAGE 

XIII. The Open Door Policy 231 

"^XIV. Japan's Challenge to Russia and Entrance 

Into South Manchuria 243 

^XV. South Manchuria: Ten Years of Japanese 

Administration 256 

The Recent Past and the Present 

XVI. Japan and Germany. The Peace of the Far 

East 285 

XVII. Japan and China: Negotiations and Agree- 
ments OF 1915 301 

XVIII. Japan's Monroe Doctrine for Asia . . . 344 

XIX. Japan and the United States 360 

XX. China and the United States 380 

Appendices 

I. Memorandum on Governmental Systems, Sub- 
mitted by Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, Constitutional 
Adviser to the Chinese Government, to President 
Yuan Shih-kai 413 

II. Message of President Yuan Shih-kai to the Council 

of State, September 6, 1915 425 

III. Message of President Yuan Shih-kai Making 

Public a Memorial from the Council of State, 
October 11, 1915 427 

IV. Law for the Organization of the Citizens' Repre- 

sentative Convention, China 430 

V. The Expansion of Japan 434 

VI. Japan's Revised Demands on China, as Presented 

April 26, 1915 435 

VII. Treaty Clauses with Regard to the Integrity of 
Korea and China and the Maintenance of the 

Open Door 441 

Index 451 



BOOK I 
POLITICS IN CHINA AND IN JAPAN 

CHINA 



CHAPTER I 



china: the revolution 



The bomb whose explosion precipitated the Chinese 
Revolution was not an extraordinary spark, but it fired 
an unusual charge of latent human energy. When a 
local mutiny develops within four weeks into a nation- 
wide revolt, leading within four months to the abdi- 
cation of an undefeated ruling family, effecting an 
accepted revolution among from three to four hundred 
million people and involving four million square miles 
of territory, great forces have been at work. When 
the power of a once great dynasty crumbles as did that 
of the Manchus, either the explosive used against it 
has been very powerful, or the resistance very weak, 
or both. In any case, a successful revolt, however sud' 
den and however much a surprise its outbreak, is not 
fortuitous ; the conditions which develop revolution must 
have been present; the plan of the leaders, if not the 
weapons of their followers, must have been prepared 
in advance; the authority of the rulers must have been 
undermined, and the moment for action must have ar- 
rived. 

The accident of the bomb explosion was merely in- 
cidental. The way had already been prepared for what 
followed. A certain ironical interest may be attached 
to the fact that the explosion occurred on quasi-Russian 
soil, that is in the Russian "concession" at Hankow; 
Activities of the Russian government had probably 

3 



4 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

contributed more during the preceding fifty years to 
the ripening of the conditions in China which bred revo- 
lutionary sentiment than had any other agency. 

First among the antecedents of the revolution stands 
a matter of precedent: twenty-six changes of dynasty 
during the four thousand years of substantial Chinese 
history. As compared with the Japanese, who claim 
twenty-five hundred years of continuous allegiance to 
a single royal line, the Chinese have been decidedly 
given to sudden political mutations. In modern times 
alone, the last Chinese dynasty, the Ming, ascended the 
throne as the result of a revolt; from them the Man- 
chus were able to wrest the imperial seat because the 
country had, in the weak years of their decadence, been 
torn again by the forces of rebellion ; and the Manchus 
in turn were, after a century of decline, driven from 
their tottering throne by the irresistible force of crys- 
tallizing popular discontent. The sages of China have 
taught that a ruler should hold the throne only so long 
as he governs well and is a true and honest "father" 
to his people. Developing their thesis much as Locke 
elaborated for us the doctrine of the "governmental 
compact," they emphasized the right of the people to 
remove the scepter from the hands of a monarch who 
disregarded or was unable to fulfill his essential obliga- 
tions. The revolutions have come at intervals, some 
long, some short, but averaging less than two hundred 
years, as variations in economic pressure and govern- 
mental efiiciency have sufficed to upset the balance of 
forces within the state. 

The turn of the wheel in 1911 was, then, no great 
surprise to those who, understanding Chinese history, 
were able to interpret the tendencies of the past half- 
century and were familiar with conditions in contem- 



CHINA: THE REVOLUTION 5 

porary China. The power of the Manchus had been 
badly shaken by the great Taiping Rebellion, when 
but for foreign assistance the Imperial forces would 
in all likelihood have gone down before the "long-haired 
rebels." From the shock of that period the throne never 
recovered. During the whole of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, the increasing influence of the West, the invasion 
of Occidental ideas, methods and forces, together with 
the inability of the Manchu government either to put 
up a successful resistance to the increasing aggressions 
of foreign powers or to adapt itself to the new condi- 
tions, were arousing the Chinese people from their men- 
tal lethargy and bringing them to a realization of their 
country's weakness and peril. Internally, forces iden- 
tical with those which had rendered the Mings an easy 
prey to the Manchus were now fast undermining the 
title of the Manchus. The later Ming Emperors had 
dissociated themselves from the administration, leav- 
ing the conduct of affairs to powerful menials and 
the chicanery of palace intrigue. Nowhere is the doc- 
trine of the cycle in history more strikingly sustained 
than in the annals of the Chinese. A century or so on 
an ascending curve, the zenith, then a century of de- 
cline; the rulers begin to lose their vigor in the somno- 
lent atmosphere of peace, prosperity and self-satisfac- 
tion; stagnation and decay set in; the people begin 
to suffer; from suffering proceeds rebellion; perhaps 
an invasion threatens; the dynasty is impotent either 
to stem the rising tide of discontent or to defend the 
nation against aggressions from without. The nadir 
in the nation's fortunes is reached. The dynasty falls, 
the debris is swept away, and a new cycle begins. 

It is to history that the thoughtful student should 
go when prompted to musings as to the probable future 



6 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

of the Chinese people. It is futile to attempt to judge 
China and to speculate as to her future on the basis, 
simply, of the past century; still more so to judge the 
revolution of 1911 by the events which have immedi- 
ately followed; and it becomes absurd to estimate the 
capacities of the Chinese people in terms of what they 
have accomplished — or failed to accomplish — in the last 
few decades, years, months, and weeks. In China's 
history there lies material for the refutation of the 
gloomy prognostications of certain pessimists, material 
for the encouragement of skeptics, material with which 
to fortify the faith of optimists. 

Returning, however, to the thread of events : During 
the first century of its power,^ the Manchu Dynasty 
produced some of the most efficient and enlightened 
rulers that ever sat on the dragon throne — and the coun- 
try prospered. During its last fifty years, the affairs 
of the central government were largely in the hands of 
women and palace hangers-on. The erstwhile virility 
of the Manchu stock had disappeared. When the crisis 
came, there was a baby on the throne and there was 
not a single really strong man among his relatives to 
defend the throne and the nation against the forces of 
rebellion which suddenly crystallized themselves. 

Occurring a good deal as a matter of course, brought 
on by the operation of economic and social forces, the 
revolution was in its more immediate aspects the result 
of a conflict between two antipathetic tendencies: a 
movement toward centralization on the part of the gov- 
ernment ; insistence upon local autonomy in certain mat- 
ters of vital contemporary interest on the part of the 
gentry in some of the central and southern provinces. 

For a brief sketch of the immediate historical an- 

^ The Manchus took the throne in l644f. 



CHINA: THE REVOLUTION 7 

tecedents of the revolution we need go back not more 
than twenty years. In 1894 and 1895 Japan treated 
China to a surprising and ignominious defeat in the 
war which had broken out between the two countries 
as the result of their opposing policies in Korea. The 
ensuing three years witnessed a scramble among the 
great European powers, together with Japan, for con- 
cessions, both territorial and industrial. By 1898 it had 
become a question whether China was or was not to be 
partitioned among the powers. In that year the Em- 
peror fell under the influence of the Cantonese K'ang 
Yu-wei and embarked upon an extensive and ill-or- 
dered program of reform. A riotous profusion of re- 
form edicts ensued during what is called "the hundred 
days," which threatened thoroughly to upset the politi- 
cal, social, and educational systems of the country. 
Alarmed at this, and finally fearful for her own per- 
sonal safety, the Empress Dowager suddenly effected 
the famous coup d'etat of September 21, 1898, which 
resulted in her seizure of the reins of government. 

Among the first of her acts, the Empress Dowager 
called on the ofiicials and the people to resist, if neces- 
sary by force of arms, any further foreign aggression. 
Then she rescinded most of the Emperor's reform edicts 
and scattered his advisers. Reaction became the order 
of the day. Encouragement was given to the ultra- 
conservatives. The activities of a secret society, which 
soon became known to the world as the Boxers, were 
encouraged by powerful elements at the court. This 
led, in 1900, to the Boxer uprising, the siege of the 
foreign legations, the invasion of North China by troops 
of the allied powers, the flight of the Court from Pe- 
king — and its absence for eighteen months, the Proto- 
col of 1901, the saddling upon China of a burden of 



8 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

debt of $325,000,000 by way of indemnity, the discred- 
iting of the Manchu administration in the eyes of the 
Chinese — particularly of the South, and a further in- 
crease in the pressure of foreign influence. 

After eighteen months of exile the Empress Dowager 
returned to Peking in a chastened frame of mind and 
became herself the leader in an extensive but conserva- 
tively conducted program of reform. The most im- 
portant result of this new development, politically, was 
the appointing of a Commission which was sent abroad 
in 1905 to study Western constitutions and methods of 
government. This Commission reported in 1906, and 
as a consequence of its report the Empress Dowager 
promised in September of that year that the country 
should have a constitution and that thorough reforms 
in law and in administration would be instituted. A 
reorganization of the metropolitan boards was at once 
ordered and the establishing of a National Assembly 
was promised. 

In 1907 Provincial Assemblies were proposed. In 

1908 a Program of Constitutional Reform conte^n- 
plating nine years was issued. In November, 1908, the 
great Empress Dowager and the hapless Emperor 
Kwang Hsii died, and the throne passed to a baby 
nephew of the latter, with his father as Regent. In 

1909 the Provincial Assemblies met, and from the mo- 
ment of their first meeting the troubles of the govern- 
ment increased many fold. 

The National Assembly met for the first time in 
the fall of 1910. In spite of the fact that the represen- 
tation had been so arranged, as the government thought, 
that the Assembly would be amenable to the control of 
the administration, this body showed itself from the very 
first a thoroughly unruly member. The Assembly was 



CHINA: THE REVOLUTION 9 

given only deliberative power. It assumed for itself 
substantial legislative authority. Among other things, 
in addition to formulating a budget it demanded that 
the policies of the government be submitted to it. It 
called vociferously for the immediate establishment of 
a cabinet. This the government succeeded in defer- 
ring until after the Assembly had adjourned, when it 
proceeded in its own way to establish such a body. At 
the head of the Cabinet which the Regent then estab- 
lished was Prince Ching, an aged, conservative, and 
corrupt official in whom the people had no confidence. 
Of the thirteen cabinet members, nine were Manchus 
— five of these being princes of the royal family — and 
four were Chinese. Here the Prince Regent made one 
of his greatest mistakes. The people of China knew 
that they were getting nothing but the form of a cabi- 
net; they knew that the men appointed as heads of 
several of the most important departments were abso- 
lutely incompetent. Especially unsatisfactory were 
the Ministers of the Army and of the Navy, two 
younger brothers of the Regent. The Cabinet was to 
be responsible to the throne only. 

The opposition to the government became defined 
and the antagonism between the forces of centraliza- 
tion and decentralization found an issue in a question 
of railway construction and loans, an issue wherein 
were involved states' rights and local autonomy senti- 
ments on the one hand and a policy of national control 
on the other. 

In connection with this controversy, the influence of 
the outside pressure, both from the West and from 
Japan, the pressure of world politics, manifesting itself 
in financial and industrial developments, had its inti- 
mate and immediate bearing upon the progress of 



10 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

China's internal affairs. To understand this we must 
devote some attention to the question of loans and rail- 
way concessions. Here, again, we find the necessary 
history beginning with the Chino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895. It was then that China began to be a bor- 
rowing nation, and it is from that time that the prob- 
lems of concessions, of the open door policy, and of the 
major political and economic battles which have been 
waged by the powers at Peking date. 

The exigencies of the war with Japan first drove the 
Chinese to call upon foreign capital for assistance, and 
it took but a little time thereafter to demonstrate that 
China's antiquated fiscal system was incapable of meet- 
ing the demands of an awakening economic and increas- 
ingly complicated political life. After the first loan it 
soon became convenient to seek additional aid from 
abroad. Some countries were only too glad to furnish 
funds, a special return being in most cases required 
in the form of valuable concessions. England, France 
and Germany were the first to enter this promising 
financial field, and those countries have continued, up 
to the present, as the principal lenders. Belgium has, 
however, recently shared largely, while the United 
States, Russia and Japan, last of all, have sought to 
participate in the opportunities afforded by this new 
demand for financial and industrial assistance. 

The entrance of foreign capital resulted before long 
in some curious combinations and ultimately in a very 
complicated political situation. In 1895 the largest 
British and German banking interests in the Far East 
made an agreement for the mutual sharing of all Chi- 
nese business which might be obtained by either. This 
financial alliance was reaffirmed in 1900 at the time of 
the negotiation of the Boxer indemnity loan. In the 



CHINA: THE REVOLUTION 11 

interval, in 1898, a group of American promoters or- 
ganizing as the American China Development Com- 
pany secured a contract for completing the construc- 
tion of railway lines from Canton to Hankow. Chi- 
nese interests were to arrange for the rights of way 
and to facilitate the work; the American company was 
to construct the line. In 1900 a supplementary agree- 
ment was concluded at Peking in which was inserted a 
clause which concludes : "... The Americans cannot 
transfer the rights of these agreements to other na- 
tions or people of other nationality." Certain Belgian 
interests had in the first place attempted to prevent the 
securing of the concessions in question by the Ameri- 
cans, but now, having failed in that, they directed their 
attention to purchasing, quietly, the shares of the com- 
pany. By 1903 the Belgians had secured the major 
portion of the stock, whereupon they showed their 
hand. The American officials of the company, together 
with their agents and engineers, were promptly dis- 
placed by Belgians. This produced an immediate out- 
cry among the Chinese, who felt that the agreement 
of 1900 had been violated and their rights and interests 
betrayed. Mr. J. P. Morgan thereupon took steps to 
regain control of the company, which he succeeded in 
doing. The Chinese were, however, not satisfied, and 
the upshot of the matter was that the concession was 
sold back to China. The Chinese government at the 
same time promised the company that if it had occa- 
sion in future to borrow for the completion of this line 
it would call on American capital. 

In 1905, various British interests, including the bank 
which had made the arrangements with the Germans 
in 1895 and 1900, made an agreement with French 
companies for the mutual sharing of business in China, 



12 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

with a view to securing a monopoly in the Yangtse Val- 
ley. Three years later the Chinese, then planning to 
complete the Canton-Hankow line and to build an- 
other line from Hankow to Chengtu, applied to the 
Anglo-French combination for a loan. The German 
bank insisted upon participation in the loan, and its 
claim was admitted. 

At this point American interests indicated a desire 
to participate in this enterprise. A financial group, 
organized, at the instance of President Taft and the 
State Department, by certain New York banks, asked 
to be allotted a share in the loan. The European groups 
refused this request, and then the United States gov- 
ernment intervened. The right of American capital to 
participate arose out of the promise which China had 
made in 1903. President Taft cabled personally to 
Prince Ching insisting upon the recognition of this 
right in favor of the new American banking group, and 
the Chinese government, after consultation with the 
Foreign Office, concluded that American capital must 
be admitted on equal terms wath those accorded the 
three European groups. Thus was formed the four 
powers loan group, including British, French, Ger- 
man, and American interests. This group negotiated 
two loans with the Chinese government in 1911, one 
for the Hukwang railways, the other for currency re- 
form. In the matter of the latter loan, China had 
earlier applied to the United States alone; but when 
the American group was admitted to participation in 
the group loan for the railways, this group shared the 
currency loan with the others. 

The contracts for both loans were signed in the spring 
of 1911. By this time, however, a decided opposition 
to the railway loan had developed in some of the prov- 



CHINA: THE REVOLUTION 13 

inces in which the railway was to be constructed. A 
prominent Chinese financier and official, Sheng Hsuan- 
huai, better known as Sheng Kung-pao, had been ap- 
pointed director of the Bureau of Communications at 
Peking. Sheng favored Imperial control of railways, 
thus throwing his influence to the side of the Manchu 
policy of centralization. Already, in 1907, one of the 
Yangtse Provinces had successfully resisted an attempt 
of the central government to borrow foreign capital 
for, and to apply it to, the construction of a railway 
within provincial borders. The provinces through which 
the Hukwang railwaj^s were to be built now followed 
this example and, strenuously opposing Sheng's pol- 
icy, voiced their objections to the Hukwang loan. The 
local gentry insisted that they would build the rail- 
ways within their provinces by and for themselves. 
Thus the conclusion of the Hukwang loan prepared 
the way for the revolution. 

Evidences of the coming storm first showed themselves 
in a revolt in the empire-province of Szechuen. Al- 
though this had the appearance of a merely local dis- 
turbance, which the government undertook to deal with 
by sending first a Manchu and then a Chinese official 
"to pacify the people," the whole of the South was ex- 
cited over the issue out of which the revolt arose — the 
conflict between provincial and Imperial authority. It 
was at this moment that the accident occurred which 
precipitated the revolution. 

On the ninth of October, 1911, a bomb exploded in 
a Chinese house in the Russian concession of the big 
Central Yangtse city of Hankow. An investigation 
at once showed the local Viceroy that an extensive revo- 
lutionary plot was being hatched. The bomb makers 
had been working with a view to an insurrection for 



14 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

which they expected to be ready in the early months 
of the next year. Documents were seized which in- 
criminated no small number of local officials. Exposed, 
and with the executioner's sword hanging over their 
heads, these men determined to raise the standard of 
revolt at once. Within two days, the local soldiery had 
seized the cities of Hankow and Wuchang, the Viceroy 
had become a fugitive, and rebellion was on in the 
Yangtse Valley. 

For years various secret societies had been under- 
mining the foundations of the government, intending, 
when the time should come, to rise against the Manchus. 
Two men, since well known to the world, had been par- 
ticularly active in revolutionary propaganda. Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen many years before had planned and led a fu- 
tile outbreak at Canton which had resulted in his be- 
coming and remaining for fifteen years an exile. Dur- 
ing the succeeding years he had traveled the world over, 
raising funds and organizing societies among the Chi- 
nese in foreign lands. Huang Hsing had been espe- 
cially active among Chinese students in Japan, of whom, 
after 1898, there had been many thousands, and in 
propagating the gospel of revolution in China. The 
secret revolutionary societies had succeeded in getting 
their men into many official posts throughout the coun- 
try and in honeycombing the Imperial army with their 
membership. 

The rebels at Hankow forced a certain theretofore 
obscure colonel, at the point of the sword, to become 
their leader. This man was none other than the later 
Vice-President, Li Yuan-hung, who during the four 
years since has made for himself an enviable reputa- 
tion as an able and honest officer and administrator. 
The revolution spread quickly through the Yangtse and 



CHINA; THE REVOLUTION 15 

Southern provinces. The Manchus, terrified as the up- 
rising assumed serious proportions, called upon Yuan 
Shih-kai, the ablest Chinese official in the Empire, 
whom they had summarily dismissed from office in 1909, 
and, swallowing their pride, gave over to him the task 
of putting down the rebellion. In the course of a few 
short weeks they had intrusted to him practically the 
whole direction of their affairs. Yuan at first directed 
the military operations in defense of Hankow. On the 
first of December the rebels took the strategic city of 
Nanking. By this time it had become evident that 
the rebellion could not be put down without a prolonged 
and expensive civil war. The Southern provinces were 
united in opposition to the government. Their capture 
of Nanking made it possible for the rebels to persuade 
Yuan Shih-kai to enter into negotiations with them. 
Tang Shao-yi, a prominent American-educated official, 
was appointed by Yuan, and Wu Ting-fang, English- 
educated and twice Minister to the United States, was 
chosen to represent the South in the negotiations which 
followed. Dr. Wu has been styled "the Franklin of 
the Chinese Revolution." It was his diplomacy in par- 
ticular which had kept certain outside powers from in- 
tervening or furnishing financial assistance to the gov- 
ernment, and without such assistance the government 
found itself in no position to put in the field such forces 
as would give hope of a successful defense. 

Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrived in China in December and 
was promptly made president of the Southern confed- 
eracy which had been established with its headquarters 
at Nanking. Ultimately it was arranged that the Man- 
chus should abdicate, turning over their power to Yuan 
Shih-kai, and then that Sun Yat-sen should resign the 
presidency of Republican China in favor of Yuan, the 



16 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

latter to act as the provisional president until a for- 
mal and regularly legalized government should be es- 
tablished. In the Edict of Abdication, under date of 
February 12, 1912, the Manchus bequeathed their au- 
thority in the following terms: "Let Yuan Shih-kai 
organize with full powers a provisional government and 
confer with the Republican army as to the methods 
of union, thus assuring peace to the people and tran- 
quillity to the Empire." The decision of the court was 
hailed as a highly politic act. Sun Yat-sen in resign- 
ing his power was acclaimed a patriot of unprecedented 
unselfishness. As a matter of fact, there was practi- 
cally no alternative for the Manchus; and Dr. Sun re- 
alized that he was not the man to carry the country 
through the difficult period of restoration and recon- 
struction which lay ahead. Dr. Sun did not, however, 
as subsequent events showed, give up all personal am- 
bition. 

It should be remembered that the revolution was not 
primarily a movement toward making China a repub- 
lic. It was in the beginning anti-dynastic. The motto 
of the revolutionary societies was, "Down with the 
Manchus." The cry, "Establish a republic," was in 
large measure a campaign slogan: in order to get rid 
of the Manchus, develop hostility to the existing regime 
and enthusiasm for a complete change in government, 
both as to personnel and as to form. 

The Southerners accepted Yuan Shih-kai as presi- 
dent of the new republic not because they wanted him 
or because they trusted him, but because they saw no 
alternative except a prolonged civil war. They, like 
the government, were short of funds. It was thus the 
exigencies of the situation and the spirit of compro- 
mise which prevails in Chinese affairs, rather than the 



CHINA: THE REVOLUTION 11 

pursuit of a definite and prearranged policy, which 
dictated the agreement which concluded the first phase 
of the revolution and left Yuan Shih-kai in possession 
de facto of the authority which the abdicating Manchus 
had bequeathed to him. 

Once in control, it became Yuan Shih-kai' s task to 
consolidate his authority, to bring order out of chaos, 
and to establish a new government according to new 
principles and upon a new foundation. 



CHAPTER II 

china: organization and government under the 

old regime 

Before proceeding to an examination of the steps 
and measures by which those in power have undertaken 
to establish a new form of government, it will be ad- 
visable to give some attention to the political principles, 
the forms, and the machinery of the old regime. For 
this purpose an analysis of the character of the govern- 
ment is more essential than a detailed description of 
its organization. At the same time a simple account 
of the departments of the government, of the officials 
within those departments, of their respective functions, 
and of their relations and interdependency, will serve 
as an introduction to the anatomy of the Chinese state. 
A number of very excellent accounts of the government 
and administration of China under the old regime are 
easily accessible, and it will be convenient for present 
purposes to draw largely upon several of the best and 
most authoritative of these.^ 

^Mayers, W. F.: "The Chinese Government," (1878); Jerni- 
gan, T. R.: "China in Law and Commerce," (IQOS), Chapter II, 
Government; Morse, H. B.: "The Trade and Administration of 
the Chinese Empire," (1908), Chapter III, Government; Richard, 
L. : "Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire," (1908), 
Section V, Chapter I, Government and Administration ; Colquhoun, 
A. R.: "China in Transformation," (revised edition, 1912), Chap- 
ter III, Government and Administration; Hirth, F. : Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (eleventh edition). Vol. VI, article on China, Government 

18 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 19 

The foundations of the government, like everything 
else Chinese, dated, more or less accurately speaking, 
from time immemorial. The Duke of Chou in the early 
years of the Chou Dynasty, some three thousand years 
ago,^ "revised, coordinated, and codified the laws," and 
the system and forms which he at that time approved 
"became a prototype of most of the characteristic fea- 
tures in Chinese public and social life down to recent 
times." ^ Thirteen hundred years later ^ feudalism was 
abolished and the centralization of the government was 
effected. During the next thousand years almost no 
innovations or alterations were introduced. The Mings * 
made a few changes, perhaps more clearly defining the 
relations of the chief executives in the provinces to 
the central government above and to the subordinate 
officials below. But practically no other alterations were 
made until the increase in intercourse with foreign na- 
tions rendered necessary a higher degree of centraliza- 
tion, this process beginning to take effect after the 
establishing of the foreign legations at Peking in 1860. 
During the fifty years between 1861 and 1911 there 
were introduced greater alterations in the machinery of 
government than had appeared during the preceding 
three thousand years. And yet, in 1911, the foundations 
of the Chinese political structure were substantially 
as they had been in the time of Chou. 

The Manchu conquerors had continued the system 
of their predecessors. Not only that, they had left the 

and Administration; China Year Book^ 1912, Chapter XIV, The 
Government. 

^ Chou Dynasty, 1122-255 b. c. 

2 Hirth, op. ciL, p. 193. 

^ Tsin Dynasty, 255-206 b. c. 

* Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644 a. d. 



20 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

administration, except for the central authority and 
in military affairs, largely in the hands of Chinese of- 
ficials. As the official ranks were recruited from the 
degree men, as the Chinese had a far greater aptitude 
for scholarship than had the Manchus, and as the pro- 
portion of Chinese to Manchus in the population has 
been almost as one to fifty, this was both the natural 
and the practical thing to do. Mr. Morse, writing in 
1906, said: "Of late years the proportion of Manchus 
holding Imperial appointments in the provinces has not 
exceeded one-fifth." ^ 

The Chinese Empire has in modern times consisted 
of the Middle Kingdom, or the Eighteen Provinces; 
Manchuria, or the Three Eastern Provinces; and the 
dependencies, Mongolia, East Turkestan, and Tibet. 
This comprises an area of 4,278,352 square miles, in 
which there is a population estimated at all the way 
from 328,000,000 to 450,000,000 persons. 

At the head of the government stood the Emperor, 
in theory an absolute and unlimited monarch. About 
him were the members of the Imperial Clan. He it was 
who appointed all the officials of the Empire. 

Nearest the Emperor in the administration came the 
members of the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Coun- 
cil. After and below these bodies came six boards or 
departments, with duties corresponding essentially to 
those of modern ministries. These, together with vari- 
ous bureaus, made up the central administration. For 
every province there was appointed an executive head 
who was either a governor-general (viceroy) or a gov- 
ernor. Below these officials there were in the admin- 
istration of the province always a high provincial treas- 
urer and a high provincial judge; and there were also 

^ Op. cit., p. 47. 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 21 

salt comptrollers and grain intendants for certain ad- 
ministrative areas. 

After the conquest, the Manchus stationed in each 
of twelve provinces, including the metropolitan province 
of Chili, and left in Manchuria, garrisons of their own 
troops. In each of eleven provinces they created the 
post of Tartar-general or generalissimo. The officers 
appointed to these posts, always Manchus, ranked 
"with, but before," the viceroy, and constituted a check 
upon his authority. They had command of the Man- 
chu troops, and their presence, with that of the troops, 
was intended as a safeguard to the position of the 
dynasty. They had few duties, and their posts became 
in later days empty sinecures. 

The provinces were divided into subordinate admin- 
istrative areas known as taos or circuits; for each of 
which there was a taotai or intendant. Within the taos 
were jus or prefectures, each having a prefect; inde- 
pendent chows and independent fings or departments, 
each of the latter having a departmental magistrate 
who reported direct to the higher provincial authori- 
ties. Within the jus, the independent chows, and 
the independent t'ings were hsiens, dependent chows 
and dependent t'ings or districts, each with a magis- 
trate who reported to the intermediate official above 
him.^ 

Down to this point all the officials were appointed 
from above and all commissions were from the Emperor, 
the actual choice in the lower ranks being made, how- 

^ Thus China proper, the Eighteen Provinces, was divided, ac- 
cording to Richard, into 95 taos; below which were 184 fus, 71 
independent chows, and 26 independent t'ings; below which were 
1,277 hsiens, 154 dependent chows, 32 dependent t'ings, and 4 de- 
pendent svih-t'ings. 



22 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ever, more often than otherwise by the superior pro- 
vincial officials. 

Within the hsiens, the chows, and the t'ings, which 
would correspond in a way to American counties, were 
the town and village organizations ; and here the head- 
men and elders attained and held their positions by and 
with local popular approval. 

Manchuria, the original seat of the Manchu author- 
ity, was left with a subordinate administration organ- 
ized somewhat like that of China proper. Mongolia 
had its own peculiar organization, subject to a Mon- 
golian Superintendency with headquarters at Peking. 
East Turkestan was made dependent on the viceroy of 
Kansu and Shensi provinces, and was organized under 
subordinate officials. Tibet was divided for adminis- 
trative purposes into two parts, both ruled directly from 
China; one under the viceroy of Szechuen, the other 
under a special district governor with residence at Sin- 
ingfu in Kansu Province. 

This represents the hierarchy of officialdom substan- 
tially as it stood in 1860. Beginning with 1861, vari- 
ous changes were made — ^most of them, however, not 
until after 1901. 

To the original six boards — of Civil Appointments, 
of Revenue, of Ceremonies, of War, of Justice, and of 
Works — there was added in 1861 the Tsung-li Yamen, 
to which was intrusted the conduct of foreign relations. 
The Tsung-li Yamen was abolished in 1901, when there 
was created in its place the Wai-wu Pu, or Board of 
Foreign Affairs, which subsequently became known as 
the Wai-chiao Pu. A Board of Commerce and a Board 
of Education were added in 1903. Conspicuous changes 
were initiated after 1905 when the Imperial Commis- 
sion sent abroad to study government had made its re- 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 23 

port. In 1906 a Board of Posts and Communications 
was added and the Board of War was reorganized as a 
Board of Military Aifairs. A Board of Dependencies 
and a Board of the Navy completed the list, so that when 
these Boards were made Ministries in 1911 there were 
twelve in all. 

The earlier boards had each a Manchu and a Chinese 
president, but it was ordered in 1906 that no distinction 
should be made, in the appointments, between Chinese 
and Manchus. 

In the interval changes were being effected in the 
other instruments of the central government. 

The Grand Secretariat or Inner Cabinet which had 
been the supreme council in the time of the Mings, 
had gradually acquired a mere honorific importance and 
became a court of archives. It contained, under the 
Manchu regime, six members, three Manchus and three 
Chinese, and had attached to it many secretaries. The 
leading viceroys were usually enrolled among its mem- 
bers. 

The Grand Council, established in 1732, had grad- 
ually superseded the Grand Secretariat in importance 
and had become the actual Privy Council, Imperial 
Chancery, and Court of Appeals. It was composed of 
six members, these being usually heads of boards, and 
a considerable number of secretaries. It was presided 
over by the Emperor, and it was its business to give ad- 
vice on matters of general administration. With the 
reforms of 1906 it was designated as the Council of 
State or Privy Council. 

In 1907 there was created an Advisory Council which 
included all the members of the Grand Secretariat and 
of the Grand Council and the heads of all the boards. 
By decree of May 8, 1911, the three councils were 



24 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

abolished and in their stead a cabinet and a privy coun- 
cil were formed. The boards became ministries and 
their heads constituted the Cabinet, 

On the first of September, 1906, an Imperial edict was 
issued foreshadowing the establishment of parliamen- 
tary institutions. On August 27, 1908, an edict an- 
nounced that a parliament would be convoked in the 
ninth year from that date. On October 31, 1909, an 
edict announced the arrangements for the membership 
of an Imperial Assembly which was to be constituted 
of two hundred members drawn from eight classes. In 
May, 1910, the appointment of members, one hundred 
of them from the newly created provincial assemblies, 
was announced. And on October 3, 1910, the Imperial, 
or National, Assembly met in Peking for the first time. 

The central government thus consisted in the last year 
of the Manchu regime of: the emperor; a privy coun- 
cil; a cabinet of twelve ministers; and an assembly of 
two hundred members.^ 

While these changes were taking place in the ma- 
chinery of the central government, there had been cre- 
ated in the provinces the ofiices of literary chancellor 
and commissioner of foreign affairs.^ 

In July, 1907, a special set of rules and principles 
for the provincial administrations was issued. This not 
only provided for the higher posts but it effected some- 

^ For an account of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and 
the Post-Office see Morse, op. cit.. Chapters XII and XIII; and 
China Year Books. 

^ There were, then, finally in the provincial administrations, eight 
Viceroys, fourteen Governors, eighteen High Provincial Treasurers, 
eighteen High Provincial Judges, eleven Salt Comptrollers, and 
eight Grain Intendants. There were also in eleven provinces Tar- 
tar-Generals, and there were three Directors-General of the Yellow 
River and the Grand Canal. 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 25 

thing of a reorganization of the prefectures, the depart- 
ments, and the districts, with corresponding alterations 
in the lower officialdom. 

By an Imperial decree of April 20, 1907, Manchuria 
was organized as three provinces along lines correspond- 
ing to those of the provincial administrations in the Mid- 
dle Kingdom, with a viceroy and three governors. The 
Tartar-generalship was abolished and a special mili- 
tary commander was placed over the troops of the three 
provinces. 

Peking had had, and retained, a separate civil govern- 
ment and a separate military organization. This ar- 
rangement is in many respects comparable to that made 
in the United States for the District of Columbia. 

China has had no system of hereditary nobility. 
There are, however, a few titled families. The eldest 
males in direct descent from Confucius and from Kox- 
inga (the pirate warrior who drove the Dutch from 
Formosa) have the title of Duke; those from General 
Tseng Kwo-fan have the title of Marquis; and those 
from Li Hung-chang have the title of Earl. Similar 
descendants of the eight "Iron-capped" Princes who co- 
operated in the Manchu conquest of China, and descend- 
ants of the thirteenth son of the Emperor Kanghi have 
titles. But these titles carry no special emoluments. 

Titles of nobility attached to the members of the Im- 
perial House in twelve degrees — ^but "in the thirteenth 
generation the descendants of Emperors are merged in 
the ranks of commoners." 

The Manchu Imperial Clan is composed of those who 
can trace their ancestry directly to the founder of the 
dynasty. The members of the direct line wear a yellow 
girdle; those of the collateral branch wear a red girdle. 
But they have no important special privileges outside 



26 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

those strictly appertaining to the government and con- 
duct of the affairs of the Family. They have been 
amenable to the Imperial Clan Court rather than to 
ordinary courts. 

The Manchu bannermen in Peking and in the garri- 
sons in each provincial city were a privileged class in 
that, being in theory soldiers, they were pensioners of 
the government. In Manchuria, however, and outside 
the garrisons, they had no such privileged position. 
There are orders of nobility in Manchuria and Mongo- 
lia depending on local, not on Chinese, law. 

Turning now from machinery, official gradations, 
and titles to the theory and practice of the govern- 
ment : 

As a political organization China defies classification. 
The government was nothing less than a unique com- 
bination of democracy and absolutism. The Emperor 
"^stood as the legal and spiritual head of the state. In 
him was vested supreme temporal authority, and he was 
the intermediary between Heaven and his people. He 
was answerable to Heaven alone for his acts, but 
Heaven was considered to hold him rigidly responsible 
for the welfare of the people. 

According to the Confucian and Mencian philosophy, 
which was the foundation of Chinese political thought, 
the Emperor ruled by divine right, but the theory of 
divine right was essentially different from that which 
has prevailed in continental Europe and from that of 
Japan. There was no idea of divine descent or of an 
inherent and interminable right. "... The old law- 
givers . . . from the foundation of the Empire, made 
it the first maxim that the Emperor was the father of 
his people, and not a master placed on the throne to 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 27 

be served by slaves." ^ The state existed not for the 
Emperor, but for the people. Mencius said: "The peo- 
ple are the most important element in the nation; the 
spirit of the land and grain are next; and the sovereign 
is the lightest." "Heaven sees as the people see; and 
Heaven hears as the people hear." The Emperor's re- 
sponsibility to his office was as clearly laid down as was 
that of the English sovereign in the writings of Locke. 
"The Chinese say that the obligations to govern justly 
and to obey loyally are reciprocal, and they have no 
such conscientious scruples about deposing a bad Em- 
peror as a respectable number of Englishmen mani- 
fested about deposing James II." ^ When the Emperor 
failed in the performance of his duties and the people 
suffered, it was considered that Heaven had withdrawn 
its favor; the ruler lost his divine right; revolution to 
overthrow him became not only permissible but a carry- 
ing out of the will of Heaven; and a successful revo- 
lution demonstrated by its success that the favor of 
Heaven had been transferred to its leaders. For a 
theory of divine right, very practical indeed! 

The succession to the Imperial office was usually by 
direct descent, but it did not of necessity pass to the 
eldest son. Fitness rather than primogeniture was the 
rule. In the absence of a son, a choice was made among 
the princes of the Imperial Family. It was not posi- 
tively known until near the end, or even after the end 
of a reign, who would be the successor. 

Though in theory absolute, the Emperor's authority 
was actually limited. "No other ruler possesses as des- 
potic power over as many people, but there is no ruler 
who is more careful than the Emperor of China to use 

^ Jernigan, op. cit., p. 57. 
^ Jernigan, op. cit., p. 56. 



28 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

that power only as modified by the customs of his Em- 
pire." "In the administration . . . the principle is 
recognized that laws are the particular instrument of 
the legislator, while customs are the instrument of a na- 
tion in general, and that nothing tends more to produce 
a revolution than an attempt to change a custom by a 
law." ' 

China had in custom a substantial "unwritten consti- 
tution," much of this constitution being in fact writ- 
ten. As a guide to custom, the Emperor was able first 
of all to refer to the teachings of the Sages, from Con- 
fucius and Mencius down. There was also a large body 
of well-established precedent to be found in the edicts 
of previous rulers. 

In the exercising of his prerogatives the Emperor was 
subject to the advice and even the restraint of his coun- 
cilors and secretaries and of the censors. 

The Chinese Censorate was a peculiar institution. 
The censors were a body of paid critics and informers 
whose duties were aptly suggested by the title given 
them, the "eyes and ears" of the Emperor. The body 
consisted of two presidents, twenty-four supervising 
censors attached to the Councils at Peking, and fifty-six 
ordinary censors. Appointments to this body were for 
an indefinite term, and a censor could hold no other of- 
fice. In close touch with the provincial gentry, the 
censors were expected to report to the Emperor upon 
matters affecting the welfare of the people and the 
realm. They were to watch the conduct of officials, 
and they were privileged to note and to criticize the 
policies and acts of even the Emperor himself. 
Through them appeals might be made to the Emperor 
from the people against the officials and from sub- 

^ Jernigan, op. cit., p. 33. 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 29 

ordinate officials against their superiors. They also 
to some extent supervised the handling of eriminaj. 
cases. They observed the working of the various boards 
and were sometimes dispatched upon various special 
missions. In theory exempt from punishment, sup- 
posed to criticize impartially and without fear, the cen- 
sors could, and frequently did, wield great influence. 

The people had the right of petition, and there v^as 
an obligation upon the Emperor to receive and read 
their petitions. "The history of China evidences that ' 
the agency of the petition ... is a potent means of 
recalling Emperors from acts of remissness to a return 
to duty." ' 

In actual practice the Emperor was greatly influ- 
enced in his decisions by his personal entourage. By 
custom he was practically — in later years, at least — a 
prisoner within the palace, and thus his knowledge of 
the actual state of the realm was gained at second 
hand and was accurate or inaccurate according as he 
had trustworthy or untrustworthy representations made 
to him. This was one of the weakest features of his 
position and was the cause of much of the evil of cer- 
tain reigns and of the undoing of more than one 
dynasty. 

A final restraint upon evil or weak inclinations of 
the sovereign was the fact that his every act and word ' 
was recorded — to be brought to light and made use of, 
when his family had ceased to rule, by the historians 
who made up the final and official annals of the dy- 
nasty. 

"A strong Emperor may assert his own will, and, 
given a suitable opportunity and a justifying emer- 
gency, may override the constitution as Abraham Lin- 

''■ Jernigan^ op. cit., p. 58. 



30 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

coin did under similar circumstances ; but when an ordi- 
nary ruler tries it, the result is what happened in 1898, 
when [the Emperor Kwang-hsii] undertook to modify- 
in a few months the developments of many centuries, and 
impatiently instituted reforms for which the Empire 
was not then ready." ^ 

The Emperor was the source of all honors and ap- 
pointments to office; in practice this system worked 
about as it does in other countries where patronage is 
the prerogative of the ruler. The peculiar feature of 
Chinese officialdom was that it was recruited almost 
entirely from among the holders of degrees obtained 
in the state examinations; thus the official hierarchy 
has been aptly described as a "civil service." The 
examinations were open to all,^ and thus scholastic 
attainment was the first qualification for the candidate 
for an official career. Scholars who had successfully 
passed all the examinations were enrolled in the Han- 
lin College, and appointments to the Grand Council 
and the Boards were made from among the members 
of this group. Of course, in practice, ability to con- 
tribute substantially to revenues, sometimes private 
and sometimes public, frequently secured or served the 
purpose of a literary degree, and more often than not 
money was a determining factor in the matter of prefer- 
ment. The possessor of a literary degree was sup- 
posed to be qualified for any and every sort of executive 
and administrative duty; and he had to accept full 
responsibility for his own acts and the acts of his 
subordinates. The principle of personal responsibility 
runs throughout Chinese life. The old literary exam- 
ination system prevailed until 1905, when it was 

^ Morse, op. cit., p. 5 1 . 

^ There were some unimportant disqualifications. 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 31 

abolished in favor of examinations including modern 
and practical subjects; but the officials are still chosen 
commonly from the ranks of the well-educated. 

All officials down to the district magistrates were in 
theory appointees of the Emperor. It was the prac- 
tice — with occasional exceptions ^ — not to appoint an 
official to a post in the province of his birth. This was 
a precautionary procedure intended to safeguard the 
government against revolutionary tendencies and to 
render the official immune to the pressure of family, 
property, and other local interests. It was expected 
that among strangers the official would be more im- 
partial and open-minded, as well as more alert and less 
subject to influences peculiar to the Chinese social 
organization, than in his home environment. Thus the 
interests of all concerned, Emperor, official, and people, 
were to be best served. 

It was also the practice in making these appoint- 
ments to establish checks by placing in the same and 
in adjoining jurisdictions men of differing political 
factions. Especially from 1860 on there were two 
competing political groups: the Hunan Party — who 
were conservatives; and the Anhwei Party — progres- 
sives; while later the Canton Party became prominent. 
By placing adherents of these parties where they could 
observe each other the government undertook to safe- 
guard itself against possible disloyalty and revolution- 
ary tendencies, as well as to diminish corruption. 
Throughout the whole system the principle of equipoise 
was constantly and effectively employed. Officials were 
appointed for a term of three years, and only rarely 
was an appointment renewed more than once. 

In 1877 Mayers wrote: "The central government 

^ Especially in military appointments and in Manchuria. 



32 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

of China ... is arranged with the object rather of 
registering and checking the action of the various pro- 
vincial administrations, than with that of assuming a 
direct initiative in the conduct of affairs. . . . Regu- 
lations, indeed, of the most minute and comprehensive 
character, are on record for the guidance of every con- 
ceivable act of administration ..." But, "the cen- 
tral government may be said to criticize rather than 
to control the action of the twenty-one provincial 
administrations . . . ," though wielding, of course, at 
all times the power of appointment and of immediate 
: removal. 

Although the pressure of foreign relations had by 
1905 resulted in a greater degree of centralization, the 
looseness of the relations between the central and the 
provincial administrations still prevailed and by that 
time had become a source of weakness. Mr. Jernigan 
wrote in 1905: "The main idea that runs throughout 
the entire provincial organization is that each province 
exists as an independent unit and is sufficient unto itself. 
There is a resemblance between the provinces of China 
and the states of the American Union under the Arti- 
cles of Confederation, and for practical purposes the 
provinces are as self -existent as were the states under 
those Articles." ^ Commenting on this suggested re- 
semblance, Mr. Morse wrote in 1906: "The compari- 
son with states would be more exact if for state were 
substituted territory, such as those of the American 
Union, which have their executive and judicial officers 
appointed by the central power and removable at its 
pleasure, but have local autonomy for the levy of taxes 
and the administration of the law. . . . The provinces 
are satrapies to the extent that ... so long as the 

^ Jernigan, op. cit., p. 42. 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 33 

tribute and matriculations are duly paid and the general 
policy of the central administration followed, they are 
free to administer their own affairs in detail as may 
seem best to their own provincial authorities." ^ With 
these limitations, viceroys and governors were almost 
independent within their provinces, whence it followed 
that the character of the individual and the distance 
of his capital from Peking to a large extent determined 
the manner in which he exercised his authority. The 
great viceroys even organized their own armies and 
navies, while in the earlier years of foreign intercourse 
it was left to them to conduct negotiations with the 
troublesome newcomers. 

Not only were these officials in a position of great 
independent authority; they were not held sufficiently 
responsible for the performance of their local duties 
and there was nothing to compel them adequately to 
cooperate with each other for common purposes. As 
a consequence, conservancy and similar works were 
neglected, or, if undertaken in one province without 
the cooperation of adjoining provinces, were often so 
much money and labor wasted. In 1894 the Nanking 
Viceroy had a fleet under his direction which he held 
safe and secure in the Yangtse River while the North- 
ern fleet under the direction of the central government 
went to battle and was defeated by the Japanese. 

The viceroys and governors were the links between 
the central government and the provincial administra- 
tions. The office of viceroy was a creation of the Mings. 
The viceroy exercised jurisdiction over two or more 
provinces. In some provinces he had direct adminis- 
trative authority, there being no governor under him. 
This was the case, for instance, in Chili and in Szechuen. 

^ Morse, op. cit., p. 59. •>■ 



34 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

In other cases, one or more of his provinces were ad- 
ministered by a governor. In some instances, a gov- 
ernor held office without having a viceroy over him. 
The Chili viceroy was, in additioil to his other duties, 
trade commissioner of the northern ports, and the 
Nanking viceroy was trade commissioner of the south- 
ern ports. The viceroys and governors were held 
responsible for the entire administration of the juris- 
diction to which they were assigned. 

The official lowest in rank of those appointed from 
above was the most important as far as the actual 
conducting of the administration was concerned. The 
hsienSj chows and fings (districts) were the "civic, 
political, judicial and fiscal units" of Chinese life, and 
the district magistrate was "to a great majority of the 
people . . . the embodiment of all the essentials of the 
government." Speaking of the hsien magistrate, Mr. 
Colquhoun says: ". . . Indeed as the last link in the 
long official chain which connects the Imperial throne 
with the peasant's hut, there is nothing that concerns 
the life of the people which does not concern this hard- 
worked official." ^ 

Although he was assisted by a complete staff of 
secretaries, collectors, clerks, sheriffs, jailers, runners, 
and so forth, the district magistrate was personally 
responsible for everything that had any relation to 
government within his district. He was the court in 
civil cases and to some extent in criminal cases ; he was 
police magistrate; he was responsible in part for the 
tax collections ; he was registrar of land ; he was famine 
commissioner; he was responsible for official buildings, 
official temples, city walls, prisons, bridges, roads, and 
schools; he had to maintain the government courier 

^ Colquhoun, op. cit., p. 58. 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 35 

service within his district; he must organize and main- 
tain philanthropic institutions; he was responsible for 
public order, public welfare and public morals.^ 

From the district we have not far to go to find the 
democratic element in the Chinese organization — for, 
though it may be said to have made its first appearance 
at the very gates of the Imperial Palace, it became con- 
spicuous in the town and village organizations within 
the district. The Chinese monarchy was a patriarchally 
organized institution, the state essentially a great po- 
litical family modeled on the social unit. The village 
was nothing more than an expanded family group — in 
addition the village was self-governing. 

"It is to the single family that the number of fam-' 
ilies is added which makes the village, and it is from 
the group thus formed that a head man (ti-pao) is 
selected by the inhabitants as practically the arbiter 
of disputes and the dispenser of justice. . . . By the 
additions to the family unit a little principality, as it 
were, is formed, which custom has invested with the 
habit of local self-government, and through that 
medium a democratic element is introduced. . . . The 
Emperor is the head of the government, but the family 
is its base. ... In the family life may be seen the 
greater Hfe of the Empire. . . . The family unit gives 
the semblance of unity to the Empire." ^ 

Just as "the American citizen has few direct dealings 
with any but his township officials, so long as he pays 
his taxes and is law-abiding, and officially hardly knows 
of the existence of the Federal Government," the same 
"may be said also of the Chinese villager.' 



" 3 



^ Morse, op. cit., pp. 69-72. 

2 Jernigan, op. cit., p. 34. ^ Morse, op. cit., p. 48. 



36 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The village, even the district, and to no small extent 
the province had its own laws and its own customs. 
There was a criminal code which applied throughout 
the Empire, and, of course, Imperial edicts meant to 
apply generally did in theory have force everywhere. 
But in most civil matters, even to fiscal arrangements, 
there was little standardization; uniformity was the 
exception, local regulations the rule, elasticity invari- 
ably apparent. The government, though patriarchal, 
was not paternalistic. It did not wish to be bothered 
with local problems and had no thought of meddling 
in them. Probably in no other large state have the 
two principles, local autonomy and laissez faire, ever 
been as consistently observed as in the government of 
China. 

So long as China was isolated, the one and only 
great Middle Kingdom, with none but insignificant and 
harmless tribes of "outer barbarians" beyond her bor- 
ders, this system w^as fairly satisfactory, though not 
conducive — ^whether because of its own inherent faults 
or the lack of the stimulus of competition — to progress. 
But when pressure began to come from without; when 
it became necessary, in order to satisfy the demands 
of foreign nations, for the government to control the 
provinces and the people wdthin the provinces, and, in 
order to resist the aggressions of those same foreign 
nations, to be able to marshal and unite the forces of 
the Empire; the decentralization, the lack of uni- 
formity, the absence of a sense of mutual interests and 
obligations, the habit of independence, and the natural 
disinclination to subordinate local interests to the neces- 
sities of the nation proved sources of hopeless weak- 
ness. 

The government long — too long — tried to meet the 



CHINA: THE OLD REGIME 37 

situation without increasing the pressure of the central 
authority. When finally it adopted a policy of cen- 
tralization it met with the opposition which it had 
anticipated and feared. The resistance to the tardy 
efforts to centralize was, however, due not alone to local 
disapproval of that policy; it was a result also of dis- 
satisfaction with the personnel of the rulers and with 
the conditions which prevailed throughout the official 
system. 

The revolution, which resulted in the overthrow not 
only of the Manchus but of the monarchy, was, like revo- 
lutions which had preceded it over and over in Chinese 
history, a protest against corruption, misrule and in- 
efficiency on the part of the ruling family — together 
with many of its official "servants" — and the consequent 
deplorable state of the realm. In this case the situation 
was aggravated by complications which were the result 
of pressure from without ; while the makers of the revo- 
lution were inspired by the example of better conditions 
which they had observed in other countries and under 
other systems, were alarmed over the dangers which 
they saw menacing the country as a result of the ina- 
bility of the incumbent officials to combat successfully 
the disintegrating tendencies of the competition be- 
tween other systems and their own, and were bent upon 
eliminating the alien dynasty and restoring the control 
of their country to Chinese hands. 



CHAPTER III 

china: reconstruction and rebellion, steps 
toward a constitution 

As. far back as 1908 the Manchu government had 
issued a body of articles indicative of what it intended 
to make the contents of a constitution. It had then 
promised that a constitutional government would be 
established in 1917. The Provisional Assemblies and 
the National Assembly had immediately demanded that 
a constitutional regime be inaugurated at an earlier 
date. After prolonged controversy the Manchus had 
promised that the change should be effected in 1913. 
Still the country was not satisfied — and the revolution 
came on as we have seen. On November 3, 1911, when 
the country was already in arms, and after they had 
made Yuan Shih-kai their prime minister, the Manchus 
promulgated a constitutional promise in the form of a 
document known as the "Nineteen Articles." In this 
it was provided that the powers of the Emperor should 
be limited by a constitution which was to be drafted 
by the Advisory Council; that the power of amending 
this constitution should be vested in parliament; that 
members of the Imperial House should be ineligible 
for seats in the cabinet; that the cabinet should be re- 
sponsible to parliament; that parliament should have 
the control of the budget ; and that action for the mak- 
ing good of these promises should be taken at once by 
the Advisory Council. These concessions came, how- 

38 



CHINA: RECONSTRUCTION 39 

ever, too late. Although the Advisory Council at once 
put the articles in force and the Regent resigned, 
giving full control to Yuan Shih-kai as premier, 
the revolution was on and the people had no 
longer any confidence in the promises of the gov- 
ernment. 

Within a month after the outbreak of the revolution, 
fourteen provinces had declared themselves independent 
of the Manchu government. The leaders in these prov- 
inces soon realized that a central government was nec- 
essary, and took steps accordingly. A convention was 
summoned, which met at Shanghai and later removed 
to Hankow. On November 3 this convention drafted 
a set of articles for the conduct of a provisional govern- 
ment. This provided for the election of a president by 
representatives of the military governors of the prov- 
inces, the convention undertaking on its own authority 
to act as a legislature until such assembly could be con- 
vened. It was also resolved that Nanking should be 
made the seat of the provisional government, and upon 
the capture of Nanking the convention removed to that 
city. Before leaving Hankow, the convention elected 
General Li Yuan-hung as chief executive. 

On December 30 this convention, then in session at 
Nanking, elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by a vote of sixteen 
out of seventeen, as president of "Republican China," 
with General Li Yuan-hung as vice-president. An 
Advisory Assembly was promptly organized, and this 
body held its first formal meeting on January 28. On 
February 12, 1912, the Manchus issued their edict of 
abdication. Dr. Sun, in conformity with the agree- 
ment which had been reached between his representa- 
tives and those of Yuan Shih-kai, tendered his resig- 
nation and recommended that Yuan be elected provi- 



40 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

sional president of the Republic ^ in his place. On Feb- 
ruary 15 the Assembly by unanimous vote elected Yuan 
provisional president, with General Li as vice-presi- 
dent. After much contention it w^s agreed that Yuan 
should be allowed to take office in Peking and that 
Peking should remain the capital, but the Assembly 
insisted upon laying down rules of procedure for the 
transferring of its governmental authority to Peking. 
The Assembly also proclaimed, on March 10, simulta- 
neously with the inauguration of Yuan as provisional 
president, the provisional constitution upon which it had 
been working. Finally, the members themselves having 
proceeded to Peking, the Assembly took up its func- 
tions at the capital on April 29. 

The Provisional Constitution of March 10, 1912,^ was 
a stumbling block to progress and a thorn in the side 
of the President during the next two years. 

The restrictions which it put upon the provisional 
President, together with the conception of their rights 
and duties entertained by the members of the Kwo-ming 
party who dominated the Assembly and were in oppo- 
sition to Yuan Shih-kai, resulted, as was inevitable, in a 
conflict between the chief executive and the legislature, 
a conflict which, after two years' duration, was brought 
to a close only by the dissolution of the opposition party. 

The first clash came over the construction of a cabi- 
net. Yuan wished a cabinet of talents. The Southern 
leaders insisted upon a party cabinet. Yuan had his 
way, as he has been doing ever since. 

Trained in the old school, an astute politician and 
statesman, knowing the traditions, the ideals, and the 

^ Of all China. 

^ For a translation of the Provisional Constitution of 1912 see 
China Year Book, 1913, p. 489 ff. 



CHINA: RECONSTRUCTION 41 

mind of the people, a believer in centralized authority, 
possessing to an extraordinary degree the confidence 
and loyalty of officials, officers and soldiers who had 
served under him in former years. Yuan soon began to 
replace the young officers, and frequently inexperienced 
civilians who had come into power during the revolution, 
by his own men and other officials who had had experi- 
ence under the old regime. The Southerners, who had 
made and fought the revolution, were greatly chagrined 
and became increasingly hostile when they found them- 
selves deprived of the spoils of office which they had 
taken unto themselves when they had expelled the Im- 
perial officials from city after city and province after 
province. ^ 

In the summer of 1912 two Southern officers who had 
gone from Hankow to Peking were, upon information 
telegraphed by Vice-President Li, seized at Yuan's 
orders, court-martialed and shot. Yuan had incontro- 
vertible evidence that these officials had been plotting 
against the new regime; but the opposition made much 
capital of their execution as an evidence of the tyran- 
nical attitude and unrepublican frame of mind of the 
provisional President. 

Dr. Sun and General Huang Hsing were persuaded 
in August to come to Peking for consultation with the 
President. There, incidentally, these two rebel lead- 
ers, who more than any others had been responsible for 
the revolt against the Manchus, were feted and eulo- 
gized by leading members of the resigned Imperial 
Family. After consultation with Yuan Shih-kai they 
announced that they were satisfied with his loyalty to 
the principles of the revolution and would support him. 
It subsequently developed that they were already plot- 
ting for his overthrow. 



42 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

During 1912 and the early months of 1913 there was 
a new ahgnment and a new formation of political par- 
ties. Most important was the change of the Tung- 
meng Hui, the old revolutionary party, into the Kwo- 
ming Tang, the Citizens' or People's Party. To the 
standards of this party the radical republicans rallied, 
and Sun and Huang were its leaders. Elections to the 
new National Assembly were held in the winter of 1912- 
1913, and the Assembly met in Peking in the first week 
in April, 1913. A prominent leader of the Southern 
Party had been assassinated in Shanghai a few days 
before, and many Southerners charged that Yuan's 
government was responsible for the murder. The 
weeks immediately preceding the opening of the As- 
sembly were marked by feverish activity on both sides 
in the endeavor to secure control of the majority of 
votes when the Assembly should convene. Prices of 
members' votes were openly quoted in Peking. Yuan, 
having so far failed to conclude the big loan with the 
Six Powers Syndicate, resorted to a number of small 
loans from European firms in order to secure funds for 
insuring adequate support in the Assembly. Many ob- 
servers were looking for an explosion, in more senses 
than one, when the Assembly met, but the gathering 
began its work in comparative quiet. Shortly a loan 
was concluded with the bankers of five powers, includ- 
ing Japan, the United States having withdrawn. The 
Assembly protested against this loan as not having 
been authorized by itself, but the governments of the 
foreign powers having substantially backed Yuan Shih- 
kai, the bankers were ready to sign this loan with 
Yuan's government without the sanction of the legisla- 
ture. Thus new resources came into the President's 
hands. 



CHINA: RECONSTRUCTION 43 

The incidents of the preceding summer, the murder 
of Sung at Shanghai, the conclusion of the loan, and 
the expulsion of various Southerners from office, were 
made the chief grounds of complaint by agitators in 
the South who were now actively and almost openly 
planning to rebel. Finally Yuan's command to the 
military governor of Kiangsi province to give up his 
office, together with his sending northern troops into 
that province, caused the governor in question to resort 
to armed opposition. This spark kindled the rebellion 
of the summer of 1913. Huang Hsing at once threw 
the whole of his influence into what was designated "a 
punitive expedition against Yuan Shih-kai." Sun Yat- 
sen joined — it was reported in certain quarters that he 
was forced to do so at the muzzle of a pistol — openly 
denounced Yuan as a traitor to the republican cause, 
and thereby forfeited the respect and confidence which 
he had up to that time enjoyed among foreigners and 
the more conservative of the Chinese. The rebellion 
was altogether premature, futile in its conception, an 
evidence of lack of statesmanlike qualities on the part 
of its leaders, and an indication that their much-vaunted 
love of country was a cloak for personal self-seeking. 
When the ex-Manchu general, Chang Hsun, obedient 
to Yuan's orders, and not without a pocketful of gold, 
marched southward and took the city of Nanking, the 
rebellion immediately collapsed. Huang Hsing ran 
away at the first indication of personal danger, and, 
together with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and many others of the 
prominent Southerners, sought refuge in Japan. 
There a number of them have subsequently actively be- 
stirred themselves with plans for a third rebellion. 

The great struggle over the constitution had begun 
in January, 1913, when the President submitted to the 



U POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Assembly a set of regulations for organizing a Consti- 
tution Drafting Committee. The Kwo-ming Party op- 
posed these proposals on the ground that the drafting 
of the constitution must be left to the Assembly which, 
then in process of election, was soon to convene. At 
the same time the question as to whether the election of 
a permanent president should take place before the 
constitution was adopted became an issue. The sup- 
porters of the government maintained that a state 
might exist without a completed formal constitution 
but not without an organized and recognized govern- 
ment. The Kwo-ming Party contended that the presi- 
dent's office must be created by, and the president's 
powers be limited by, a constitution. They were seek- 
ing to establish every possible check upon the personal 
power of Yuan Shih-kai, and they succeeded in pre- 
venting the adoption of the President's proposals. 

The new National Assembly, convened in April, 
after a few weeks elected a committee of sixty, in which 
the Kwo-ming Party was preponderatingly represented, 
to draft a constitution. Professor F. J. Goodnow, 
who had been appointed by the government as Consti- 
tutional Adviser, had already arrived from the United 
States, but -his services were little sought by the youth- 
ful and radical republicans who dominated this commit- 
tee. In the summer occurred the rebellion, to which 
we have referred, which was promptly suppressed, fol- 
lowed by the flight to other lands of a large number of 
the Kwo-ming Tang leaders. In October the Chin-pu 
Party, supporting the President, succeeded in secur- 
ing the passing in the Assembly of laws for the elec- 
tion of a permanent president. 

This law provided that natives of China, above forty 
years of age, possessed of the f iill franchise, and hav- 



CHINA: RECONSTRUCTION 45 

ing" been resident in China for above ten years, should 
be eligible for the presidency. The election was to be 
effected by the two Houses of the National Assembly 
in joint session, with a quorum of three-fourths of the 
members, and by a vote of two-thirds majority. The 
presidential term should be five years and the president 
should not be elected for two terms in succession. At 
the same time it was provided that until the adoption 
of a permanent constitution the provisional constitution 
should continue in full force. 

The government then succeeded in forcing the As- 
sembly to elect a president, the suggestion that foreign 
intervention was impending having proved a powerful 
weapon for the securing of this end. The election was 
held on October 6. Of the 850 members of the Assem- 
bly, 759 were in attendance, and on the third ballot 
Yuan Shih-kai received 507 votes and Li Yuan-hung 
196, some members having left the House. Thus Yuan 
was elected to the presidency. On the next day Li 
Yuan-hung was elected vice-president. The inaugura- 
tion was held on October 10, 1913, the second anniver- 
sary of the beginning of the revolution. 

Several American republics, including- the United 
States, had already recognized the Chinese Republic, 
and now the European powers and Japan promptly 
gave their recognition. The Republic, with Yuan as 
its president, thus acquired an internationally recog- 
nized legal status. 

The installation of Yuan Shih-kai as permanent pres- 
ident marked the defeat of the Kwo-ming Party and 
foreshadowed the fate which was shortly to overtake it. 
The President soon proposed for the consideration of 
the Assembly three amendments to the provisional con- 
stitution, which were intended to remove restrictions 



46 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

which hampered his activities. These the Constitution 
Drafting Committee rejected entirely. Then the Pres- 
ident sent his representatives to the Committee to par- 
ticipate in the discussion of their draft, and the Commit- 
tee refused to Hsten to these representatives. On Oc- 
tober 26 the constitution drafted by the Committee was 
submitted to the Assembly. The Committee had un- 
dertaken to lodge supreme authority in the legislature, 
thereby tying the hands of the President. The theory 
underlying the draft constitution which it had produced 
was that of cabinet government. While influenced to 
some extent by French as well as by English practices, 
the draftsmen had sought to avoid the centralization 
which prevails in the French system. They contem- 
plated in a confused way a system of administrative law 
and administrative courts. Yuan Shih-kai objected to 
the limitations put upon the executive, the great au- 
thority given the legislature, the provisions for admin- 
istrative law, and the establishing of a permanent par- 
liamentary committee; and he appealed to the country 
against the work of the Kwo-ming Party as exhibited 
in the document which its committee had produced. 

The response to the President's appeal was a flood of 
telegrams from the provinces denouncing the draft con- 
stitution and in no few cases demanding the dissolu- 
tion of the Assembly. Having obtained the recogni- 
tion of the powers, having overcome a rebellion and 
scattered its leaders, having secured a permanent elec- 
tion, and being armed with this new expression of pub- 
lic opinion. Yuan was now in a position to act firmly 
and if necessary drastically. He therefore determined 
to break up the Kwo-ming Party. This he did on No- 
vember 4 by declaring the Kwo-ming members expelled 
from the Assembly and their party dissolved. If ever 



CHINA: RECONSTRUCTION 47 

a party created the necessity for its own destruction the 
Kwo-ming Tang had done so. The draft constitution 
went at once into the wastebasket, the National Assem- 
bly was rendered incapable of action because of the ab- 
sence of a quorum, and the President became in fact the 
government. 

That he was able to effect this coup without an out- 
break was evidence that Yuan was firmly in the saddle. 
It now became possible to proceed with some assurance 
of success to the problem of constitutional reorganiza- 
tion. 



CHAPTER IV 

china: the provisional constitution and provi- 
sions FOR A PERMANENT CONSTITUTION 

With the elimination of the Kwo-ming Tang, the 
problem of constitution drafting was simplified. The 
government was able to propose plans and to act ac- 
cording to its own views of what the country required. 
There was immediately circulated throughout the coun- 
try for discussion a constitutional draft which had been 
prepared by Professor Goodnow, wherein an ingenious 
plan was provided by which, beginning with a presi- 
dential system, the government might gradually and 
without revolution be transformed to the parliamentary 
system. 

For some time it was thought that the President 
would restore the Assembly by causing new members 
to be elected to fill the seats from which the Kwo-ming 
Tang members had been ejected. Before action on 
this matter, however, the President decided to summon 
a body of experienced men to give him counsel and as- 
sistance, and, in conformity with this decision, he and 
the cabinet members and the provincial governors re- 
spectively appointed representatives. Seventy-one 
such delegates, constituting a council designated as the 
Administrative Conference, assembled formally in Pe- 
king on December 26, 1913. 

The President, in an address before the Conference, 
indicated what he considered the object of its creation: 

■48 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 49 

"I am convinced that it is necessary to gather the ideas 
and opinions of the majority of the people. With this 
in view I call the Conference so that the delegates can 
cooperate with the government in the work for the 
promotion of the national welfare." It was made clear 
by the chairman that the Conference was expected to 
act in an advisory capacity and that it was not to con- 
sider itself empowered to impose its will on the govern- 
ment. 

Two measures of importance were soon recommended 
by the Conference: first, the formal dissolution of the 
Assembly; second, the creation of a special conference 
to amend the provisional constitution. Although it had 
originally been intended that the Administrative Con- 
ference should function for but a short time, the gov- 
ernment decided to retain it until a substitute body 
should have been provided for. Consequently, the Ad- 
ministrative Conference continued to function until 
June 5, 1914, by which date a Council of State had been 
created to supersede it. 

The dissolution of the Assembly was decided upon 
only after the opinions of the governors of the provinces 
had been sought and a joint telegram signed by all the 
governors had urged the dissolution. The Assembly 
was condemned because, having proved itself incompe- 
tent and obstructionist, and having sat nine months in- 
stead of four, it had accomplished nothing beyond the 
squandering of several million dollars. In an account 
of it, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao says: 

For more than twenty days it [the Assembly] could not 
elect a speaker, and over a hundred days elapsed before it was 
able to draw up rules and regulations for its own procedure. 
For a long time the absence of a quorum and the irregular 
attendance of the members became an almost every-daj occur- 



50 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

rence, and when there was a quorum the members quarreled 
with each other like a lot of old ladies from the country and 
behaved like naughty school boys. Before dispersing each day 
the members wasted half the day in wrangling about unneces- 
sary things. With a salary of $6,000 per annum, none of the 
members seems ever to have given a thought for the benefit of 
the country. . . . We may have a great love for parliamentary 
institutions, but we love our country much more. ... * 

It was urged that the salvation of the country de- 
manded action instead of wrangling over theories and 
forms, and that authority to act should for the time 
being be vested in the President. On January 10, then, 
acting on the recommendation of the Administrative 
Conference, the President formally dissolved the As- 
sembly, promising at the same time to convoke later a 
new parliament in accordance with the stipulations of 
the provisional constitution. 

The dissolution of the National Assembly was fol- 
lowed, on March 1, by the dissolving of the provincial 
assemblies and local self-governing bodies throughout 
the country. Thus China became for the moment a 
"republic without representative legislatures," but the 
change was on the whole welcomed by the people. 

When the President asked the Administrative Con- 
ference to consider the question of amending the pro- 
visional constitution, his message pointed out the defec- 
tive and embarrassing features of that instrument: he 
declared that he had for two years submitted to its hu- 
miliating and impracticable conditions, he referred to 
his efforts to secure relief at the hands of the Assembly 
and to the perversity and neglect of that body, and he 
asked that the Conference should make suggestions 
looking to amendments. On January 6, 1914, the Con- 
^ The Justice, Vol. I, No. 15, July 1, 1913. " 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 51 

ference reported that it considered it more convenient 
to revise the provisional constitution than to draft a new 
document; also that a separate body should be created 
to take this matter in hand. There followed, in ac- 
cordance with the rules drawn up by the Conference 
and promulgated by the President, the creation of a 
Constitutional Compact Conference, whose duties and 
powers were to be confined to the revising of the 
provisional constitution and the drafting of other im- 
portant and necessary laws supplementary thereto. 

The Constitutional Compact Conference was com- 
posed of representatives elected — in theory at least : two 
from each province; four from the city of Peking; 
eight from Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, 
and Turkestan; and four by the National Chamber of 
Commerce. The qualifications both for eligibility to 
election and for participation in the election were placed 
very high. There were made eligible as voters: citi- 
zens who are or have been high ofiicials ; masters of arts 
or higher graduates who have accomplished something 
in literature ; college students who have studied f o r three 
full years; and those who possess property valued at 
$10,000 and who have done something for the public 
welfare. There were eligible for election: those who 
have been high officials for five years or more and who 
have good records in administration; college students 
who have studied politics and law for three years or 
more; and well-known scholars who have written prac- 
tical and useful books. Obviously the government was 
in a position, through the governors of the provinces, 
to determine in large measure the composition of the 
new Conference and, consequently, the work of the 
Conference.^ 

^ This Conference is still in existence. Dec. 31^ 1915. 



52 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The Constitutional Compact Conference began its 
work in Peking in March, 1914. The government 
placed before the Conference certain suggestions for 
the amending of the provisional constitution, explain- 
ing that: existing conditions made the amending im- 
perative; it was the expectation of the President that 
the Conference should not go too far; the alterations 
must be satisfactory both to the government and to the 
people; the President must be released from the sub- 
jection to the Assembly which was implied in the con- 
stitution as it stood ; the cabinet members must be made 
dependent upon the President ; provision must be made 
for the issuing of urgent orders and for dealing effi- 
ciently with financial questions; and the problem of 
the ultimate drafting of a permanent constitution must 
be kept in mind. The Conference went ahead with its 
work at once and at the end of April submitted a re- 
vised provisional constitution, which was promulgated 
by the President on May 1, 1914. 

The revised provisional constitution, designated as 
the "Constitutional Compact of the Chinese Re- 
public," ^ greatly enlarged the power of the executive, 
limiting the competence of the legislature in propor- 
tion. In conmienting upon it, the North-China 
Herald said: "The real point for emphasis is that 
for the past two years the government of China has 
been in a more or less fluid state which it was neces- 
sary to crystallize; and in achieving this process, the 
Constitutional Compact Conference has produced that 
kind of a system which accords best with the necessities 
of the country." 

^ Still in force, December 31, 1915, though necessarily about to 
be changed. 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 53 

The new instrument gave the president authority to 
convene and dissolve the legislature, to initiate legisla- 
tion and submit financial estimates, to issue orders — 
with the consent of the Council of State — ^when the leg- 
islature was not in session, to determine the official sys- 
tem and appoint and dismiss both civil and military offi- 
cials, to make treaties, to declare war and conclude 
peace, to control the army and navy, to confer titles 
of nobility and honors, and to grant amnesties and 
pardons. 

It provided that a legislature should be created, to 
consist of a single House, elected by the people, the 
methods of election and the organization to be decided 
upon by the Constitutional Compact Conference. As 
a precautionary measure it was undertaken to make this 
body subordinate to the will of the executive by the 
provision that the president might — with the concur- 
rence of the Council of State- — ^refuse to promulgate an 
act even though the legislature might twice have passed 
it. 

The president was made the chief of the administra- 
tion. He was to be assisted by a secretary of state 
and nine ministers, the latter to be heads of administra- 
tive departments: namely. Foreign Affairs, Interior, 
Finance, War, Navy, Justice, Education, Agriculture, 
and Commerce and Communications. The secretary 
of state and the ministers should be entitled to sit and 
speak in the legislature, and should be liable to im- 
peachment by the censors before the Court of Admin- 
istrative Justice. 

The courts should be composed of law officers ap- 
pointed by the president, their organization, and so 
forth, to be determined by statute. Administrative law 
proceedings and other special law proceedings were 



54 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

to be conducted according to a special body of 
law. 

A Council of State, for deliberation upon important 
questions, should be provided for by the Constitutional 
Compact Conference. 

In finance, the president was given extensive con- 
trol: certain estimates might not be rejected by the 
legislature except with his consent; under extraordi- 
nary circumstances he might make urgently needed ap- 
propriations ; and under ordinary circumstances, if the 
new estimates were not acted upon by the legislature, 
the appropriations of the previous year should remain 
in force. A Board of Audit should be provided for 
by the Conference. 

The permanent constitution should be drafted by 
a committee of ten persons elected by the Council of 
State; the draft made by this committee should be 
passed upon by the Council of State and then submitted 
by the president to a National Convention for final 
adoption. The National Convention should be pro- 
vided for by the Constitutional Compact Conference, 
and the Convention should be convoked and dissolved 
by the president. The constitution should be promul- 
gated by the president. 

In supplementary articles it was provided that laws 
already in force and not conflicting with the Constitu- 
tional Compact should remain in force; that regula- 
tions already in force for favorable treatment of the 
Emperor, the Imperial Clan, the Manchus, Mongols, 
Mohammedans and Tibetans, should never be altered; 
and that until the legislature should have been con- 
voked, its powers and functions should be assumed and 
discharged by the Council of State. There was also 
a provision for amendment. 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 55 

This, then, is the instrument of government in ac- 
cordance with whose provisions the efforts toward re- 
construction have, since May, 1914, been carried on.^ 

The next matter with which the Constitutional Com- 
pact Conference concerned itself was the creation of 
the Council of State. The organization of such a body- 
had been suggested by Dr. Goodnow as early as Febru- 
ary, 1914. It was then contemplated that the func- 
tions of this Council should ultimately be advisory only, 
but during the interval between the dissolution of the 
Administrative Conference and the creation of the leg- 
islature they were to be legislative as well — and pro- 
visions to this effect were embodied in the revised con- 
stitution. In May the Constitutional Compact Confer- 
ence worked out provisions for the organization. The 
Council was to consist of seventy members, appointed 
by the president. The vice-president was to be the 
speaker. Among its duties, it should rule upon doubt- 
ful points in the provisional constitution and all laws in 
connection therewith and should decide in cases of dis- 
pute arising between the executive and the judiciary. 
It should be a body of reference for matters on which 
the president might desire guidance, especially matters 
concerning treaties and the establishing of administra- 
tive offices, reforms, and educational and industrial de- 
velopment. It should have the right to initiate legis- 
lation by means of formal suggestions to the president, 
bearing ten or more members' signatures. It will be 
seen at once that its position is in theory not unlike that 
occupied in fact by the United States Senate in the 
early years. The Council represents Yuan Shih-kai's 

^ Supplementary laws have been enacted, as infra. It is expected 
that the National Convention will draft a new constitution early 
in 1916. 



56 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

conception of a legislative body suited to present needs, 
and it is expected that when the permanent constitu- 
tion is adopted it will remain a part of the machinery of 
the government, becoming perhaps a second chamber of 
the legislature. 

The President appointed a conservative-minded 
body of men and the Council of State began its work 
in Peking on June 20, 1914. The most important of 
its early acts was the recommendation that the law for 
the election of the president which had been passed by 
the Assembly in October, 1913, should be considered by 
the Constitutional Compact Conference with a view to 
amendment. 

It was necessary to alter the presidential election law 
for the reasons that, as the Council pointed out in its 
recommendation: the law provided that the president 
should be elected by a joint session of both Houses of 
Parliament — while now there was to be but one House 
of Parliament; the law provided that in case the presi- 
dent was unable to act, the vice-president first, and then 
the premier, was to succeed to his duties — whereas now 
there was to be no premier; and, the law provided that 
the duties of the president should be those prescribed 
in the provisional constitution — whereas now the then 
provisional constitution had been superseded by an- 
other. The President submitted the recommendation 
to the Conference, which in turn referred it to a com- 
mittee of fifteen of its members. After due consid- 
eration, an amendment was framed, passed upon by the 
Conference, and, on December 26, promulgated by the 
President. 

The revised law for the election of the president con- 
sists of fifteen articles. It provides that male citizens 
forty years of age and of twenty years' residence shall 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 57 

be eligible for the presidency; that the president's term 
of office shall be ten years, and that the term may be 
extended; that before each election the president shall 
nominate three candidates for the succession; that there 
shall be an electoral college composed of one hundred 
members, fifty of whom shall be from the Council of 
State and fifty from the legislature; that in the elec- 
toral college three-fourths of the members shall consti- 
tute a quorum and voting shall be by single ballot, 
while a two-thirds vote shall be required for election. 
If, during the year appointed for the election of the 
president, two-thirds of the members of the Council of 
State decide it advisable, the then president shall be 
allowed to continue in office for another term. The pro- 
visions for the vice-presidency are similar, except that 
the nomination of candidates for the vice-presidency 
lies with the president. 

These provisions, taken collectively, are original and 
unique, an innovation in the method of choosing a chief 
executive. The Constitutional Compact Conference 
explained and justified them, in a memorandimi, as fol- 
lows: With regard to the nomination system, "at the 
time when the government begins to be built up, it 
takes several decades to carry out one fixed policy be- 
fore the country can be consolidated. If the president 
does not nominate his candidates . . . during the fre- 
quent changes of the head of the state, then cunning 
people will contend for the presidency, and it is greatly 
to be feared that the fixed policy cannot be continuously 
carried out. . . ." The reason advanced for the ex- 
tension of the term was this: "Since the establishment 
of the Kepublic . . . there are innumerable matters of 
business awaiting transaction. . . . China is one of the 
largest countries in the world, and as such it is impos- 



58 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

sible to achieve any result in three years. Only a long 
term will enable the president to establish the govern- 
ment jfirmly." In defending the composition of the 
electoral college, it was argued: "The Council of State 
is a special legislative organ, while the legislature is to 
be organized by the people themselves. The members 
are well qualified and have great experience in admin- 
istration, and they truly represent the people." As to 
the provision that the Council of State may extend the 
term of the president, it was declared: "At every ten 
years the president shall be changed once, but should it 
be deemed unwise to change the president on account of 
special circumstances, this rule will meet the emer- 
gency." 

The promulgation of these clauses, rendering the 
presidential office enormously powerful, aroused lit- 
tle surprise and occasioned little adverse comment 
among the people. In conformity with the provision 
authorizing the president to nominate candidates for 
the succession to the presidency and the vice-presidency, 
Yuan Shih-kai prepared a list of his nominees, and this 
list was deposited shortly in a strong box, locked and 
sealed, on an island in the lake adjoining the presiden- 
tial palace. 

While dealing with the presidential election law the 
Conference busied itself also with the question of pro- 
visions for the election and organization of the legisla- 
ture. The government had proposed to it thai the leg- 
islature should not contain more than three hundred 
members and had intimated what were its views as to 
the qualifications for electors and candidates respec- 
tively. On July 4 the Conference appointed a commit- 
tee of five members to draft the law. This committee 
drafted separate laws for the organization and for the 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 59 

election, and submitted its work to a larger committee 
of fifteen. The drafts were approved by the Confer- 
ence and were proclaimed as law by the President on 
October 27. A bureau to have charge of the election 
of representatives to the legislature was then established. 
This bureau prepared, and there were issued by the 
President on March 9, 1915, four sets of regulations to 
govern the coming elections. 

The provisional constitution provides that the legis- 
lature shall consist of one House. The law for the or- 
ganization of the legislature provides that there shall 
be two hundred and seventy-five members, with a term 
of four years. Forty members are to be elected from 
the central electoral college ; two hundred and two from 
the provincial electoral colleges, apportioned as fol- 
lows: ten each from ten provinces, nine each from six 
provinces, and eight each from six provinces ; nine from 
the special administrative districts, as follows: four 
from Shungtien (Metropolitan District), two from 
Jehol, one from Suiyuan, one from Charhar, and one 
from Szechuen frontier; with sixteen from Mongolia, 
six from Tibet and two from Chinghai. There shall be 
one session each year, beginning on September 1 and 
ending on December 31, but the president is authorized 
to extend the session for not more than two months, or 
to call a special session. The secretary of state, the 
ministers, and special representatives of the president 
shall have the right to attend the sessions and to speak. 
Three readings shall be required for the passage of im- 
portant bills. And the president shall have, according 
to the provisional constitution, absolute veto power. 

The election law deals, in the course of thirteen chap- 
ters, first with the qualifications of electors, and then 
with methods of election. The qualifications of voters 



60 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

vary. In all cases the minimum age is thirty years. To 
be an elector in Peking one must: be a resident and 
have rendered meritorious service to the country; or 
have been a high official ; or be a recognized scholar ; or 
be a graduate of a college, or possessed of qualifications 
equal to those of a graduate; or have taught in a col- 
lege for two years or more ; or possess immovable prop- 
erty to the value of $10,000; or be a prince of hereditary 
title or rank in one of the eight Banner Corps. Citi- 
zens residing abroad who are possessed of a capital of 
$30,000 in commercial or industrial concerns may be 
electors in the central electoral college, but to vote they 
must, apparently, come to Peking. 

In the provinces and special administrative districts, 
to be an elector one must have one or more years' resi- 
dence and must : have been a high official ; or be a grad- 
uate of a high school, or be possessed of a similar edu- 
cation; or have a capital of $5,000. 

In the eight Banners in the Metropolitan District 
one must be a graduate of a high elementary school, or 
have an equal education ; or possess movable property to 
the value of $5,000. 

In Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinghai, one must be of 
princely or hereditary title or rank, or be otherwise dis- 
tinguished, educational and property qualifications not 
being specified. 

To be eligible for seats in the legislature, candidates 
must be males, above thirty years of age. In the pri- 
mary electoral districts a candidate must have had at 
least two years' experience in official posts; or be a 
graduate of or student in a college; and must possess 
immovable property or capital to the value of $10,000. 
There are eligible at large: those who have rendered 
meritorious service to the nation; those of five or more 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 61 

years' experience as officials; learned scholars; gradu- 
ates of colleges ; college teachers of three or more years' 
experience ; and owners of immovable property or capi- 
tal to the value of $30,000. In Mongolia, Tibet, and 
Chinghai, princes, dukes, and all others who are quali- 
fied as electors are eligible. 

The right to be a candidate is to be suspended in the 
case of the active secretary of state and the various min- 
isters of the cabinet ; the active chairman of the Council 
of State; the chief judge and councilors of the Admin- 
istrative Court; the chief censor and assistants of the 
Censorate; the chief and assistant auditors of the Bu- 
reau of Audit; the chief of the Bureau of Mongolian 
and Tibetan Affairs; the active administrative officials 
of the provinces and special administrative districts; 
the active judicial officials; military and naval men, 
either active or on the reserve; police officers in active 
service; and monks, priests and other religious func- 
tionaries, except these last in Mongolia, Tibet, or 
Chinghai. 

Election is to be by the direct method in the central 
electoral district and in Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai; 
and by the indirect method in the provinces and special 
administrative districts. 

Obviously a legislature composed of members elected 
from a thus limited group of candidates, returned by 
such an electorate, and having so many restrictions 
upon its powers, will lack certain of the characteristics 
which popular conception associates with the legislative 
body in a republic. It is worthy of note, however, that 
here, as in the plan for the choice of the president, the 
makers of the Chinese constitution have not blindly fol- 
lowed the models of Western constitutions; they have, 
on the contrary, subordinated demands of theory and of 



62 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

consistency between the instrument and its name to the 
demands of the conditions with which they have to 
deal. The men who have been making China's consti- 
tution have sought to devise machinery suited to the 
needs of China as she is and necessarily will be for some 
time to come. The Peking Daily News has said of 
the provisions for the legislature: ". . . The Legisla- 
ture may be expected to develop on progressive lines, 
changing with the times and the conditions . . . until 
ultimately a form of government is realized which will 
meet the requirements of a later age." 

The next product of the Constitutional Compact 
Conference was a body of rules for the organization 
and election of the National Convention. Here again 
the government first suggested principles which it de- 
sired to see followed, the Conference referred the sug- 
gestions to a committee, the committee reported, the 
Conference appointed a drafting committee, this com- 
mittee drew up the rules, the Conference approved, the 
government accepted, and, on March 12, 1915, the 
President proclaimed. A bureau was then established 
to look after the election and organization of the Con- 
vention, and the head of the bureau for the election of 
the legislature was directed to take charge of this elec- 
tion also. 

The chief provisions of the law relating to the Con- 
vention deal with the apportionment of membership, 
the methods of election, the qualifications of candidates, 
and the powers of the Convention. 

The members are to come from the following sources : 
twenty each from the legislative, the executive and the 
judicial departments of the government; forty from the 
central electoral constituency; two hundred and two 
from the provinces ; nine from special administrative dis- 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 63 

tricts; and twenty- four from the dependencies — mak- 
ing three hundred and thirty-five in all. 

Members from the central body, special administra- 
tive districts and dependencies are to have the same 
qualifications and to be elected by the same methods as 
those provided for membership in and election to the 
legislature. Members from the legislative department 
are to be elected by and from among the members of 
the legislature, or, if the legislature has not yet been es- 
tablished, by and from among the members of the 
Council of State, the election being conducted by the 
Minister of the Interior. Members from the executive 
department must have qualifications similar to those re- 
quired for candidacy for the legislature in the provinces, 
must be administrative officials in the Metropolitan Dis- 
trict, and will be chosen by election, the election being 
conducted under the supervision of the chief judge of 
the Administrative Court. Members from the judicial 
department must be judicial officials in the Metropolitan 
District, and they will be chosen by election, the election 
being conducted under the supervision of the Minister 
of Justice. 

It will be the business of the Convention, as provided 
by the provisional constitution, to pass upon the consti- 
tution which shall have been prepared by a special 
drafting committee. The Constitution Drafting Com- 
mittee is to consist of ten persons elected by the Coun- 
cil of State. The draft which this committee makes is 
to be examined and passed upon by the Council of 
State, after which it shall be submitted by the President 
to the National Convention. The Convention may 
amend the draft, but resolutions for this purpose must 
first have been referred to a committee and there have 
been approved by a two-thirds vote, after which their 



64 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

passage will require a two-thirds vote of a three-fourths 
quorum. No ordinary motion may be put until sec- 
onded by twenty members, and no proposal for amend- 
ing" the draft constitution until seconded by forty mem- 
bers. The Convention is to sit for but four months, 
and if within that time it has not adopted a constitution 
it is to be dissolved by the president who will then sum- 
mon another Convention. It has obviously been in- 
tended that the Convention be dominated by the govern- 
ment and that the constitution be satisfactory to Yuan 
Shih-kai. Except for the possibility of some little ad- 
verse public opinion, it may be considered an advantage 
to have the constitution as an instrument of government 
conform to Yuan Shih-kai's and his adviser's concep- 
tions of the needs of the country. As a product of this 
group it is bound to be conservatively and carefully 
drawn, it is likely to be workable, and its adoption will 
probably be facilitated and expedited. Japan's con- 
stitution was the product of draftsmen appointed by 
the Emperor. Prince Ito, acting for the Emperor, 
knew the needs of the country, and he drafted a consti- 
tution far more satisfactory than could have been pro- 
duced by any body of men which might at the time have 
been assembled in Japan as the result of a free vote of 
even a limited electorate. It is futile to expect that a 
country which has been an absolute monarchy shall be 
suddenly transformed into an ideal indirect democracy. 
The educated and the wealthy classes — and until re- 
cent times the two have been practically identical in 
China — have always been regarded among the Chinese 
as the natural repository of administrative authority. 
The provisional constitution of 1914 and the supple- 
mentary laws provide the machinery for nationalizing 
the authority of those who qualify in these classes. 



CHINA: PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION 65 

whereas it has heretofore been localized. They look to 
the establishing of a real and efficient legislature, rep- 
resentative of the whole country even though it may 
not be representative of all parties and of all classes of 
the people. A larger and, in theory at least, more 
popularly elected parliament, the National Assembly 
of 1913, has already had its trial and been found want- 
ing. 

Upon the ruins of an absolute monarchical system 
the government has been endeavoring to construct a 
carefully limited autocracy which shall have the ap- 
proval and favor of the aristocracy. Membership in the 
aristocracy in China depends neither on birth nor on ap- 
pointment, it comes of brains and achievement. There 
is no caste system; there are no legal bars preventing 
any man from qualifying for participation in the po- 
litical life of the state. The government of China has 
long been a curious combination of autocracy and de- 
mocracy, and such, for a long time, it will remain — no 
matter what the name — whether the state be organized 
as a republic or as a monarchy. 



CHAPTER V 

china: political parties and party politics 

China has already since the revolution passed through 
several phases of political readjustment. The old mon- 
archy was succeeded by republicanism. The radical 
element which came temporarily into power in the South 
expected to control the destinies of the new republic. 
The radicals were, however, soon replaced by moderates, 
with a progressive-conservative "dictator" in the presi- 
dential chair. Now, it seems, the presidential chair is 
to give place to a throne, the republic to be succeeded 
by a new monarchy. That there was reaction was not 
surprising. There is always reaction when enthusias- 
tic reformers and inexperienced or self-seeking officials 
and counselors have gone too far. There was reaction 
in 1898, and anyone can now see that the sweeping 
and immediate changes for which the Emperor's re- 
form policy called would have weakened if not wrecked 
the state. In the present instance the surprising thing 
about the reaction has been not that it came, but that 
it came so soon, so steadily, with so little commotion 
and with so great moderation. 

The revolution was the product of the activities of 
political societies. The overthrow of the Manchus was 
the work of the radicals. The elimination of the rad- 
icals in favor of conservatives was to a considerable ex- 
tent due to the impatience, the ill-advised self-confi- 
dence, the political cupidity, and the obstructionist tac- 

66 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 67 

tics of certain of the factions and parties which were 
formed after the revolution by members of the former 
pohtical societies. The repubhcan government was de- 
pendent for its success or failure upon the character of 
the support which would be accorded it by some of the 
political groups and the ability which it might itself 
manifest in dealing with the opposition which would 
continue from others. To understand the changes of 
the past four years, especially the prospective return to 
monarchy, we must have in mind certain facts in the 
history of these societies and parties. 

Political parties as they are organized and as the 
term is now understood in Western countries were un- 
known in China before the revolution. In a monarchy 
which has no representative system there is no sphere 
for and no conception of "parties" in the sense in which 
the term is applied in the Occident. There may be 
factions, more or less conscious, more or less organized, 
the followers of this or that statesman, the advocates of 
this or that policy, but not parties. There may be rev- 
olutionary, reform and other societies with political pro- 
grams — but these also are not parties. There have been 
of course all of these in China. Thus there were a half- 
century ago the "Hwai group" or "Anliui men," the 
followers of Li Hung-chang, and the "Siang group" 
or "Hunan men," the followers of Tseng Kwo-fang. 
Later we have the strong group of personal adher- 
ents whom Yuan Shih-kai during his years as a resi- 
dent of Korea, governor, viceroy and grand coun- 
cilor, attached to himself. Contemporaneously we 
have roughly speaking the "Southern" and the "North- 
ern" parties, or, more specifically, the "Cantonese" 
and the "Anhui" groups. There have always, in prac- 
tically every dynasty, been political factions and secret 



68 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

societies, and the influence of these alignments and or- 
ganizations has at times resulted in revolutionary 
changes. But until 1912 there had been no society or- 
ganized as are western political machines and calling 
itself a party. 

During the period of impending change which be- 
gan with 1898 there arose a number of political asso- 
ciations, some organized with a view to effecting defi- 
nite reforms, some actively engaged in the planning of 
revolution. There were, broadly speaking, two views 
as to how reform should be effected. According to 
one group the monarchy must be made constitutional 
but the Manchus should retain the throne. Accord- 
ing to the other the Manchu Dynasty should be 
swept away — after which the Chinese, or, more 
specifically, the makers of the revolution, would es- 
tablish a new government and work out a new 
system. 

After the failure of the reform program of the Em- 
peror in 1898, some of the leading members of the re- 
form group carried on a propaganda of political edu- 
cation from Japan and other countries to which they 
had fled. Without any definite organization, the fol- 
lowers of these leaders were known as the Li-hsien Tang 
(Constitutional Party), but they later became known 
as the Pao Huang Hui (Society for the Protection of 
the Emperor) . Most prominent among those advocates 
of constitutional monarchy were Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and 
K'ang Yu-wei. Most prominent of the revolutionaries 
was Dr. Smi Yat-sen. 

In the same years, between 1898 and 1901, the advo- 
cates of revolution began to organize, the headquarters 
of their activity being Tokyo. There were various 
branches of each of these groups. Thus, of the former, 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 69 

there were two/ which had as their chief purpose the 
study of political science. They advocated reforms, 
they suggested the organization of political parties, but, 
being composed of scholars, chiefly of the old school, 
and having nothing to do with the practical politics of 
the country, they were not political parties. As to po- 
litical creed, they might be called the moderates, or con- 
stitutional conservatives, while the revolutionaries 
would be called the radicals. 

After 1900, both groups began to publish, chiefly in 
Tokyo, literature which was widely circulated both 
among the Chinese abroad and in China. The best 
known of the papers of the constitutionalists was the 
Sing-ming Hsung-pao, or Popular Enlightenment 
Magazine, edited and published by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. 
Liang believed that China should have a government 
something like that of Prussia under Frederick the 
Great, or that of Russia under Peter the Great, but 
he frowned upon the idea of revolution. The best 
known of the revolutionary papers was the Ming Pao, 
or People's Magazine, which held that the Manchus 
must be driven out. 

The doctrines advocated and the classes appealed to 
by the two groups respectively were very different. The 
moderates advocated a peaceful evolution through the 
establishing of a constitution and constitutional prac- 
tices. Their literature was read by old scholars, the 
officials and literati, and students. The radicals main- 
tained that nothing short of the overthrow and elimi- 
nation of the Manchus would achieve the salvation of the 
country — for the reason that the Manchus were inca- 
pable either of effecting reforms themselves or of al- 

^ The Tsen-wen Hsieli (Political Discussion Society) and the 
Hsien-tsen-nien-kiu Hui (Constitutional Study Society). 



70 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

lowing the Chinese to effect them. Their pubHcations 
were read by young students, the more or less modern- 
ized Chinese abroad, and others who had come espe- 
cially under the influence of "Western" and new ideas, 
especially those who had a smattering knowledge of 
Western history, of the American and the French rev- 
olutions, and had gained therefrom various conceptions 
of "democracy," "liberty," "natural rights," and other 
unoriental political doctrines. The literature of these 
groups soon began to have its effect, both educational 
and political. 

At the same time the lessons which the Empress Dow- 
ager and the court had learned from the experiences of 
the Boxer uprising and attendant events of 1900 led to 
practical results. In 1905 the Imperial Commission 
was sent abroad to study constitutions and governments, 
and in 1906 the government launched its program of re- 
form. The constitutionalists voiced their sentiments 
in 1909 and 1910 by repeated demands for a parlia- 
ment. The radicals were responsible for sporadic out- 
breaks at various points in 1906, 1907, 1910, and finally 
the revolution in 1911. The revolutionary elements had 
been definitely organized and announced themselves in 
1905 under the name Tung-meng Hui (Alliance So- 
ciety). The Manchus were unable to adapt them- 
selves to the rapidity with which new ideas were 
making themselves felt, and they did not realize the 
facts and the necessities of the situation until too late. 

The radicals, although they achieved their end and 
drove the Manchus from the throne, were of too heter- 
ogeneous a mind, and were too far removed from an 
intimate understanding of the still conservative temper 
of the country, to be able to command the confidence of 
the whole people and to carry on a program of recon- 



CHINA; POLITICAL PARTIES 71 

' struction. Sun Yat-sen's resignation in favor of Yuan 
Shih-kai was an admission of his and his party's con- 
sciousness of their inabihty to meet the needs of in- 
ternal conditions and of their recognition that they had 
not the confidence of the foreign powers. Yuan Shih- 
kai had the confidence of the North, of the conserva- 
tive elements throughout the country, of the constitu- 
tionalists, and of the foreign governments. Radical 
leaders, although they hated and mistrusted him, ad- 
mitted that Yuan was the one man whose control of 
affairs might be considered promising of success. As 
provisional president, Dr. Sun had been from the very 
first confronted with the problem of disposing of, 
among his supporters who represented several differ- 
ent societies, the "spoils" of the revolution. Both for 
personal reasons and for party reasons it was highly 
expedient that the South and the North, that the vari- 
ous factions, be reconciled. Naturally, the peace nego- 
tiations followed — and the compromise was effected: 
Yuan accepted the revolution and the republic; the 
South accepted Yuan. The revolutionaries — which 
now meant the South, that is, the Tung-meng Hui — 
lost no time in organizing themselves as a political party, 
with a definite platform. Although they had given up 
the name of office to Yuan, nevertheless their object was 
to control Yuan and to make him the instrument for the 
carrying out of their political principles. Ultimately 
they would eliminate him. When the reorganization of 
the Tung-meng Hui took place, a considerable num- 
ber of recruits from the old official class joined the 
party. Unfortunately for both, many of these offi- 
cials had unsavory reputations, and with their accession 
no few of the better members already within the party 
withdrew from its ranks. 



72 . POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The new party insisted upon the principle of respon- 
sible government and undertook to compel Yuan Shih- 
kai to choose a party cabinet. Yuan actually appointed 
five Tung-meng Hui men as members of his first cabi- 
net, in March, 1912, among these being the Premier, 
Tang Shao-yi, one of the new members of the party. 
Had they been content with this, the party might have 
gradually intrenched itself in power. Insisting, how- 
ever, upon a strict party alignment, they came into con- 
flict with Yuan's determination to have a cabinet of his 
own choosing and responsible to himself alone. Check- 
mated at the outset, the Tung-meng Hui cabinet mem- 
bers resigned in June, 1912, and from that time to now 
there has been continuous warfare — although a truce 
was declared in August of that year — between the lead- 
ers of that party and the President. 

When, after the fall of Nanking, the question of mak- 
ing peace with the North was raised, there had been 
four views among the Tung-meng Hui members. The 
opinion of some favored yielding absolutely to the 
North. Others advocated yielding as a temporary 
measure. A third group proposed that the governors 
of the provinces should be elected by the people, and 
that the powers of the provincial assemblies should be 
increased. Here we see the evidences of the sentiment 
for decentralization and provincial authority which had 
been one of the forces working in opposition to the later 
policy of the Manchus. 

The fourth group busied themselves with the prac- 
tical political aspects of the situation. First of all they 
reorganized the society, and the Tung-meng Hui was 
first declared a political party on March 3, 1912, with 
Sun Yat-sen as its director. Its declared objects were 
the consolidation of the Republic and the diffusion of 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 73 

democratic ideas. Its political platform called for cen- 
tralization of power ; development of local government ; 
fusion of the five population elements; state socialism; 
equality of sexes; obligatory military service; reforms 
in taxation and public finance; efforts toward national 
equality; development of natural resources; furthering 
of agricultural and colonizing enterprises; and, finally, 
insistence upon responsible cabinet government. 

With parts of this program the party might have 
succeeded had its leading members been anything like 
as able statesmen as they had been agitators, and had 
not the party received numerous accessions from unde- 
sirable elements. With five members in the first cabi- 
net they had a splendid opportunity, but with the breach 
with Yuan and the resignation of these members, fol- 
lowed by obstructionist tactics in the Assembly, the op- 
portunity was thrown away. 

At a great party meeting held in Peking on July 21, 
Sung Chiao-jen, one of the leading members of the 
party, made a speech denouncing the government as in- 
capable of benefiting the countrj^ and declaring that 
none but a party government organized by the Tung- 
meng Hui could prove satisfactory. There is no doubt 
but that many of the members of the party were hon- 
est in their advocacy of a responsible cabinet system, be- 
lieving that the concentration of power in the hands of 
the President would but pave the way for him to make 
himself a dictator. At the same time there were many 
others who were thinking only of the victor's right to 
spoils. And there is also no question but that the 
methods employed by the party then, and subsequently 
as the Kwo-ming Tang, were both ill-advised and, from 
the point of view of practical statesmanship, hopelessly 
shortsighted. 



74 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

While the Tung-meng Hui was setting out upon the 
course which led to its destruction, other parties were 
being organized. Early in 1912, Tsai Ao,^ the mili- 
tary governor (tutuh) of Yunnan, a disciple of 
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, organized a party ^ with a pro- 
gram emphasizing the practical aspects of fiscal ques- 
tions and practical constructive reforms and develop- 
ments. 

Another party ^ was organized at Wuchang by Gen- 
eral Li. Still another^ was formed by influential offi- 
cials at Peking. These groups and two others drew 
together after the reorganization of the Tung-meng 
Hui (in March), and were soon in opposition to the, 
radicals. They were more conservative than the Tung- 
meng Hui and favored a government based on talents. 
Their moderate attitude attracted to their membership 
many scholars and officials, and they became the sup- 
port of the President. Their amalgamation to form a 
new party, the Kung-ho Tang (Republican Party), 
took place in May. 

For some time Tsai Ao's party ^ held the balance in 
the Assembly and when the two larger groups were in 
conflict was able to swing decisions one way or the 
other. As time went on, however, some of the mem- 
bers of this group became more and more radical, and 
in the readjustments which came in the summer of 
1912, the founder and some of the more moderate mem- 
bers left the party and went over to the moderates who 
were in opposition to the Tung-meng Hui ; the remain- 

^ Now leading the Yunnan rebellion. 

^ The Tung-yi Kung-ho Tang (Coalition Republican Party). 

^ The Ming She (People's Society). 

^ The Kwo-ming Hsie Hui (Citizens' Cooperation Society). 

^ The Tung-yi Kung-ho Tang. 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 75 

ing members ultimately joined the Tung-meng Hui. 

Still another party was organized in March, 1912. 
Chang Ping-lin, the well-known editor of a revolution- 
ary paper, had been, since 1905, a member of the Tung- 
meng Hui. As a result of a diif erence of opinion with 
Dr. Sun and Huang Hsing, whom he afterwards con- 
demned as lawless rebels, he left that society while the 
revolution was still going on and became the founder 
of a party which took the name Tung-yi Tang (Coali- 
tion Party). 

Also early in 1912 a group of men from among the 
reformers of 1898 who had subsequently become known 
as the constitutionalists, organized a "Society for study- 
ing the establishing of a Hepublic." ^ During the cabi- 
net crisis of July- August, 1912, the leaders of this party 
declared that the one thing which the party wished was 
the organization of a strong centralized government. 
The name Ming-chu Tang (Democratic Party) was 
adopted soon after. The party was composed largely 
of scholars, and the members concerned themselves with 
the future, aiming at the development of qualified re- 
publican citizenship. The party platform, written early 
in 1912 by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who was still in Japan, had 
a widespread influence in shaping public opinion. It 
emphasized the fact that there must be preparation for 
and an education in party practices before party gov- 
ernment could safely be adopted ; that China's weakness 
was due to long pursuit of laissez-faire policies, hence a 
policy of governmental interference and paternal ad- 
ministration should be adopted; that for this end a 
strong centralized government was essential; and that 
China should shape her institutions in accordance with 
world experience and tendencies. 

^ The Kung-ho Chien-hsieh Taulun Hui, 



76 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The drawing together of the rival elements led the 
Tung-meng Hui to a practical step to strengthen its 
position. This was nothing less than an amalgama- 
tion, or rather an absorption, proposed by Dr. Sun Yat- 
sen and Huang Hsing, while in Peking in August, 
1912, by which there were united to the Tung-meng 
Hui five other parties. Sung Chiao-jen was put in 
charge of the negotiations. The need of uniting for the 
approaching parliamentary elections was urged. On 
August 23 the amalgamation was effected and the new 
party came into being as the Kwo-ming Tang (Na- 
tionalist Party ) } Thus the Tung-meng Hui increased 
itself and, under a new name, continued its activities. 

The Kwo-ming Tang was a real and substantially 
organized party. The chief items in its declared policy 
were: to maintain the union of the North and the 
South; to develop local government; to encourage the 
adoption of socialistic principles; and to maintain sat- 
isfactory relations with foreign powers. 

One of the first acts of the Kwo-ming Tang was to 
attack the government because of the execution of two 
Southern military men at Peking on August 16. These 
men had been denounced by the Vice-President, General 
Li Yuan-hung, and the Kwo-ming Tang members in 
the National Council moved that Li be impeached. The 
moderates defeated the motion, and the government 
threatened that if the Kwo-ming Tang pressed the 
measure it would be forced to produce evidence which 
would incriminate other members of the party — where- 
upon the effort for impeachment was discontinued. 

The party next induced the acting Premier, Chao 
Ping-chun, to become a member, and in so doing it de- 
parted from its adherence to the principle of party gov- 

^ Kwo-ming Tang may also be translated Democratic Party. 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 77 

ernment upon which it had been insisting, for Chao was 
heading a non-party cabinet. 

The formation of the Kwo-ming Tang, and its ini- 
tial activities, led to a more formal organization of the 
Kung-ho Tang on September 1, 1912. The members 
of this party became the backbone of the opposition to 
the Kwo-ming Tang. Chang Shao-tseng now became 
director and a little later the party was reinforced by 
the accession of many of the prominent members of the 
old Pao Huang Hui and the Ming-chu Tang, among 
whom, in October, was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had just 
returned from his long exile in Japan. The political 
program of the Kung-ho Tang was : to bring the whole 
country under a uniform administration and to 
strengthen the authority of the central government ; its 
policy was, in short, nationalism. 

There were, then, at the end of 1912, two leading 
parties in the field, the Kwo-ming Tang (National 
Party) and the Kung-ho Tang (Kepublican Party), 
which had in the process of their construction absorbed 
most of the smaller parties and seceders from the re- 
maining groups. The most important party develop- 
ment in 1913 was the amalgamation of the Kung-ho, 
the Tung-yi and what remained of the Ming-chu Tang 
to form the Chin-pu Tang (Progressive Party). 

When the National Assembly opened on April 8, 
1913, the Kwo-ming Tang had an easy majority in the 
Upper House and a substantial minority in the Lower 
House. As long as the other parties were disunited the 
Kwo-ming Tang could easily dominate the Assembly. 
It was, then, to make an effective opposition that the 
three leading moderate groups came together. The 
formal amalgamation was effected on May 29, and the 
name Chin-pu Tang was adopted. Li Yuan-hung was 



78 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

elected director, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Dr. Wu Ting- 
fang, Chang Chien, and six others were given the lead- 
ership of the party. 

While the election to the Assembly had been going 
on in January and February, there had been rumors 
that Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing were planning an- 
other revolution, and finally a telegram had been sent 
by the tutuhs of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow and 
Szechuen, telling the President that certain Kwo-ming 
Tang members were organizing a rebellion. The 
Kung-ho Tang newspapers declared that the Kwo- 
ming Tang leaders were negotiating with the Japanese 
and had pledged extensive concessions and even po- 
litical control in certain provinces in return for assist- 
ance to be given them for carrying on a revolution. 

Toward the end of February the President received 
a memorial signed by many of the tutuhs proposing the 
formation of a committee to draft a constitution. The 
Kwo-ming Tang leaders at once challenged the right 
of the executive to interfere in the drafting of the con- 
stitution. In March an incident occurred which gave 
the Kwo-ming Tang the opportunity to make com- 
plaints more likely to appeal to popular opinion or 
prejudice. On March 21 Sung Chiao-jen, by that time 
the acknowledged leader of the party, was shot by an 
assassin as he was taking train at Shanghai for Peking 
to attend the coming meeting of the National Assem- 
bly. The incident was seized upon by the Kwo-ming 
Tang leaders as the occasion for a violent denunciation 
of the government, which they charged with having in- 
stigated the murder. 

When the Assembly met in April the situation was 
critical because of the open and fierce hostility of the 
Southern leaders to the President, while fuel was added 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 79 

to the flames shortly when the government concluded 
the Quintuple Loan. 

The first thing which the new Assembly did was to 
fall to contending over the election of speakers. After 
the election was effected at the end of April, the Sung 
Chiao-jen case and the question of the foreign loans 
were made the subjects of heated discussion. The Kwo- 
ming Tang leaders had insisted that the loan question 
be referred to the Assembly, and when the government 
signed the loan without thus submitting it, the speakers 
of the Senate appealed the matter to the provinces in 
a statement seeking to arouse an expression of popu- 
lar disapproval of the government. The Kwo-ming 
Tang members forced resolutions through both the Sen- 
ate and the House, declaring the loan illegal and the 
contract void. Four of the Kwo-ming Tang tutuhs 
denounced the government, and Sun Yat-sen tele- 
graphed to London warning the public that the consum- 
mation of the loan would mean civil war. The Presi- 
dent issued two mandates on May 3, presenting the gov- 
ernment's side of the case and declaring that he would 
no longer tolerate treasonable agitation. A joint tele- 
gram from thirteen tutuhs designated the four Kwo- 
ming Tang tutuhs and Huang Hsing "rebels," and the 
General-in-chief of the Fengtien troops telegraphed 
that he was ready to go south and suppress the Kwo- 
ming Tang "rebels." Throughout April and May nu- 
merous memorials came in from mercantile organiza- 
tions urging the President to take strong measures for 
the security of trade, which was suffering because of the 
rumors of impending rebellion. The merchants of 
Shanghai appealed to the Assembly to check the flood 
of seditious literature which was flowing from the Kwo- 
ming Tang press. In the middle of May it became 



80 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

known that large numbers of Northern troops were be- 
ing moved to Hupeh to strengthen Li Yuan-hung's 
position at Wuchang, whence a strong detachment 
was sent to Kiukiang to watch the situation in 
Kiangsi. 

The formation of the Chin-pu Tang in May gave the 
President a strong support. At a party meeting on June 
14, the chairman, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, outhned its pohcy in 
a way that constituted a distinct defiance of the Kwo- 
ming Tang. He announced that the party had decided 
to nominate Yuan Shih-kai as candidate for the per- 
manent presidency; that the party did not consider the 
government responsible for the death of Sung Chiao- 
jen; that it considered the action of the government in 
making the foreign loans expedient and legal ; and that 
its only concern with the loans was to see that the 
money received was properly expended. 

The Kwo-ming Tang at first denounced the new 
party as a creature and slave of the President, but be- 
fore long it began to seek to effect a compromise. The 
Chin-pu Tang stuck to its policy of supporting the 
President, and the Kwo-ming Tang was able to make 
no headway by peaceful political methods. 

Toward the end of May the President threw down 
the gauntlet to the opposition. In June two mandates 
were issued, cashiering one Kwo-ming Tang tutuh and 
"promoting" two others to frontier posts. The cash- 
iered governor then took up arms on July 12, and the 
second revolution was on. General Huang Hsing at 
once issued a bombastic proclamation announcing a 
"punitive expedition" against the President, and de- 
clared Nanking independent. The misguided insur- 
gent troops made no kind of showing against the gov- 
ernment troops except in a futile attempt to take the 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 81 

arsenal at Shanghai, and after two weeks it was evident 
that the rebelHon was doomed to failure, whereupon 
Huang" Hsing was the first to flee the country. The 
recapture of Nanking by the government troops early 
in September brought the uprising to an end. The 
punitive expedition had in no sense appealed to or had 
the support of the substantial classes, and without the 
military support of Li Yuan-hung, Chu Jui — the tutuli 
of Chekiang, and Chang Hsun, all of whom remained 
loyal to the government, it had no chance whatever of 
success. As soon as the rebellion was crushed the Presi- 
dent appointed Hsiung Hsi-ling, one of the reformers 
of 1898 and now a member of the Chin-pu Tang, pre- 
mier, with a very well selected cabinet. 

The government then brought pressure to bear on the 
Assembly^ to proceed to the elections, and Yuan Shih- 
kai was, on October 6, chosen permanent president, with 
Li Yuan-hung as vice-president. 

The rebellion had been instigated and launched by 
the Kwo-ming Tang leaders. Even as far back as 
April and May the President had been urged to sup- 
press that party, but he was not then or even during 
the rebellion ready to go that length. Finally, how- 
ever, having come into possession of conclusive docu- 
mentary evidence that many of the Kwo-ming Tang 
members of the Assembly had participated in the revo- 
lutionary activities, he decided, after consultation with 
his Cabinet and various of the authorities in the prov- 
inces, to order the party dissolved, which he did on No- 
vember 4. From then until the present the Chin-pu 
Tang, at once conservative and progressive, has been 
the leading party in Chinese politics. 

■^ Especially employing reference to serious aspects of the in- 
ternational situation. 



82 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The documents which incriminated the Kwo-ming 
Tang members showed that even before the murder of 
Sung Chiao-jen the party had laid its plans to oppose 
Yuan Shih-kai at every turn and to nullify his authority 
if he were elected permanent president. They showed 
also that various Kwo-ming Tang members of the As- 
sembly had been in receipt of regular and substantial 
subsidies from the Kwo-ming Tang provincial gover- 
nors. From the moment when the Assembly opened 
the Kwo-ming Tang members had neglected no oppor- 
tunity to embarrass the President and manifest con- 
tempt for him; at the beginning they refused to have 
his address read; and the climax was reached when in 
October they refused to admit his delegates to the final 
sessions of the Constitution Drafting Committee. 
Though the rebellion had failed, the party remained 
irreconcilable, and the constitution which its members 
were drafting was unsuited to the needs of the country 
and calculated to render the government absolutely im- 
potent. The President had decided, therefore, that the 
welfare of the nation rendered the elimination of this 
dangerous obstructionist element imperative. The ef- 
fect of the dissolution of the Kwo-ming Tang was to 
leave more than half the seats in the Assembly empty — 
while the will of the President became law. 

Since its dissolution there have been various reports 
of the secret activities of the Kwo-ming Tang. At nu- 
merous points in foreign countries, but especially in 
Japan, and to some extent in the Philippines, the lead- 
ers who fled have organized societies, whose purpose 
has been the carrying on of opposition propaganda. 

In the course of later developments the Kwo-ming 
Tang leaders seem to have disagreed and the part}?- to 
have been split into two factions. The reaction to the 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 83 

presentation of the Japanese demands to the Chinese 
government in January, 1915, made known in Febru- 
ary, evidenced and emphasized this disagreement. One 
faction still insists upon opposition to Yuan Shih-kai 
and revolution at the earliest possible moment. Tlie 
other seems to have gathered some political wisdom and 
to possess some sense of the needs of the country. 
Members of the latter persuasion telegraphed from 
many points abroad urging popular support of the Pres- 
ident and unified national opposition to the Japanese 
demands. Although this is an encouraging sign, it will 
be necessary to observe the actions of the members of 
this group further before it will be possible to rely 
upon the sincerity of their expressions. We know of 
the insincerity of the pledges of loyalty to the President 
which some of them made in August, 1912; and it has 
been reported on excellent authority that, simultane- 
ously with the sending of an open cable last March urg- 
ing the party to support the government in resisting 
Japan, the most prominent of the leaders of this faction 
was asking a well known American publicist to write 
articles denouncing Yuan Shih-kai. The unanimity, 
however, with which Chinese opinion both at home and 
abroad rallied to the support of the President in the 
negotiations with the Japanese speaks well for the ris- 
ing sentiment of national patriotism which is discern- 
ible in the contemporary politics of China. In Janu- 
ary, 1915, the government pardoned many of the mem- 
bers of the Kwo-ming Tang who had been proscribed 
as a result of the rebellion of 1913, and no few of these 
temporary exiles have already returned to their homes. 
This is an indication not only of a liberal disposition on 
the part of the government but of the administration's 
confidence in the security and strength of its own po- 



84, POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

sition. The constitutional developments have been dur- 
ing the past year along lines dictated by and satisfac- 
tory to the administration and the conservative-progres- 
sive party — which represent the better thought of the 
substantial classes. 

After all the welter of party organizing and party 
strife which the past four years has witnessed, there may 
be said to exist at present but two political parties: the 
Kwo-ming Tang (Nationalist Party), which continues 
its activities sub rosa and is for the present powerless; 
and the Chin-pu Tang (Progressive Party), which is, as 
far as any party may be said to be, in power, supporting 
the President but leaving the determination of policies 
to him. Several minor parties have either formally dis- 
banded or quietly dissolved. ' The opposing lines of in- 
ternal political policy, as represented on the one hand 
by Kwo-ming Tang theories and on the other by Chin- 
pu Tang practice, are substantially a projection of the 
difference which existed before the revolution. On the 
one hand, there is insistence upon local autonomy and 
decentralization, manifesting itself in opposition to the 
government, with plans for revolution, and the apparent 
belief, in some quarters at least, that China is capable 
of being transformed suddenly into a representative de- 
mocracy organized along the lines of a federal repub- 
lic. On the other, we find insistence upon a strong, cen- 
tralized government, putting national above all other 
interests, manifesting itself conservatively, with a com- 
prehension at once of the condition of the country, of 
the character of the people and their institutions, and 
of the forces and influences which must be taken into 
consideration by practical statesmen dealing with prac- 
tical problems. In its endeavors to establish a new sys- 
tem, the government is not neglecting the background 



CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES 85 

of the past which must be made the foundation of the 
edifice which it rears; it is considering the conditions 
and needs of the nation — for whom the structure is be- 
ing built ; and it has an eye to the future which will de- 
termine the ultimate design. 

Whether or not we believe that "a people has the kind 
of government which it deserves," we cannot escape the 
truth of the proposition that governmental machinery- 
must be suited to the character and the condition of the 
people for whom it is designed. In China we have a 
people of peaceful and civic tendencies, engaged in most 
part in agricultural pursuits, their industrial organiza- 
tion of a very simple character, their mercantile class 
extensive but engaged in "small business." The people 
desire peace, order, and opportunity to go about their 
business; most of them know little of and care less for 
participation in politics; they have no extreme views 
with regard to "liberty, equality and fraternity"; their 
view of "natural rights" is that men have a right to live, 
eat, and propagate ; they have never asked for the fran- 
chise ; they have always possessed the right, by the route 
of education, to enter the ranks of officialdom if they so 
desired. They are glad to be rid of the domination of 
the alien Manchus. They regard the revolution as a 
natural occurrence, a manifestation of history's repeti- 
tion of itself. They consider that their race, the Chi- 
nese, has come back to its own in that a Chinese now 
sits in the seat of authority in Peking. They have no 
inclination to insist upon the niceties of republicanism. 
And they abhor the idea of another revolution — which 
to them means more fighting, more disorder, destruc- 
tion, waste and inconvenience. 

The problems of China's foreign policy are such that 
the government needs the united support of the whole 



86 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

people. The question of national existence is more im- 
portant than that of the immediate introduction of im- 
ported political machinery. 

Considering the question from a variety of angles, 
we are led to the conclusion that neither is China ready 
for party government nor is there in existence any party 
which would be qualified to assume the responsibility 
of conducting the affairs of the country. Examining 
closely the conduct of those who have been struggling 
professedly for the establishment of party government, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the battle which they 
have waged has been largely in the interest of personal 
ends. In so far as the efforts of these are sincere, their 
insistence upon the policy which their party advocates 
is largely the result of erroneous and inadequate com- 
prehension of what is practical and what is possible in 
politics. For the present the country needs a stable 
and centralized government. A regime which will 
guarantee law and order internally and which will give 
the greatest promise of defending the integrity of the 
country is the first and greatest necessity. To secure 
and insure such a government and to support such a 
regime seems to be the object of the men around Yuan 
Shih-kai, and these men, regardless of party affiliations, 
are the "party in power." 



CHAPTER VI 



china: the return to monarchy* 



Immediately after the conclusion of negotiations 
with Japan in May, 1915, the leaders of the Chin-pii 
Tang, now the most influential of the political parties 
in China and the support of the government, memorial- 
ized the President, asking him to hasten the convening 
of the National Assembly. It was argued that the po- 
sition of the government would be strengthened by the 
existence of this body. The President straightway, on 
May 25, issued orders that the census lists of voters 
qualified for the primary elections should be completed 
by September 13. In July the President issued a fur- 
ther mandate directing the bureau concerned with prep- 
arations for the election of representatives to the Na- 
tional (Constitutional) Convention to hasten its work. 

The Council of State had been instructed on July 1 
to appoint the Committee of Ten for the drafting of a 
permanent constitution. The Council at once made its 
appointments and the President announced the mem- 
bership. The Committee held its first meeting on July 
31. It was announced that in all probability the draft 
of the constitution would be ready by the end of the 
year; and the Chinese press chose to believe that the 
existing provisional constitution and its supplementary 

•^ The author is indebted to the editors of the Review of Reviews 
for permission to use portions of an article which appeared in the 
February, 1916^ number of the (American) Review of Reviews. 

87 



88 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

laws would be made the basis of the work. The gov- 
ernors of the provinces were to be taken into consulta- 
tion, and particular deference was to be paid to the 
views of Dr. Goodnow as Constitutional Adviser. It 
was reported early in August that the elections would 
be held in January and February and the convention 
be summoned in March, 1916. 

Thus far had the legal reconstruction gone when, sud- 
denly — as far as the outside world is concerned — there 
began to come rumors that the Chinese were discussing 
the possibility and advisability of reverting to the mon- 
archical form of government. Inasmuch as there are 
not lacking those who attribute the origin of the back- 
to-monarchy agitation to the government, it is at least 
significant that the preparation of the machinery by 
which the proposal, in the issue, was "referred to the 
people" was being hastened by the government at the 
very moment when the suggestion that the question be 
considered was insistently put forward. At the same 
time, this cannot in any sense be taken as conclusive 
evidence of the complicity of the government. For, in 
view of the fact that the time was approaching when 
the final step in the organization of the republican gov- 
ernment was, seemingly, about to be taken, it was nat- 
ural that any group interested in averting this consum- 
mation and preferring some other form of government 
should at that moment come forward with counter pro- 
posals. 

For several weeks there had been whisperings and 
echoes of whisperings in Peking on the subject of mon- 
archy, monarchy versus republicanism, the desirability 
of China's returning to monarchy. Then there ap- 
peared in one of the local papers an account of an 
alleged conversation between the President and one of 



CHINA: RETURN TO MONARCHY] 89 

the provincial military governors, in which the Presi- 
dent was represented as having said that he was utterly- 
opposed to the idea of the monarchy, that he certainly 
would not serve as Emperor, that he had no desire to 
establish a dynasty, and that he considered none of his 
sons competent to succeed himself. 

The talk, however, went on, and the discussion finally 
came into the open with the organizing of a "Peace 
Planning Society," or "Society for the Devising of Per- 
manent Peace." 

Conspicuous among the organizers and leaders of the 
new society were some of the close friends and support- 
ers of Yuan Shih-kai. The society began its propa- 
ganda with the publication, on August 16, of a long 
manifesto in which it made much use of certain known 
views and alleged recent utterances of Dr. Goodnow. 
It was represented that Dr. Goodnow had said: "A 
monarchical system of government is better than a re- 
publican system." This the Peace Society made the 
text of its manifesto. It made telling use of references 
to the situation in Mexico as illustrating the difficulties 
of a weak republic with a populace ignorant of political 
affairs. 

Two days later, on the 18th, the Peking Gazette pub- 
lished an interview in which Dr. Goodnow declared that 
in being made to appear as categorically favoring the 
monarchical system he had been misrepresented. A 
restoration of the monarchy in China would, in his opin- 
ion, be justified only in case: (a) the change were accept- 
able to the thinking people of China and to the foreign 
powers; (b) the succession to the throne were fixed so 
that no doubt could arise as to who would succeed ; and 
(c) the monarchy were constitutionally limited, with 
large powers vested for the moment in the crown, but 



90 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

with provision for the gradual development of a more 
popular government. He declined to give an opinion 
as to whether the conditions could be met in China at 
the present time. 

Dr. Goodnow had submitted a long memorandum to 
the President, dealing with the advantages and disad- 
vantages of various types of government, illustrating 
from examples both historical and contemporary. In 
the course of this, he said: 

China is a country which has for centuries been accustomed 
to autocratic rule. The intelligence of the great mass of its 
people is not high, owing to a lack of schools. The Chinese 
have never been accorded much participation in the work of 
government. The result is that the political capacity of thr 
Chinese people is not large. . . . 

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that China has during the 
last few years been attempting to introduce constitutional 
government under less favorable auspices than would have beer 
the case had there been a royal family present which the people 
regarded with respect and to which they were loyal. . . . 

It is, of course, not susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is 
better suited than a republic to China. China's history and 
traditions, her social and economic conditions, her relations 
with foreign powers all make it probable that the country would 
develop that constitutional government which it must develop 
if it is to preserve its independence as a state, more easily as a 
monarchy than as a republic.^ 

In the interval, the Asia Jih Pao, a Chinese newspa- 
per, published a statement ascribed to Yuan Shih-kai, 
in which the President declared that he was unwilling 
to become an Emperor under any circumstances. As for 
the proposals and propaganda of the Peace Society, 

^ See Appendix I. 



CHINA: RETURN TO MONARCHY 91 

he said, such suggestions had been made long before the 
society was organized; the question of what is the best 
form of government was such as ought to be studied by 
the scholars of the country; and so long as the society 
did not cause disturbance in the country, he would not 
be likely to object to its existence. 

The opposition to the proposed change came chiejfly 
from the South — whence has come most of the opposi- 
tion to measures originating in or favored in the North. 
But no effective opposition leadership was developed. 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen is in Japan and is discredited. Huang 
Hsing is also out of the country — an exile. The ex- 
pressions of opposition came in the most part from 
newspapers and from members of the dissolved Kwo- 
ming party; also from business men who were not so 
much opposed to the monarchy as to change, feeling 
that change would disturb business. The foreign news- 
papers published in the settlements in some cases fa- 
vored and in some cases opposed the change, the chief 
ground urged for opposition being the danger of dis- 
turbance which would ensue. The Peking Daily News 
said: 

To speak frankly, China is enjoying the monarchical system 
today, but the country describes itself as a republic, and con- 
sequently the system would fall to pieces on the death of the 
ruler if no provision were made for its maintenance. That 
provision can be made without danger or loss of time simply by 
abandoning the fatuous pretenses that the system that prevails 
is republicanism. 

In view of his oaths to the republic and his recent self- 
denying utterances, it was anticipated that Yuan would 
be in a position of some embarrassment if it were under- 
taken to put the scepter in his hands. To obviate this 



92 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

situation, it was suggested in some quarters that his 
eldest son, Yuan Koh-ting, be made Emperor, with 
Yuan himself as regent for life. As the younger Yuan 
is more than thirty years of age, it was obvious that such 
a regency would be a mere subterfuge; while, as it is 
contrary to Chinese custom to allow a son a position of 
authority over his father, an attempt to establish such 
a system would be not without its difficulties. There 
were other suggestions for the throne, some proponents 
advocating the claims of the ex-baby-emperor, the 
Manchu Hsuan Tung; others, a scion of the Mings, 
the last Chinese dynasty; but most people looked upon 
Yuan Shih-kai as the logical and necessary candi- 
date. 

The fact that Li Yuan-hung, the Vice-President, 
moved out of the palace and was several times absent 
from the meetings of the Council of State was hailed 
by the opposition as an indication that he was against 
the proposed change. But the evidence is inconclusive. 
Li did not resign his offices. He has apparently as- 
sumed an attitude of neutrality. Himself one of the 
leaders in the establishing of the republic, he would nat- 
urally be disinclined to give support to the return-to- 
monarchy movement. At the same time, having wit- 
nessed the difficulties of the republican government, and 
being an ardent admirer of Yuan Shih-kai, he may be 
not at all hostile to the idea of a limited. Yuan mon- 
archy. 

Probably the strongest of the opponents of the 
change, and certainly the most influential, was Liang 
Ch'i-ch'ao. Long an advocate of constitutional mon- 
archy, recently a staunch supporter and a holder of high 
offices in the republican government, easily the fore- 
most of Chinese publicists, Liang explained his oppo- 



CHINA: KETURN TO MONARCHY 03 

sition in a powerful article in which, addressing Yuan 
Shih-kai, he concludes: 

Why should I have opposed you when you first suggested 
the first change of government and oppose you again now? 
Because a change in the conduct of a government is a sign of 
progress, while a change in the form of a government is a sign 
of revolution. A sign of progress leads a nation to progress, 
and a sign of revolution leads a nation to revolution. I have 
always opposed revolution ; hence I am opposing you now as I 
opposed you before, for a revolution always retards the prog- 
ress of a nation. . . . To say that because you wish to reform 
the conduct of a government a change of its form is necessary 
is nonsense. 

The next move was made by the Council of State, 
an instrument of the President. The Council recom- 
mended early in September that the President call a 
convention to decide for or against the restoration, and 
if that be not possible, that he "devise other proper and 
adequate means to consult the will of the people." The 
Council reported that it had received eighty-two peti- 
tions from different bodies favoring a monarchy. 

On October 8, the Council passed a bill providing for 
the election of a convention of citizens to decide as to 
the future form of government, and the President at 
once promulgated the bill as law% The military ele- 
ments were by this time urging that Yuan proclaim 
himself Emperor on October 10, the anniversary of the 
beginning of the revolution, but the President refused 
to consider this, and, to prevent a demonstration, can- 
celed the orders for a parade of the troops on that day. 

The President, next, on October 12, issued a mandate 
saying that he had received petitions from representa- 
tive sources expressing the unanimous opinion that the 



94 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

republican form of government was unsuited to the 
needs of China and requesting him to adopt a consti- 
tutional monarchy, "so that the peace be maintained." 
But, according to the constitutional compact, sovereign 
rights are vested in the entire body of citizens, therefore 
he must leave the decision to the people. 

On October 29, it was announced in Peking and 
Tokyo that the Japanese government had requested the 
Chinese government to postpone the project of rees- 
tablishing a monarchical regime. What had happened 
at Peking was this: the Japanese Charge d' Affaires, 
the British Minister and the Russian Minister had called 
on the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and, with 
the Japanese Charge as spokesman, had inquired verb- 
ally concerning the possible results in case China should 
undertake to make the change. The Japanese Charge 
asked whether President Yuan was confident that the 
change could be peaceably effected. He disclaimed any 
desire on the part of his government to interfere in the 
internal affairs of China, but suggested that, as there 
were evidences of opposition in South China, and in 
view of the disturbed state of world politics, the change 
should at least be delayed. The British Minister took 
part in the discussion, the Russian Minister expressed 
his approval of the position of his colleagues, and it was 
represented that the French government gave its un- 
official support to these views, the reason for its not 
having sent its representative to the conference being 
that it was for the moment preoccupied with the cabinet 
changes at home.^ 

On the same day, it was announced in Washington 
that the United States government, although it had 

■^ A few days later the Italian government announced its concur- 
rence in the views expressed by the ministers of the three powers. 



CHINA: RETURN TO MONARCHY. 95 

been approached on the subject by "interested powers," 
had declined to express an opinion or to take any action 
in the matter. 

The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs thanked the 
ministers of the three powers for their friendly advice, 
said that the question was purely one of internal poli- 
tics, declared that he could guarantee that order would 
be preserved, and suggested that if the government were 
at this stage to endeavor to suppress the consideration, 
such an attempt would cause the very disturbances 
which it was sought to avoid. 

The formal reply of the Chinese government was 
given on November 1 through the Vice-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, who called at the legations of the for- 
eign powers and made verbal statements. He thanked 
the powers for their friendly interest, but declared that 
the question was already in the hands of the Chinese 
people and the consideration could not, therefore, be 
postponed. As for political disturbances, his govern- 
ment had been informed by the officials in the provinces 
that they would be able to keep order in the event of 
a decision to effect the change. He besought the co- 
operation of the powers in restraining a small number 
of rebels who might seek to operate in foreign coun- 
tries and in the foreign concessions in China. He made 
it evident that his government considered the matter 
one of purely domestic concern. 

In the meantime, the balloting for the election of rep- 
resentatives to the colleges which were to decide the 
question had been going on. The vote was taken on the 
basis of the electoral census and lists prepared for the 
coming election of the National Assembly and the choos- 
ing of delegates to the National Convention. The elec- 
tion officials had given notice to qualified citizens in 



96 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

every district and every special electoral group that 
they were entitled to cast ballots to determine what form 
of government should be adopted. The persons so noti- 
fied were required to register, and all who had regis- 
tered were allowed to vote on the days set for their dis- 
tricts or groups. In each of the provincial constituen- 
cies the voters selected five men who in turn chose one 
as elector for the district. The electors proceeded to 
their respective provincial capitals and there cast their 
ballots either for the republic or for constitutional mon- 
archy. The voting for the dependencies was done by 
citizens who happened to be in Peking. 

The canvass of the returns showed that all but fifty 
of the 2,043 electors had declared for constitutional mon- 
archy. In many provinces the electors were asked to 
express themselves as to who should be Emperor — and 
the unanimous opinion, where sought, was for Yuan 
Shih-kai. The Council of State immediately sent Yuan 
a petition asking him to accept the throne, and on De- 
cember 11 it was announced that Yuan "in deference to 
the will of the people" had consented to become Em- 
peror. That the question of the form of government 
was submitted to the electorate, and that the electors 
voted for the monarchy, indicates, to begin with, two 
things: first, that President Yuan Shih-kai had con- 
cluded that the change was desirable or necessary; sec- 
ond, that he was confident that it could be effected suc- 
cessfully and without likelihood of serious opposition. 
Yuan has been and is practically absolute. Had he not 
favored the change, he would have discouraged discus- 
sion and he could have prevented its consideration. He 
had control of the organizing of the electoral machin- 
ery; he knew in advance what return he could expect 
in the elections. 



CHINA: RETURN TO MONARCHY 97 

The decision in favor of monarchy must be credited 
first to the President, who was undoubtedly affected 
by the pressure of the military element and influenced 
by considerations of foreign policy; the confirmation 
of the decision may be credited to the limited aristo- 
cratic electorate, which was essentially of the govern- 
ment's choosing. The people as a whole have not known 
any too much about the question under discussion, and 
they have not in the mass decided either way. 

China has been a republic only in the sense that a 
state having an elected chief executive with a limited 
term of ofiice is a republic. The President has been 
all but absolute and he might have remained in office 
for eighteen more years. Yuan Shih-kai, Emperor, will 
rule little differently from Yuan Shih-kai, President, 
but a state in which there is an Emperor, with a life 
term and a fixed succession, will, of course, be a different 
state from that in which the people have the legal right 
to change their chief executive at intervals. 

As far as China's immediate future is concerned, her 
greatest needs are security, order, and an efficient of- 
ficialdom. The people have been little concerned as to 
what the government shall be called or how organized, 
if only it will afford them security and do them justice. 
They have always considered that the test of a satis- 
factory government is to be sought in the happiness of 
the people. There is little doubt among qualified ob- 
servers that China's position among the nations will 
be strengthened by the assurance that a strong execu- 
tive is securely established in authority at Peking. As 
for the more distant future, a country that has experi- 
enced twenty-five changes of dynasty, established a tem- 
porary republican government, and again reverted to 
monarchy, may, if the time comes and it so chooses. 



98 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ask another Emperor to abdicate, and establish an- 
other repubhcan government. 

Before agreeing to accept the throne, Yuan an- 
nounced that no change would be made "this year." 
Probably the intention is that the change shall not be 
effected until after the Constitutional Convention shall 
have met and framed a permanent constitution.^ In 
view of the Japanese, British, Russian and French "sug- 
gestions" of October 29, and as a measure of practical 
expediency, this would be good political strategy. 

That the change would not be accepted without some 
disturbance was a foregone conclusion. The assassi- 
nation of Admiral Tseng, Governor of Shanghai, on 
November 10, was an act in protest against the govern- 
ment. On December 5 a party of would-be rebels at- 
tempted — to the discomfort of the foreign settlement— 
to seize a government training ship lying in the river 
at Shanghai, but without success. 

The rebellion which has broken out in Yunnan is 
somewhat more serious. On the day following the an- 
nouncement of Yuan's acceptance of the proffered 
throne it was reported that five provinces had revolted. 
Later and more reliable reports indicate that the ris- 
ing is confined practically to Yunnan, where the ex- 
Tutuh (military governor), Tsai Ao, is in command 
of a body of insurgents. 

Tsai Ao is one of the "Young Chinese" who, studying 
military science in Japan, played an important part in 
the revolution. As tutuh in Yunnan he made an ex- 

^ The election of delegates for the Constitutional Convention is 
now under way, and the Convention will in all likelihood be or- 
ganized and will function substantially as has been provided in 
the laws framed during the past year. 



CHINA: RETURN TO MONARCHY 99 

cellent record by restoring and maintaining peace in 
that somewhat restless province. In 1913 he was of- 
fered a seat in the Council of State at Peking, and later 
was appointed director of the Bureau for the Survey- 
ing of Lands. Early in December last he left Peking, 
on the plea of ill health, to recuperate in Japan, and 
he was next heard of as leader of the revolt in Yunnan. 

In estimating the significance of the revolt, it must 
be remembered that Yunnan is furthest removed of the 
provinces from Peking; and also that the Yunnanese 
have been particularly exasperated by the success of 
the government in its relentless campaign for the sup- 
pression of opium growing, which was a lucrative oc- 
cupation there. 

To what extent Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, the 
best known of the republican leaders, are in sympathy 
or connection with the rebellion is not known. Both 
learned their lesson in 1913; and neither will be ready 
to associate himself with another unduly precarious 
undertaking. 

It is scarcely to be expected that the rebellion will 
make great headway. In the first place, the armed forces 
of the nation, especially the better trained troops of 
the North, are under the absolute control of Yuan — 
to whom they are loyal. Nearly all of the military gov- 
ernors in the provinces are either old followers or per- 
sonal friends of Yuan, and the few exceptions are 
practical men and essentially conservative in disposition. 
In the second place, the principle of monarchical gov- 
ernment fairly represents the political ideal of the peo- 
ple as a whole. Third, even his worst enemies concede 
that Yuan is the ablest man to whom the nation can 
look both for reconstruction within and for defense 
against what, after all, is the greatest menace to its lib- 



100 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

erties — danger from without. Yuan's preeminence is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Manchus looked to 
him — whom they had two years before disgraced — as 
their best hope in their hour of danger; that Sun Yat- 
sen yielded the position of chief executive in his favor; 
that the bankers of the five powers group signed their 
loan contract with him personally in spite of the op- 
position of the Assembly; that the best of the revolu- 
tionary generals, along with the former officers of the 
Manchus, remained loyal to him when their misguided 
colleagues embarked upon the ill-advised and easily sup- 
pressed rebellion of 1913; and, finally, by the fact that 
for thirty years the representatives of foreign coun- 
tries, both official and unofficial, who have come in con- 
tact with him have felt and have shown their confidence 
in him. 

If Yuan's government is overthrown it will be by 
forces greater than those moving the rebellion in 
Yunnan. 

Biographical Notes appear infra, pp. 405-4-12. 



POLITICS IN CHINA AND IN JAPAN 

JAPAN 



CHAPTER VII 

japan: the rise of japan as a modern power 

The modern history of Japan begins in the sixteenth 
century. Not until 1542 did the first white men, Portu- 
guese under Mendez Pinto, land on the soil of that iso- 
lated island realm. The newcomers brought with them 
guns, powder, cotton and tobacco. Seven years later 
Francis Xavier and his missionary band introduced the 
Bible. The Buddhist priests, traditionally tolerant, lis- 
tened impassively to Xavier until his bigotry stirred 
them to the point of opposition, but he was helped on 
his way as he moved from place to place by the desire 
of the people for the trade which followed him. 

The dual system of government, a survival of many 
centuries, under which the Mikado, the legal and titular 
sovereign, remained in the seclusion of his palace at 
Kyoto, while the Shogun, the head of the military nobil- 
ity, governed the country, prevailed at this time in all its 
significance. The last quartei ol the sixteenth century 
saw the Ashikaga clan deposed from the shogunate 
and the control of the admmistration wrested from it 
by Nobunaga Oda, one of the greatest of Japan's war- 
riors and statesmen. 

Nobunaga permitted the Christian missionaries to 
go on with their propaganda. His successor, Hideyoshi 
Toyotomi, the "Napoleon, of Japan," was antagonized 
by the militant methods employed by the Jesuit priests, 
and in 1597 he authorized a general persecution of the 

103 



104 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Christians, who are estimated to have numbered by that 
time 300,000. In 1593 Franciscan and Dominican friars 
had begun to come from the Philippines and Spain, and 
their subsequent quarrels with the Jesuits soon antago- 
nized the native rulers. 

About 1600 the first Dutch traders reached Japan. 
One of their vessels carried as its pilot an Englishman, 
Will Adams. Though neither an official nor a scholar, 
Adams made a favorable impression upon the Court 
and by virtue of his practical knowledge of shipbuilding 
soon found himself in the high favor of the Shogun. 
He spent the remainder of his life in Japan. 

The monopolistic returns from the foreign trade, 
which increased rapidly in value as a consequence of the 
competition which arose between the British and the 
Dutch East India Companies, predisposed lyeyasu, the 
founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate,^ to tolerance of 
the missionaries. lyeyasu even sent an emissary to Eu- 
rope to observe the conduct of Christians in their own 
countries, but the report brought back of inquisitions 
and religious strife, coupled with the suspicion which 
developed locally from sectarian contentions, led him in 
1614 to publish an edict requiring the banishment of 
all foreign priests, the destruction of their churches, and 
the punishment of all native Christians who would not 
recant. From this time persecution became constantly 
more vigorous. The Christians did not tamely submit, 
and in 1637 the Christian Revolt of Shimabara brought 
upon them a great massacre at Hara, the Dutch lending 
ignoble aid with the guns of their ships. By 1640 prac- 
tically all foreigners had been driven out with the ex- 
ception of the Chinese and the Dutch, both of whom 

were interested in trade rather than in missions. The 
_____ 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 105 

Chinese traders were confined to Nagasaki; the Dutch 
to Deshima, a small island in the harbor off that city, 
to which two ships from Europe were allowed to come 
annually until, in 1790, the number was reduced to one. 
Between 1640 and 1854 Japan remained, except for 
this one small aperture, absolutely sealed against the 
influences of the West. 

During these years a history of Japan was compiled 
which, though not published until 1851, was copied by 
hand by many enthusiastic students. In spite of Im- 
perial decrees Dutch scientific books were read. Grad- 
ually the restrictions were relaxed. In 1809 the study of 
the English language was begun, and in 1847 an Eng- 
lish grammar was published. 

Two revolutionary changes make the history of Japan 
in the nineteenth century in some respects analogous 
to that of Western nations in the same or proximate dec- 
ades. The first was the reopening of Japan; the sec- 
ond the restoration of power to the Emperor. The 
same preliminary changes led up to and influenced both ; 
the first hastened on the second. 

Circumstances as well as men were favorable to the 
United States in the efforts which several nations be- 
gan early in the century to direct toward the opening up 
of trade with Japan. Americans had no traditions of 
early unsatisfactory relations to contend with, and their 
first steps toward friendship were facilitated by the fa- 
vors they were able to confer in the restoring of ship- 
wrecked sailors found at sea or cast away upon the Ore- 
gon and California coasts. The Pacific had become of 
some importance to Americans through the whaling in- 
dustry, and the wrecking of a few of our vessels on the 
Japanese coast made it imperatively necessary to ob- 
tain guaranties for friendly treatment of our sailors. 



106 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Not until 1853, however, did the forcing of the doors 
begin, their rusty hinges being then loosened by the oil 
of Commodore Perry's diplomacy with the pressure of 
the presence of the "black ships" and the menace of their 
terrible cannon. 

The United States had sent Commodore Perry with 
instructions to negotiate with the ruler of Japan to the 
end that: (1) Protection should be guaranteed to 
American seamen who were in danger or had suffered 
shipwreck on the Japanese coast; (2) permission should 
be granted to American vessels to obtain supplies in 
certain Japanese ports; and (3) certain ports should 
be opened to American trade. Perry took with him 
new inventions of many kinds and gifts, which proved 
extremely useful as an adjunct of diplomacy. 

Perry had a letter from the President of the United 
States which he was instructed to deliver to the "Sov- 
ereign of Japan" ; and this he delivered to a representa- 
tive of the Shogun who was eventually sent to him to 
receive the message from America. His reluctant hosts 
were now greatly put to it to decide what reply they 
should make to the unwelcome proposals. 

In the circles of Japanese officialdom counsels were 
divided ; the Shogun, who knew more than others of the 
outside world and of comparative forces and was there- 
fore better able to understand what Perry's arrival must 
portend, favored accepting the inevitable; the Imperial 
court in its self-contained ignorance urged that no favor 
be accorded the annoying requests of the impertinent 
foreigners. 

Recognizing the reasonableness of giving them time 
to consider, Perry, having informed them that he would 
return next year for his answer, sailed away to the Chi- 
nese coast. At Shanghai the commander of a Russian 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 107 

fleet proposed to him that they join forces and compel 
the Japanese to accede to the common demand that they 
open their doors. This Perry refused to consider, hav- 
ing orders from his government that he was at all 
times to respect the sovereign rights of Japan and was 
not to use force unless compelled in self-defense to 
do so. 

The American fleet, reenforced and presenting an 
imposing array, returned to Yedo Bay in February, 
1854. The interim had been spent in argument between 
the courts of Kyoto and of Yedo, the Shogun pointing 
out that Japan was in no position to withstand the for- 
eigners if appeal were made to arms, and urging the ad- 
vantages of accepting commercial intercourse for the 
sake of learning the arts and methods of the West ; the 
Emperor insisting that his retainers must not per- 
mit "these people to pollute one inch of our terri- 
tory." 

Fear and common sense prevailed. The Shogun 
signed a treaty with Perry on March 31, 1854. This 
treaty — from which dates the rise of "New Japan" — 
recognizing the principles of "friendship and amity," 
provided that two ports should be opened for the pur- 
chase of supplies, that shipwrecked sailors should be 
properly cared for, and that consuls might be stationed 
at Shimoda should circumstances require. It contained 
a most-favored-nation clause. In the same year Great 
Britain, in the following year Russia and Holland, and 
later other nations obtained similar treaties. All were 
signed on the responsibility of the Shogun, the Mikado 
remaining obdurate in his refusal to have anything to do 
with the men from the West. It is interesting to note 
that by this time the individual power of the Shogun 
had greatly declined, the holder of the title being fre- 



108 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

quently a mere youth, and that the real authority lay 
in the hands of a number of Lords in Council at the 
Shogun's Court. I 

In August of 1856 Mr. Townsend Harris, designated 
as American Consul-General to Japan, landed at Shi- I 
moda. Harris was invested with diplomatic powers 
and his primary mission was to obtain a commercial 
treaty. To this the Shogunate was favorable, but it was 
necessary to convey to the country the impression of 
resistance. Hence, although he obtained a convention 
in 1857 guaranteeing consular and extraterritorial privi- 
leges and arranging a rate of exchange between Japa- 
nese and American coins, it was not until July, 1858, 
that Harris was able to secure the signing of the long- 
sought commercial treaty. When it had been concluded, 
however, Harris' treaty of 1858 became, and it re- 
mained until the making of the new series after 1894, 
the model for the treaties of other nations, while its i 
terms remained the basis of Japan's commercial rela- -| 
tions with the world until 1899. It provided for the J 
reception of diplomatic representatives at the capital, J 
and of consuls at open ports, together with extraterri- 1 
torial jurisdiction; American citizens were given the?j 
right to live at Yedo and the open ports ; four new ports j 
were to be opened ; commerce was to be freely allowed 1 
at the open ports, subject to a low scale of ad valorem 
customs duties; importation of opium was forbidden; 
and most-favored-nation treatment was guaranteed. 

In the following month representatives of Great Brit- 
ain, France, and Russia obtained treaties with practi- 
cally identical provisions. 

Japanese emissaries had been sent abroad on special t 
missions prior to the closing of the country. But the 
seventy-one commissioners who left Japan in February, 






JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 109 

1860, to exchange at Washington the ratification of the 
new treaty formed the first diplomatic mission which 
the Japanese sent abroad. These commissioners were 
taken across the Pacific and up the Atlantic Coast on 
American war vessels, and their visit to the United 
States made upon them, as did they upon America, an 
extremely favorable impression. Harris returned as 
first American Minister to Japan, and there he remained 
until May, 1862. 

In the annals of Japanese- American relations the 
name of Townsend Harris should be inseparably linked 
with that of Commodore Perry, for while it was Perry 
who forced Japan to unlock her doors, it was Harris 
who persuaded her to open them and prepare to qualify 
for membership in the society of nations. 

The signing of these treaties was not unattended with 
disorder and violence, but the marvel was that so little 
of this was manifested. The Shogun acted throughout 
consistently; if perpetrators of iniquity upon foreigners 
escaped punishment, it was usually because they were 
either unattached and lordless ronin or vassals of feudal 
chiefs whose power was too great for even the Shogun 
to restrain. Harris' life was menaced and his secre- 
tary was murdered. In 1861 and 1862 the British Le- 
gation was attacked. In 1861 an Englishman was killed 
near Yokohama by an attendant of the Prince of Sat- 
suma for an insult, according to Japanese standards, 
to the dignity of that feudal chief. An indemnity was 
demanded, and as this was not forthcoming a British 
squadron bombarded the Satsuma stronghold, Kago- 
shima, and the indemnity was increased threefold. 

When the extreme conservatism of the Imperial 
Party manifested itself in the issuing by the Mikado 
of a decree ordering the closing of the ports and the 



110 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

driving out of the foreigners, the Shogun sent envoys 
to European capitals asking that the treaties be sus- 
pended and the opening of the new ports be postponed. 
The envoys emphasized the disturbed condition of the 
country and the increase in the cost of hving due to 
foreign trade. The result was a compromise : the order 
for the expulsion of foreigners was withdrawn, and the 
treaty powers agreed to the postponement of the open- 
ing of all the new ports excepting Yokohama. The 
members of this mission, as had been those who went 
to the United States in 1860, were deeply impressed 
with the wealth, power, and influence of Occidental 
countries. 

The Satsuma clansmen, one of the great southern 
groups, had already been given an effective illustration 
of the futility of resistance to the armed force which 
backed the diplomacy of the West. It remained for 
another great clan of the South, Choshiu, to be brought 
to a similar realization. The men of Choshiu had in view 
the double end of prohibiting the encroachment of the 
foreigners and of weakening the Shogunate in order to > 
obtain preponderant influence with the Imperial throne. 
Their opportunity for action lay in their possession of 
the forts which controlled the Straits of Shimonoseki i 
leading into the Inland Sea. Here they fired upon the 
vessels of the Shogun, of the United States, and of Eu- 
ropean nations, in utter disregard both of municipal and I 
of international law. A combined squadron of British, 
French, Dutch, and American warships bombarded the 
forts in September, 1864, and landed marines, who 
spiked every gun in the fortifications. The Shogun took 
it upon himself to pay an indemnity of $3,000,000, which 
the powers concerned agreed to divide equally among ( 
themselves. Twenty years later the United States re- 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 111 

turned its share of this indemnity, to the great grati- 
fication of the Japanese. 

In the light of their later great achievements, it is 
of special interest to recall that the late Prince Ito, Ja- 
pan's greatest statesman, and the late Marquis Inouye, 
likewise destined to serve as one of the most influential 
among the "Elder Statesmen," hastened home from stu- 
dent life in London at this time to urge upon their clans- 
men the futility of resistance to such superior force and 
the civilization which it represented. Their advice was 
considered the shallow judgment of youth — until the 
course of events justified their contentions. 

The bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki 
accomplished what no other influence could have ef- 
fected. The Satsuma and Choshiu clans, which had been 
the bulwarks of anti-foreign sentiment, arrived at a sense 
of their comparative weakness and became desirous of 
learning western methods. The weakening effects of 
feudalism were apparent. An interest was aroused in 
foreign customs and inventions. Satsuma and Choshiu 
men forgot their own minor differences and united to 
bring about centralization of government. From this 
time forward the influential elements in Japan were 
reconciled to the idea of intercourse with foreign na- 
tions. 

The next effort of the diplomats w^as directed toward 
securing the Emperor's ratification of the treaties, which 
was felt to be necessary in view of the traditional rever- 
ence of the Japanese for the authority of the throne. 
In this the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, took 
the lead. Under instructions from his government, he 
proposed to the Japanese that if the Emperor would 
ratify the treaties, consent to an early opening of cer- 
tain ports, and agree to a tariff on a 5 per cent, basis, 



112 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Great Britain would waive two-thirds of the Choshiu 
indemnity. A naval demonstration was arranged in the 
last months of 1865, in which the French and Dutch 
participated with the British. These measures accom- 
plished their prime purpose, for the Emperor published 
a decree announcing his approval of the treaties. The 
British had, however, asked for more than could be 
given and therefore had an excuse for retaining the in- 
demnity because the Japanese postponed the opening < 
of Hiogo and Osaka. 

In 1866 the United States, Great Britain, France and 
Holland signed a new convention with the Japanese, 
procuring a revision of the tariff. By this new arrange- 
ment foreign intercourse was further encouraged. Of- 
ficials were no longer to prevent free intercourse, com- 
mercial and social, between inhabitants of treaty ports :, 
and foreigners ; natives were to be allowed to hire for- J 
eign vessels to trade either at the open ports or abroad ; 
and Japanese were to be free to go abroad as students 
or traders. 

As the time for the opening of Hiogo and Osaka drew | 
near, the strange situation was presented of Emperor* 
and Shogun opposing the fulfillment of their promise, 
while the great clans urged that it be kept to the let- 
ter. Nothing could more clearly have demonstrated 
than did this change of front on the part of the clans that « 
the cause of seclusion was lost. Thoroughly consistent 
in their aim to overthrow the shogunate, the clansmen 
had completely altered their plan of operations to that 
end. Having encouraged the Mikado in his reaction- 
ary policy, they now opposed reaction. The weather 
vane of clan opposition had swung from in to out, and 
it was now the wish of the Satsuma and Choshiu leaders 
to plunge as quickly as possible into the unknown sea 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 113 

of Western influence and customs in order that Japan 
might emerge equipped with the essentials for the at- 
tainment of unity at home and predominance in the 
Orient. 

Fate decreed that the full Imperial consent to the 
change in the national policy should be given by a new 
Emperor. In 1867 Mutsuhito, destined to reign until 
1912 and to symbolize in an extraordinary degree the 
spirit of the new Japan, succeeded his father upon the 
throne. The youthful monarch at once gave his con- 
sent to the opening of the ports, and thus after twelve 
years of divided counsels Japan was officially open to 
the world. 

Simultaneously with this complete reversal of atti- 
tude on the question of foreign affairs there occurred a 
momentous revolution in the machinery of the Japa- 
nese government. For seven centuries the Shoguns had 
been in control of the administration. In 1868 the then 
holder of the shogunate resigned his administrative 
power, mostly at his own volition, into the hands of the 
Emperor. A variety of factors had led to this decision. 
Originally the vigorous agents of leisure- and luxury- 
loving sovereigns, the Shoguns had in turn fallen a prey 
to the enervating influence of court life and an age of 
peace, and their prestige had waned as their authority 
was wielded by subordinates. A revival of historical 
studies brought the educated classes to a realization that 
the Shoguns had usurped and were exercising powers 
which belonged of "divine right" to the Emperor. With 
peace, the advantages of the feudal system sank, in the 
popular mind, in relative importance to the disadvan- 
tages which that regime brought home to the trading 
and industrial and the agricultural classes. Producers 
began to chafe under the burden of supporting a great 



114 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

horde of privileged nobles and military men in an age 
when the latter rendered no real service and contributed 
little to the common welfare. All this had its direct 
bearing later on the question of the abolition of feudal- 
ism. The shogunate was further weakened by the ri- 
valries of the clans, but, fortunately for the Shogun, the 
clans were more jealous of each other than of his power. 
The bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, 
however, drove the two most powerful clans to unite 
for purposes of foreign policy. Most effective prob- 
ably, of all influences, the thinkers among Japanese 
statesmen had begun to realize that the dual system 
could no longer continue to operate successfully, since 
the new activities of the government, especially in the 
field of foreign affairs, required unity and a strong cen- 
tral authority. 

The attitude of welcome which the Shogun had been 
compelled to assume when Perry presented his demands, 
had undermined his influence with the daimyos and the 
samurai. Whether willingly or not, the Shogun had 
entered into treaty relations with the "barbarians" and 
had abandoned the traditional policy of seclusion. It 
was but logical for the nation to desire centralization 
of power in order that, since the incoming of alien in- 
fluences was inevitable and had been accepted, the coun- 
try might be united and capable of protecting itself 
against undue pressure. 

With splendid grace, when one considers that since 
1603 his family had held the highest office under the 
Emperor and that millions of retainers were at his com- 
mand, the Shogun Keiki, bowing to the expressed wish 
of the great daimyos, resigned. Though his resignation 
was accepted, the control of foreign affairs was left in 
his hands for some months. The great clans were sus- 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 115 

picious of this and attempted to make the issue certain 
by high-handed measures, seizing the gates of the Im- 
perial Palace and obtaining a decree which ordered the 
abolition of the shogunate. The Shogun, although will- 
ing to leave the question to the assembled daimyos, re- 
sented this action by a few clans. His followers were 
even more incensed and, had they been led by an lye- 
yasu in the struggle that followed, might have turned 
defeat into victory. The clans and the Imperial Court 
had, however, found a common ground for cooperation, 
and with their victory over the Shogun's retainers the 
Imperial Court obtained full control, thus making the 
way open to a reorganization of the government along 
lines of centralization. 

There still remained one great obstacle in the path 
of progress. This was the institution of feudalism. 
Having developed with the shogunate, it was but natu- 
ral that it should fall with that office. The weakening 
influences which had undermined the Shogun's position 
had a similar effect upon feudalism. Both institutions 
were essentially decentralizing influences ; both were out 
of date ; both were shown to be elements of weakness to 
the state in conflict with Western powers. 

The Restoration had been very largely due to the 
work of the younger men, men in the prime of youth 
fired by patriotic spirit and ambition. Many of these 
were samurai of the better type. These men now en- 
gaged in the work of bringing the daimyos to a sense 
of the necessity for their surrender of their feudal pre- 
rogatives. Force was out of the question; the arts of 
persuasion alone could be used. The task was not so 
difficult as might have been expected in view of the age 
of the system and the extent of the privileges, amount- 
ing practically to supreme administrative, judicial, and 



116 POLITICS m THE FAR EAST 

financial power, which the daimj'^os enjoyed. The samu- 
rai were in great part sustained by the feudal lords, so 
that it is difficult, in spite of the opinions of some writers, 
to see wherein these warriors could have expected better 
conditions for themselves to follow upon the destruction 
of feudalism. While the principle of selfishness cannot 
be entirely ruled out of account, that alone would be ut- 
terly inadequate to explain the action of the feudal 
chiefs in 1869. In that year, within as many weeks as 
the feudal regime had lasted centuries, the system was 
abolished through voluntary surrender by the daimyos 
of their lands and prerogatives, to be dealt with by the 
Emperor as he deemed best. We see in this great re- 
nunciation a tremendous evidence of the power of the 
ideal of reverence for the Emperor. Moreover, the sac- 
rifice, which proved very costly to both chieftains and 
samurai, appears to have been due in part to a sensing 
of the fact that the future of the country demanded it. 
The great light which showed the inconsistency of the 
institutions of the old regime with the hopes of the new 
appears to have broken suddenly upon the minds of the 
influential classes, and without waiting to be forced into 
what would ultimately have had to come, they took the 
step which marked the climax of the revolutionary 
process. At first glance the nobility of the sacrifice 
would seem to put the transaction above the realm of 
criticism. But it is fair to ask whether, in the enthusi- 
astic unanimity of this renunciation, the Japanese aris- 
tocracy were not swayed in many cases by unquestion- 
ing emotionalism or, in some cases, fear of appearances, 
at the expense of that spirit of initiative and individu- 
ality which is essential in the character of a people des- 
tined to hold a leading place in the procession of na- 
tions. For the development of great and abiding in- 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 117 

stitutions and of the highest ideals in government, it is 
essential that the ruling few be able to draw inspiration 
from those whose affairs they administer; government 
must be a process of give and take made possible be- 
cause both the leaders and the led are in agreement, as 
a result of individual conviction, as to fundamental prin- 
ciples of action. 

The Imperial Rescript which announced to the pow- 
ers that the reins of government had been resumed by 
the Emperor was issued in February, 1868. Shortly 
thereafter the leaders of the principal clans addressed 
a memorial to the throne wherein, declaring that the 
closure of the country had been a mistake, they sug- 
gested a change of attitude : 

Let the foolish argument which has hitherto styled foreigners 
dogs and goats and barbarians be abandoned. Let the court 
ceremonies hitherto imitated from the Chinese be reformed, and 
the foreigners' representatives be invited to court in the manner 
prescribed by the rules current among all nations, and let this 
be publicly notified throughout the country, so that the count- 
less people may be taught what is the light in which they are to 
regard this subject. 

While this memorial indicated the attitude of the lead- 
ers, many of the samurai of the inferior type continued 
to view the presence of foreigners as an insult to their 
sovereign and their own traditions, and a number of 
minor outbreaks occurred. In March, 1868, the escort 
of the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, was at- 
tacked by two of these obdurate swordsmen, whereupon 
the court leaders apologized and the Mikado issued this 
decree: 

All persons in future guilty of murdering foreigners, or of 
committing any acts of violence toward them, will be not only 



118 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

acting in opposition to His Majesty's express orders and be the 
cause of national misfortune, but will also be committing the 
heinous offense of causing the national dignity and good faith 
to suffer in the eyes of the Treaty Powers with whom His 
Majesty has declared himself bound by relations of amity. 

This and a declaration which soon followed, remov- 
ing the prohibition of missionary work, amounted to an 
official sanctioning of the policy favoring foreign in- 
tercourse which the Shogun had inaugurated. 

Following upon the Restoration, the treaty powers 
all transferred their diplomatic connections to the 
Court of the Mikado, which, after remaining at Kyoto 
until 1868, was in that year removed to Tokyo. In the 
'first year of the new order the diplomatic corps was 
received in audience by the Emperor. 

In April, 1868, the Emperor issued the famous 
"Charter Oath," promising reforms looking toward rep- 
resentative institutions and the substitution of new 
methods for those found old and outworn. The era of 
reform forthwith began. The Sovereign appeared in 
public. The old nobility was abolished and with it the 
samurai, whose passing, though inevitable, has about it 
a touch of pathos. In 1869 the first Assembly met, "for 
the purpose of getting at national opinion and taking 
the advice of the ruling classes." 

European dress began to be worn. Between Yoko- 
hama and Tokyo telegraph lines were run in 1868, and 
by 1872 a railway was in operation between those cities. 
In 1871 the first newspaper appeared, the Shimhun- 
Zasski. In the same year prefectures coordinated to 
the central government were substituted for the clan ad- 
ministration, this being the first step toward doing away 
with the feudal organization. Numerous ceremonial 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 119 

forms disappeared and Western informality began to be 
imitated. In 1875 tbe European calendar was adopted. 
Post offices were established. In 1877 Japan signed the 
International Postal Convention, and in 1879 she be- 
came a party to the International Telegraphic Conven- 
tion. Numerous students went to Europe and America 
to acquaint themselves with the literature and the scien- 
tific and legal foundations of the West. 

In 1872 universal military service was introduced. 
This was a logical following-out of the policy which 
had abolished feudalism. The military class, the samu- 
rai, had expected to be retained as the army of the new 
Japan. Disappointed and feeling a sense of outrage 
over the disregard of their traditionally exclusive claims 
to fight their country's battles, they now revolted under 
the leadership of Saigo Takamori, one of the Satsuma 
samurai and a notable leader of the movement for the 
Restoration. The revolt failed, the warrror class going 
down to defeat before the first levies of the new in- 
fantry. The establishment of the conscription system 
rid the country of its unruly military gentry and placed 
Japan in line with European practices. 

A college for the study of foreign languages had been 
established in 1857; a school of European medicine, in 
1858. Out of these grew the University of Tokyo. In 
1871 the Ministry of Education was reorganized. The 
students who had gone to foreign lands found them- 
selves handicapped by ignorance of languages. In 1884 
the study of English was made a part of the course in 
the public schools. In other ways the general educa- 
tional curriculum was revised so as to aid students in- 
tending to go abroad. In accordance with the general 
attitude of the government the lowest classes, hitherto 
"outcasts," were declared citizens. The instrument of 



120 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the Emperor in carrying out these reforms was the 
Council of State, the collegiate head of the adminis- 
tration, which contained both reformers and more con- 
servative representatives of the clans. To the wisdom 
of this body the greater part of the credit for so peace- 
fully wrought a transformation is due. 

The Japanese were not long in discovering that in 
ratifying the Treaties of 1858 and of subsequent years 
they had parted with two essential attributes of sov- 
ereignty, judicial and financial autonomy. Foreign 
courts with extraterritorial jurisdiction were estab- 
lished in Japan, and the tariff rates were fixed and 
could not be raised. In principle and in practice the 
people felt extraterritoriality to be a disgrace and an 
injustice, while the expanding governmental activities 
called for increased revenues. It is clear that in draft- 
ing the details of the treaties advantage was taken, by 
foreign negotiators, of Japanese ignorance and help- 
lessness, although in principle and for the conditions 
prevailing when they were made the treaty provisions 
were reasonable and just. 

According to a clause in some of the treaties, propo- 
sitions for revision were to be in order in 1872. In 
1871 the government sent a commission to the United 
States and Europe under Iwakura Tomomi, Minister 
for Foreign Afi'airs, together with Ito and others. This 
commission was to explain the progress which Japan had 
made and to try to secure a revision of the treaties. It 
was also to collect information concerning European in- 
stitutions and methods of government. The effort to 
secure treaty revision failed. The Japanese were not 
yet able to offer satisfactory guaranties for the security 
of foreigners and foreign trade. Also, the treaty pow- 
ers had agreed to act in common and they could not 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 121 

agree upon terms of revision. No doubt the influence 
of foreign manufacturers and merchants who wished to 
continue to profit by the very low tariff duties was con- 
siderable. 

It was pointed out to the envoys that Japan should 
bring her legal system up to standards of Western civili- 
zation, and they saw for themselves that their nation 
must make itself strong enough to stand the test of 
international conflict. The Japanese statesmen set 
themselves immediately at both tasks. Advisers and 
experts in law, finance, military affairs, agriculture, and 
science were employed. The reform of the civil law was 
based upon general Occidental practice ; that in commer- 
cial law followed the German system; while France 
furnished the models for the altered criminal laws. The 
jury system was not adopted, but a hierarchy of col- 
legiate courts, permitting the appeal of cases, was in- 
stituted. A civil service system was adopted, a cabinet 
system and a privy council were established. A com- 
mission appointed for drafting a constitution worked 
from 1881 to 1889, in which year the constitution was 
promulgated. 

A conference met at Tokyo in 1882 to consider the 
question of revising the treaties, but the American repre- 
sentative stood alone in his willingness to act fa- 
vorably to Japan.^ In 1886 another conference was 
held. Some progress was made toward reform of the 
tariff duties, but no agreement was reached on the ques- 
tion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The prospects 
were that a compromise would be obtained by substi- 

^ The United States had negotiated a treaty with Japan in 1878, 
yielding the points for which the Japanese were contending, but 
this could not go into effect until the other powers should have 
agreed to similar provisions. 



122 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

tuting for the foreign tribunals a number of foreign 
judges on the benches of those Japanese courts which 
would have to deal with cases involving foreigners. 
This proposition was opposed by the Japanese people, 
because it involved the appointment of judges by the 
diplomatic corps of foreign powers and therefore con* 
stituted another invasion of Japanese sovereignty. A\ 
this time the United States made with Japan an ex- 
tradition treaty, an evidence of good will and of diver- 
gence from the viewpoint of the British government, 
which held that it had the right under extraterritoriality 
provisions to search for and arrest in any part of Japan 
a British fugitive from justice. 

Count Okuma took up the struggle for treaty re- 
vision, and because of his willingness to compromise was 
attacked by a fanatic who considered him a traitor 
The government and people began to feel the gaining 
of recognition a well-nigh hopeless task. Reform, how- 
ever, continued. The constitution was promulgated in 
1889, and in 1890 the first elections for the Diet took 
place. In 1893 the Lower House urged that revision 
of the treaties be vigorously pressed. Great Britain was 
still the leading power in the Far East and the success 
of the movement for treaty revision hinged upon her 
attitude. In 1894 the conclusion that Japan's progress 
warranted the alteration of the treaties and that the 
friendship of Japan might not be without value in the 
future, led the British government to yield and to sign 
the first of the revised treaties which five years later 
became effective. 

The United States at once followed the action of 
her greatest trade rival and signed a new treaty. By 
1897 all the powers had taken similar action. These 
treaties were to take effect in 1899. They surrendered 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 123 

extraterritorial jurisdiction and control over the tariff, 
subject to the condition that for twelve years certain 
rates should remain as fixed by the new treaty. Hence- 
forth Japan was to possess judicial and financial au- 
tonomy. In return the whole country was opened to 
the residence of foreigners. 

Japan thus after twenty-two years of diplomatic 
endeavor and patient effort toward reform had received 
her charter of admission on a basis of legal equality 
into the family of nations. Immediately the govern- 
ment showed its appreciation by publishing a rescript 
which asserted it to be the Emperor's intention to treat 
natives and foreigners impartially and called upon the 
people to sustain the honor of Japan in the eyes of the 
world by refraining from any sort of attack upon the 
foreign population. The Buddhist ecclesiastics issued 
notices that religious freedom was guaranteed by the 
constitution and that injury to Christians was to be con- 
sidered a crime. 

Since 1900 Japanese progress has continued. Espe- 
cial attention has been concentrated upon the army and 
the navy. Between 1902 and 1913, $373,000,000 were 
spent on the navy alone. Japan now possesses ship- 
yards capable of building the largest modern warships, 
with their machinery. Her factories can furnish re- 
liable armor plate for all the ships she can build. Her 
greatest handicap lies in the fact that her supplies of 
raw material, especially coal and iron, are limited. 

Progress in the development of land armament has 
been equally rapid. Since the war with Russia, the 
Japanese army has reached a strength twice as great 
as it possessed in that struggle, with an estimated peace 
footing of 250,000 men, and a possible war complement 
of 2,000,000. The administration of the army and navy 



124 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

is coordinated through the agency of the Supreme Mili- 
tary Council of War which contains officials from both 
services and advises the Emperor in all matters per- 
taining to both. The expenditure for the army has been 
even heavier than for the navy, totaling some $493,000,- 
000 in the ten-year period, 1902-1913. This means that 
in that period Japan expended over $860,000,000 for 
her army and navy. The results of such tremendous 
sacrifice are a consolidation of influence, an assured po- 
sition against foreign aggression, and a national debt 
which is entirely out of proportion to the country's 
wealth and resources. 

The educational system provides a series of schools 
from kindergarten to university. For every boy and 
girl an elementary school training covering six years is 
required. After this period further education is volun- 
tary. Compulsion has been unnecessary, no feature in 
modern Japanese life being more striking than the uni- 
versal desire for education along Western lines. Above 
the elementary school are the so-called "middle schools," 
offering philosophy and Oriental languages in addi- 
tion to the subjects found in American grammar and 
high schools. Graduation from the middle school ex- 
empts a youth from one year of military service. 

The high school, to which an aspirant for university 
work now passes, enables him to prepare for the uni- 
versity in three years or to spend four years in the study 
of some professional subject such as law or medicine. 
The chief concern of these schools is the teaching of 
foreign languages, a function performed very inade- 
quately by the middle schools. 

There are a considerable number of normal schools, 
higher normal schools, colleges, and technical schools, 
for students who do not wish to attend or can- 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 125 

not be admitted to the universities. There are now 
four Imperial universities, of which those at Tokyo 
and Kyoto are the best known. Tokyo University has 
Faculties of Law, Medicine, Engineering, Literature, 
Science and Agriculture; Kyoto University has the 
same with the exception of Agriculture. There are 
also various private and endowed institutions of college 
or university standing, of which the most important 
are Keiogijuki (Keio) University; Waseda University 
— which was founded by Count Okuma; and Doshisha 
University — a Japanese-Christian institution. On the 
whole, however, the demand for higher education has 
outrun the provision of facilities. The universities are 
unable to accommodate the whole number of qualified 
students who apply for admission, and every year large 
numbers of applicants have to be turned away. 

The first railway was opened to traffic in 1872. To- 
day there are 5,000 miles of line, yet the increase of in- 
dustry and trade renders the transportation facilities 
insufficient and adds to the problem of internal develop- 
ment. In 1906 the government bought out thirty-six 
private companies, thus concentrating the ownership of 
railways in its own hands. 

Since 1880 the government has stimulated the growth 
of a merchant marine by large subsidies. This policy 
has been bound up since 1896 with that of insuring a 
sufficiency of transports in case of any future war. The 
subsidies have operated as was expected, and Japan's 
steam merchant shipping in 1914 totaled 1,700,000 tons 
gross, placing her sixth among the nations. 

The growth of Japanese industries has been phenome- 
nal. From a condition in which agriculture was all- 
important, Japan has progressed since the Restoration 
to a place which entitles her to consideration as an in- 



126 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

dustrial nation. Her rapid development in this respect 
has already enabled her to take advantage of the awak- 
ening of China to Western influences. Her geographi- 
cal position and her cheap labor are greatly in her favor 
in competition for Far Eastern trade, but she labors un- 
der the handicaps of possessing comparatively limited 
natural resources and lack of capital. In the initiation 
and upbuilding of manufactures and the improvement 
of methods for the exploiting of natural products the 
government has always led the way. Foreign trade 
has been developed concurrently with the industrial out- 
put, imports amounting in 1913 to some $370,000,000, 
and exports totaling $320,000,000. There was a fall- 
ing away in 1914, due to the war. The figures were: 
imports, $288,000,000; exports, $285,500,000. In the 
first half of 1915 the exports exceeded the imports, both 
figures, however, remaining below those of 1913. The 
United States and China are by far the best of Japan's 
customers. 

Since 1867 Japan has completely transformed her 
banking system. She now possesses some 2,300 banks 
which at the end of 1913 had deposits of over $1,000,- 
000,000. More than six hundred of these are savings 
banks. In 1897 the gold standard was adopted. The 
currency system has been proved to be sound, and the 
opportunities for safe investment are numerous. 

In the realm of national finance the situation which 
has developed out of the boundless ambition of new 
Japan is little short of appalling. Revenues have in- 
deed increased sixfold within the past twenty years, but 
the burden of taxation has in the same period been 
tripled, or, if we include the tariif duties, quadrupled. 
The rates of land, income, and business taxes, insti- 
tuted for a time of war, have been kept at the increased 



JAPAN: RISE AS A MODERN POWER 127 

figure. This has been necessitated because of post hel- 
ium pohcies involving increase of armament, the han- 
dling of the debt, colonial enterprises, and measures of 
internal development. The significance of the situation 
is brought out in clearer perspective when we consider 
that the government owns the railways, posts and tele- 
graphs, and forests; that it carries on enterprises of an 
auxiliary character employing over 200,000 persons; 
that it holds the monopoly of the sale of camphor, to- 
bacco, and salt — in these various ways narrowing the 
fields open to individual enterprise, and reducing the 
potential capacity of the people for paying taxes. The 
additional fact that the national debt had increased at 
a more rapid rate than either revenue or taxation during 
the decennial period beginning with 1902 has operated 
with those just mentioned to arouse an insistent demand 
for retrenchment, a demand which successive govern- 
ments had been seeking to meet in some degree until 
the outbreak of the present war. But now participa- 
tion in the war has required additional outlay and a 
further postponement of economy. 

Viewed from every standpoint save that of the finan- 
cial obligations of her government, the recent domestic 
history of Japan is inspiring. ^ Japan has shown her- 
self a prodigy among nations. Whether, as is so fre- 
quently the case with prodigies, she will early reach a 
point of arrest followed by decline of vigor will depend 
largely upon her success in addressing herself to the 
task of duly proportioning her activities to her ultimate 
capacities. 

^ At the present moment the evidences of corruption in party- 
politics and the renunciation by Count Okuma of the principle of 
popular and responsible government are a cause of misgiving to 
some observers. On this question see Chapter X. 



CHAPTER VIII 

japan: constitution and government 

The Japanese people are proud of affirming that 
their constitution was the gift of the Emperor. The 
historian knows, however, that the gift was asked for 
in emphatic terms. "Constitutional government" was 
the slogan of all the early movements toward the for- 
mation of political societies. So marked was this fea- 
ture of every program that, except for the tendency of 
the Japanese to rally to the call of leaders rather than 
to compare principles, one party would have done for all. 

The growing influence of the political societies made 
itself felt in 1881 when the Emperor issued an edict 
promising a constitution and a national assembly. The 
latter was to be convoked in 1891 ; time and opportunity 
were to be allowed for preparation and for the expres- 
sion of desires for or against reform. 

The Restoration government had been organized in 
seven departments after June, 1868. One of these was 
a bicameral deliberative assembly, the Gisei. The 
Lower House was composed of members, chosen one 
from each Daimiate, representing the governing author- 
ities and empowered to discuss specified matters under 
the control of the Upper House. Because of its un- 
progressive character the Gisei proved short-lived and 
in 1871 it was replaced by the Sa-in, or Left College. 
This assembly also contained only Imperial nominees 
but possessed a somewhat wider range of deliberative 

128 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 129 

and legislative powers. In the same year a better basis 
for representation was made possible when the feudal 
organization was done away with and the centralized 
system of prefectures was established. 

That the highly developed governmental institutions 
of Europe and America should be examined by and 
should influence the Japanese in their progress toward 
a constitution was inevitable. In 1871 a special com- 
mission was sent to both America and Europe, and this 
commission upon its return advised the adoption of per- 
manent laws and a constitution based on Imperial law, 
which would provide opportunity to consult the wishes 
of the people in proportion as their capacity for self- 
government increased. 

From this time the Sa-in was continuously memori- 
alized and urged to procure the establishment of a truly 
representative assembly. The Sa-in considered that, 
while the samurai and wealthier merchants were capable 
of exercising the franchise intelligently, the general pub- 
lic was not yet awakened and the power of the clans 
would be increased, not diminished, by halfway reforms. 
A step was taken, however, in May, 1874, when the 
Emperor established a deliberative assembly of local au- 
thorities, after which, in 1875, the Sa-in was abolished 
and the Genro-in was authorized to do certain legisla- 
tive work. The Genro — ^made up of the Elder States- 
men — has from then until recently played the first 
role in determining the personnel and policies of the 
successive governments; in fact, as the real privy coun- 
cil and the mouthpiece of the Emperor, it may almost 
be said to have been the government itself. 

Toward the making good of the Emperor's promise, 
Ito, Hirobumi and others were in 1882 dispatched to 
Europe to make a close study of Western pohtical theo- 



130 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ries and institutions. Upon their return, the Bureau 
for Constitutional Investigation was established with 
Ito at its head. But the work of drafting the consti- 
tution was to be done by Ito under the Emperor's per- 
sonal supervision. 

Meanwhile Western ideas were bringing about grad- 
ual reform. In 1884 the European system of ranking 
nobility was adopted. Titles to the number of five hun- 
dred were conferred upon men of noble descent and 
upon civil and military officers who had been promi- 
nent in the Restoration movement. A rescript of 1885 
established the cabinet system which exists today under 
constitutional sanction. In 1888 the Privy Council was 
added to the list of governmental institutions — a move 
very pleasing to the people since the function of this 
body was to advise the Emperor on matters of 
state. 

On February 11, 1889, the constitution was promul- 
gated. With its accompaniment of important laws of 
election, finance, organization of the Houses, and local 
government, this document was the greatest construc- 
tive production of Ito's life. By the gift of the consti- 
tution the Emperor, in some degree voluntarily, began 
the breaking of the road to national self-government, 
and placed within popular reach privileges and respon- 
sibilities great indeed to a people hitherto unaccustomed 
to representative government. Not that the people re- 
ceived the controlling power. Rather the foundations 
were laid upon which an edifice of representative gov- 
ernment might later be raised. It then remained for 
legal and extralegal forces to rear the superstructure 
and to establish the institutions of self-rule. Some- 
thing of this has subsequently been accomplished and 
much still remains to be accomplished. 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 131 

To consider the constitution itself: The center about 
which every office and every official revolves, and from 
which all derive their power, is the Imperial Throne. 
The Emperor remains, as before, the supreme head of 
the government. Like the English King, in legal the- 
ory the Mikado is the fountainhead of justice and hon- 
or; like the German Emperor, he has the potential 
power of an autocrat; unlike either, the legal basis of 
his power is less its foundation than is the attitude 
of filial reverence, approximating worship, with which 
the Japanese people regard him. Emperor not 
alone by right of inheritance, but by divine ordinance 
as well, he can do no wrong and his actions are not 
to be made the subject of irreverent comment or dis- 
cussion. 

The constitution retains in the Emperor the important 
functions of government, but the executive, the legisla- 
tive, and judicial powers are to be exercised "according 
to the provisions of the present constitution." This 
suggests the sovereign of Thomas Hobbes' "original 
compact," and the attitude of James I when he de- 
clared: "I will not be content that my power be dis- 
puted upon but I shall ever be willing to make the rea- 
son appear of all my doings and rule my actions ac- 
cording to my laws." 

"The Emperor exercises the legislative power with 
the consent of the Imperial Diet." Ito believed thor- 
oughly in concentration of power. This article in the 
constitution must, however, be read in connection with 
a later article which gives to each House of the Diet 
permission to initiate projects of law. It is therefore 
inaccurate to say that the Diet's functions are merely 
passive, though the authority to withdraw unwelcome 
bills and to amend, them gives the Emperor powers 



182 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

which can be rendered nugatory only through the de- 
velopment of party responsibility and a broadened fran- 
chise. 

The Emperor's legislative power is rendered effective 
by the introduction of bills, the withdrawal or amend- 
ment of bills brought in by others, and the right to 
exercise an absolute veto. In the Emperor alone re- 
sides the right to propose constitutional amendments. 
The session of the Diet may last only three months and 
the Emperor convokes, closes, and prorogues the Diet 
and dissolves the House of Representatives. During 
the interim periods the ordinances of the Emperor have 
the force of law. These must receive the approval of 
the Diet when it assembles, but the amount of discus- 
sion allowed is often so meager that the assent given 
is perfunctory. Imperial ordinances in conflict with 
law are of no effect. 

The Emperor's executive powers embrace the whole 
field of administration. To him belongs the power to 
organize the departments, appoint and remove officials, 
and fix salaries. In consequence, all officials, including 
the cabinet ministers, are responsible to him. He has 
supreme command of the army and navy, he declares 
war, makes peace, and concludes treaties. Martial law 
he may proclaim ; the granting of titles and other honors 
lies in him; he orders pardons and rehabilitation. As 
in England, the cabinet acts for the Sovereign in the 
performance of all these functions. The Emperor does 
not directly exercise judicial authority. His appoint- 
ments and removals give him an indirect influence which 
is moderated by constitutional provisions requiring the 
observance of law. Ito was particular about procur- 
ing an independent judiciary, and he provided that re- 
movals should be only "by way of criminal sentence or 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 133 

disciplinary punishment," the rules for the latter to be 
"determined by law." The administrative courts af- 
ford the executive the means of safeguarding official 
authority. 

Chapter III of the constitution provides for an Im- 
perial Diet consisting of a House of Peers and a House 
of Representatives, the first composed of princes of 
the blood, nobles, and. persons nominated by the Em- 
peror. The noble orders below the rank of marquis are 
empowered by ordinance to elect from among their own 
number representatives to the Upper House. The per- 
sons appointed by the Emperor are chosen from two 
general classes : ( 1 ) those who have become famous for 
learning or services to the state ; ( 2 ) persons elected, one 
for each city and prefecture, from among the highest 
taxpayers. The number elected by the nobles and those 
elected by the high taxpayers sit for seven years ; those 
appointed because of distinction sit for life. The num- 
ber of non-noble members may not exceed that of the 
nobles. 

The House of Peers contains 374 members, the House 
of Representatives, 381. The members of the latter are 
chosen from single electoral districts by male electors 
over twenty-five years of age and paying at least ten 
yen ($5.00) in direct taxes. As the Election Law of 
1900 abolished property qualifications for candidates, 
practically any male citizen of the age of thirty years 
may become a candidate for the Lower House. With 
a population of 54,000,000, the franchise is at present 
restricted by the small tax qualification to about 1,550,- 
000, making approximately one elector to every thirty- 
four of the whole population. At the last election 
(March, 1915), about three-fourths of those qualified 
voted. The House of Representatives is elected for 



134 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

a four-year term. The ordinary sessions are annual, and 
last for three months.^ Members receive a compensa- 
tion of 2,000 yen a year, with free transportation. The 
presidents and vice-presidents of each House are ap- 
pointed by the Emperor from among certain members 
designated by vote of the House. Usually the delibera- 
tions are public. The constitution safeguards the rights 
of members to free speech and freedom from arrest in 
all but specified instances. 

When we turn to examine the checks exercised by the 
law-making branch upon the administrative depart- , 
ment, we fail to find those with which we are familiar i 
in western systems. Dr. Uyehara ^ has suggested that \ 
Ito misinterpreted the real nature of the English con- 
stitution in that he failed to realize that it is the Cabinet, 
controlled by the Commons, which, rather than the^ 
King, now exercises the function of appointment.; 
Whether or not Ito understood the English system, his 
constitution is at the opposite pole from the British if \ 
we compare the two from the standpoint of the rela-j 
tions of the executive and the legislature. In Great 
Britain, Parliament is supreme ; in Japan, the Emperor, 
acting through various administrative agencies, is stilll; 
sovereign. The Japanese Lower House has about that| 
degree of power which had been acquired by the Brit- 
ish House of Commons before party government was 
established; it possesses a resisting power, a potential 
check upon arbitrary government, which can be madel 
extremely effective when necessary. 

The rights and privileges of the Houses are virtually 
identical. The Upper House sits for a longer period, 
seven years, and cannot be dissolved short of that period. 

^ Beginning usually on tlie 1st of December. 

2 Uyehara: "The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909." 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 135 

It must, however, be prorogued whenever the Lower 
House is dissolved. 

The powers of the Diet are comprehended un- 
der five heads: (1) Legislative power, (2) finan- 
cial power, (3) power of interpellation, (4) authority 
to address the Throne, (5) authority to receive pe- 
titions. 

As already noted, the Houses may initiate ordinary 
laws and all laws must be approved by them. These 
powers imply the rights of debate and committee dis- 
cussion, which are exercised under cabinet supervision 
and control. The relation of the executive to legisla- 
tion will require further notice in connection with the 
discussion of the Cabinet. 

The financial system includes the use of a budget, 
which must be introduced first in the Lower House and 
requires the consent of the Diet. An analysis of the 
constitution shows that while the Diet has the power 
to control taxation and loans, it cannot deal with those 
administrative fees and other charges "having the na- 
ture of compensation," which, because of the many gov- 
ernmental activities in Japan, are the source of one- 
third of the total national revenue. 

Again, a considerable portion of the appropriations 
elude the Diet. The constitution removes from its con- 
trol "already fixed expenditures," "such expenditures 
as may have arisen by the effect of law," and such as 
"appertain to the legal obligations of the government." 
The first category, Ito explains,^ embraces the estab- 
lishment requirements of the departments, of the army 
and navy, of all officials, and those necessitated by trea- 
ties ; the second is made up largely of salaries, pensions, 

^ Ito : "Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan." 



136 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

etc.; the last includes the expenditures necessitated by 
the national debt. 

The constitution permits the government to incur lia- 
bilities over and above those of the budget and, although 
the consent of the Diet must be obtained, since that con- 
sent is always sought after the fact — when the money 
is already spent — objection is futile. 

Finally the governmental income is assured by the 
provision which lays down the decision that: "When 
the Imperial Diet has not voted on the budget, or when 
the budget has not beefi brought into actual existence, 
the government shall carry out the budget of the pre- 
ceding year." This provision and another just pre- 
ceding it in the constitution, which empowers the gov- 
ernment "in case of urgent need for the maintenance of 
public safety" to issue ordinances to supplement the 
revenue, places the executive in a position substantially 
independent of the Diet. Thus the financial power of 
the Diet rests very largely upon the fear that the ad- 
ministration may have of popular disapproval; that is, 
upon the moral suasion rather than upon the legal force 
which the Diet can exert. 

It is a curious paradox that in every instance where 
a legislature's position is one rather of opposition than 
of initiation, its so-called minor powers become the most 
effective. In the Japanese practice, the right of the 
Diet to interpellate the ministers and the right to appeal 
by address to the Emperor are of about equal import- 
ance. The latter, however, being inconsistent with real 
responsible government, must decline in importance with 
the development of representative responsibility; the 
former will grow in importance as the chief weapon 
of the parliamentary opposition in expressing its opin- 
ions regarding the actions of the majority leaders. To- 



JAPAN; CONSTITUTION 137 

day this important instrument is in the hands of the 
minority parties. Whether it has been finally settled 
there or will again be made an instrument of attack by 
the whole House ag-ainst an irresponsible Cabinet will 
depend upon the endurance of the government majority. 
The normal situation in Japan has been one in which 
the leaders in the Lower House, no matter of what 
party, give and withdraw allegiance at will. Hence 
their usual practice is to resort to the power of interpel- 
lation much as the American representative uses his 
right of speech-making as a method of showing his con- 
stituents that he is "up and doing." Irresponsibility to 
party leadership and party policy leads members into 
active and often meaningless attacks upon the govern- 
ment. Such an attitude is futile, since the interrogated 
minister may assign reasons of state or the wishes of 
the Emperor as excuses for refusing to answer ques- 
tions. Unless the question is one of nationwide im- 
portance, these modes of evasion are usually efficacious. 

The right to present addresses to the Emperor is 
supplementary to that of interpellation. If the Cabinet 
proves obdurate and refuses to reply satisfactorily, re- 
course is still possible, over the heads of the ministers, 
to the Emperor — the father of his people. This is a 
procedure of great effectiveness in that the Japanese 
expect from their Emperor the justice of an almost 
divine being. It is therefore felt by the Ministry to be 
incumbent upon it to prevent, if possible, resort to the 
address, lest this bring down upon it popular criticism 
and Imperial censure. 

The last right, that of receiving petitions, is of small 
importance because, unless the government desires to 
take up the petitions, the Houses are powerless to pro- 
cure their consideration. Furthermore, the Houses can- 



138 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

not receive petitions affecting the constitution or cases 
before the administrative courts. This power is not 
likely to become important since, although an increased 
development of cabinet responsibility will lead to more 
ready consideration of petitions, this will probably be 
accompanied by an increased intimacy between mem- 
bers and their constituencies, which will render the oc- 
casions for petitioning less frequent. 

Japan has not yet arrived at a regime of representa- 
tive government. The well-formed public opinion from 
which a representative legislative body must take its 
cues does not exist. The power of the bureaucracy still 
remains the recognized and accepted thing. It follows 
that the brilliant oration and serious debate in parlia- 
ment which flourished for a brief period while the tran- 
sition from the old to the present governmental forms 
was being effected has languished and all but disap- 
peared. The real discussion takes place in committees, 
to which cabinet members have the right of entry. The 
power of the lobbyist with money and favors to ex- 
change for laws and subservience is stronger than that 
of the members who will argue and stand for principles. 
The willingness hitherto of the members of the Lower 
House to sell their votes has left the House of Peers 
an important conservative force. The majority in that 
House oppose party control in principle and support 
the government. The normal Japanese Diet thus pre- 
sents the spectacle of a tug of war with the two Houses 
at the opposite ends of the rope. 

Not finding in the Diet the instiumentalities by which 
the government is carried on, we turn to three other 
forces in the state: one entirely outside both law and 
constitution, the other two recognized by and partially 
ruled for by the constitution. 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 139 

The Genro, or Elder Statesmen, an extraordinary 
group of men of whom but a few now remain, have 
been since 1868 the sustaining advisers of the Emperor. 
To this group the great clans have all contributed their 
leaders, and, tlirough the stress of change, of wars, of 
reform, and of the development of parties, these leaders 
have charted the course and controlled the helm of the 
ship of the state, making and unmaking cabinets, in- 
stituting such alterations as seemed compatible with 
the progress attained, now and then the butt of ridi- 
cule for failure to move more rapidly, but always watch- 
ful for the best interests of Japan. To the Genro un- 
questionably belongs the credit and praise for having 
brought the nation through the most critical part of the 
transition period. The mention of such names as Ito, 
Yamagata, Itagaki, Katsura, Inouye, Oyama, and Mat- 
sukata is enough to prove the paramount capacity of 
the extralegal body they have composed, Today there 
remain only three of the great group of Elder States- 
men and these are all men far along in years. ^ 

The Cabinet and the Privy Council, having already 
found a place among the organs of government, re- 
ceived small attention in the constitution. That instru- 
ment simply provides with regard to the first that the 
"ministers of state shall give their advice to the Emperor 
and be responsible for it," and that all laws, Imj)erial 
ordinances and Imperial rescripts which relate to affairs 
of state must be countersigned by a minister; with re- 
gard to the second, that it shall deliberate, when con- 
sulted by the Emperor, upon matters of state. 

The Privy Council, which contains ecc offlcio all the 
cabinet ministers, is thus continued in its original ca- 
pacity as an advisory board to the Emperor. It has 

^ See infra. 



140 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

no other functions or powers. Its decisions are shaped 
in the main in conformity to the will of the Cabinet 
when that body contains men of commanding influence. 
On the other hand, the approval of the Emperor gives 
to a decision of the Council a sanction which the Cabinet 
may not question. 

The position of isolation from parliament and electo- 
rate which the Privy Council occupies places in the 
hands of the Cabinet a peculiar power. It enables the 
ministry to escape, in especially difficult circumstances, 
the consequences of its acts. By incorporating minis- 
terial policies in the procedure of the Privy Council, the 
interpellation in the Diet may be avoided. 

The Cabinet as an institution is not mentioned in 
the constitution, which merely indirectly recognizes its 
existence. It is made up of the heads of the nine ad- 
ministrative departments in addition to the premier. 
The premier is appointed by the Emperor and chooses 
his Cabinet as he deems expedient. Without recogniz- 
ing the principle of party government and responsibil- 
ity to the dominant group or combination of groups in 
the Lower House, there nevertheless exists the realiza- 
tion that government by consent cannot be possible un- 
less members of these groups compose the Cabinets The 
ministers for the army and the navy are still appointed 
from outside party circles. And it is always to be re- 
membered that the ministers are responsible neither to 
parties nor to the electorate, but solely to the Emperor. 

As the channel through which the Imperial preroga- 
tives are placed in operation, the Cabinet is the most 
important actual organ of the government. Its powers 
are the powers of the Emperor and embrace practically 
the whole fields of administration and legislation. Iso- 
lated from the world as the Emperor is, he must assent 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 141 

most frequently to the proposals of the Cabinet, whence 
that body becomes a policy-determining as well as a 
policy-enacting body. 

The actual administrative functions have already been 
indicated in discussing the Imperial powers. iVll these 
the Cabinet performs as in Great Britain, in the name 
of the Emperor. 

The constitution and the laws secure a large degree 
of independence for the ordinary courts. Over the ad- 
ministrative courts the Cabinet has entire control. 
These are established by Imperial ordinances and the 
premier appoints and removes the judges. Thus in its 
relations with the people the government is as amply 
safeguarded as in those with the Diet. 

Cabinet ministers may sit and speak in either House, 
or they may delegate other members to speak for them. 
They possess free entrance to all committees. They 
may introduce, amend, or withdraw bills on any sub- 
ject, and their bills have precedence over those of pri- 
vate members. The effectual legislative power of the 
Cabinet may be realized from the fact that since the 
Diet was instituted the Emperor has never refused his 
approval to any law presented to him. 

In the interpellation, questions are answered or not 
according to the will of the Ministry. The House is 
frequently placed at a great disadvantage through the 
withholding of information. It has, however, no power 
to compel the giving of information; its only recourse 
is to bring on a dissolution, and that is so hkely to put 
the House in a state even less to its liking than being 
left in ignorance that only the gravest disagreem^ent 
will lead it to push matters to such a conclusion. 

The prorogation for fifteen days is an effective 
weapon of the Cabinet, which it can suspend as a sword 



142 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

over the head of the Diet to force concentration of at- 
tention upon its own bills. Through its use the gov- 
ernment shortens the already brief session. 

Finally the Imperial right to convoke and prorogue 
the Diet and to dissolve the Lower House furnishes the 
decisive instrument by which the government succeeds 
in legislating "with the consent of the Diet." The power 
of dissolution is used in Japan as it is in Great Britain, 
but with this tremendous difference, that in Japan it 
is a manifestation of Imperial displeasure, indicating 
that the Emperor's government is at variance with the 
people's representatives and that he wishes the people 
to elect others. Furthermore, the succeeding election 
w^ill bring out the efforts and influence of an all-pervad- 
ing bureaucracy exerted upon the side of the govern- 
ment. An excellent illustration of this was given in 
the dissolution of December, 1914, and the elections of 
March, 1915.' 

A special feature of the legislative power is that con- 
nected with finance. The preparation of the budget is 
a ministerial function. The Cabinet, alone, fixes the 
many administrative fees which bulk large in the sources 
of revenue. On the other side of the national account 
sheet there are numerous appropriations of a permanent 
character which the Diet may not alter without the 
consent of the government. Expenditures in addition 
to the budget "shall subsequently require the approba- 
tion of the Imperial Diet," but may be incurred on cabi- 
net responsibility. We have already noted the provi- 
sions of the constitution which insure sufficient funds 
in the event of recalcitrancy on the part of the Diet, 
or extraordinary circumstances that prevent the convok- 
ing of the Diet. 

■^ See infra. 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 143 

In the spring of 1915 a British cabinet was completely 
transformed because of dissatisfaction primarily with 
the acts of one departmental head. Such a transfor- 
mation is not to be expected in Japan because there 
the Cabinet is not responsible as a whole for the acts 
of individual members. Neither are ministers responsi- 
ble for acts of the Cabinet as a whole. The complete 
structure of model parliamentary government will not 
have been established in Japan until cabinets are homo- 
geneous and responsible to the House which has elected 
them. The ministers of state do not act as a body and 
in accord with the will of the premier, but they are re- 
sponsible only for the action taken in connection with 
their own departments. In Japan as in the German 
Empire, the premier is all in all; the ministers are of 
comparatively small importance. This is becoming 
gradually less the case as real party government takes 
the place of autocracy in responsible guise. 

Last in order among the fundamental institutions 
comes the judiciary. Without establishing particular 
courts, the constitution provides such safeguards as the 
law may afford to insure judicial independence and hon- 
esty. The courts are to exercise the judicial power ac- 
cording to law; they are to be organized according to 
law; the judges must be appointed from among lawfully 
qualified persons ; unless dismissed for criminal act or by 
way of disciplinary punishment, the rules for which are 
matters of law, judges are to have life tenure; all cases 
involving officials or between them and private persons 
are to go to the Court of Administrative Litigation. 
These administrative courts take cognizance of a class 
of cases numerous and important enough to guarantee 
to the government that pronounced supremacy that has 
been shown to exist throughout the other branches. 



y 



144 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Cases arising over direct and indirect taxes — excepting 
export and import duties — certain cases involving busi- 
ness pursuits, irrigation cases, and in general cases af- 
fecting the official hierarchy, all come before the admin- 
istrative judiciary. And when we remember that "ac- 
cording to law" in Japan signifies substantially "accord- 
ing to the wish of the government," the legal safeguards 
surrounding the ordinary courts are seen to have, of 
necessity, but small force as a final restraint upon gov- 
ernmental action. 

The same observation may be made concerning the 
Japanese "bill of rights," which composes fifteen ar- 
ticles out of the seventy-six that make up the constitu- 
tion. Equal eligibility to office; liberty to change his 
place of residence ; freedom from arrest, trial, and pun- 
ishment; the right to judicial trial; exemption of his 
house from liability to search; privacy of correspond- 
ence; inviolability of property rights; freedom of re- 
ligious belief; liberty of speech, publication and asso- 
ciation; and the right of petitioning the Diet are spe- 
cifically guaranteed to the individual subject by the con- 
stitution. But in no instance does the constitution it- 
self declare the conditions by which these precious privi- 
leges shall be preserved; in no case does the constitution 
declare that such and such a law shall not be passed or 
that a certain act shall not be done; in no case does it 
assign a penalty for the agent who shall contravene one 
of these rights. In every case the privilege is to be ex- 
ercised "according to law" or "within the limits of law." 
Such a guarantee may easily come to resemble an instru- 
ment of sounding brass. There is value in the constitu- 
tional expression of these rights so long as the Throne 
feels its moral obligation to observe them ; but their com- 
pelling force is obviously slight indeed. 



JAPAN: CONSTITUTION 145 

Amendments to the constitution not only require Im- 
perial sanction; they must be proposed to the Diet by 
Imperial order. Debate upon them cannot be begun 
unless two-thirds of the members of the House are 
present, and passage requires the affirmative vote of 
two-thirds of those present. No amendment m.ay be 
proposed during a regency. This article has sufficed 
to prevent any amendment during the twenty-six years 
since the constitution was established. 

As a written document the Japanese constitution is 
a model of brevity and clear expression. It is also re- 
markable for the skill with which, while appearing to 
establish many new and democratic forms, it preserves 
old and autocratic facts. If we are justified in assum- 
ing that Japan will press forward to attain Western 
responsible government, Ito's constitution must be re- 
garded as a master instrument for the transitional 
period. It expresses the political concepts of the 
Genro; it preserves authority that can be relied upon 
until such time as another authority can be developed 
and trained to take its place. 

We find in the Japanese character and traditions the 
explanation of the matter-of-fact way in which the 
people have accepted the work of the leaders in their 
constitutional development. The skill with which the 
Ruling House and the Dynasty have retained the loy- 
alty of the people and led the classes and factions as 
one united nation through the vicissitudes of funda- 
mental change without revolution all but baffles Western 
comprehension. We can to some extent, however, un- 
derstand the results of these forces and we cannot fail 
to admire the spirit of cooperation, of working together 
for the great national interests, which the Japanese have 
exhibited. Their great problem for the immediate fu- 



146 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ture is to preserve their unity of action and purpose 
while ridding themselves of the shackles of traditional 
authority. For a people habituated through the cen- 
turies to obedience to superiors, and unaccustomed to 
the exercise of individual initiative, this change will re- 
quire tremendous readjustment. The conception of 
representative democracy has penetrated only very 
slightly and affected only certain groups. The world 
watches, not without apprehension for Japan's internal 
peace, the movement which has begun to make itself 
manifest toward the political recognition or self-asser- 
tion of the proletariat. 



CHAPTER IX 

japan: political parties and party politics 

A TRANSITION period in the life of a nation is seldom 
without its accompaniment of contending political the- 
ories. To arrive at an adequate conception of the prob- 
lems of contemporary Japan it is necessary to go to 
some extent into the history of political views and of 
factional and party alignment. Although it is but a 
short while since poUtical associations first appeared, 
today, as during the past two decades, we find internal 
political developments centering largely around, and 
foreign policy complicated by, party strife. A survey 
of Japanese party history will not only throw light upon 
present-day problems, but it will at the same time sup- 
plement and elucidate the record of the constitutional 
movement. 

In analyzing Japanese political situations, certain 
salient facts must be kept in mind. It is now only sixty 
years since, upon the urgent request of the United 
States, Japan began to emerge from her two centuries 
old attitude of exclusive seclusion. It is now but forty- 
four years since Japanese feudalism was abolished; and 
it is well to remember that the abolishing of the forms 
of an institution does not at once do away with its ideals 
and practices. It is but twenty-six years since the first 
elections were held for the Imperial Diet. The Japa- 
nese political party puzzle is sufficiently complicated for 
the Japanese, but it appears confusion confounded to 

147 



148 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the uninitiated Occidental who, unfamiliar with the pe- 
culiar constitutional structure of the Japanese state and 
baffled by Japanese names and the duality and triplicity 
of translations which have been attached to some of 
the party designations, is at first utterly at a loss when 
trying to discover what are the real issues among, and 
what are the respective objects of, these various parties. 
For present purposes it will be expedient to follow 
closely the main lines along which development has pro- 
ceeded, avoiding the numerous cuh de sac which invite 
to easy but profitless digression. 

In the background there stand four permanent faC' 
tors, referred to and in some sense evaluated in the chap- 
ter dealing with the constitution. These are the Em- 
peror, the Genro, the clans, and the bureaucracy. These 
together have composed the government. One out- 
standing feature has been the control of the official 
hierarchy by the clans through the Genro, the Genro 
having been recruited from among clan leaders. An- 
other feature of outstanding importance: in the course 
of the political unfolding, the men of one of these clans, 
Choshiu, have gotten control of the army, w^hile those 
of another, Satsuma, have taken unto themselves the 
navy. For twenty-five years cabinets have been made 
and unmade by the Genro, their choice alternating be- 
tween army and navy men in accordance with the relative 
ability of potential candidates from the respective clans. 
Beneath this oligarchical domination has spread the 
dependent minor officialdom — completing the adminis- 
trative system and forming the link between the gov- 
ernment and the people. 

Once we realize the importance of these factors, it 
becomes possible to grasp the general nature of the is- 
sues which have run as current and cross-current 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 149 

through the recent years of Japan's internal politics. 

First: Believers in real representative government 
have been fighting against the absolutism of the oli- 
garchy and the bureaucracy. 

Second: There has developed a feud, over the mat- 
ter of appropriations and policy for their respective 
branches, between the supporters of the army and those 
of the navy, which has lessened the power of the clans 
as such and contributed to the ultimate supremacy of 
the parties. 

Third : The people have at last discovered that they 
in the long run pay the piper, while the government, 
the army, and the navy dance; and they a-re beginning 
to revolt against the burden of taxation which mod- 
em development and imperial expansion have put upon 
them and whose weight is, by Western standards, abso- 
lutely appalling. They have begun to object alike to 
the appropriations asked by the navy and those de- 
manded by the army — for both of which, incidentally, 
they are beginning to hold the bureaucracy responsible. 

Taking up now the thread of party history, we shall 
speedily see how these issues have been developing and 
how the lines of diiFerence have been emerging more 
and more clearly through three decades. 

In 1874 Itagaki Taisuke organized an association 
called the Risshiska for education in political science. 
Soon after this a Patriotic Association, the Aikokusha, 
was started along similar lines. From these begin- 
nings political parties have developed. In 1880 the 
first of the parties was founded, this being the Jiyu-to 
or Liberal Party, organized under Itagaki's leadership. 
In the next year a reorganization was effected and a 
program adopted in which the call for the establishment 
of constitutional government was the central feature. 



150 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

In 1882 Okuma Shigenobu organized the Kaishin-to 
or Reform Party, which afterwards became known as 
the Shimpo-to or Progressive Party. This had a pro- 
gram calling for internal reform as necessarily prece- 
dent to emphasizing international rights and prestige, 
and proposing to extend the spheres of local author- 
ity, to broaden the franchise, to promote commercial in- 
tercourse while avoiding complications with foreign 
states, and to reform the currency system. 

In the same year the government supporters organ- 
ized the Teisei-to or Imperialist Party. Their party 
pledged itself to absolute obedience to the Mikado. Its 
program contemplated the reforms foreshadowed in the 
Imperial promise of a constitution and contained as its 
most important plank the proposition: "An absolute 
veto power over all legislation should be left in the 
hands of the Emperor." 

The Liberals, following Itagaki, were radicals, doc- 
trinaires, revolutionary rather than evolutionary in their 
ideas. Later events proved them also to be opportunis- 
tic, but that characteristic has not been peculiar to them. 
The Progressives, following Okuma, were progressive- 
conservatives, practical, bent on reasonable reforms. 
Okuma's avowed purpose was to place the control of 
the cabinet in more democratic hands. He objected to 
clan government and continuously directed his efforts 
against it. The Imperialists ^ were thoroughly conser- 
vative, bent upon restraining or checkmating the tend- 
ency toward democracy. Political parties were at the 
time forbidden by law to have any branches in the prov- 
inces. The consequence was that numerous local par- 
ties sprang up, which by the use of the word "rikken" 

^ Led by Fukuchi Genichiro, Maruyama Sakura and Misaki 
Kamenosuke. 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 151 

(constitution) in their titles indicated the importance at- 
tributed to constitutionaHsm. But dissolution overtook 
them all before two years were past. This was due 
partly to a decline of interest after the Emperor's prom- 
ises were made known; and partly to repressive meas- 
ures curtailing freedom of speech and liberty of the 
press. For several years thereafter there was compara- 
tively little party activity. 

The constitution went into effect in 1889. The first 
national election was held in 1890. The three hundred 
members then returned to the Lower House were di- 
vided into ten groups, the largest being the Independ- 
ents with sixty-nine members. These groups coalesced 
into four, then into two which operated in practice as 
an official party and an opposition. The largest of the 
four groups was the resuscitated Jiyu-to or Liberal 
Party. Itagaki was bent especially upon securing 
modifications of the laws interfering with freedom of 
speech and association, and in addition he desired re- 
form in local government, retrenchment, and education. 
The second largest group was that of the Progressives 
under Okuma. During the years between 1890 and 
1900 the normal situation was one of opposition between 
the government and all the parties which manifested 
inclinations toward insubordination. Outside and in- 
side the Diet, parties grew stronger. In 1893 the law 
against provincial branch organizations was repealed. 
In the first two years of parliamentary history, two pre- 
miers left office on account of clearly demonstrated pop- 
ular disapproval. Then Count Ito became minister- 
president, and by virtue of enthusiasm over the war with 
China, held his office for four years. In all these early 
sessions of the Diet the great object of disagreement 
was the budget, the house uniformly demanding a re- 



152 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

duction of at least ten per cent, on the government es- 
timates. 

Ito's announced attitude was one of "equal recogni- 
tion and equal benevolence" to all parties. In fact, 
however, he attempted in 1894 to procure an alliance 
with the Liberals, and in 1895 he obtained a favorable 
majority by a combination of the Liberals, the Nation- 
alists and the official party, thus creating for the first 
time a government majority in the House of Represen- 
tatives. At this time Itagaki was made Minister of the 
Interior. The clans gave evidence of their hostile atti- 
tude toward parties by demanding that Itagaki leave 
his party and by announcing that his appointment was 
due not to party service but to his deserts for services 
as a statesman. Itagaki nevertheless did not accept of- 
fice without a promise of reform along liberal lines — 
calling especially for liberty of the press and for a 
greater degree of cabinet responsibility to the House. 
The House of Peers prevented the passage of the lib- 
eral measures and, upon losing in consequence the sup- 
port of his new allies, Ito resigned. 

Count Matsukata, who then took office, included in his 
cabinet Count Okuma, not as leader of the Progressive 
Party, of course, but in order to separate him from his 
party. Count Okuma soon resigned in deference to his 
principles of responsibility to the Diet and the people. 
The usual procedure by which a ministry vindicated its 
independence of popular support followed. The Pre- 
mier first dissolved the Diet and then resigned. 

The Liberals made advances to the Ito ministry which 
succeeded Matsukata, but their demands for compen- 
sation were considered excessive and Ito determined to 
put them to the test of swimming the political sea alone, 
no doubt expecting them to sink ignominiously. To 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 153 

this end he advised the Genro to place in power the two 
most prominent party leaders in the country, Okuma 
and Itagaki. The party of the former, the Progres- 
sives, who in 1896 had changed their name to Shimpo-to, 
had, in desperation, united with the Liberals to form the 
Kensei-to or Constitutional Party, with party, cabinet, 
and ministerial responsibility as the central plank of its 
platform. 

Thus there came in 1898 the first attempt to estab- 
lish a "party" government. In addition to a respon- 
sible ministry and plans for many internal improve- 
ments, the program of the new party called for empha- 
sis of national rights and prestige, together with exten- 
sion of trade and commerce. The new commercial trea- 
ties which effected Japan's emancipation from tariff 
restrictions and insured the abolition of the extrater- 
ritorial jurisdiction of foreign nations had already been 
signed, and these treaties went into effect in the next 
year, 1899. 

Ito did not suggest putting the Kensei-to leaders in 
power ujitil after he had attempted to win over Marquis 
Yamagata and other Elder Statesmen to the idea of 
either establishing a government party, with himself at 
its head, or making sufficient concessions to insure the 
support of the dominant political party. Marquis 
Yamagata, a conservative Imperialist, the "Walpole of 
modern Japan," insisted that "to make the government 
dependent upon any political party was a violation of 
the spirit of the constitution." As a result Ito resigned 
and the Okuma-Itagaki combination was called upon to 
form a new cabinet, which it did, with Count Oloima 
as Premier and Count Itagaki as Minister of the In- 
terior. Four portfolios went to the Progressives, three 
to the Liberals, while the army and navy departments 



154 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

were put in charge of non-party men. The Diet was 
not in session, and a general election was to intervene 
before the beginning of the next session. The new 
cabinet was, therefore, not based upon membership in 
the Diet. And although, as we have seen, there had 
been some slight tacit recognition of parties, this was 
far from sufficient to have laid a sound foundation for 
a party government, still less so for a combination party 
government. The fortuitous character of the Kensei-to 
was soon apparent, and within four months discussion 
over conflicting policies and over the division of the 
spoils made continuance of the coalition government 
impossible. The Liberal-Progressive combination went 
out of office, and for the time being the clans were 
rendered stronger than ever. The attempt at party 
government had proved premature. But it had its 
effect in paving the way for the recognition of party 
groups as real political factors. The tradition that 
party men could never hold office had been shat- 
tered. 

Marquis Yamagata, compelled to read the handwrit- 
ing on the wall, upon taking office made a working ar- 
rangement with the Liberals, without, however, includ- 
ing any party man in his cabinet. New tax laws were 
imperatively needed, and with the aid of the Liberals 
these were passed. The support of the Liberals was 
ahenated when numerous offices upon which they were 
looking enviously were made dependent upon competi- 
tive examination. 

Ito had only ten years before insisted upon "minis- 
terial independence." One of the secrets of his great 
success as a statesman was, however, that he placed wis- 
dom above consistency. He now demonstrated his supe- 
riority to theories by organizing a party of his own. The 



^■' JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 155 

Liberal Party was dissolved, and Ito's new party ap- 
peared under the name of Rikken Seiyu-kai, or Consti- 
tutional Government Friends Association. Thus was 
formed what is now the strongest political party, the 
Seiyu-kai. Its leaders were Ito, Suematsu Kencho, 
Saionji Kimmochi, Hoshi Torn and Matsuda Masa- 
hisa. Ito was making use of an up-to-date method of 
directing and controlling opinion. 

The Seiyu-kai program called for business methods 
in administration, friendship with foreign nations, the 
perfecting of national defenses, promotion of education 
and development of the national character, and general 
internal development. To offset the influence of this 
party, the Progressive Party was reorganized, with 
Count Okuma as leader. Marquis Yamagata resigned, 
and Ito was called upon to form a cabinet. This he did, 
with seven Seiyu-kai and three non-partisan members. 
The Seiyu-kai commanded a majority in the Lower 
House. But the Upper House, resenting the fact of 
Ito's having become a member and leader of a political 
party, opposed him. The old clan spirit was not given 
to yielding easily. Even with Ito the arbitrary spirit 
of clan government was too strong to permit quick 
adaptation to party politics, so that, when before long 
the ministers disagreed, he, unaccustomed to party lead- 
ership, made no attempt to bring about harmony but 
instead resigned. No one of the Elder Statesmen was 
then willing to form a new government. The idea of 
bowing to the desires or demands of parties was the 
stumblingblock. Under these circumstances the Genro 
decided to abstain from holding office, leaving the actual 
work of government to younger men, who should be 
under their control. This determination led to an out- 
side follower of Yamagata, Viscount Katsura, being 



156 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

put forward and given a mandate to form a ministry. 
Katsura selected a cabinet containing none of the Elder 
Statesmen and at the same time containing no members 
of political parties. The first Katsura Ministry was 
thus of a transitional character such as the logic of evo- 
lutionary growth demanded. 

During the next five years there were five cabinets, 
headed successively by Katsura, Saionji, Katsura, Sai- 
onji, Katsura. These manifested throughout almost no 
difference in policies of state, though the political ideas 
of the two leaders were by no means identical, Katsura 
being a disciple of one of the strictest clan leaders, while 
Saionji, with his French training, was in various re- 
spects an ardent democrat. However, with Katsura as 
with Ito and Yamagata, concessions to the actualities 
became inevitable, and ten years later it was Katsura i 
himself who came forward and led in a third attempt t 
to form a party government. 

Katsura Taro was of the Choshiu clan. He was first i 
and always an army man. In 1885 he had assisted Gen- ■ 
eral Kawakami in reorganizing the army. He was > 
Minister of War in 1898 while Marquis Yamagata, the 
political head of the militarist faction, was Premier. 
Until 1912 he stayed by the tradition of militaiy despot- 
ism and clan government. 

Katsura's first premiership endured for four and one- 
half years, the longest term through which any Jap- 
anese Cabinet has continued in power. Fortunately for 
him, the Progressives as well as other opposition parties 
had reached the conclusion that their own ends might be 
better served through cooperation with the government 
than through unrelenting opposition. When he came 
to ofiice they were prepared to trade their support for 
recognition and its advantages. The Russo-Japanese 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 157 

War brought with it naturally a cessation of internal 
political dissensions and led the Diet to demonstrate its 
patriotism as a unit by loyal support of the government 
through that crucial period. In the session of 1903, 
however, Katsura had shown his mettle and his strength 
by retaining office in the face of party opposition led 
by Ito and involving a majority of the lower chamber. 
Ito had demonstrated his inability to lead a party when 
he himself was in power ; he now failed to make the most 
of the leadership of a majority opposition. 

In July, 1903, Ito dissociated himself from his party 
and reentered the Privy Council. His place as leader 
of the Seiyu-kai was taken by Marquis Saionji. Kat- 
sura had won in the contest against party government, 
and his belief that the people should obey those ap- 
pointed from above to rule them had been strengthened. 
With such a conception, Katsura was never popular and 
he did not care for popularity. His two great aims 
were "to make Japan the premier country in the Far 
East and to make the Choshiu clan predominant in Ja- 
pan." This of course spelled, for one thing, militarism 
in the extreme. 

It was Katsura, as Premier, and Count Hayashi, then 
Minister to London, who made the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in 1902. In spite of Ito's preference for an 
agreement with Russia, Katsura and Marquis Yama- 
gata secured the support of the Emperor for the Eng- 
lish alliance. This cemented the foundation of Kat- 
sura's power and of his success. The alliance gave Ja- 
pan her chance to face Russia without fear of a third 
power. It gave her the financial support necessary for 
defiance of Russia. It thus made possible the war. 
Success in the war established Japan as a first-rate 
; power and vindicated the imperialistic program of the 



158 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

military group. For all this Japan owes Great Britain 
a very large debt of gratitude. 

Katsura incurred popular resentment through his 
repression of freedom of speech during the war period, 
and a wave of indignant disappointment was the popu- 
lar reaction to the announcement of the terms of the 
Portsmouth treaty. He resigned in 1905 to avoid the 
results of this ill feeling and to leave the task of financial 
reorganization to a fresher and younger man. The war 
had added enormously to Japan's already large debt 
and taxes, and Katsura had been no more successful 
than was Pitt a century before in England in his at- 
tempt to pay off one debt by creating another. On 
Katsura's recommendation, Marquis Saionji was ap- 
pointed premier. Saionji, by this time the Seiyu-kai 
leader, was a disciple of Ito and a believer in party 
government. For three sessions he had the support of 
the Seiyu-kai but he did not attempt to construct a party 
cabinet. He followed the lines of Katsura's policies 
and he made practically no progress toward the solu- 
tion of the great financial problem which has confronted 
Japan. 

After three years Katsura was again called to the 
premiership. He received the support of the Seiyu-kai, 
for what reason it is difficult to understand unless it was 
that the party was looking forward to seeing Saionji 
restored when he had completely recovered from his "ill- 
ness." Katsura was strongly intrenched, the parties 
were tired of opposition for its own sake, and the nation 
was well pleased with the measures of the government 
in its Korean and Manchurian policies. At this time 
the Seiyu-kai had an absolute majority in the Lower 
House, and with their support Katsura had little diffi- 
culty in getting through his budgets and other impor- 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 159 

tant measures. But the people grew restive under his 
leadership, especially because of his autocratic methods 
and disposition to favor the army, and he was finally 
denounced as a despot and a bureaucrat. Marquis 
Saionji was summoned again in September, 1911, to 
take up his mantle. 

During the second Katsura ministry several events 
of great consequence had taken place. Effective ad- 
vances had been made toward the consolidation of Ja- 
pan's interests in South Manchuria. The bullet of a 
misguided Korean patriot had removed Prince Ito in 
1909. Japan had proceeded to the annexation of 
Korea in 1910. Katsura had definitely committed 
Japan to a high protective tariff policy, with the revi- 
sion of her commercial treaties, in 1911. In 1910 the 
Shimpo-to party was dissolved and a group of the Pro- 
gressives, ninety-two strong, took the name Kokumin- 
to or Constitutional Nationalists. At this time various 
minor parties existed : the Yushin-kai or Reform Party, 
standing for eradication of corrupt practices and the 
discontinuance of the war taxes ; the Boshin or Commer- 
cial Club, made up of business men; and the Chuo or 
Central Club, made up of independent members of all 
parties. Handicapped in competition for governmental 
favors by the prominence and numbers of the Seiyu-kai, 
these parties, especially the Nationalists, strove to break 
up the Seiyu-kai by putting forth some distinctive pol- 
icy which might serve as a lodestone for the rallying of 
a strong party. The Progressives have, of all Japanese 
parties, shown most comprehension of the meaning of 
party loyalty and least tendency to opportunism, 
largely, no doubt, because of the magnetic personality 
and consistent principles of their great leader. Count 
lOkuma. Although Okuma resigned his leadership to 



160 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

younger men in 1907, he remained the inspiration and 
guiding counselor of the party. 

Marquis Saionji entered upon his second ministry in 
September, 1911, with financial problems greater than 
ever to face. By this time militarism had run mad. 
There was on the one hand the problem of reconciling a 
policy of financial retrenchment with the demand for 
military expansion; and on the other that of meeting 
the demands of both the army and the navy. It was 
especially on the latter point that the second Saionji 
ministry went to pieces. The Choshiu men were now 
insisting upon putting two new divisions of the army, 
40,000 additional men, into Korea. Saionji was bent 
upon retrenchment, and the Diet was planning a cut 
in the budget of from ten to fifteen per cent, all along , 
the line. The War Minister, Baron Uyehara, insisted i 
on meeting the demands of the army and, rather than > 
yield, resigned. The Cabinet was unable to find an- 
other minister from the ranks of the army who would 1 
stand against the demands of the Choshiu clan. The 
issue was clearly drawn between the military and bu- 
reaucratic factions on the one hand and the civil and i 
democratic elements on the other. It is a remarkable 
commentary upon Japanese politics that as late as 
1912 a premier having the popular confidence to an . 
unusual degree and backed by a majority in the House ' 
of Representatives was forced to resign by the con- 
tumacy of a proponent of the militarist program. 

In 1912 the Emperor Mutsuliito died. He had been 
the personal embodiment of the spirit of new Japan. 
During the forty-five momentous years of the Meiji 
or Enlightened Era, the magic of his sacred name was 
among the instrumentalities which inspired the activi- 
ties of the nation; the acts of the ministers were re- 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 161 

garded as expressions of the Imperial will; a rescript 
from or a reference to the Emperor sufficed to win 
the support of the nation or silence opposition to many 
a measure which would otherwise have been defeated. 
His passing could not fail to weaken the impelling force 
of loyalty to the throne which had been one of the chief 
reliances of his successive governments. Immediately 
upon the death of the Emperor, Prince Katsura was 
called back from a mysterious mission upon which he 
had been sent to Russia and was attached to the person 
of the new Emperor as Lord Privy Seal and Grand 
Chamberlain. 

Upon Marquis Saionji's resignation, the Emperor 
called on Prince Katsura to come once more into active 
life. Four months previously Katsura had declared 
himself forever through with politics. Marquis Mat- 
sukata, noted for his financial ability, was too old to 
lead a cabinet; and General Terauchi, ivhom Prince 
Yamagata favored, was too deeply concerned with 
Korean affairs as well as too valuable in that connec- 
tion to be recalled. Katsura was placed in office over 
the heads of the party leaders, he was regarded as the 
embodiment of the bureaucratic spirit, his acceptance 
pi office in December, 1912, v^^as hailed by the people as 
an apostasy from his declared intention to keep out of 
politics, and his accession was greeted by a violent out- 
hurst of opposition. Seiyu-kai and Kokumin-to jour- 
nalists met in Yokohama and passed, with tremendous 
excitement, the following: 

' Resolved that, whereas through the insolence and arrogance 
'jf the clans, which have now reached the extreme point, consti- 
iCutional government is in danger, we hereby pledge ourselves to 
i-xterminate clan government and refuse all offers for com- 
, promise or reconciliation, in order to protect the constitution. 



162 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Katsura had lost the popular confidence. But he 
still thought that he could win by adopting his oppo- 
nents' tactics. In January, 1913, he announced his in- 
tention of forming a new party of his own, "to achieve 
the perfection of constitutional government." The an- 
nouncement did not achieve its purpose. Mob violence 
began in February. The press reflected the Diet's dis- 
satisfaction, and venerable and heretofore revered 
statesmen were lampooned in true Western style. Kat- 
sura was stoned; the journalistic establishments which 
supported him were wrecked. But Katsura stood by 
his task. On the 7th of February he issued a manifesto 
looking to the formation of his new party. In order 
to avert a vote of censure in the Diet he resorted to 
an Imperial ordinance and suspended that body. In his 
effort to combine the old tactics of the Genro and the 
bureaucracy with the new methods of party support he 
actually alienated both sides at once. A resolution ex- 
pressing want of confidence was signed by two hun- 
dred and twenty-nine members of the Diet, two hun- 
dred and fourteen of them being of the Seiyu-kai. The 
resolution complained of the Premier's resort to Im- 
perial rescripts, charged him with using his office for 
personal ends, and declared that his refusal to reply 
to interpellations would mean the destruction of con- 
stitutional government. On the other hand the bureau- 
crats considered him a deserter. The men who came 
to the support of his newly raised standard were either 
his own proteges or certain of the most disliked and 
distrusted of Japanese political leaders. With these he 
could not regain the confidence of the country, though 
he worked desperately toward that end. He enlisted 
the help of the Emperor and of Marquis Saionji. He 
was fighting against the principle of responsibility to 



i 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 163 

the Diet and he was defeated. Not even the expres- 
sion of the Imperial will swayed the opposition from its 
purpose. After leaving office Katsura himself con- 
ceded that in his opinion no premier should thenceforth 
attempt to carry on the government without a parlia- 
mentary majority behind him. 

The formation of Prince Katsura's party was accom- 
panied by a complete break-up of old party lines. His 
new organization, the Rikken Doshi-kai, the Consti- 
tution Friends Party, or Unionists, came out with 
ninety-three members. The Kokumin-to, which had 
formerly ninety members, lost forty-seven to this new 
party, retaining forty-three. The remainder, led by Mr. 
K. Inukai, were firmly pledged to party politics and 
were foremost in causing the fall of the Katsura Cabi- 
net, as they were subsequently in that of the Yamamoto 
Cabinet. They have since been bent on the overthrow 
of the Okuma Cabinet. 

The Seiyu-kai still retained a majority so that, upon 
Katsura's fall, in the natural course of events, Marquis 
Saionji as their leader should have returned to power. 
But the Emperor had been persuaded, before Katsura 
fell, to order Saionji to make terms for his party with 
Katsura. This Saionji, as an honest party leader, 
could not do. He was thus made to appear disobedient 
to the Emperor, with the result that for the moment he 
had to retire from active politics. The name of the 
Emperor still retains much of its magic power. 

The clans were still to make another attempt to avert 
the impending transition. They prevailed upon the 
Seiyu-kai to agree to support a Satsuma clansman. Ad- 
miral Yamamoto. Though a navy man, Admiral Ya- 
mamoto was somewhat under the influence of Prince 
Yamagata. Upon his assuming office, Mr. Yukio 



164 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Ozaki and some twenty-four other members of the Diet 
seceded from their party and formed the Seiyu, or 
Constitutionahsts, Ckib. This group, together with 
the Nationahsts, insisted upon party government with 
no compromise. 

During the summer Prince Katsura fell ill. In the 
autumn he died. The leadership of his new party 
passed to Viscount Oura, Baron Goto, and Baron Kato, 
none of whom was in favor with the people. 

Prince Katsura was undoubtedly the greatest states- 
man of modem Japan after Prince Ito. As an Imperi- 
alist, he went beyond Ito. In turning finally from 
the principle of bureaucratic government and in break- 
ing away from the control of the Genro, he contributed, 
though late, to the progress of the movement toward 
popular government. 

Probably never again will a Japanese minister be 
chosen from the ranks of the Elder Statesmen. The 
members of that unique and wonderful group have one 
by one disappeared. Ito, the maker of the constitution, 
the organizer of the Seiyu-kai, the author of the Chino- 
Japanese War, the first resident-general of Korea, the 
foremost diplomat of Japan, was assassinated in 1909. 
Katsura, the maker of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
the conductor of the Russo-Japanese War, the founder 
of Japanese influence in Manchuria, went, as we have 
seen, in 1913. General Nogi, hero of the Russo-Jap- 
anese War, followed his Imperial Master to the grave 
in 1912. Marquis Inouye, the early comrade of Ito, 
repeatedly a cabinet minister, "guardian of the trea- 
sury," and in later years ofttime mediator when the 
views of other leaders have clashed, has just recently 
passed away^ at the age of eighty, after more than 

^ September 1, 1915. 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 165 

fifty years in the service of his country. There re- 
main: Prince and Marshal Yamagata, a war lord and 
uncompromising opponent of party government ; Prince 
and Marshal Oyama, who stands for the army faction 
but is not active in politics; and Marquis Matsukata, 
the founder of Japan's financial system. Each of these 
men is over seventy years old. Prince Yamagata, the 
most influential, is seventy-seven. There is little likeli- 
hood that any new men will succeed to the mantles which 
were worn by these great leaders of the transition 
period. At the same time the influence of the little 
group of members who survive still remains a decisive 
factor in the choosing of cabinets and the framing of 
policies. 

The Katsura Cabinet had resigned on February 12, 
1913. The Yamamoto Ministry which succeeded to 
office contained six members of the Seiyu-kai, which still 
retained a majority in the Diet. The army and navy 
departments were left in non-party hands. As the 
Seiyu-kai had declared that they would support none 
but a party cabinet, and as the cabinet of Yamamoto 
was clearly the product of a compromise which left the 
controlling influence in the hands of the Genro, the 
party was accused of having sold out to the bureau- 
cracy. The Nationalists severed their connection with 
the Seiyu-kai and seceders established the Seiyu Club 
as we have already noted. Many of the latter have since 
returned to the Seiyu-kai. 

The appointment of Admiral Yamamoto as Premier 
meant a temporary eclipse of the army faction and as- 
cendancy of the navy — a victory for the Satsuma clan 
at the expense of Choshiu. It meant temporary defeat 
to the demands of the army for additional Korean de- 
fenses. The budget estimates submitted in January, 



166 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

1914, were lower than those of the preceding year for 
the army, but were three per cent, higher for the navy, 
while a new naval program was submitted which con- 
templated an increased outlay of $80,000,000 in seven 
years. Thus, while Admiral Yamamoto had proposed, 
along with the relaxation of government interference 
with industrial undertakings and the maintenance of the 
status quo in the Far East, a policy of financial reform, 
his first budget showed no sign of putting the principle 
of retrenchment into practice. Popular sentiment was 
therefore already crystallizing in hostility to the navy 
program, when an exposure began which finally culmi- 
nated in the fall of the Yamamoto Ministry. 

In January, 1914, definite news reached Japan of de- 
velopments in a trial in Berlin which indicated that sev- 
eral officers in the Japanese navy had been guilty of 
graft in making purchases for the navy. Coupled with 
this came similar accusations in connection with con- 
tracts with an English armament firm. The oppor- 
tunity for a violent attack upon the bureaucracy was not 
lost. A committee of inquiry was instituted, which led 
to the indictment of two officers and a court-martial 
procedure. The opposition in the Diet called on the 
ministry to resign. This the ministry refused to do un- 
til the findings of the court-martial should be kno^.^n. 
An attempt was made by the opposition to pass a vote 
of censure on the government. This was defeated 
through the Seiyu-ka; support of the government. But 
the people protested against the vote. As in 1912, 
great mass meetings were held and near riots became 
frequent. Both Houses were agreed on demanding a 
radical reduction of the naval estimates, but a deadlock 
arose over the amount of the reduction, the Peers de- 
manding double that proposed by the House. In the 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 167 

face of this widespread opposition, the Cabinet on March 
23 suspended the Diet for three days and on March 24 
resigned. The government declared that the resigna- 
tion was not due to the naval scandal but to the fact 
of Parliament's failure to agree on the budget. All of 
the opposition papers declared that the naval scandal 
was the cause. Whatever the cause, the resignation 
carried the implication that a ministry could no longer 
stand against the opposition of a strong majority in 
the Diet. 

After various possibilities had been canvassed, Count 
Okuma was called on to organize a new cabinet, and 
on April 16 the aged Progressive leader came from his 
retirement and took the reins of government. A less 
sincere patriot would not have undertaken the almost 
hopeless task which awaited him. It is now evident that 
Count Okuma rightly interpreted Japanese sentiment 
and was justified in expecting national support. He 
took office, however, with the backing of a minority only 
in the Diet. His cabinet contained Baron (Taka-akira) 
Kato as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Premier 
himself took charge of Home Affairs. Later Viscount 
Oura became Minister of Home Aff°airs. Count Oku- 
ma's program emphasized economic reform, the eradi- 
cation of corrupt practices, and the establishment of re- 
sponsible government. Education should be fostered, 
peace maintained, productive enterprises advanced, and 
ta^xes reduced. Unforeseen developments in world poli- 
tics soon diverted the attention of the Cabinet from this 
program to such an extent that up to the present little 
or nothing has been done along the lines of its declared 
policy. 

The calling to power of Count Okuma, the man of 
all men in Japan who had consistently and indefatiga- 



168 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

bly upheld and advanced the course of self-government, 
was an event which observers, even those not the most 
optimistic, were inclined to regard as epoch-making. 
Beginning with the societies for the study of political 
thought and institutions before unknown, the move- 
ment toward responsible governnient had slowly but 
surely gained strength, through the successive stages 
marked by governmental intolerance to the formation 
of parties by clan leaders, until there finally came into 
control of the government a cabinet which was by its 
own professions responsible to the Diet and to the 
people. 

There are, therefore, inferences to be drawn from the 
history of party politics previous to 1914, which estab- 
lish a background for comparison with the outstanding 
features of the period during which Count Okuma has 
been in power. Certain coinciding inferences may 
fairly be drawn from the events of the later period, but 
certain others which might be expected are not at all to 
be drawn. 

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Japanese 
party history has been the absence of concrete and de- 
tailed programs. All parties have asserted their ad- 
vocacy of general principles, but with these they have 
been content. The reason is not far to seek. Electors 
can scarcely be expected to focus their interest upon the 
planks of a j)latform which an irresponsible ministiy 
may either disregard or use as a blind while working 
out schemes of its own in legislative action, thereafter 
leaving it to the framers of the platform to rage over 
the substitutions. A very natural corollary, since there 
must be some basis of choice in a representative system, 
has been the prominence of the personal element. The 
power of individual statesmen of well-known families, 



JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES 169 

of high ability, or possessed of great personal magnet- 
ism, prevails among the Japanese perhaps more strongly 
than among any other people unless it be the Chinese. 
Parties have usually had such personages as their lead- 
ers, and elections have depended rather upon the per- 
sonality of candidates than upon the measures which 
they have advocated. 

Party government in a parliamentary system entails 
upon party members implicit obedience. We are not 
surprised to find, therefore, that in Japan the bonds 
of party have been very loosely drawn ; that nearly every 
election has seen the rise of new parties or political clubs, 
with the return by the older parties of numbers sud- 
denly greatly diminished or increased. With the Diet 
also, members have paid small regard to the "whips," 
and ministerial programs have been the exception be- 
cause no ministry has felt warranted in expecting con- 
sistent support. 

The Liberals first, and much later the Progressives, 
were forced into a policy of opportunism. The same has 
been true of practically all the parties and groups. 
This, of course, has involved frequent disappointment 
over the failure to receive the compensation promised 
in return for the support of government measures. But 
half a loaf taken when it might be had has frequently 
later been followed by more, and it would be futile to 
condemn the parties for making such use of their mea- 
ger powers as they have found possible. Unfortu- 
nately such practices have increased the opportunities 
for corruption of many sorts, opportunities of which full 
advantage has been taken. As in the English House 
of Commons before reform, where from Walpole to 
Pitt the King and the ministers contended with open 
purse against an opposition which was open to and 



170 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

given to pecuniary persuasion, so in Japan, the govern" 
ment's clan henchmen, protected by the throne, have 
held out purses and patronage to keep in running or- 
der their profitable bureaucratic monopoly, while, in 
spite of the danger of punishment for similar actions, 
the party politicians have nevertheless played the game 
of graft vi^ith a dexterity and success that might aiouse 
the envy of old-time Tammany leaders. 

Finally the attention of Western students is drawn by 
the fact that there exist in Japan as yet no Socialist or 
Labor parties, no group established upon a line of so- 
cial or economic cleavage or division. No doubt this is 
partly due to the electoral qualification which requires 
the payment of 10 yen ($5.00) in direct taxes, which, 
though small by American standards, is large when we 
consider the comparative poverty of the masses in 
Japan. Another influence accounting in large meas- 
ure for the absence of class divisions in politics has 
been the all-pervading spirit of reverence for the Em- 
peror. Impelled by this, the greatest of forces in old 
Japan, the people have looked upon the government 
and its agencies as manifestations of the vtdll of the 
Heaven-descended Sovereign whose impartial benevo- 
lence toward all classes of his people was unquestion- 
able. This influence has suffered a noticeable decline 
since the death of Mutsuhito, and today the Kokumin- 
to is rapidly establishing lines of cleavage suggesting 
those which are familiar and seemingly ineradicable in 
more democratic countries. 



CHAPTER X 

JAPAN : COUNT OKUMA AND THE PRESENT REGIME 

Count Okuma's appointment as Premier was the 
most popular since the constitution was promulgated, 
and it was hailed in many quarters as marking defi- 
nitely the end of the old era. Count Okuma once de- 
scribed himself as the representative of the Meiji Era. 
As a matter of fact he has always been in advance of 
contemporary Japanese thought. He was the founder 
of the Progressive Party in 1882 and was its leader 
until his retirement from active politics in 1907. At that 
time he refused to join the group of Elder Statesmen. 
He remained aloof as a free critic, but was recognized 
as an informal adviser upon all sorts of national ques- 
tions. His position in this regard was not unlike that 
maintained for some time by Lord Rosebery in Eng- 
land. 

Count Okuma is not a member of either the Sat- 
suma or Choshiu clans. He comes, however, of the 
samurai class. He was fifteen years old when Commo- 
dore Perry entered Yedo Bay. He has thus seen the 
whole of the growth of modem Japan. Nearly sev- 
enty-eight years old, he has declared his intention to live 
to be one hundred and twenty. In his early youth he 
led in the movement toward constitutionalism. From 
1873 to 1888 he was connected with the Department of 
Finance. In the latter year he became Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and it was under him that the treaties 

171 



172 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

were revised. In 1898 he became Prime Minister and j 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in that coahtion cabinet! 
which was the first attempt at party government. He 
has ever stood for increasing participation of the people 
in the affairs of government. Waseda University, 
which he founded as an independent educational estab- 
lishment, bears witness to the sincerity of his early 
championship of popular education and freedom of \ 
thought. He has frequently been spoken of as the 
"Grand Old Man" of Japan. 

In forming his cabinet in April, 1914, from members 
of two minor parties in the Lower House, Count Okuma j 
sought to combine democratic convictions with experi- 
ence and satisfactory official records. Baron Kate, 
leader of the Doshi-kai, had been Ambassador to Great ' 
Britain; Viscount Oura had held ministerial office mi- 
der Katsura, and Mr. Wakatsuki under Saionji. Count j 
Okuma found support in particular among the com-ii 
mercial classes and the liberal-conservative ranks of the 
younger men. His advocacy of a policy of strict j 
economy and internal development was calculated to| 
draw such men to his standard. 

It was soon prophesied that the Okuma cabinet would 
be overthrown by the opposition of the Kokumin-to and ■< 
parts of the Seiyu-kai. Some politicians asserted that 
Count Okuma should have given Mr. Inukai, the leader \ 
of the Kokumin-to, a seat in his cabinet to assure the 
support of the Nationalists. Count' Okuma's support- 
ers objected to Inukai as a radical, a visionary, an im- 
practical opportunist. The Kokumin-to is in Japan 
•what the Kwo-ming Tang is in China, and the leaders ; 
of the two parties, Inukai and Sun Yat-sen, are close 
friends. The recognized leader of the Progressives be- 
fore the Radicals formed the Kokumin-to, Count 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 173 

Okuma had differed with the latter rather in degree of 
radicalism than in fundamental principle. 

Count Okuma made a special appeal to the educated 
middle class, the laboring classes, and the students. 
Lacking the command of a majority party he appealed 
to all sections and parties, and, whatever the details and 
the immediate promises of his platform, he sought the 
broadest possible support for the furtherance of a thor- 
oughly national policy. At the same time he did not 
hesitate to incur hostility in some quarters by dealing 
summarily with leaders implicated in irregular political 
practices. One of his first acts on becoming premier 
was to retire three influential admirals, including the 
ex-Premier, indicating thereby a determination to hold 
officials strictly responsible for corruption revealed un- 
der them. After the elections of March, 1915, he of- 
fered his resignation because of corrupt practices 
charged against one of the members of his Cabinet. 

The Cabinet had to meet a situation in which mili- 
tarism versus anti-militarism, autocracy and bureau- 
cracy against representative and party government had 
been and have remained outstanding issues. The Seiyu- 
kai favored the navy over the army. The Doshi-kai 

) favored the army and opposed the navy. The Koku- 

i min-to and Yushin-kai were against both and against 
the bureaucracy. The first problem then was to recon- 
cile the conflicting elements sufficiently to command a 
majority in the Diet. 

The second great problem was to devise measures to 

} promote internal progress and guarantee the national 
security while at the same time reducing taxation. Fi- 

; nances have been, since the Russo-Japanese War, the 
hardest problem of the successive cabinets. Japan's na- 

I tional debt was in 1894 only $130,000,000. It now 



174 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

stands at approximately $1,250,000,000. That is, it has 
increased by nearly ten times in twenty years. It ex- 
ceeds the sum of the net debt of the United States ($1,- 
050,000,000) and is equal to nearly one-half the sum 
of the gross debt. It equals twice the sum of the debt 
of China ($600,000,000). But the national wealth of 
Japan is, according to the most generous estimate ever 
published,^ $18,500,000,000, as compared with $140,000,- 
000,000 of the United States. China's debt is estimated 
at $600,000,000; and China's wealth at $53,000,000,- 
000. But the United States has a population twice that 
of Japan; and China's population is more than six times 
that of Japan. According to Mr. Takahashi's esti- 
mate, the per capita wealth in Japan amounts to $363; 
in the United States it amounts to $1,525.^ Thus, not 
only do the Japanese owe nearly twice as much per citi- 
zen on their public debt, but they have assets less than 
one-fourth those of the people of the United States to 
balance against this burden. The obligation of the Jap- 
anese taxpayer in relation to his nation's debt is, there- 
fore, from eight to ten times as heavy as that of the 
American. 

In China the per capita wealth is one-third that in 
Japan. But the population is over six times that of 
Japan, and the national debt is one-half. This makes 
the obligation of the Chinese citizen to his nation's debt 
one-fourth as heavy as that of the Japanese. The av- 
erage Japanese pays twenty per cent, of his income in 
taxes, while among the wealthy it runs, on account of 
progressive rates of taxation, to nearly forty per cent. 

^ Estimate of Mr. Hideomi Takahaslii, in the Tokyo Economist. 
See Japan Year Book, 1915, p. 659. 

^ Other estimates place that in Japan lower and that in the United 
States higher. 



JAPAN: THE PKESENT REGIME 175 

With the sentiment in the country strong for econ- 
omy, with the people surprised and disgusted by the rev- 
elations of corruption in official circles, Count Okuma's 
prospects of loyal support in an endeavor to carry out 
his promises were bright. The Minister of Finance an- 
nounced that he would continue the policy of putting 
aside 50,000,000 yen annually for debt redemption. 
Practically no new public works were to be undertaken, 
and the railway appropriation was to be diminished. 
This last feature the Seiyu-kai opposed strenuously, de- 
manding 50,000,000 yen in place of 15,000,000 for rail- 
way work. The matter was, however, not made an is- 
sue in the short, June, 1914, session of Parliament, which 
closed with harmony prevailing. 

The great European War began at the end of July, 
1914, and with its beginning went the good intentions 
of the Japanese government toward economy. During 
the period while Japan was engaged in actual military 
operations against the Germans in China, the Japanese 
people manifested that unified support of the govern- 
ment that marked the Chino-Japanese and the Russo- 
Japanese Wars. With the capture of Tsing-tao and 
the suspension of hostilities, the Cabinet was again called 
upon to face the problem of governing under princi- 
ples of responsibility to a Diet whose Lower House con- 
tained a hostile majority. Although the Kiaochow cam- 
paign had been successful. Count Okuma had to con- 
fess to the expenditure of large sums in carrying out 
the project. He came to the Diet with a request in 
addition that the army be increased to the extent of 
36,000 men, raising thus the old question which had led 
to the fall of the Saionji government. The course which 
Count Okuma followed at the moment may or may not 
be considered consistent with his theory of parliamen- 



176 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

tary government. Upon the rejection of the proposed 
increase by a majority of sixty-five votes, he resorted to 
an Imperial rescript dissolving the House of Represen- 
tatives and calling for a new election on March 25, 1915. 
Count Okuma's confidence in the strength of his posi- 
tion was apparent. No suggestion was made that the 
Emperor ask some other statesman to form a cabinet. 
Both the government and the people were to await the 
opinion of the electorate upon the question. 

The contest was conducted according to modern po- 
litical party methods. The unfavorable vote on the ap- 
propriations had been a plain indication of the Seiyu- 
kai's determination to regain control, since no alliance 
with the ministry was possible. The issue was therefore 
clearly drawn. Between January 1 and March 25 elec- 
tioneering was carried on with a feverish activity sug- 
gestive of the most approved — or disapproved — Occi- 
dental methods. Special trains carrying platform ora- 
tors; phonograph records; personal telegrams; women 
canvassers; all betokened a careful study of Western 
procedure and willingness to profit thereby. In his cam- 
paign Count Okuma cleverly avoided the issue of the 
army increase, basing his plea for support upon the 
success and value of his China policy and making use 
in particular of a powerful personal appeal. The lat- 
ter factor was decisive in the election. But in addition 
to the personal popularity of their leader, the govern- 
ment group could rely upon its success in Shantung, 
upon the fact that the government was engaged in ne- 
gotiations with China which promised great advantages, 
and upon the decreased popularity of the Seiyu-kai due 
to criticism directed at its opportunistic policy and its 
connection with the naval scandals. On the other hand, 
the Seiyu-kai was much more united than were the 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 177 

groups supporting the government. The Doshi-kai and 
Chusei-kai indulged in contention over their nomina- 
tions, while the failure of the ministry to protest more 
vigorously against the California land laws was a sore 
point with the people, and of this the opposition ora- 
tors did not fail to make the most. 

Japan has no law limiting campaign expenses or re- 
quiring parties or candidates to give account of cam- 
paign contributions and disbursements. The expenses 
of election campaigns have been steadily increasing. 
Seats in the 1915 election are said to have cost from 10,- 
000 to 100,000 yen. According to the report of the 
Legal Affairs Bureau of the Department of Justice, 
9,224 persons were proceeded against on charges of 
corrupt practice; 237 were punished by imprisonment 
and 5,209 by suspension of eligibility to office and of 
the right to vote.^ After the election, steps were taken 
looking toward the introduction of a Corrupt Prac- 
tices Act at the next session of the Diet.^ 

The returns proved a landslide for Count Okuma. 
The Seiyu-kai lost over ninety seats, the majority of 
which went to Doshi-kai candidates. The membership 
in the newly elected house was reported as follows : For 
the government: Doshi-kai — 150; Chusei-kai — 36; 
unattached, most of whom would support the govern- 
ment — 62. Against the government: Seiyu-kai — 106; 
Kokumin-to — 27. Total 381. A majority requires 
191 votes. The assured opposition was 133. The gov- 
ernment needed to control only a half-dozen votes from 
among the unattached in order to have a majority, but 

'^ Japan Year Book, 1915, p. QQ6. 

^ The number of franchise holders increased from 501,000 in 1898 
to 1,502,673 in 1908, and according to official returns there were 
l,54"i,725 qualified voters in Japan in 1915. 



178 POLITICS IN THE FAK EAST 

of the sixty-two unattached members nearly all were 
considered favorable to the government. Thus the gov- 
ernment was able to count on a working majority of, 
say, fifty in the House. Its first task was to assure it- 
self of satisfactory party alignments. Count Okuma's 
victory by no means indicated the absence of a wide- 
spread and vigorous opposition to his policies. Not yet 
can a Japanese ministry be confident of the abiding loy- 
alty of its majority, and it will probably not be able 
to do so until the Cabinet becomes responsible to the 
House. Although, because of the constitutional pro- 
vision for budget repetition, a government cannot be 
forced from power by the Diet, nevertheless on a ques- 
tion of increasing the supplies the house may prevent 
the government from carrying out old or embarking 
upon new policies which require increased expenditures.! 
There is thus, in fact, a substantial degree of interde-: 
pendence. 

The Emperor ordered a special session of the Diet, 
to convene on May 27 for a session of twenty-one days.! 
The particular business to come before the session was 
the consideration of the army and navy estimates. 

Before the special session convened, the governmenii 
had already secured from China a formal agreement witl 
regard to many of the concessions wliich Japan had de- 
manded. But this agreement does not dispose of tl 
matter of the further items which were included in tl 
original demands, and the fate of those items — the 63 
tent to which they will be insisted upon later — will 
pend upon developments both abroad and in interiil 
politics.^ Immediate^ upon the assembling of the Die 
the government scored a victory on the issue which haj 
led to the elections, in that the Diet passed the bud| 

^ See Chapter XVIII. 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 179 

estimates increasing the army and navy appropriations 
by 52,000,000 yen. Thus the poHcy upon which Count 
Okuma had insisted in December, of strengthening the 
armed forces of the country "in order that our diplo- 
matic dealings may be made more eiFective," received 
the legislative sanction. 

At the same time the government was not allowed 
to go free because of the material successes which its 
diplomacy had achieved. On the contrary, the China 
poHcy was made the subject of a vigorous attack from 
many quarters and from many points of view. Some 
critics denounced the government as having taken an 
unfair advantage of China's weakness at a moment 
when the other nations had their attention concentrated 
on the war. Some declared that the government had 
laid the country open to criticism by its failure to com- 
municate the exact form of the demands on China to 
the powers, especially to Japan's ally. Great Britain. 
Some asserted that the government had blmidered in 
asking China for the concession of railway rights which 
had already been given Great Britain. Some com- 
plained that, inasmuch as the retrocession of Kiaochow 
was a foregone conclusion, the government had put it- 
self in the wrong by withholding the agreement to make 
the restoration. Some considered the resort to an ulti- 
matum a fauoc pas. Some took exception to the whole 
China policy. 

Professor K. Hayashi, of the chair of International 
Politics of Keio University and a member of the Diet, 
resigned from his party, exclaiming: "Why were such 
abominable demands in the first place framed by the 
Cabinet? ... It is absolutely an insult to our neigh- 
bor's sovereignty. Those desires if accepted, were, that 
China would consent to be a protectorate of Japan." At 



180 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

a mass meeting of the Taishi Rengo Taikwai, an asso- 
ciation interested in Chinese affairs, a resolution was 
passed declaring: "The diplomacy of the present min- 
istry has done harm to the friendly Sino-Japanese re- 
lationship, has invited the suspicion of the powers, and 
has injured the prestige of the empire. The members 
of the ministry should . . . resign their positions." 

On the other hand some of the most severe critics 
found fault with the government for its having failed 
to compel China to accede to all the demands. An Eng- 
hsh writer, in a communication to the Far Eastern Re- 
view under date of August 1, explains the situation as 
follows : 

Japan is now disgusted with its government for getting into 
bad odor in China and for embroiKng it with foreign powers. 
The most determined efforts have been made to get the Okuma 
Government out, and particularly to force Baron Kato to re- 
sign. The Government has been saved by the proximity of the 
Coronation, but it seems the universal opinion that they will 
have to go eventually because of their mishandling of the op- 
portunity in China. In other words, Japan does not know 
what it wants. It is cross with the Government, not because of 
the demands, which are not really understood, but for getting 
the country into trouble.^ 

As far as formal criticism was concerned, the politi- 
cal opposition came, of course, from the ranks of the 
Seiyu-kai and the Kokumin-to. Baron Kato, as Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, was repeatedly called on to 
explain in the Diet this, that, and the other feature of 
what the government had done or failed to do in the 
China negotiations. At one sitting an ultra-radical 
member called him a traitor, the implication being that 

^ Far Eastern Review, August^ 1915^ p. 87. 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 181 

he had betrayed his country's reputation and best in- 
terests. 

On June 3 a vote of censure against the government 
was moved in the Diet by Seiyu-kai and Kokumin-to 
leaders, on the score that the negotiations with China 
had been conducted in a mistaken manner from begin- 
ning to end, that the cordial relations between the two 
countries had been damaged, suspicion on the part of 
foreign powers been engendered, the dignity of the Em- 
pire been harmed, and thus not only had the peace 
of the Far East not been established but seeds of future 
trouble had been sown. After Baron Kato, Count 
Okuma himself took the floor in defense of the govern- 
ment's policies. The motion was rejected by a vote of 
232 to 133, as the government still retained its majority, 
but the fact that it had been moved and had received 
more than one-third of the votes is significant. 

There seems little doubt but that Baron Kato had 
kept the other members of the Cabinet much in the 
dark as to the real nature and implication of the de- 
mands, while conflicting statements which Count Okuma 
made during the progress of the negotiations indicate 
that the Premier himself was exceedingly ill informed as 
to what was transpiring at Peking. But, of course, the 
whole Cabinet had to accept the responsibility. 

Immediately after the attack on the Cabinet, an at- 
tempt was made to impeach Viscount Oura, the Min- 
ister of Home Affairs, on the ground of interference and 
illegal practices in the March elections. This motion 
was also defeated — ^but the fact that it had been intro- 
duced assumed a new meaning a few weeks later when 
definite charges were brought against the Home JNIin- 
ister. 

In the final session on June 9, an attempt was made 



182 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

to pass a vote of "no confidence" in the Speaker of the 
House, and, though this motion was defeated, the ses- 
sion was one of extreme confusion. 

By this time the Chinese boycott of Japanese trade 
had assumed alarming proportions, and this added to 
the fire of criticism directed against the government. 
Early in July it was reported that the Elder; Statesmen, 
Marquis Inouye and Marquis Matsukata, voicing the 
financial and business interests of the country, held the 
government's diplomacy responsible for the boycott and 
for the misunderstanding as to Japan's intentions cur- 
rent abroad. 

The greatest shock to the foundations of the Cabinet 
came, however, with the appearance of evidence in sup- 
port of the charge that Viscount Oura had been guilty 
of corruption in connection with the elections in March. 
As knowledge of the scandal developed, it appeared 
that Oura had given funds to Mr. Hayashida, Chief 
Secretary of the House of Representatives, to distribute 
in order to secure support to insure the passing of the 
army bill. Viscount Oura had secured the money in 
question from the funds of the Doshi-kai, of which party 
he was one of the leaders. 

Mr. Hayashida resigned, was arrested, and was sent 
to prison. ^ On July 29 Viscount Oura resigned from 
the Cabinet. After a report from Count Okuma, the 
Emperor sanctioned Oura's resignation and appointed 
Count Okuma Minister of Home Aifairs ad interim. 
Then Count Okuma offered the resignation of the whole 

^ The preliminary court, on September 23, found Mr. Hayashida 
and four members and thirteen former members of the House guilty 
of bribery in an attempt to induce opposition members to support the 
army bill. Viscount Oura had given Mr. Hayashida 40,000 yen for 
this purpose. 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 183 

Cabinet on the ground that it could not continue in 
office while the charge of corruption stood against one 
of its members. Simultaneously, the Genro was sum- 
moned by the Emperor to consider the situation. 

It was alleged in many quarters that the Oura scan- 
dal had been seized upon by the government as an ex- 
cuse for its resignation, the real reasons being the diffi- 
culties which it had had to face both at piome and 
abroad, especially the criticism of its foreign policy and 
the problems of finance, together with the evident rest- 
lessness of the people under the increasingly autocratic 
attitude of the ministry. 

The Genro made a canvass of possible nominees for 
the premiership, the names of Marquis Matsukata, 
Count Terauchi, Viscount Hirata and Mr. Takashi 
Hara, leader of the Seiyu-kai, being considered. Mar- 
quis Matsukata was in favor of appointing a new cabi- 
net. Prince Yamagata urged that Count Olamia re- 
main in office. Baron Kato let it be known that he 
positively would not continue in the Foreign Office, and 
it was agreed that he should be let out. It was found 
impossible, however, to agree upon a successor to Count 
Okuma or to advise that his resignation be accepted. 
The Emperor, therefore, commanded Count Okuma to 
withdraw his resignation and form a new cabinet. Vari- 
ous names were suggested for the Foreign Office: 
Baron Motono, Ambassador to Russia ; Viscount Chin- 
da, Minister to the United States ; Mr. K. Inouye, Am- 
bassador to England; and Baron Ishii, Ambassador to 
France. 

On August 8 the following cabinet appointments 
were announced: Premier — Count Okuma; (tempo- 
rary) Minister of Foreign Affairs — Count Okuma; 
Minister of Finance — Mr. Tokitoshi Taketomi (Doshi- 



184 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

kai) ; Minister of Navy — Vice- Admiral Tomosaburo 
Kato; Minister of War^ — Lieutenant General Ichino- 
suke Oka ; Minister of Justice — Mr. Yukio Ozaki ; Min- 
ister of Communications — Mr. Katsundo Minoura 
(Doshi-kai), or Viscount Masakata Sengoku; Minis- 
ter of Commerce and Agriculture — Mr. Hironaka Kono 
(Doshi-kai) ; Minister of Education — Dr. Sanae Ta- 
kata (President of Waseda University) ; Minister of 
the Interior — Dr. Kitokuro Ichiki.^ Baron Kato was 
made a Member of the House of Peers. And on Au- 
gust 12 Baron Ishii was appointed Minister of For- 
eign Affairs. 

The Association of Okuma Supporters had sent cir- 
culars throughout the country, urging that support be 
accorded to Premier Okuma on the ground that his ideal 
was to make Japan a nation of the foremost rank, ca- 
pable of competing with the most powerful countries. 
Count Okuma, the circulars said, had resigned because 
the allegations of election bribery created a situation re- 
pugnant to one of his lofty principles, but nevertheless 
he was unwilling to be a cause of concern to the Em- 
peror, who had asked him to remain in office. 

Count Okuma announced that his decision to remain 

^ The appointments for the War, Justice, and Commerce port- 
folios are the same as in the Cabinet which resigned on July 30. 
Vice-Admiral Kato, named for Minister o£ Navy, was Admiral 
Togo's Chief of Staff in the battle of the Sea of Japan, and last year 
was appointed Commander-in-chief of the First Japanese Squadron. 
Mr. Taketomi, selected for Minister of Finance, was Minister of 
Communications in the retired Cabinet. Mr. Minoura has held sev- 
eral public offices and is chairman of the Shunju Press Society. Dr. 
Takata, designated Minister of Education, is President of Waseda 
University and a member of the Higher Educational Council. Dr. 
Ichiki, named as Minister of the Interior, was formerly Minister of 
Education. 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 185 

in office was due to representations of the Emperor that 
the situation was such both at home and abroad as to 
make it highly inadvisable to change the premiership. 

It became apparent at once that the Seiyu-kai and 
the Kokumin-to would continue their opposition. Mr. 
Hara, the president of the Seiyu-kai, said in a speech 
at Kyoto: "Though this country takes its rank among 
the great powers by dint of its military strength, it is 
miserably backward in economic conditions." He con- 
tinued to the effect that the Okuma Cabinet had done 
nothing for the nation. At a great joint meeting of 
opposition forces, Mr. Kojima, of the Kokumin-to, 
said : 

The recent acts of Count Okuma have warned all party men 
in Japan that the time has come for their awakening. His acts 
of late are entirely in contradiction to what he used to profess 
while he was out of power. He has accomplished none of his 
promises made to the people at the beginning of his administra- 
tion. Count Okuma and the late Prince Ito were the two most 
zealous in the introduction of a constitutional form of politics 
in this country. Yet ever since he ascended to power last year. 
Count Okuma has always acted against the principles of con- 
stitutionalism. His doings have affected to no small extent the 
credit of the constitutional form of politics in Japan. . . . The 
Genro were a useful factor in Japanese politics, but they are 
now out of date since the conditions of the country have under- 
gone great changes in the past decade. 

There can be no questioning the fact that Count 
Okuma has , in his recent utterances distinctly repudi- 
ated the principle with which throughout his political 
career his name has been associated and toward which 
his efforts have been directed, the principle of responsi- 
ble party government. Prince Ito and Prince Katsura, 



186 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

each, in his late years, forsook his earlier political prin- 
ciples — but to quite the contrary conclusion to that at 
which Count Okuma has apparently arrived. Count 
Okuma now lays emphasis on his obligation to the Em- 
peror alone. He is quoted as having said recently: 
"The present Cabinet is the choice of the Emperor and 
any person among his subjects venturing to criticize his 
ministry is acting against the wish of the Emperor." 
He reminds the people that the constitution was the 
free gift of the Emperor (and the constitution makes 
the Cabinet responsible to the Emperor only). Thus 
Count Okuma invokes the doctrine of unrestrained Im- 
perial authority as constituting the foundation of the 
administration — which amounts to a complete negation 
of the principles for which he has long contended. 

As between theory and the practical facts of a po- 
litical situation. Count Okuma has, like his predeces- 
sors, subordinated the former to the demands of the 
latter. The Nichi Niclii represents him as having said, 
on the occasion of a recent visit to Kyoto, that he must 
frankly admit that his efforts in the direction of party 
government had ended in failure. Though still in fa- 
vor of party government, he finds no existing political 
parties possessed of the qualifications, necessary to make 
it a success. Political parties must meet the needs of 
the times and be replenished by men of new ideas. 
The leading members of all the existing parties are men 
of old ideas, while the middle classes are hostile to all 
parties. How, he asks, can the advance of constitu- 
tional government [party government?] be expected 
from such a state of things? 

It would be interesting to know what Mr. Ozaki, the 
Minister of Justice, thinks of this view. He was one 
of the leaders in the attack on the last Katsura minis- 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 187 

try because that ministry sought shelter behind the 
Throne, and the attacks at that time led to the Tokyo 
riots and the stoning of the ministers. Count Okuma 
is now doing exactly what Prince Katsura then at- 
tempted to do. The opposition will not fail to make 
the most of this paradoxical situation. 

In justification of his volt e-f ace ^ Count Okuma in 
his public utterances emphasizes the necessity of unity 
within the nation. The present is, he urges, the mo- 
ment of great opportunity for Japan, affording rare 
chances to promote the interests of the nation in every 
direction. Europe is at war; the shipping, the com- 
merce, and the productive energy of the European na- 
tions are demoralized. Now is the time for Japan to 
bend her energies to the securing of new markets. The 
diplomatic efforts of the government should not he 
hampered by party strife. Programs for development 
at home should not be subordinated to or exploited for 
political purposes. 

The newspapers which support the government have 
taken up this cry. They declare that Japan is enter- 
ing on a new period of national progress which makes 
necessary the uniting of efforts and the laying aside of 
party rivalries. 

These pleas appear already to be having an apprecia- 
ble effect upon public opinion. The returns from the 
recent election of members of the Prefectural Assem- 
blies, in which many neutral or independent candidates 
have been chosen, indicate that the voting public is be- 
coming convinced of the futility of mere party politics 
and is anxious to strengthen the government for the 
purposes of a national policy. 

Commenting on this fact, the Japan Daily Mail says : 
"In view of the evidence of an apparent detestation of 



188 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the existing political parties, it may be said that the 
time is coming for the appearance of a new political 
party with sound political views and principles, if the 
chance be seized by a really able politician." ^ A split 
in the Doshi-kai is indicated by the formation of a so- 
ciety called the Sakurada Club — which is also attracting 
some of the Chusei-kai members. This suggests the 
possibility that a new party may be in process of forma- 
tion. 

The new Okuma Cabinet faces a most complicated 
situation and has ahead of it problems of the greatest 
magnitude. The Diet is to convene on November 29. 
The Seiyu-kai and the Kokumin-to will enter the ses- 
sion organized for opposition, probably demanding the 
fall of the ministry and insisting on the eradication of 
what they affirm are the evil consequences of the in- 
tervention of the Genro. Among the inherited disabil- 
ities of the administration will be dissatisfaction with 
the China policy and criticism of the appointment of 
a successor to the Nogi family.^ Among the practical 
issues will be the problems of reduction in the taxes, of 
meeting the demands for the expansion of the navy, and 
of formulating an acceptable foreign policy. 

Japan's finances are, as has been indicated elsewhere, 
a problem of both chronic and acute difficulty. At pres- 
ent economic conditions are upset. The money market 
is unprecedentedly dull. Imports have declined rela- 

^ Weekly Edition, Japan Daily Mail, October 2, 1915. 

^ The government has recently decided to revive the family of 
General Nogi, who, being without heirs, committed suicide in 1912 
in order to follow his lord, the Emperor Mutsuhito, into the spirit 
world. This undertaking, implying disregard of the obvious inten- 
tion of General Nogi to bring the line of his family to an end, has 
occasioned a surprising amount of criticism among the Japanese 
people. 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 189 

lively to exports. The treasury surplus was practi- 
cally wiped out by the expenses of the Shantung cam- 
paign. The tax receipts have in recent years shown a 
gradual decline. The revenue for the fiscal year is re- 
ported as suffering a substantial decrease. At the same 
time, Japan is gaining commercially, along with some 
other states, by the war. Her monopoly of shipping on 
the Pacific is proving profitable. She is manufactur- 
ing and selling munitions on a large scale. The shift- 
ing of her trade balance is, apparently, increasing her 
specie reserve abroad. These facts are, of course, 
sources of encouragement to the government and serve 
to alleviate popular dissatisfaction over the state of the 
nation's finances. 

The budget statement submitted by the Cabinet for 
the fiscal year 1915-1916 estimates receipts at 557,000,- 
000 yen and expenditures at 491,500,000 yen, leaving 
a surplus of 65,000,000 yen. But the opposition has 
affirmed that the government's statement amounts to 
a mere patchwork, giving no indication of a constructive 
financial policy. The government reported the war 
expenses of the year 1914-1915 at 79,000,000 yen, to 
which must be added 20,000,000 yen for extraordinary 
military purposes. 

The new naval program is represented as calling for 
four battleships, nine light cruisers, twenty-four de- 
stroyers, and several submarines, over and above all con- 
struction under way. The total cost for new construc- 
tion is estimated at 170,000,000 yen. 

The opposition complains that the Okuma ministry 
has not as yet carried out any of the promises which it 
made in April, 1914. How effectively the opposition 
forces may make themselves felt cannot be predicted. 
Their strength is less than that of the government in 



190 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the Lower House. There will probably be no concerted 
action against the government in the Upper House. 
The government and the opposition each claim to rep- 
resent the real will of the nation. The government has 
the great advantage that it represents the known will 
of the Emperor. Count Okuma enjoys the personal 
favor and the unlimited confidence of the Emperor and 
has the good will and esteem of the people at large to a 
degree possessed by probably no other Japanese states- 
man in modern times. The tenure of office of the min- 
istry seems assured for several months at least, but what 
it may be able to accomplish remains to be seen. 

It is still too early to estimate with assurance the full 
significance of the present situation. On the one hand 
Count Okuma has scored conspicuous victories both in 
his foreign policy and in the domestic contest, of which 
the former was the occasion for and in many respects 
the cause of success in the latter. On the other hand 
his achievements have been at the expense, first, of his 
political platform of a year ago, calling for retrench- 
ment and internal constructive reform — both more es- 
sential, in the long run, to Japan's salvation than are 
mere political victories ; and, second, at the sacrifice, not 
the less to be regretted because necessary, of a lifelong 
ideal. Count Okuma has made no more progress to- 
ward the solution of Japan's financial problems than 
had his predecessors who went down one after another 
largely because of their inability to ofi'er the nation 
either the reality or the semblance of an adjustment be- 
tween the demands of a policy of national aggrandize- 
ment on the one hand and those of relief for the tax- 
payers on the other. Count Okuma's government last 
year forsook the paths of peace and anti-imperialism 
and led the nation in a new step on the highway of force- 



JAPAN: THE PRESENT REGIME 191 

ful imperial expansion. Did Count Okuma persuade 
his ministers to this reversal of form, or was he per- 
suaded? Has he bent the nation to approval of his 
China policy and the militarism and expense which it 
involves — or is he but the agent of his people, himself 
bending to an insistent demand for a forward and on- 
ward policy? 

Count Okuma began his administration along lines 
apparently consistent with the principles which he had 
all his life advocated, the principles of popular and re- 
sponsible government, but he now declares that, hav- 
ing tried these methods, he finds them, for the purposes 
of contemporary Japan, wanting. Is he leading his peo- 
ple to a Promised Land, or are they but traveling with 
him on the edge of a circle which will keep them in or 
even lead them deeper into the wilderness of financial 
burden from which other leaders have failed to extri- 
cate them? If he fails here, as others have failed, will 
not his people begin to plead their own cause more 
forcefully than any authorized leader, however sincere, 
has been inclined to plead it for them? 

In Japan the Emperor's ministers still determine the 
policies and the people continue to pay for what the 
government chooses to undertake. The influence of 
the Diet with the government has increased but it is not 
yet paramount. The influence of the people with the 
Diet has increased but the Diet is not really represen- 
tative. The influence of the Genro still remains a 
forceful factor. The peers have not yet been subordi- 
nated to the commons. The franchise is still narrowly 
limited. Labor unions are under a legal ban. Move- 
ments looking toward the establishing of parties along 
socialistic lines have been vigorously frowned upon. The 
law of the press is still very harsh. Ofiicialdom has the 



192 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

benefit of administrative law. The ministry is by the 
constitution responsible to the Emperor alone. 

The renewal by the Emperor of Count Okuma's man- 
date does not terminate the struggle between the prin- 
ciples of autocracy and liberalism; it does not reconcile 
the rival contentions of the expansionists and the do- 
mestic consolidationists ; it does not solve the problem 
of finance; it puts no money in the coffers of the gov- 
ernment or the pockets of the people — and among 
Japan's political problems that of finance is the most 
imperatively pressing of all. 



BOOK II 

CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS: CHINA, JAPAN, AND 
THE UNITED STATES 

THE RECENT PAST 



CHAPTER XI 

japan: steps on the road to empire. 

the passing of korea. 

Japan may be said to have embarked on the course 
of empire building at about the time when the German 
Empire and the Kingdom of Italy were first beginning 
to adjust themselves to their newly-won positions among 
the states of Europe. Between 1870 and 1875 the con- 
sciousness on the part of the Japanese of new national 
strength and the first flickerings of imperialistic ambi- 
tion manifested themselves in various and successful ac- 
tivities. Having before them the examples of the 
treaties which had been forced upon them by the West- 
ern nations, Japan and China made their first treaty in 
1871.^ This treaty, concluded at Peking, contained a 
provision stipulating" that if either party was aggrieved 
by a third power the other would render assistance or 
exercise good ofiices — ^which caused the Occidental press 
to speak of an "alliance" of the Asiatic nations — ^but 
such a stipulation had little significance. Permanent 
embassies, reciprocally, and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
were provided for, but there was no most-favored-nation 
clause. 

In 1871 certain inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands 
who had been shipwrecked on the southern coast of 
Formosa were murdered by Formosan savages. The 
Loochooans had long been paying tribute to both China 

^ Ratified in 1873. 

195 



196 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

and Japan. Formosa was a dependency of China. The 
Japanese in 1872 took up the case, and, contending that 
the murdered men were Japanese subjects, demanded 
redress of the Chinese government. The Chinese first 
maintained that the Loochooans were Chinese subjects; 
later, that the southern Formosans were outside Chinese 
control and jurisdiction; to the end, in both cases, that 
China had no responsibility in the matter. While this 
was in dispute the Japanese government in 1872 invited 
the King of the Loochoo Islands to come to Tokyo, con- 
ferred upon him Japanese titles and gifts, including 
cash, secured his surrender to Japan of the treaties which 
his government had made with the United States, 
France, and Holland, and thus established the de facto 
dependence of his kingdom upon Japan. In 1874 
the Japanese sent a military expedition to Formosa to 
exact, where the Chinese government was declining to 
act, the penalties which it had demanded; and this ex- 
pedition occupied the whole of southern Formosa. The 
Chinese government naturally protested against this in- 
vasion, which had gone beyond the necessities of pun- 
ishment — whereupon the Japanese demanded a large 
indemnity for the expenses which the expedition had in- 
curred, together with pledges for the future. The con- 
troversy very nearly led to war between Japan and 
China, the former having gone so far as to send an ul- 
timatum and prepare for the withdrawal of its repre- 
sentatives; but at that point the British Minister to 
China oiFered mediation, with the result that a treaty 
was signed at Peking in 1874 by which China agreed 
to pay an indemnity, Japan to withdraw from Formosa, 
and each govermnent undertook to protect subjects of 
the other on its soil. By this the Chinese government 
tacitly recognized that the Loochooans were Japanese 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 197 

subjects. In the course of the next two years the Jap- 
anese took control of the administration of the islands; 
and in 1879 they refused General Grant's offer of medi- 
ation as to the status of the islands and proclaimed the 
completion of their incorporation in the Japanese ad- 
ministration. 

In 1875 a dispute of some years' standing between 
Russia and Japan as to the possession of the Island 
of Saghalin was, for the time being, terminated. Japan 
claimed that in olden times the island had belonged to 
her, but that during the period of exclusion the Rus- 
sians had encroached upon it. In view of the conflict- 
ing claims, a division had been proposed. Japan had at 
one time offered to accept the 50th parallel as a bound- 
ary, but the Russians insisted upon a line between the 
48th and 47th parallels. In 1872 the Japanese offered 
to buy the Russians out, but they later decided that it 
was inadvisable to pay for a "worthless island." In 
1875 the island was given up to Russia in return for 
the recognition of Japan's complete sovereignty over 
the whole of the Kurile group. Its status was destined 
to be revised in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese 
War, when, by the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, 
Japan secured the southern half. 

In 1861 the British government had renounced in fa- 
vor of Japan certain inchoate claims which had been 
established in its favor to possession of the Bonin Is- 
lands, and in 1876 the Japanese government incorpo- 
rated these islands as part of the Japanese dominions. 

With these minor successes to encourage them, the 
Japanese next proceeded to the more important task, to 
which they had already begun to devote attention, of 
altering the political attitude and position of the 
Koreans. 



198 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Korea, from very early times, had had more or less 
important and generally undefined relations with China 
and Japan. It was by way of Korea that Chinese civ- 
ilization was carried to Japan. Through Korea the 
Mongols made their way when they attempted to in- 
vade Japan in 1281. Toward the end of the sixteenth 
century the Japanese twice invaded and twice with- 
drew from Korea. From then until 1834 it was the 
practice of the Korean Court to send envoys to Japan 
upon the installation of each new Shogun, but Korea in 
no sense acknowledged political connection with Japan, 
while she did look to China as her suzerain. After 1834 
the practice of sending envoys to Japan was discon- 
tinued. Between 1868 and 1873 the Japanese several 
times asked for a renewal of friendly relations, but this 
the Koreans refused. In 1873 certain Japanese states- 
men memorialized their Emperor to the effect that Rus- 
sia, with her policy of pressing southward, was the 
greatest of the perils against which Japan must guard, 
and it became henceforth a cardinal feature of Japa- 
nese policy to prevent Russia from absorbing Korea. 
Japanese radicals, before long, were even proposing the 
immediate conquest of the peninsula. 

Troubles of the Jesuits first drew to Korea the polit- 
ical attentions of a Western power. Although China | 
stood as suzerain, Prince Kung refused, when the | 
French Minister at Peking made representations to I 
him, to acknowledge responsibility on China's part for i 
misdeeds of the Koreans. Therein China made the in- 
itial mistake in that progressively unsatisfactory policy 
which ultimately lost to her her suzerainty over Korea j 
and to the latter her national existence. The French ' 
Minister in 1866 proclaimed Korea annexed to France, 
while a French fleet bombarded certain Korean for- 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 199 

tresses — but the French government did not confirm the 
annexation ! 

Five years later the complete disappearance of an 
American schooner in Korean waters occasioned the 
sending of an American fleet, accompanied by the Amer- 
ican Minister to China, to the mouth of the Han River. 
The American government had thoughts of securing a 
treaty; but beyond the destruction of the forts vt^hich 
fired on the ships the expedition accomplished noth- 
ing. 

These and other impressions from without intensified 
the prejudice of the Koreans against foreigners — in- 
cluding the Japanese. The Korean Court even went 
out of its way, in a letter replying to peaceful over- 
tures made by the Emperor of Japan, to express a most 
insulting contempt for the people and dominions of the 
latter. 

The Japanese finally accomplished what the Ameri- 
can government had contemplated — the making of a 
treaty with the King of Korea. In September, 1875, 
a Japanese gunboat, while surveying the mouth of the 
Han River, was fired on by a Korean fort. The Jap- 
anese made a landing in force and practically annihi- 
lated the garrison. The statesmen who were "making" 
Japan already had among their policies an intention to 
"open" Korea. They proceeded forthwith to send, in 
January, 1876, an expedition which, following some- 
what the tactics used by Commodore Perry in negotiat- 
ing with Japan twenty years before, succeeded in per- 
suading the Korean Court to enter into a treaty of 
"peace and amity." This treaty, signed on February 
26, 1876, put an end to Korea's isolation and was des- 
tined to mark the beginning of her subjugation to 
Japan. 



200 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

In the treaty it was declared that Korea was an in- 
dependent state enjoying the same sovereign rights as 
Japan. As Professor Longford has said : 

The same extraterritorial clauses that Perry had forced on 
the Japanese when they were ignorant of all international 
usages, of which they afterwards so bitterly complained, were 
introduced by them into their treaty with Korea, and . . . this 
was only the first of many incidents in Japan's intercourse with 
Korea that found exact counterpart in the story of her own 
early relations with European Powers.^ 

In 1880 Japan sent a minister to take up residence 
at Seoul, and Japanese traders went to the three open 
ports for which the treaty had provided. Two years 
later representatives of the United States and Great 
Britain appeared. The Chinese were already growing 
apprehensive with regard to Japan's intentions, and Li 
Hung-chang realized that it was imperative that some- 
thing be done. He apparently concluded that it might 
be possible to neutralize the effect of the Japanese ac- 
tivities by opening Korea to the w^hole world. On be- 
half of China he recommended to the Korean King that 
he make treaties with Western powers, and he suggested 
to the representatives of the powers that they make ad- 
vances to the King. The result was a series of treaties 
in 1882-1884. These purported to be made with an in- 
dependent state. At the same time the King wrote let- 
ters to the powers declaring that China was his suzerain. 
But neither then nor later was China willing to assume 
responsibility for what this vassal might do. 

There were two factions at the Korean Court, one pro- 
gressive and the other conservative. The Progressives 
looked to Japan for example and aid; the Conserva- 

^ Longford •' "The Story of Korea," p. 303. 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 201 

tives relied upon China. Japanese influence led to the 
employing of numerous Japanese advisers and instruc- 
tors by the Korean Court and the sending of young Ko- 
reans to Japan for education. The Regent was thor- 
oughly conservative. In 1882 he instigated an attack 
upon the Japanese legation. The Japanese had to flee 
for their lives, and their legation was burned. Many 
Korean officials of the pro-Japanese faction were mur- 
dered. The Japanese government demanded an apol- 
ogy and an indemnity, which the Korean Court gave. 
In the Convention of Chemulpo, concluded between Ko- 
rea and Japan on July 27, 1882, it was provided that 
the Japanese might keep Japanese soldiers in their 
legation as a guard at the expense of the Korean gov- 
ernment.^ In the next year the Japanese government 
restored a part of the indemnity which had been ex- 
acted. In 1884 there occurred a collision between the 
Conservatives and the Progressives of Korean official- 
dom. The Progressives called upon Japanese troops 
for assistance. Chinese troops under the Chinese Resi- 
dent, Yuan Shih-kai, came to the aid of the former. The 
Korean King took refuge with the Chinese. The Jap- 
anese legation was again attacked and burned, and again 
the Japanese staff had to flee for their lives. The Jap- 
anese people clamored for war — with both Korea and 
China. Plenipotentiaries were appointed, Count Ito 
for the Japanese, Li Hung-chang for the Chinese, and 
a convention was made at Tientsin on April 19, 1885. 
In this, both China and Japan agreed to withdraw their 
troops from Korea. "In case of any disturbance of 
grave nature occurring in Korea which might necessi- 
tate the respective countries or either sending troops, it 

^ Great Britain and France had furnished a precedent for this in 
their early relations with Japan. 



202 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

is hereby understood that each shall give to the other 
previous notice in writing of its intention to do so and 
that after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their 
troops." The King of Korea was to be asked to equip 
an armed force which could insure the public safety — 
employing military experts from a foreign countiy other 
than China and Japan. 

The Chino-Japanese Treaty of 1885 paved the way 
for the war which came ten years later. Japan, by her 
armed interference with the Korean Court in 1884, had 
destroyed for the time being the last vestiges of confi- 
dence on the part of most of the Koreans and had lit- 
erally driven the Korean government to dependence 
upon the support of China. Yuan Shih-kai,^ as Chi- 
nese Resident, became the power behind the Korean 
throne. Although conservatism prevailed, trade, es- 
pecially in imports, increased ; European technical and 
political and administrative advisers were engaged; a 
customs service modeled on that established in China 
by Sir Robert Hart, and with officers from the Chi- 
nese service, was founded; settlements were established 
in the open ports. Of these activities Professor Long- 
ford has said: 

Here again Japan was unfortunate. The Japanese who 
came to these ports were the reverse of a credit to their coun- 
try; unscrupulous adventurers, bullies, and the scum of all the 
ruffiandom of Japan predominated among them, and their con- 
duct and demeanor toward the gentle, submissive, and ignorant 
natives, who were unresisting victims to their cupidity and 
cruelty, were a poor recommendation of the new civilization of 
which they boasted. On the other hand, Chinese traders — law- 
observing, peaceable, and scrupulously honest in all their trans- 

^ Now President of China, 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 203 

actions — were living witnesses of the morality engendered by a 
faithful observance of the old.^ 

The years between 1885 and 1894 were marked by 
strife and bloodshed among the Korean factions on the 
one hand, and intrigue between these factions and the 
Chinese, Japanese, and Russians on the other. Before 
1895 China and Japan contended for preponderance of 
influence; after 1895 Russia took China's place in the 
contest. Japan was in both instances concerned, first, 
over the question of her own security; second, for op- 
portunity for expansion and self-aggrandizement. In 
the spring of 1894 an insurrection among the Koreans 
broke out. The government troops were repeatedly 
defeated, and before long the Min followers, the strong- 
est faction at the court, appealed to China for assist- 
ance. China responded by sending a large military 
force to Korea, informing Japan, in accordance with 
the terms of the treaty of 1885, that she was doing so. 
The Japanese met this move by sending an equally 
large force. China, describing Korea as her "tribu- 
tary state," endeavored to dictate limits to the number 
of troops which Japan might send and to the employ- 
ment which these should take upon themselves. The 
Japanese proposed that the two countries should co- 
operate in suppressing the rebellion and reforming the 
Korean government. The Chinese refused this offer, 
calling the attention of the Japanese to the fact that the 
latter had already recognized Korea as an independent 
country. In the interval the rebellion had died of in- 
anition, but the Japanese, having decided to go ahead 
and force reforms upon their own account, augmented 
the number of their troops; and the Chinese retained 

^Longford: "The Story of Korea/' p. 328. 



204 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the troops which they had sent, justifying themselves 
by pointing to the presence and increase of the Japa- 
nese troops. Finally the Chinese determined to send 
more troops, a move which could only be construed as 
an evidence of their decision to oppose the Japanese 
program. A small Chinese squadron convoying a 
British vessel which, acting as a transport, had twelve 
hundred Chinese soldiers aboard, was met, as it ap- 
proached Korea, by a Japanese squadron, and hostili- 
ties ensued. Six days later war was declared between 
Japan and China, and in the subsequent engagements 
on sea and land China was ignominiously beaten. The 
Japanese had actually invaded north China, had taken 
Wei-hai Wei, and were ready to advance upon Peking 
when peace was concluded upon China's solicitation, at 
Shimonoseki, on April 17, 1895. 

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China recognized the 
"full and complete independence of Korea"; Japan ac- 
quired the island of Formosa and the Pescadores at 
China's expense ; the southern extremity of Manchuria, 
from a line drawn from near the mouth of the Liao 
River to the mouth of the Yalu River, was ceded to 
Japan ; and China was required to pay an indemnity of 
200,000,000 taels. Russia, Germany, and France^ 
promptly compelled Japan to retrocede South Man- 
churia, but the remainder of her spoils she kept, together 
with an increase of the indemnity. 

By this war Japan had made a great stride forward. 
She had demonstrated her military and naval prowess, 
showing herself a "power." She had acquired a big 
and potentially valuable colony. Incidentally, the fear 
which her people had had of Russia was now crystallized 
into hatred — which made easy the military preparation 

^ See infra. Chapter XII. 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 205 

of the next ten years with a view to revenge for the 
Russian interference. But most important of all, China 
had been eliminated from Korea, and this left Japan, 
strengthened by the prestige which she had acquired as 
a conqueror, free to force upon Korea a program which 
would either establish her as a substantial barrier for 
Japan against Russia or would prepare the way, as it 
did in the event, for Japan, with apparent justification, 
to assume control of the Korean government. Japan 
at once sent one of her greatest statesmen, Count In- 
ouye, to inaugurate reforms. She sent, also, unwit- 
tingly, some of the very worst elements of her popula- 
tion, a horde of adventurous immigrants who proceeded 
at once to exploit the Koreans and render the name of 
Japan infamous among them. Let Count Inouye's 
own words bear witness as to one of the chief reasons 
why Korea did not welcome the professedly benevolent 
efforts of Japan, why she seemed insensible to the ben- 
efits to be derived from the program of reform which 
Japan offered her during the next ten years. 

All the Japanese are overbearing and rude in their dealings 
with the Koreans. The readiness of the Chinese to bow their 
heads may be a natural instinct, but this trait in their char- 
acter is their strength as merchants. The Japanese are not 
only overbearing but violent in their attitude towards the 
Koreans. When there is the slightest misunderstanding, they do 
not hesitate to employ their fists. Indeed, it is not uncommon 
for them to pitch Koreans into the river, or to cut them down 
with swords. If merchants commit these acts of violence, the 
conduct of those who are not merchants may well be imagined. 
They say : "We have made you an independent nation, we have 
saved you from the Tonghaks, whoever dares to reject our ad- 
vice or oppose our actions is an ungrateful traitor." Even 
military coolies use language like that towards the Koreans. 



206 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Under such circumstances, it would be a wonder if the Koreans 
developed much friendship with the Japanese. It is natural 
that they should entertain more amicable feelings toward other 
nations than toward the Japanese. For this state of things 
the Japanese themselves are responsible. Now that the Chinese 
are returning to Korea, unless the Japanese correct themselves 
and behave with more moderation, they will entirely forfeit the 
respect and love of the Koreans. 

Another circumstance that I regret very much for the sake 
of the Japanese residents is, that some of them have been un- 
scrupulous enough to cheat the Korean Government and peo- 
ple by supplying them with spurious articles. The Koreans, 
taught by such experience, naturally hesitate to buy from the 
Japanese. An examination of recent purchases made by the 
Korean Government from Japanese merchants would cause con- 
scientious men to cry out. I do not say that the Japanese alone 
have been untrustworthy. But I hope that, in future, they will 
endeavor to get credit for honesty instead of aiming at imme- 
diate and speculative gains.^ 

The Japanese had the misfortune also to be ofRciall}'- 
and inextricably implicated in an attack on the Palace 
on the morning of October 8, 1895, in the course of 
which the Korean queen was brutally murdered. Ja- 
pan's opportunity was, for the moment, by the acts of her 
own subjects, worse than lost. The Korean King fled 
for safety to the Russian legation, and from there for 
two years, under Russian influence, directed the affairs 
of his realm. In 1897, removing to a newly built pal- 
ace, he announced for himself the assumption of the 
title of Emperor — this step being taken in order to em- 
phasize in the eyes of China and Japan the complete 
independence which in theory his country was entitled 
to enjoy. 

^ Count Inouye, in the Nichi Nichi Shimbun, quoted by Professor 
Longford, in "The Story of Korea," pp. 337-338. 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 207 

At this point the attention of all countries having in- 
terests in the Far East was drawn to the rumors of Rus- 
sian diplomatic activity at Peking. It soon became 
known that Russia had gained railway and mining priv- 
ileges of importance in Manchuria, and it was suspected 
that she had effected an alliance with China. Then fol- 
lowed in rapid succession the events of the scramble for 
concessions.^ Maddened by the Russian acquisition of 
Port Arthur, the Japanese saw clearly that a conflict 
between themselves and the Russians was inevitable, the 
only remaining question being: when would the armed 
encounter occur? 

In 1900 Japan increased her military prestige, gained 
valuable experience, and won the moral approval of 
most of the powers with whom she cooperated, by the 
part which her troops played in the expedition of the 
Allies for the relief of the Peking legations. During 
the ensuing negotiations, and from then until 1905, the 
Japanese government stood firmly with the English 
and the United States governments in resistance to the 
efforts of certain other powers to secure special and in- 
dividual privileges at the expense of the open door pol- 
icy and the integrity of China.^ 

It soon became evident that Russia was aiming at the 
absorption of Manchuria. She had acquired special 
privileges, especially in railway building and finance, 
in 1896. She had poured soldiers into Manchuria un- 
der the name of railway guards. She had secured the 
lease of Port Arthur and Dalny after having expressly 
prevented Japan from holding them. During the 
Boxer period she had actually seized territory along the 
Amur. She had tried to lease the port of Masampo 

■'- See infra. Chapter XII. 
^ See infra. Chapter XIII. 



208 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

from Korea, but Japan had protested so vigorously to 
the Korean government that this was given up. She 
had constructed enormously strong fortifications at Port 
Arthur, and she was keeping a strong fleet at Vladi- 
vostok. 

During the negotiations between China and the pow- 
ers in 1900 and 1901, Russia tried to complicate the sit- 
uation. In Manchuria Admiral AlexiefF made an 
agreement with the Tartar General at Mukden on No- 
vember 11, 1900, by which the whole of the province 
was to be put under Russian command, and a Russian 
Resident with general powers of control was to be sta- 
tioned at Mukden. The United States, Great Britain, 
and Japan protested, and with this backing China re- 
fused to sign the agreement. But the Russians con- 
tinued the negotiations, and in January, 1901, secured 
an agreement which gave them a privileged position. 

By this time England was looking for some way to 
retrieve her diminished influence in the Far East. Japan 
was looking for an ally and a financial backer in her 
coming struggle. As a result there came a surprise to 
the diplomatic world — the announcement that England 
and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance on January 
30, 1902. This treaty stated that both countries de- 
sired to maintain the status quo and peace in the Far 
East, the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and 
the open door. The two countries declared that they 
had no aggressive intentions against China or Korea, 
but that each might take the measures necessary to safe- 
guard its interest if threatened by the aggressive ac- 
tion of any power or by disturbances in China or Korea. 
If either should become involved in war with a third 
power the other would remain neutral, but if a fourth 
power joined in hostilities the second would come to the 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 209 

assistance of its ally. This treaty was to remain in 
force for five years. 

The Anglo-Japanese alliance has had momentous re- 
sults. It was the first such alliance in history between 
a European and an Oriental state. It stamped the seal 
of British approval on Japan's aspirations and efforts 
toward recognition as a great modern power. It made 
possible Japan's adventure into the great war and her 
entrance into Manchuria, with her subsequent success- 
ful forward policies. 

In April, 1902, Russia formally promised China that 
Manchuria would be evacuated within eighteen months. 
This was supposed to mean that she would withdraw 
her troops; but when the time came she simply concen- 
trated the soldiers along the railway. Russians had fur- 
thermore obtained from Korea the right to cut timber 
on the banks of the Yalu near Yangampo, and had 
taken advantage of this to create fortified posts. The 
Japanese therefore decided that the time had come to 
interfere, and they began by asking the Russian gov- 
ernment to discuss the Manchurian and the Korean situ- 
ations. 

Ignorant of the completeness of Japan's military 
equipment, entirely underestimating the ability and de- 
termination of the Japanese statesmen and soldiers, 
contemptuous of the Orient, somewhat intoxicated with 
the apparent success of their Far Eastern policy, and 
never dreaming that the Japanese would force the issue 
to the point of war, the Russian officials refused to dis- 
cuss the question of Manchuria and proposed that Korea 
should by agreement be considered a quasi-neutral ter- 
ritory. 

Four times the Japanese addressed the Russian 
government, and then, having received only unsatis- 



210 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

factory replies, they struck. In the course of the war 
which followed, Japan defeated Russia on the sea and 
drove her troops out of South Manchuria; but, though 
she had beaten Russian armies, she had not destroyed 
them, and she had not invaded Russian soil. Using 
Korea as a highway she had thrust her armies into Man- 
churia and had driven the Russians back to a point 
somewhat north of Mukden. 

The war was brought to an end by the conclusion of 
the Portsmouth Treaty, September 5, 1905. By this, 
Russia transferred to Japan all her special rights and 
possessions — including the lease of the Liaotung Penin- 
sula, the railway line, and coal mines — in South Man- 
churia. In the treaty Russia declared that she had not 
in Manchuria "any territorial advantages or preferen- 
tial or exclusive concessions to the impairment of Chi- 
nese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of 
equal opportunity." 

In the interval, just before the close of the war. Great 
Britain and Japan had renewed ^ their agreement of 
alliance, with alterations, in view of the new situation, 
considerably to the advantage of Japan. 

With Russia thrown back and temporarily crippled, 
with South Manchuria partly under her control and 
interposed as a buffer between the grasping claws of 
the Great Northern Bear and the coveted Korean prize, 
and with Great Britain's acquiescence assured, Japan 
was after 1905 free to make the most of the helplessness 
and demoralization of both China and her nearer neigh- 
bor. Korea naturally came in for her first and most 
solicitous attention. 

At the beginning of the war with China in 1894 Ja- 
pan had made a treaty of alliance with Korea, in which 

^August 12, 1905. 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 211 

Article I declared: "The object of the alliance is to 
maintain the independence of Korea on a firm footing." 
In the treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the war ^ 
China recognized "definitely the full and complete in- 
dependence and autonomy of Korea." 

In 1898 Japan and Russia had made an agreement 
wherein the two governments recognized "definitely the 
sovereignty and entire independence of Korea" and 
pledged themselves "mutually to abstain from all direct 
interference in the internal affairs of that country." In 
the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of 1902, "the high 
contracting parties, having mutually recognized the in- 
dependence of China and Korea," declared themselves 
to be "entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tenden- 
cies in either country." 

Three years later, however, in renewing the alliance, 
the British and Japanese governments omitted mention 
of their devotion to the principle of Korea's integrity, 
mentioning only that of China ; while Great Britain rec- 
ognized the right of Japan "to take such measures of 
guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may 
deem proper and necessary to safeguard [her] inter- 
ests, provided always that such measures are not con- 
trary to the principle of equal opportunities for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations." ^ 

In the Portsmouth Treaty Russia likewise recognized 
Japan's paramount interests in Korea and right to take 
such measures as those referred to in the treaty just 
mentioned. 

When declaring war against Russia in 1904, the Em- 
peror of Japan had issued a rescript, in the course of 
which he declared: "The integrity of Korea is a matter 

' 1895, 

^Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August, 1905, 



212 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

of gravest concern to this Empire. . . . The separate 
existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our 
realm." 

Thirteen days later, on February 23, 1904, Japan 
signed a Protocol with the Emperor of Korea, which 
began : 

Article 1. For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and 
solid friendship between Japan and Korea and firmly establish- 
ing the peace of the Far East, the Imperial Government of 
Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of 
Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improve- 
ments in administration. 

Article 2. The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a 
spirit of firm friendship insure the safety and repose of the 
Imperial House of Korea. 

Article 3. The Imperial Government of Japan definitely 
guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Korean Empire. 

Three months after the conclusion of the war, on No- 
vember 17, 1905, the Korean Emperor was compelled 
to accept a convention which begins: 

Preamble. [The two governments], desiring to strengthen 
the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, 
have . . . concluded: 

Article 1. The Government of Japan . . . will hereafter 
have control and direction of the external relations and affairs 
of Korea. ... 

In 1906 Marquis Ito was made (Japanese) Resident- 
General in Korea. 

In 1907 Japan prevented the representatives of the 
Korean Emperor from being given a hearing at the 
Hague Conference. 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 213 

This success was immediately followed by the fram- 
ing of a convention to which the Korean Emperor had 
to agree, to the effect that : 

The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring speedily to 
promote the wealth and strength of Korea and with the object 
of promoting the prosperity of the Korean nation, have 
agreed : 

1. In all matters relating to the reform of the Korean Ad- 
ministration the Korean Government shall receive instructions 
and guidance from the [Japanese] Resident-General. . . . 

4. In all appointments and removals of high officials the 
Korean Government must obtain the consent of the Resident- 
General. 

5. The Korean Government shall appoint to be officials of 
Korea any Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident- 
General. 

6. The Korean Government shall not appoint any foreigners 
to be officials of Korea without consulting the Resident-General. 

In 1908 Prince Ito declared publicly that it was no 
part of Japan's purpose to annex Korea. 

In 1909 Prince Ito declared that Korea must be 
"amalgamated" with Japan. 

In the next year came the final act in the tragedy of 
the "Hermit Kingdom." The broken and bewildered 
Emperor accepted the dictum of superior force, applied 
by the representatives of the country which had five 
years before solemnly guaranteed the integrity of his 
domains and the security of his throne — and set the 
sanction of legality upon Japan's annexation of his 
realm by signing the following treaty: 

Article 1. His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes com- 
plete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea. 



214 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Article 2. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the 
cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the 
complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan. 

This agreement was signed on August 22. On Au- 
gust 29, 1910, Japan formally declared Korea annexed 
to the dominions of His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan. 

No power intervened, there was no offer of mediation, 
there was not a word of official protest. The inevitable 
— an artificially created inevitable — had happened. The 
Japanese had been working toward this end for more 
than a quarter of a century. They had carefully pre- 
pared for the final cowp, and when at last they took 
possession there was not a court in the world to which 
the Koreans could appeal for a hearing, not an advocate 
to plead for their cause. No matter how worthy the ob- 
jects of Japanese statesmen may be; no matter how 
much of admiration their cleverness, their perseverance, 
and their success may command ; no matter how marvel- 
ous the work which they do in the regions to which they 
go — when viewed against the background of centuries 
of non-progress on the part of the indigenes ; it is essen- 
tial that the world — if it is really interested in the fate 
of further portions of regions in which Japan is busy- 
ing herself, and while it is being offered Japan's sooth- 
ing promises of self-denial — read for itself the record 
of Japan's diplomatic promises as set forth in the story 
of this passing of Korea. 

Japan immediately notified the world that Korea's 
customs treaties would remain in force for ten years. 
In the next year Japan adopted for herself a revised 
tariff on highly protective lines. It is to be presumed 
that in 1920 when the Korean treaties expire Japan's 



JAPAN: ON THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 215 

tariff will go into effect for this her colony. Korea has 
already disappeared as a state ; the open door to Korea 
will soon have been closed.^ 

^ For chronological record of Japan's expansion see Appendix V. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE OPENING OF CHINA AND THE SCRAMBLE FOE 
CONCESSIONS 

The term "open door" in international politics at 
once suggests two things : there is the question of open- 
ing the doors of any given country; and there is the 
problem of keeping the doors open. Within the latter 
problem there are a variety of questions with regard to 
the methods by which and the terms upon which the 
doors are to be kept open. A complete explanation of 
the open door policy in its application to China as a 
practical problem would necessitate an inquiry into the 
history of China's relations with foreign countries dur- 
ing practically the whole of the past four hundred years. 
Obviously such a digression is not necessary for pur- 
poses of the present account. Passing over three hun- 
dred years of the early commercial intercourse with Oc- 
cidental nations, suffice it to say : China was first opened 
to foreign trade on a legal basis in 1842, when the Brit- 
ish, after a successful war, secured by treaty the opening 
of five ports, the right to appoint consuls, and the right 
to "cany on their mercantile transactions with whatever 
persons they pleased." At the same time they secured 
the cession of the island of Hongkong, this being the 
first cession of territory made by China to a foreign 
power. There soon followed treaties between China 
and the United States and France respectively. 

An early indication of what has throughout been the 

216 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 217 

g-uiding principle of American policy with regard to 
China appears in a memorandum presented by Caleb 
Cushing- to the Chinese negotiator during the prelimi- 
naries to the making of the treaty of 1844: "We do 
not desire any portion of the territory of China, nor 
any terms and conditions whatever which shall be oth- 
erwise than just and honorable to China as well as to 
the United States. . . ." 

The history of the period immediately following 
shows that the representatives of Great Britain, the 
United States, and France considered the interests of 
Western governments in securing rights of trade and 
security for their subjects as practically identical. The 
British at once opened Hongkong as a free port — ^which 
it has remained — and the Portuguese at Macao soon 
followed their example. When the British secured the 
setting aside of a special area at Shanghai in 1845 for 
commercial purposes, they developed the settlement on 
the principle that it was to be open to all, and the 
Shanghai international settlement became the model for 
the foreign settlements subsequently opened at other 
treaty ports. 

When in 1854 the question of treaty revision came up 
Lord Clarendon's instructions to the British represen- 
tative laid special emphasis upon certain recommenda- 
tions, among which the first was: to obtain access gen- 
erally to the whole of the Chinese Empire. The Ameri- 
can and French envoys were instructed by their gov- 
ernments to cooperate with the British. New treaties 
were made, after necessary resort to force by the British 
and the French, in 1858 and 1860. The demands made 
then by the British, the French, the Americans, and the 
Russians were in general the same. The Russians, how- 
ever, made a separate treaty by which they gained ter- 



218 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ritory in the northeast and special concessions and privi- 
leges in the portions of the Chinese Empire contiguous 
to Siberia. 

The new treaties provided for the residence of foreign 
ministers at Peking, opened new ports, fixed the Chi- 
nese tariff at five per cent, ad valorem^, gave definition 
and certainty to the principle of extraterritoriality, le- 
galized the opium trade, and settled the details with re- 
gard to a number of rights for which the foreigners had 
contended. Great Britain secured the cession of Kow- 
loon to round out her commercial base at Hongkong. 

Each of the powers had declared that it did not desire 
to obtain exclusive concessions. None, of course, wished 
to see exclusive privileges granted to any of the others. 
Circumstances dictated the exceptions made in favor 
of Russia and Great Britain. In each of the treaties 
appeared the most-favored-nation clause, iwhich pro- 
vided in effect for "free and equal participation in all 
the privileges, immunities, and advantages that have 
been or may be hereafter granted [by China] to the 
government or subjects of any other nation." ^ These 
treaties mark the real opening of China's doors; their 
provisions have extended, through the operation of the 
most-favored-nation clause, to all the powers which now 
have treaties with China, and they constitute the foun- 
dation of the common rights of foreigners and foreign 
residence and commerce in China today. 

The ministers who were appointed shortly to Peking 
acted at first along lines of cooperation, though, not 
unnaturally, they differed frequently as to the meth- 
ods which were necessary. Other nations soon made 
treaties, and by 1870 the list of treaty nations on Chi- 
na's register included England, the United States, 

^Wording in the British-Chinese Treaty, 1858, Article 54. 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 219 

France, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, 
Holland, Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Italy and Austria- 
Hungary. Japan joined the list in 1871. Before long 
there began to appear evidences of a diversity of aims 
and of individual policies. This was illustrated when 
the British Minister negotiated the Chefoo Treaty in 
1876, and it became conspicuous in and after 1885. It 
reached a climax in the scramble for concessions of the 
period from 1895 to 1898. From and out of the per- 
plexities and dangers to which this was leading there 
arose finally the definite enunciation of the open door 
policy in its application as a measure to secure a return 
to the principle of concerted action, as a check upon 
rivalries which were a menace to all, and as "an instru- 
ment through which the threatened partition of China 
and a general imbroglio might be avoided." 

The first substantial abstraction of territory from the 
Chinese Empire was that consummated by the Rus- 
sians in the treaties of 1858 and 1860. By these trea- 
ties China lost and Russia acquired the whole of what- 
ever had belonged to China north of the Amur and east 
of the Ussuri Rivers. The region comprised approxi- 
mately a million square miles. It carried with it six 
hundred miles of coast line. This area was not opened 
to the world, it became a part of the closed Russian 
Empire. Such was one of the indirect, unanticipated, 
and at the same time little noticed results of the success 
which the British and the French in combination had 
had elsewhere in using force to open China to the trade 
of the world. In addition Russia received special trade 
privileges, including a lowering of the customs duties 
all along the frontier, and special and exclusive rights 
on the Amur, the Ussuri and the Sungari Rivers. 

Russia had begun, and twenty-five years later it be- 



220 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

came the part of Japan to renew the policy of encroach- 
ment on China's territories. The assertion which has 
frequently been made, that England established the 
precedent for territorial encroachment when she took 
Hongkong, is entirely misleading ; Hongkong is a small 
island; it was taken for the purpose of establishing a 
commercial base for the increased convenience of all na- 
tions, including China; it was thrown open as a free 
port for the use of all nations on equal terms. 

While Russia was advancing in the North, France 
paved the way for her absorption of the regions in the 
South which were by loose ties dependencies of China. 
A rather inglorious war was followed by treaties in 
1885 and 1886 which marked the complete severance 
of Indo-China from the Chinese Empire and secured 
for France commercial privileges along the Chinese 
frontier. 

We have seen elsewhere how Japan proceeded step 
by step between 1875 and 1895 to sever the ties which 
had long existed between China and Korea. It was Ja- 
pan's forward policy that brought on the Chino-Jap- 
anese War of 1894. Not content with securing the ter- 
mination of China's suzerainty over Korea and the rec- 
ognition of the complete independence of the Korean 
Kingdom, the Japanese exacted from China in the 
treaty of Shimonoseki ^ the cession of Formosa, the Pes- 
cadores, and South Manchiu'ia. It was this war and 
the attempt to take from China a large and important 
area near the political heart of the Empire — this, and 
not Germany's seizure of Shantung two years later — 
that marked the first step in the series of aggressions 
which culminated in the "scramble for concessions"; it 
was this that raised the question which soon became an 

1 April 17^ 1895. 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 221 

issue: Is China to be partitioned? The scramble for 
concessions led indirectly to the Boxer uprising; the 
Boxer uprising gave Russia the chance to consolidate 
her position in Manchuria; and Russia's encroachments 
in Manchuria led to the Russo-Japanese War. Thus 
did the ambition of Japan contribute to the cause of 
peace in the Far East! 

The world was surprised at the crumpling up of 
China and disposed to applaud Japan's victory. Rus- 
sia, however, with her own ends in view, pointed out sub- 
stantial reasons for objecting, and secured the support 
of Germany and France in forbidding Japan to re- 
tain the chief item of her spoils. The three powers com- 
pelled Japan to restore South Manchuria to China. 
It may be noted in passing that the territory which Ja- 
pan had undertaken to annex there was much greater 
in extent than that which Russia secured by lease in the 
same region three years later. 

The war had revealed China's military inferiority, her 
financial weakness, her administrative inefficiency and 
official corruption ; hence the impression that she was on 
the verge of dissolution, with the consequent talk and 
consideration of her partition. For Japan, success be- 
came a stimulus to already existing ambitions. For the 
other powers, the precedent set by the attempted ab- 
straction of the Liaotung Peninsula ^ ushered in a 
period of aetivity which was marked from the first by 
complete disregard on the part of the great European 
nations of the principle of China's integrity, a period 
characterized by a general scramble to gain particular 
concessions and counter concessions and to establish 
"spheres of influence." 

France and Russia were not slow to demand compen- 

^ South Manchuria. 



222 POLITICS m THE FAR EAST 

sations for the service which they had rendered China. 
The Chinese, needing money to pay the indemnity which 
Japan had exacted, applied to England for a loan. 
Russia intervened and compelled them to turn to 
France ; the needed funds were therefore borrowed from 
France, with Russia as the broker; and Russia was 
given promises of future advantages. 

Within two months after the signing of the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki the French Minister secured from the 
Chinese a convention granting to France territorial con- 
cessions and commercial privileges of an exclusive char- 
acter. The special concessions which had been given 
Russia in the north in the treaties of 1869 and 1881 
furnished the models for the concessions now sought 
and obtained by the French along the land frontier ad- 
joining their Indo-Chinese territories. These conces- 
sions to France could not fail to affect disadvanta- 
geously actual competitors by sea routes, together with 
British interests which might attempt to compete by 
way of Burmah for trade in South China. Persever- 
ance by France in a policy manifestly intended to se- 
cure for herself a position of exclusive interest in the 
southwestern provinces was bound to bring on a clash 
of interests between herself and Great Britain. The 
British protested against the violation, in favor of 
France, of China's most-favored-nation pledges. China 
was, however, helpless to oppose the French demands. 
England therefore had recourse to demands for com- 
pensating concessions to herself — which she obtained in 
1897. In the interval, France and England found it 
convenient to agree (1896) that concessions, privileges, 
and advantages conceded to either in the provinces of 
Yunnan and Szechuen should be "extended and ren- 
dered common to both powers." In February, 189.7» 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 223 

China made compensation, to the satisfaction of Eng- 
land, as an offset to the concessions made to France, in 
the form of the cession of certain lands on the North 
Burmah frontier and the opening of new trade routes 
and ports in South China. 

In 1895 Russia had posed as China's particular 
friend. Was it not she who had saved the Liaotung 
Peninsula? Did not she secure and guarantee the loan 
from France for the payment of the indemnity? True 
she had threatened that if China refused to act accord- 
ing to the suggestions of those who had assisted her she 
would allow Japan to retain her spoils. This did not 
alter the fact that she had rendered services — which 
called for material recognition; but it does add to the 
irony of the situation which developed w^hen, having 
forced Japan to disgorge and having assisted China to 
pay for what was given back, the Russians calmly pro- 
ceeded with plans for appropriating to themselves the 
very territory in question. The situation became posi- 
tively farcical when ten years later Japan foiled Russia 
in this attempt; and the irony of it all is further in- 
creased when during the latest decade we find Russia 
and Japan joining hands for the mutual promotion of 
both their common and their respective interests at the 
expense of China. But how about the ultimate division 
of the spoils? 

China has had the professed friendship of Russia and 
then that of Japan forced upon her. She has paid each 
for the defense of a shadow — the shadow of sovereign 
rights in Manchuria. And now who are the rulers of 
Manchuria? 

Whether the Cassini Convention of 1896 was a myth 
or a reality, and what it contained if the latter, need not 
concern us now. China and Russia did in 1896 agree 



224 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

upon the establishing of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
Company; the Russo-Chinese Bank was formed and 
became a powerful political instrument in the hands of 
the Russian government; China did grant Russia the 
right to project the Trans-Siberian railway across 
North Manchuria, and, eighteen months later, to build 
an extension southward to Port Arthur. 

While these sundry advances were being made by Ja- 
pan, France, England, and Russia, the German gov- 
ernment was moved to the conclusion that Germany 
ought at the earliest possible moment to acquire a naval 
base and establish a sphere of influence in China. An 
intimation that such a policy was under consideration 
was given in the Reichstag in 1896. Shantung Province 
was decided upon as the region to be sought. The mur- 
der of two German missionaries in Shantung in No- 
vember, 1897, furnished the occasion for action. A 
German fleet at once took possession of Kiaochow Bay, 
demands were made upon the Chinese government, and 
Prince Henry of Prussia was dispatched to negotiate 
a settlement, the Emperor speeding him on his way 
with the famous "mailed fist" injunction. 

On March 6, 1898, the convention was signed by 
which Germany secured the lease of Kiaochow Bay 
and its environs for a period of ninety-nine years, with 
the right to build certain railways in the province, to 
open mines along the railways, and to have the first 
refusal of loans and other forms of assistance in case 
China undertook with foreign aid to develop the prov- 
ince. It was in addition provided that, "should Ger- 
many at some future time express a wish to return 
Kiaochow Bay to China after the expiration of the 
lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expendi- 
ture she has incurred at Kiaochow, and to cede to Ger- 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 225 

many a more suitable place." Will China at the end 
of the present war be made to reimburse Germany for 
her recent losses at the hands of Japan? 

It appears that Kussia had already secured an op- 
tion upon concessions in this region and that the ac- 
quiescence of the Russian government to the German 
occupation was secured by the suggestion that Germany 
would lend her approval to the Hussian advance in 
Manchuria. England was at the moment so occupied 
elsewhere that she was in no position to interfere, and, 
notwithstanding that the traditional British policy con- 
templated the preserving of the territorial integrity of 
China, the British government did not even remonstrate. 
Count Billow explained that it was no part of German 
intention to precipitate a movement toward the partition 
of China but that Germany must have her share of in- 
fluence in the future development of the Far East and, 
if partition were to take place, she intended to be among 
those gaining thereby. 

The German occupation of Kiaochow annoyed Rus- 
sia; and the failure of Great Britain to object was prob- 
ably a disappointment. The one fact afforded a prece- 
dent, the other gave a sense of assurance, and both made 
the Russians feel that the moment was opportune for 
an advance in Manchuria. A Russian fleet was or- 
dered into Port Arthur. The British government made 
no objection. After having assured both the British 
and the Japanese governments that they desired simply 
a winter berth for their ships, the Russian government 
in January, 1898, demanded of China that Port Arthur 
be leased to Russia, hy way of compensation, on terms 
similar to those on which Kiaochow had been leased to 
Germany. By a convention of March 27, the Liaotung 
Peninsula, including an area of 1,300 square miles and 



226 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the ports of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, was leased 
to Russia for a period of twenty-five years. So far as 
is known neither the British nor the Japanese govern- 
ment made any protest. The Russians at once com- 
pleted the arrangements for the linking up of the newly 
acquired bases with the railway in the north, and in the 
agreement China guaranteed to the Russians a number 
of exclusive privileges along the railway and in the ad- 
joining regions. 

There lay ahead of Russia the opportunity to ex- 
clude the interests of other countries from Manchuria 
and assimilate the whole rich region ; had she been more 
patient and less arbitrary during the next few years she 
might possibly have achieved a peaceful conquest. The 
agreements were thoroughly ingenious. Taken col- 
lectively they secured to Russia a more favorable posi- 
tion in Manchuria than had been accorded any other 
country in any part of China. Russia had, by them, 
the right to build on Chinese soil and under her own 
jurisdiction and administration some 1,700 miles of 
railway; she had control of the Liaotung Peninsula; 
she had special privileges all along the railway, includ- 
ing the right to introduce soldiers as guards; and she 
enjoyed special customs reductions on the northern 
frontiers. The apparent simplicity of the situation de- 
veloped in the Russian statesmen an overconfidence 
which failed to take into account tlie purposes and grow- 
ing strength of Japan; while the Japanese, indignant 
over the events of 1895, apprehensive for their own se- 
curity, and ambitious for their own expansion, over- 
looked nothing. 

It was not for France to allow Germany and Russia 
the acquisition of these huge concessions without de- 
manding something for herself. The French govern- 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 227 

ment had already in March, 1897, secured the first of 
what became a series of China's "non-alienation" dec- 
larations,^ this having been a declaration by the Tsung-li 
Yamen that China had no intention of ceding the Island 
of Hainan to any power. Great Britain, following this 
example, secured a promise, February 11, 1898, from 
China, that under no circumstances would the Yangtse 
Valley be ceded to any other power. France then ob- 
tained a promise of the non-alienation of any part of 
the provinces bordering on Tonking.^ The Japanese 
secured a similar declaration with regard to Fukien 
Province, the Yamen declaring it China's intention 
"never to cede or lease [Fukien] to any power whatso- 
ever.^ The impression has been carefully fostered by 
the interested parties on the one side that these declara- 
tions are to be looked upon as the bases of inchoate prior 
rights in favor, as concerns each of the regions, of the 
powers to whom the declarations respectively were 
made; and that interpretation is, it seems, the prevail- 
ing one. A scrutiny of the words used by the Chinese 
in the declarations should make it evident that the Ya- 
men had no such intention. In strict construction, their 
phraseology carries a denial of any intention to alienate 
any part of these regions to anybody. 

In addition to these declarations the British secured 
the pledge that the post of Inspector-General of Mari- 
time Customs should continue to be filled by a British 
subject as long as British trade with China should con- 
tinue larger than that of any other country. From this, 
certain other countries have chosen to conclude and have 

^ There had been a declaration with regard to Port Hamilton in 
1887 which is not of present political importance. 
2 April 10, 1898. 
^ April 26, 1898. 



228 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

intimated that it is to be considered a corollary that if 
their trade at any time surpasses that of the British 
they shall have the right to require that the Inspector- 
ate-General be turned over to one of their nationals. 

On the day after the signing of the Kiaochow agi*ee- 
ment the French demanded : ( 1 ) that the bay of Kwang- 
chou (Kwangchou Wan) be leased to them on terms 
similar to those of the German lease in Shantung; (2) 
that the right be given them to construct a railway to 
Yunnanfu on terms similar to those accoraed to Russia 
for railway construction in Manchuria ; ( 3 ) that a pledge 
be given that no portion of China south of the Yangtse 
Valley would be alienated to any power other than 
France; and (4) that the post of Director-General of 
the Imperial Postal Service be filled by a Frenchman as 
the Inspectorate-General of Customs was filled by an 
Englishman. On April 10, 1898, China granted these 
demands in substance, excepting that regarding the 
post office, and later that too was granted. On May 2, 
France asked for and secured the right to build a rail- 
way line from Pakhoi to the West River. 

The first anxiety of the British had been for the se- 
curity of the Yangtse Valley, and they had obtained in 
February the non-ahenation pledge referred to above. 
As soon as the German and Russian demands had been 
approved, the British government arranged for the lease 
of Wei-hai Wei, a port which lies on the Gulf of Pechili 
at a point between Kiaochow and Port Arthur. This 
move was evidently made for strategic reasons; but as 
Wei-hai Wei is in Shantung Province, the British gov- 
ernment took particular pains to assure Germany that 
it did not intend to infringe German rights in the prov- 
ince. At the same time, as an offset to the French ac- 
quisitions in the South, Great Britain asked for and 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 229 

obtained an extension of the Kowloon area, opposite 
Hongkong, this being desired especially for military 
purposes. In the agreement for the lease of Wei-hai 
Wei^ it was provided that Great Britain should hold 
that port "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall 
remain in the occupation of Russia," a subtly worded 
clause inasmuch as it was unlikely that Russia would 
ever voluntarily give up what she had once acquired. 

Japan, having already secured the "non-alienation" 
agreement mentioned above with regard to Fukien, in 
June asked that settlements be immediately established 
for the exclusive use of Japanese subjects at six speci- 
fied points, and this demand was granted. 

The Italian government, not willing to enjoy the dis- 
tinction of having remained indifferent, and encouraged 
apparently by the fatal influence of example, chose to 
ask for the lease of Sanmen Bay on the Chekiang coast, 
together with other rights which, had they been granted, 
would have established an Italian sphere of influence 
over two-thirds of that rich province. This was too 
much for the Chinese, and the Yamen rejected the de- 
mand with studied discourtesy. The Italian Minister 
then sent an ultimatum, but his government, after some 
confusion, concluded by declaring that it did not care 
to press the matter as Sanmen was not a good port and 
really not worth bothering about. The ripe grapes had, 
apparently, all been gathered. 

The Italian demands in their later stages were the 
last of this long series. The Chinese government had 
finally found the courage to refuse a concession; it had 
been goaded to the point of turning. In September, 
1898, the Empress Dowager had effected her coup 
d'etat, had locked up the Emperor, Kwang-hsii, and had 

^ July 1,1898. 



230 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

taken the reins of government again into her own hands. 
In November, 1899, she sent out word to the viceroys 
and governors appealing to them to resist all further 
aggressions of foreign powers — if need be by force of 
arms. The period of the scramble for concessions was 
at an end. 

Are the Japanese-Chinese disagreements and agree- 
ments of 1914-1915 destined, as were those of 1894- 
1895, to become the prelude to another scramble? 



CHAPTER XIII 



THE OPEN DOOR POLICY 



Such, then, was the situation in China at the end of 
1898. Germany had secured her foothold in Shantung; 
Russia was ready to make herself at home in Manchuria ; 
France and Great Britain had taken ports, and had 
agreed to share concessions in the southwest. France 
had her special interests in Yunnan. Great Britain 
had asserted her claim to the Yangtse Valley as a sphere 
of influence and considered the region adjacent to 
Hongkong another special sphere of interest. Japan 
had earmarked Fukien Province. Italy alone had had 
her demands refused. The United States had asked 
for nothing, been refused nothing, and been given 
nothing. 

At the same time, while these momentous events had 
been taking place in China, the United States by force 
of an entirely separate set of circumstances had been 
drawn from its antecedent position of aloofness from 
world politics and before the end of 1898 had become 
unexpectedly but in a very direct way interested in the 
politics of the Far East. The Spanish- American War 
had begun in April; the Treaty of Paris which put the 
United States in possession of the Philippine Islands 
was signed in December. 

With the acquisition of the Philippines, the Repub- 
lican administration became suddenly enthusiastic over 
the possibilities of American commercial expansion in 

231 



232 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the Pacific. We had ventured, or stumbled, into world 
politics. We had a base in the Pacific Ocean. It be- 
hooved us to have a Far Eastern policy and to make 
the most of the opportunity before us. The Chinese 
situation had commanded the attention and the inter- 
est of every foresighted follower of international de- 
velopments for several years. Everyone knew that 
China was a great potential field for commercial ex- 
pansion. What then should be our attitude with re- 
gard to China? 

It happened that the British and the United States 
governments had been for some time in hearty sympathy 
in their disapproval of the course which matters had 
been taking in China. It was from the British, if from 
any source, that one might have expected opposition 
to a movement threatening to upset the status quo and 
to close markets in the Far East. Great Britain had 
little to gain and much to lose by the partition of China ; 
she would gain by a wider opening of doors everywhere 
and would lose by the closing of doors anj^where. She 
did not desire for herself additional territory, with the 
responsibilities for administration which would attend. 
She did desire the freest possible markets. She had the 
largest investments of capital and the greatest number 
of commercial enterprises operating in the T'ar East, 
and her chief desire was to insure the widest j)ossible 
opportunities for the increase of her trade, with the 
minimum of political entanglement. 

British statesmen had, however, wavered during the 
period of the scramble, and they appear to have hesi- 
tated between the sphere of influence and the open door 
policies. They had not, because of preoccupation else- 
where, been able to oppose the advances made by their 
rivals, and they had finally capitulated to the pressure 



THE OPEN DOOR POLICY 233 

of competition in the rush of concessions. When at last 
they had decided that the open door policy was that 
which was most desirable for the purpose of conserv- 
ing their own interests, they were not in a position con- 
sistently to come forward as sponsors for that policy. 

On the other hand the United States was free from 
entanglements and had a clear record in the Far East. 
In stepping forward as the advocate of an open door 
policy it could not reasonably be accused of having ul- 
terior political motives. To what extent the move was 
discussed, and whether it was agreed upon between the 
two governments in advance, we cannot say. The prin- 
ciple of defending China's integrity and encouraging 
a wider opening of her doors to foreign trade on terms 
enjoyable equally by all comers had long been cardinal 
features in the policies of both countries. The British 
had, however, recently been thrown on the defensive 
and were open to suspicion. It was, therefore, not sur- 
prising that the formal diplomatic advances designed to 
secure express adherence to the policy of maintaining 
open doors and to discourage activities based on the as- 
sumption that China was on the verge of dissolution 
issued from the American Department of State rather 
than from the British Foreign Office. 

It was the United States, then, that formally enun- 
ciated the open door policy, asking the powers to pledge 
themselves to the principles therein involved — the idea 
being to establish by mutual consent a rule which should 
operate as a guaranty of equality of commercial op- 
portunity and as a positive force toward securing the 
peace of the Far East and advancing the best interests 
of all the countries concerned. 

In September and November, 1899, Secretary Hay 
sent to the diplomatic representatives of the United 



234, POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

States at London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, 
and Rome, instructions to advise the governments to 
which they were respectively accredited of the hope that 
they would make "formal declaration of an 'open door' 
policy in the territories held by them in China." An as- 
surance was sought from each power that : first, it would 
"in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested 
interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased 
territory" which it might have in China; second, "the 
Chinese treaty tariif of the time being shall apply to all 
merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are 
within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they be 'free 
ports'), no matter to what nationality it may belong, 
and . . . duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chi- 
nese government"; and, third, "it will levy no higher 
harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequent- 
ing any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on ves- 
sels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges 
over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 'sphere' 
on merchandise belonging to citizens or sub j ects of other 
nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall 
be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own 
nationals transported over like distances." 

In due course favorable replies had been received 
from all the governments addressed, though one of the 
notes was decidedly equivocal in its wording, while sev- 
eral not unnaturally made the reservation that assent 
was given upon the condition that t^e proposals were 
accepted by all the other powers concerned. 

Having in hand and having compared the replies. 
Secretary Hay on March 20, 1900, sent instructions to 
each of the above-mentioned representatives to inform 
the government to which he was accredited that, inas- 
much as it had accepted the declaration suggested by the 



THE OPEN DOOR POLICY 235 

United States and as like action had been taken by all 
the various powers concerned, the condition of common 
acceptance having- been complied with, the United States 
government would consider the assent given as final and 
definite. In other words. Secretary Hay declared that 
in his opinion each of these six powers had entered into 
an agreement with the United States which amounted 
to a mutual pledge to preserve the commercial status 
quo and to refrain, each in what might be its sphere of 
interest, from measures calculated to destroy equality 
of opportunity. 

These notes constitute the formal basis of the open 
door policy as it has been theoretically in force with re- 
gard to China during the past fifteen years. It should 
be noted that they do not constitute a treaty,, either be- 
tween the United States and the six powers individu- 
ally, or among the powers as a group, or between the 
powers and China. They have, however, the character 
of formal affirmations, and the seven powers are by them 
formally pledged to the principles of the open door 
policy.^ 

The aggressions of the powers during the three years 
just past had not been without their effect upon the 
minds both of the governing officials and of the people 
of China. In November ^ the Empress Dowager had, 
as indicated above, appealed to the viceroys and gover- 
nors to resist further encroachments. The government 
urged the people to act "to preserve their ancestral 
homes and graves from the ruthless hand of the in- 
vader." Already there were being heard mutterings 
among the populace both against the government and 
against the foreigners. In the spring of 1900, "while 
the ink was not yet dry on Secretary Hay's summariz- 
^ For further pledges see Appendix VII. ^ 1899. 



236 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ing notes," the storm burst. The Chinese government 
skillfully maneuvered the forces of discontent so that 
the outbreak developed into an attack on foreigners in- 
stead of against the Court. The Boxer uprising threw 
the affairs of China and the possibilities as to her imme- 
diate future into the melting pot. While the attack on 
the legations was still in progress, Secretary Hay, on 
July 3rd, sent a circular telegram to the diplomatic rep- 
resentatives of the United States at eleven capitals, de- 
claring : 

In this critical posture of aifalrs in China It is deemed appro- 
priate to define the attitude of the United States. . . . We 
adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the 
Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of pro- 
tection of lives and property of our citizens. . . . The purpose 
of the President Is, as It has been heretofore, to act concur- 
rently with the other powers . . . the policy of the . . . 
United States is to seek a solution which may bring about per- 
manent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial 
and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to 
friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard 
for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all 
parts of the Chinese Empire?- 

In various ways each of the powers addressed indi- 
cated and intimated that it intended to be governed in 
its actions by these principles. 

In sending troops to the relief of the legations the 
powers acted in concert ; but no sooner had Peking been 
taken than Russia acted independently in withdrawing 
her minister and her troops. It is true she first sug- 
gested to the other powers that they all do this; but it 
was reasonable to suppose, as was immediately shown, 

^ Italics by S. K. H. 



THE OPEN DOOR POLICY 237 

that they would not agree to such a move. Russia had 
ulterior motives; here was an opportunity to give the 
impression of friendliness to the Chinese; she had work 
for those soldiers to do in Manchuria — which she had 
virtually occupied with her military forces under cover 
of suppressing the Boxers; there were these two points 
to gain and there was nothing to lose, for the soldiers 
of the other powers who would remain in Peking would 
insure Russia's interests there just as well as could the 
presence of her own. 

During the long negotiations which were concluded 
by the signing of the Peace Protocol on September 7, 
1901, the United States government opposed every sug- 
gestion of partition of China or abandonment of the 
open door policy. Foreign troops continued in joint 
occupation of Peking until September 17, and guards 
have been kept at the legations ever since, except that 
the Russians withdrew theirs in 1914 for reasons not 
unlike those which moved them in 1900. Troops re- 
mained at Tien-tsin until August, 1902, and at Shang- 
hai until four months later. 

On October 16, 1900, Great Britain and Germany 
made an agreement mutually pledging themselves to 
both the observance and the support of the open door 
and the integrity of China policies. This was of course a 
special declaration arising out of the situation which 
had been brought on by the Boxer outbreak, but its pur- 
port was general; it was, in conformity with its own 
provisions, communicated to the various powers — with 
the request that declarations of adherence to its prin- 
ciples be given. 

The settlement whose terms were embodied in the 
Peace Protocol of 1901 was arrived at by common 
agreement of the powers and without any subtraction 



238 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

from China's territories. It was signed by the repre- 
sentatives of twelve powers — including those of China. 
In the Protocol there appeared an account of the punish- 
ing of the officials conspicuously implicated in the Boxer 
uprising, and of the official apologies which China would 
make to certain powers. In the succeeding articles it 
was agreed: 

That China should suspend the examinations for five 
years in cities where foreigners had suffered personal 
violence ; 

That China should prohibit the importation of arms; 

That China should pay an indemnity of 450,000,000 
Haikwan (Customs) taels (about $32.5,000,000) at a 
fixed rate of exchange, the amortization to be completed 
by the end of 1940, the customs revenues, the native 
customs, and the salt revenues being made security; 

That the legation quarter at Peking be under the ex- 
clusive control of the foreign nations, with no Chinese 
residents, and with the right to be made defensible; 

That China should raze the Taku forts and others 
which might impede free communication between Pe- 
king and the sea; 

That the foreign powders might station troops at cer- 
tain points in North China; 

That China should publish and circulate certain 
edicts ; 

That the Chinese tariff be revised; 

That China undertake certain conservancy works. 

The final article made note of the metamorphosis of 
the old Tsung-li Yamen (Office of Foreign Affairs) for 
which there was now to be substituted the Wai-wu Pu 
(Board of Foreign Affairs) , and of an agreement as to 
ceremonial in the reception of foreign representatives. 

In conformity with the provision regarding the tariff, 



THE OPEN DOOR POLICY 239 

an international commission met at Shanghai to make 
the necessary revision. The agreement which this com- 
mission arrived at (August 29, 1902), providing for 
bringing the tariff up to an "effective 5%" and that 
"all duties levied on imports ad valorem be converted as 
far as feasible . . . into specific duties," was signed at 
once by eight powers and nineteen months later by four 
more. 

A week after the signing of this agreement, a sep- 
arate Anglo- Chinese commercial treaty was signed.^ 
Article III of this treaty contains matter of the greatest 
importance, should it be made effective, to the trade of 
all countries and to China, but it cannot go into effect 
until its principles have been by convention approved 
by the other powers. It provides for the abolishing by 
China of likin and transit duties. In return, England 
consents that "foreign goods on importation, in addition 
to the effective 5 per cent, import duty . . . shall pay 
a special surtax equivalent to one and a half times the 
said duty to compensate for the abolition of the likin, 
of transit dues in lieu of likin, and of all other taxation 
on foreign goods . . .," ^ and that the export tax be 
raised to not more than 7% per cent. This provision 
would mean the raising of China's import duties from 
the existing 5 plus 214 per cent, to 12 per cent. 

These agreements were to come into effect on Janu- 
ary 1, 1904, provided all the powers entitled to most- 
favored-nation treatment entered into similar engage- 
ments without having exacted any political or exclusive 
commercial concessions in return therefor. The United 
States and Japan included articles providing for the 

^The Mackay Treaty, September 5, 1902. 

^ This provision not to affect salt, native opium, and some other 
articles. 



240 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

abolition of likin and the raising of the tariff rates in 
the commercial treaties which they proceeded to make 
with China in 1903; but as the other powers have not 
yet made similar agreements with China, these provi- 
sions, which would simplify many matters, have never 
been given force. China remains not only minus auton- 
omy in the matter of tariff policy, but limited to the five 
per cent, rate — which annoys the Chinese just as like 
restrictions annoyed the Japanese until their removal in 
1899. 

As the decision of the Empress Dowager in Novem- 
ber, 1899, to resist all further foreign aggression, marked 
the end of a period, so the return of the Court to Peking 
in January, 1902, marks the beginning of a new era. 
The Empress Dowager had "eaten bitterness," she had 
learned that China was hopelessly weak and the West- 
ern nations powerful. She decided that henceforth she 
would combat foreign influence by accepting it. She 
was ready to profit by the instruction and she hoped to 
learn how to employ the methods of the West. But of 
concession giving China had had enough. She forth- 
with busied her officials with the study of Occidental in- 
stitutions, but in the conduct of foreign relations she un- 
dertook to defend the national integrity by refusing ter- 
ritorial and, as far as possible, other concessions to any 
and all powers alike. 

To understand the present political situation and to 
be able to form one's own opinions with regard to con- 
temporary developments in the Far East, it is essential 
to remember the facts, observe the tendencies, and grasp 
the underlying significance, first, of the scramble for 
concessions and, second, of the enunciation of the open 
door policy. The scramble for concessions was cumu- 
lative. An attack had been made upon China's integ- 



THE OPEN DOOR POLICY 241 

rity. The impression that China was helpless and po- 
tentially partitionable went abroad. One power de- 
manded concessions by way of compensation. The 
equilibrium having been disturbed, the subsequent de- 
mands of some of the powers were dictated by the mo- 
tive, perhaps unconscious but none the less real, of re- 
dressing and maintaining the "balance of power" — in 
terms of opportunity and influence. Each special con- 
cession to a single power was a menace to the interests 
of each and all of the other powers. Therefore each of 
the others sought special privileges for itself as an offset 
to what it lost through the fact that special privileges 
had been given to its rivals. 

When the spheres of influence had been staked out, 
the question presented itself to each of the powers : What 
are the others going to do in their spheres with regard 
to my interests, and what shall I do in mine with re- 
gard to their interests ? The United States, having no 
sphere of influence, found an answer, in theory, to the 
question of all, in the securing of the pledges that the 
doors of opportunity for trade of all nations should be 
kept open and the integrity of China should be respected. 
The granting of the concessions had created a new 
status. The open door agreements, recognizing that 
status, undertook to define the common rights and op- 
portunities of the nations under its conditions. The 
Peace Protocol confirmed the new situation. There- 
after it was understood to be the desire of the nations 
to maintain and respect the status quo. Certain na- 
tions, conspicuously the United States, Great Britain, 
and Germany, have subsequently lived up to the impli- 
cations and prescriptions of these agreements. Certain 
others, France in some degree, Russia more, and Japan 
most of all, have chosen to exert themselves along lines 



242 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

which no amount of explanation can reconcile with the 
conception of a desire scrupulously to observe either the 
spirit or the letter of the agreements and to maintain 
the status quo. 

Russia's activities in Manchuria immediately betrayed 
her intentions. The settlement at the end of the Russo- 
Japanese War materially altered the political and geo- 
graphical alignment. A new status was created. New 
pledges were made for the maintaining of the newly cre- 
ated status quo. Japan's activities in Manchuria dur- 
ing the next ten years further modified the alignments. 
In 1914 Japan's conquest of the German possessions in 
Shantung again abruptly altered the situation. And, 
finally, Japan's demands upon China in January, 1915, 
and the granting of the special privileges and conces- 
sions which China has been forced to make to Japan 
constitute a complete upsetting of the balance of power 
and suggest all the possibilities of a reversion, after the 
European War shall have been concluded, to specula- 
tion, apprehensions, competition, and consequent de- 
velopments such as marked the years 1895 — 1898. Inj 
the light of commercial conquests such as Japan has 
prosecuted in Manchuria, and of military and diplomatic 
aggressions which have marked her China policy sincej 
August, 1914, the open door and integrity of China) 
agreements of 1899, 1900, and 1901 may as well be ac- 
knowledged to have become, potentially at least, so many 
"scraps of paper." 



CHAPTER XIV 

japan's challenge to RUSSIA AND ENTRANCE INTO 
SOUTH MANCHURIA 

Having fortified themselves with the railway con- 
cessions and the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, the 
Russians after 1898 proceeded to make themselves en- 
tirely at home in Manchuria. While Dalny was de- 
clared a free port, Port Arthur was treated as Russian 
soil. Chinese customs regulations were quite ignored. 
An attempt was made to get rid of the British engineer- 
in-chief on the Chinese railway which was being ex- 
tended with British capital north of the Great Wall, 
and later to block the extension entirely. The British 
government protested that the Russians were interfer- 
ing with rights guaranteed by the most-favored-nation 
clauses in China's treaties. The Russian reply took the 
form of a proposal for a reciprocal agreement regard- 
ing Russian and British interests in Manchuria and the 
Yangtse Valley respectively — such a reply being, log- 
ically, quite beside the point. The British government 
compromised on the matter of the railway and accepted 
the proposal for a reciprocal exclusion agreement. This 
controversy foreshadows the Russo-Japanese veto, 
which came eight years later, of the proposed construc- 
tion of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen extension. 

The Anglo-Russian agreement took the form of an 
exchange of notes on April 28, 1899, in which Russia 
engaged not to seek railway concessions in the Yangtse 

243 



244 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Valley nor obstruct applications for railway concessions 
there which should have the support of the British gov- 
ernment; while the British g-overnment gave similar 
pledges, mutatis mutandis, with regard to railway con- 
cessions north of the Great Wall. Both parties de- 
clared that they had "nowise in view to infringe in any 
way the sovereign rights of China or existing treaties." 
In this transaction the British government virtually bar- 
gained in defense of a right such as it had earlier de- 
clared it would defend at any price; it confirmed Rus- 
sia's privileged position in Manchuria and secured in 
return an empty promise regarding the Yangtse Valley 
— for Russia was already proceeding under a Belgian 
mask with plans to penetrate the British sphere to the 
Yangtse and beyond. 

The Boxer outbreak was to the Russians a veritable 
invitation to occupy Manchuria outright. Having 
moved in, and having garrisoned some fifty points, they 
had no intention of moving out. After the Allies had 
occupied Peking, Russia was the only power which, in 
the settlement, sought territorial gains. Other powers, 
Great Britain, the United States, and Japan in par- 
ticular, dissented from the proposition that Russia's 
special position in Manchuria gave her the right to make 
special terms. 

In the fall of 1900 the Russians tried to put through 
an agreement with the Tartar General at Mukden 
whereby a Russian Resident-General with "general pow- 
ers of control" was to be installed at Mukden and the 
Chinese military forces in Manchuria were to be put 
under Russian command. The United States, Great 
Britain, and Japan protested, enabling the Chinese gov- 
ernment, thus supported, to refuse to ratify the agree- 
ment. A modified agreement, still leaving Russia in 



JAPAN'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA 245 

a privileged position, was signed in January, 1901. 
Throughout the negotiations of 1901 Russia played for 
special terms for herself, with constant opposition from 
the representatives of some of the other powers. In De- 
cember it became known that a convention was under 
way whose provisions, had they been agreed to, would 
have rendered Manchuria in all but name a Russian pro- 
tectorate. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan 
renewed their protests against the continuing of the 
Russian military occupation. 

In February, 1902, Secretary Hay addressed to the 
governments of eleven countries identical notes express- 
ing the views of the American government in the face 
of a situation which has had its parallel in the circum- 
stances of the Japanese demands upon China of Janu- 
ary 18, 1915. Seldom does history repeat itself as 
promptly as it has done in the case of the Japanese 
duplication in 1914-1915 of the Russian performances 
of 1901-1902. 

The Hay note of February 1, 1902, reads as follows: 

An agreement by which China cedes to any corporation or 
company the exclusive right and privilege of opening mines, 
establishing railroads, or in any other way industrially develop- 
ing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the gravest concern by 
the government of the United States of America. It consti- 
tutes a monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations 
of treaties concluded between China and foreign powers, and 
thereby seriously affects the rights of American citizens ; it re- 
stricts their rightful trade and exposes it to being discriminated 
against, interfered with or otherwise jeopardized, and strongly 
tends towards permanently impairing the sovereign rights of 
China in this part of the Empire and seriously interferes with 
her ability to meet her international obligations. Furthermore, 
such concession on the part of China will undoubtedly be fol- 



246 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

lowed by demands from other powers for similar and equal, ex- 
clusive advantages in other parts of the Chinese Empire, and 
the inevitable result must be the complete wreck of the policy 
of absolute equality of treatment of all nations in regard to 
trade, navigation, and commerce within the confines of the 
Empire. 

On the other hand, the attainment by one power of such 
exclusive privileges for a commercial organization of its nation- 
ality conflicts with the assurances repeatedly conveyed to this 
government by the imperial Russian ministry of foreign affairs 
of the imperial government's .intention to follow the policy of 
the open door in China, as advocated by the government of the 
United States and accepted by aU the treaty powers having 
common interests in that Empire. 

It is for these reasons that the government of the United 
States, animated now, as in the past, with the sincere desire of 
insuring to the whole world the benefits of full and fair inter- 
course between China and the nations on a fopting of equal 
rights and advantages to all, submits the above to the earnest 
consideration of the imperial governments of China and Russia, 
confident that they will give due weight to its importance and 
adopt such measures as will relieve the just and natural anxiety 
of the United States.-^ 

This note is well worth study as one compares the then 
Russian- Chinese situation with the present Japanese- 
Chinese situation. 

The Russian government again assured the United 
States that the commercial rights of all nations would 
be respected. The attitude of the United States, Great 
Britain, and Japan, and, finally, the announcement of 
the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,^ caused 
Russia to modify her position. On April 8, 1902, she 

1 U. S. For. Rel., 1902, 275, 926. 

2 January SO, 1902. 



JAPAN'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA 247 

made an agreement with China, promising gradually to 
withdraw all her forces from Manchuria and to restore 
to China the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang-Hsinmintun 
Railway, which she had occupied during the [Boxer 
trouble. 

The conclusion of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance paved 
the way for momentous developments in the Far East- 
ern situation and even in world politics. This alliance 
was entered into by each of the contracting parties as a 
measure of defense — on the part of Japan, especially 
against Russia ; on that of Great Britain, partly against 
Russia and also to some extent against France, Russia's 
ally. French capital had made possible the building of 
the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways, 
and the diplomats of Russia and France were in con- 
stant cooperation in the prosecution of their Far Eastern 
policies.^ 

In the preamble of their agreement Great Britain and 
Japan declared: 

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated 
solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace 
in the extreme East, being moreover especially interested in 
maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of China 
and the Empire of Korea and in securing equal opportunities 
in these countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, 
hereby agree . . . 

They then stipulated that either might take the meas- 
ures necessary to safeguard its interests if threatened by 
the aggressive action of any power or by disturbances 

^ An interesting account of the reaction of this Far Eastern un- 
folding upon politics in Europe is to be found in Tardieu's "France 
and the Alliances," It was not until 1904< that the Anglo-French 
entente was effected. 



248 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

in China or Korea; and that if either should in defense 
of these interests become involved in a war with a third 
party and then be attacked by a fourth, the other would 
come to its assistance. 

Russia and France met this with a joint Declaration, 
on March 16, 1902, affirming that the principles animat- 
ing the British and Japanese policies in the Far East 
were the same as those which underlay their policies, but 
adding that : "Being obliged themselves also to take into 
consideration the case in which either the aggressive ac- 
tion of third parties, or the recurrence of disturbances 
in China, jeopardizing the integrity and free develop- 
ment of that Power, might become a menace to their 
own interests, the two allied Governments reserve to 
themselves the right to consult in that contingency as 
to the means to be adopted for securing those in- 
terests." 

As the dates agreed to for the withdrawal of their 
troops approached, the Russian officials, instead of re- 
moving their soldiers, simply called them in from points 
at which they were stationed and distributed them along 
the railway line as "guards." 

The Chinese government v/as then asked to agree to 
the establishing of a customs service at Dalny and some 
interior points, independent of the Chinese Customs and 
under a Russian commissioner, and of post-offices under 
the same control. 

It was reported in April, 1903, that Russia was pro- 
posing to China new conditions as to the price of evacu- 
ation, these including privileges in both Manchuria and 
Mongolia such as would virtually close those regions to 
foreigners other than Russians. It was being demanded 
that the Chinese government open no new treaty ports 
in Manchuria : that it admit no new consuls without the 



JAPAN'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA 249 

previous consent of the Russian government; that it 
employ no foreigners other than Russians in any branch 
of its administration in Manchuria and MongoKa; that 
the Newchwang customs receipts be deposited in the 
Russo-Chinese Bank; and that Russian interests be given 
precedence in several other matters. All this was clearly 
in violation of the open door. 

The Russian Ambassador to England informed Lord 
Lansdowne that no such conditions had been suggested. 
The British government chose to accept the assurances 
of the Russian Ambassador, but the American and the 
Japanese governments took occasion to make another 
protest. Then the Russian government through its Am- 
bassador at Washington assured Secretary Hay that no 
such demands had been made. In the meantime the 
United States Minister at Peking had received from the 
Russian Charge a copy of the demands, which agreed 
with the reports which had been made. Secretary Hay 
saw fit, however, to let the matter rest with the publish- 
ing of a note declaring that the United States felt bound 
to accept the explanation of the Russian government. ^ 

In the autumn the Russian government declared the 
Amur region and the Kwantung territory a special ad- 
ministrative area. A Russian "viceroy" was given su- 
preme civil, military and naval authority, and was em- 
powered to conduct diplomatic negotiations with "neigh- 
boring states." He was to be responsible for law and 
order in the "districts traversed by the Chinese Eastern 
Railway," and to watch over the interests of Russian in- 
habitants of the regions under his jurisdiction or "lying 
on the other side of the border." This could scarcely 
be construed as evidence of an intention to "evacuate" 
Manchuria. 

^ May 3, 1903. ^ 



250 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Russian agents were at the same time busying them- 
selves in Mongolia, surveying a railway route from 
Khailar to Kalgan, erecting forts at Urga, and explor- 
ing. 

In September, 1903, the Russian Minister announced 
to the Chinese government that the evacuation of Feng- 
tien Province (South Manchuria) would be carried out 
if China would agree not to transfer any part of Man- 
churia to any other powers, would promise that no con- 
cessions would be made to England without equivalent 
provisions for Russia, would leave the telegraph line 
from Port Arthur and Newchwang to Mukden in Rus- 
sian hands, and would undertake that there be no in- 
crease in the import tariff on goods entering Manchuria 
by rail. This indicated that the American and Jap- 
anese protests had had some effect. 

In the meantime, the American and the Japanese 
governments had been pushing the negotiations for their 
commercial treaties with China and were insisting that 
several new ports in Manchuria be opened to foreign 
trade. The Russians made some opposition to this, but 
the United States and Japan insisted, and on October 
8 the American and on October 9 the Japanese treaties 
were signed, whereby it was provided that Mukden, An- 
tung, and Tatungkow, all three in Manchuria, should 
be opened to foreign trade. 

October went by and still the evacuation did not take 
place. It was estimated that Russia had 45,000 soldiers 
in Manchuria. Soon Japan began to demand that Rus- 
sia fulfill her promises. Yuan Shih-kai, then Viceroy 
of Chili Province and Commander-in-chief of the new 
Chinese army, urged on his government that its proper 
policy would be to side with Japan. 

In consultation with the Russian Minister at Tokyo, 



JAPAN'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA 251 

Baron Komura drafted proposals in August, 1903, in- 
cluding the following points : 

(1) The independence and integrity of China and 
Korea should be respected and the open door preserved ; 

(2) Japan's interests in Korea and Russia's in Man- 
churia should be recognized; 

(3) Each power should be at liberty as to industrial 
and commercial activities in its sphere of influence, 
without interference from the other; 

(4) Only sufficient troops should be kept on the 
ground to protect interests, and these should be re- 
called when no longer needed. 

(5) Russia should recognize the exclusive interest of 
Japan in assisting the Korean government. 

The Russian government presented counter propo- 
sals. In these, Manchuria was mentioned only to the 
effect that Japan should recognize it as outside her 
sphere of interest. The integrity of Korea was to be 
respected. Both powers were to agree not to use the 
territory of Korea for strategic purposes nor to erect 
fortifications on its coast. The part of Korea north 
of the 39th parallel was to be regarded as a neutral 
zone. 

These proposals amounted practically to a demand 
that Japan recognize Russia's complete freedom of ac- 
tion in Manchuria while accepting close restrictions upon 
her own actions in Korea. The tone of the negotiations 
indicates that the Russians were confident that Japan 
would not risk war. On October 30, the Japanese sent 
a second communication to the Russian government, ex- 
pressing willingness to recognize Manchuria as outside 
their sphere of interest, if the Russians would reciprocate 
by recognizing Korea as outside theirs. The Russians 
replied, ignoring the proposals about Korea and declin- 



252 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ing to discuss the Manchurian question. Japan then 
sent a third set of proposals, to which Russia repHed still 
insisting upon being left absolutely free in Manchuria. 
Japan then sent an ultimatum. This had not been an- 
swered when, on the 5th of February, 1904, the Japa- 
nese Minister at St. Petersburg sent his government 
word that the Russians were thoroughly resolved not to 
yield on the question of Manchuria. Japan thereupon 
broke off diplomatic relations and ordered her fleet to 
act. 

The first intimation which the Russians in the Far 
East had that war was on came when the Japanese at- 
tacked the Russian ships at Port Arthur on February 9. 
On the next day a formal declaration of war was issued 
by both countries. 

At the beginning of the war both Russia and Japan 
made agreements that the neutrality of China — except 
for Manchuria — should be respected and that operations 
should be limited as far as possible to territory over 
which the dispute had arisen. South Manchuria thus 
became the battle ground, and Korea became Japan's 
military highway. The Japanese destroyed two Rus- 
sian fleets, captured Port Arthur, and drove the Rus- 
sian armies out of the southern extremity of Man- 
churia ; but when the war closed no Japanese soldier had 
set foot on Russian soil, the Russian army lay south of 
Changchun in no danger of destruction, the Russian 
generals were begging the Tzar to continue the conflict ; 
and, as we know now, Japan, after her brilliant series of 
victories, was, without having given any evidence of the 
fact, approaching exhaustion. 

When the war broke out, in February, 1904, the 
United States government made representations to the 
Russian and the Japanese governments asking that they 



JAPAN'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA 253 

respect "the neutrality of China and in all practicable 
ways her administrative entity," — to which both govern- 
ments replied favorably. 

In January, 1905, Secretary Hay sent notes to the 
American Ambassadors to the powers other than Rus- 
sia and Japan, saying that apprehension existed on the 
part of some of the powers lest in the negotiations for 
peace between Russia and Japan demands might be 
made for the concession of Chinese territory to neutral 
powers. He then proceeded to reaffirm the policy of 
the United States of maintaining the integrity of China 
and the " 'open door' in the Orient." Replies were soon 
given by all of the major powers, "declaring tlieir con- 
stant adhesion to the policy of the integrity of China 
and the 'open door' in the Orient." ^ 

In the spring of 1905 the President of the United 
States approached the governments of Russia and Japan 
with requests that they try to make peace. This 
friendly suggestion led to the conference at Portsmouth, 
where, not without the good offices of President Roose- 
velt and Kaiser Wilhelm, Baron Komura and Count 
Witte managed to agree upon terms of peace. Count 
Witte had absolutely refused to listen to Japan's pro- 
posal that Russia should pay indemnities; he had been 
perfectly willing to break off the negotiations, and only 
after Baron Komura had been persuaded to drop that 
demand was it found possible to proceed to a successful 
conclusion. The Portsmouth Treaty, signed on Septem- 
ber 5, 1905, provided: 

( 1 ) For recognition of Japan's "paramount political, 
military and economic interests" in Korea; 

(2) For transfer of the rights of Russia in the Liao- 
tung Peninsula to Japan; 

^ Moore's "International Law Digest," Vol. V, 555-556. 



254 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

(3) That the southern section of the Manchurian 
railway be ceded to Japan ; 

(4) That the portion of Saghalin south of the 50th 
parallel be ceded to Japan; 

(5) That Russia and Japan should withdraw their 
troops from Manchuria, but retain railway guards; 

(6) That neither Japan nor Russia should obstruct 
"any general measures common to all countries which 
China may take for the development of the commerce 
and industry of Manchuria' ; 

(7) That railways in Manchuria he exploited purely 
for commercial and industrial, and in no way for stra- 
tegic purposes — except in the Liaotung Peninsula. 

In Article III of the treaty the Russians declared 
that they had "not in Manchuria any territorial advan- 
tages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impair- 
ment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the 
principle of equal opportunity." 

On December 22, 1905, China and Japan made a 
treaty (the Komura Treaty) in which China confirmed 
the terms of the Russo-Japanese treaty in so far as they 
concerned her, and agreed to additional arrangements 
concerning Manchuria. A set of secret protocols was, 
at Japan's instance, attached to this treaty; and provi- 
sions of these protocols were subsequently made to serve 
as the warrant of legality for Japan's refusal to allow 
China, England, and the United States to engage in 
railway enterprise in Manchuria. This treaty and the 
protocol opened the way for the developments in South 
Manchuria which in the course of ten short years have 
so altered conditions there that Japan was able in Jan- 
uary, 1915, to present with substantial show of reason- 
ableness that portion of her new demands which had to 
do with Manchuria. 



JAPAN'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA 255 

In August of 1905, Japan and Great Britain had re- 
newed their alliance. The new treaty provided for the 
maintenance of the territorial rights of the contracting 
parties and the defense of their special interests in the 
regions of Eastern Asia and India; the maintenance of 
the general peace of those regions ; and the preservation 
of the integrity of China and the open door. Great 
Britain recognized Japan's paramount and exclusive 
rights in Korea. It was agreed that if either party 
should become involved in war in defense of its terri- 
torial rights or special interests in the regions mentioned, 
the other would come to its aid. This amounted to a 
formal and automatical^ operating, defensive, and, if 
necessary, offensively defensive alliance. 

The close of the war left Bussia in North Manchuria 
and found Japan ensconced as successor to what had 
been Bussia's rights in South Manchuria. There were 
thus two foreign powers, where there had been one^, with 
spheres of interest in Manchuria. Bussia had, before 
the war, failed to live up to her open door pledges. 
We shall now turn to see something of what Japan has 
made of those pledges since. 



CHAPTER XV 

\ SOUTH MANCHURIA: TEN YEARS OF JAPANESE ADMINIS- 
TRATION 

1. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND RAILWAY POLICIES 

South Manchuria is so important both strategi- 
cally and commercially that its fate is of vital interest 
in world politics. Of its three principal seaports, Dai- 
ren, Newchwang, and Antung, the first named ranked 
in 1912 seventh, and the second ranked tenth in the vol- 
ume of trade among China's ports; while Antung has 
fast been forging to the front. South Manchuria has 
already three trunk railway lines with numerous 
branches. These lead from five important ports to the 
heart of Manchuria, affording connection on the east 
with Korea and thence with Japan, on the west with the 
capital of China, and to the north with the Trans-Si- 
berian and Russia in Asia. Port Arthur commands the . 
gateway to the Gulf of Pechili and the heart of North j 
China. From the vantage ground of the Liaotungi 
Leased Territory, and through the instrumentality of 1 
the South Manchuria Railway, Japan now dominates 
South Manchuria, 

Japan has committed herself to the principles of the 
open door and the integrity of China in not less than 
ten formal diplomatic exchanges — ^beginning with her 
assent to the principles enunciated by Secretary Hay in 
the circular notes of 1899. The latest of such formal 

256 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 257 

pledges appears in the Treaty of June 13, 1911, with 
Great Britain, which for the second time renewed the 
Ang-lo- Japanese Alliance. 

Japan's legal rights in South Manchuria depend upon: 
the Portsmouth Treaty, concluded between herself and 
Russia (September 5, 1905) ; the ratification of the 
terms of that treaty as affecting China in the Komura 
Treaty made between China and Japan (December 22, 
1905) ; the secret protocols annexed to the Komura 
Treaty; and subsequent agreements which have been 
made between China and Japan — most of which have 
had to do with railways and the administration of the 
customs.^ Having a direct bearing upon the manner in 
which the rights accruing from these treaties shall be 
exercised are the pledges which Japan has made to 
other nations to observe the open door and respect 
China's integrity. 

While observing and in estimating the possible effects 
of Japan's activities in Manchuria and of her whole 
China policy we need always to keep in mind the his- 
tory of Korea. It is not irrelevant to remember that, 
whereas Japan in 1904 formally guaranteed to the Em- 
peror of Korea the security of his throne and the integ- 
rity of his realm, in the short period of three years there- 
after Korea had been reduced to the position of a de- 
pendency, while in four years more there was consum- 
mated the complete annexation of that helpless country 
to the dominions of Japan. 

In Manchuria, no sooner had the war been concluded 
than complaints began to come, chiefly from commer- 
cial sources, of discrimination on the part of the Jap- 
anese against the nationals of other countries. These 
complaints increased in volume, were taken up by pub- 

^ And, now, the agreements of May 25, 1915. 



258 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

licists and consular officials, and for several years kept 
Japanese apologists, and at times the Japanese govern- 
ment, busy with denials and explanations. It was more 
than once acknowledged by responsible Japanese offi- 
cials that objectionable methods had been pursued by 
some of their countrymen in the early days of the new 
Japanese influx. There is no question but that the Jap- 
anese government did actually put a stop to some of 
these practices; and ultimately it became the Japanese 
policy and habit to assert categorically that no prac- 
tices infringing the principle of equality of opportunity 
any longer existed. Most recently we have had the re- 
peated assertions of Count Okuma that Japan has not 
violated, is not violating, and does not intend to vio- 
late the principles of the open door policy in Manchuria 
— or in any other part of China. 

Is there, then, nothing in the contentions of those 
who maintain that Japan in her activities in Manchuria 
has failed to live up to her pledges and has infringed 
the rights of other nations? 

The Japanese had formerly been loud in their com- 
plaints of German policy in Shantung and Russian pol- 
icy in Manchuria. They objected to both because both, 
they said, violated the open door. Now themselves com- 
plained of, as their new policies unfolded, they cited 
German and Russian precedents as justification for 
what they were doing. Justification or no justification, 
by appeal to these precedents the Japanese were unwit- 
tingly accusing themselves of deliberately violating the 
open door. 

Accusation and self-accusation, affirmation and de- 
nial, argument and difference of opinion aside, there are 
certain facts of which no denial can be made. Their 
bearing upon the question of the rights of Japan 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 259 

and those of other nations may be a matter of contro- 
versy. 

It is a fact that Japan, introducing as the legal evi- 
dence and justification of her right to do so provisions 
of the secret protocols annexed to the Komura Treaty, 
prevented the building, by British firms and with British 
money, for the Chinese government, of the proposed 
Hsinmintun-Fakumen extension of the North China 
Railway. Russia had declared in the Portsmouth 
Treaty — when transferring her rights to Japan — that 
she had "no special privileges in Manchuria." In the 
same treaty the two countries had pledged themselves 
"not to obstruct any general measures common to all 
countries which China may take for the development of 
the commerce and industry of Manchuria." It follows 
that a secret treaty provision in which China undertook, 
upon Japan's demand, "not to construct any railway 
Hues parallel to and competing with the South Manchu- 
ria Railway," amounted to the establishing in Japan's 
favor of a new and special privilege. This diminished 
China's freedom of action ; it was therefore an immediate 
violation of the pledge made to Russia ; it was contrary 
to principles set forth in the Anglo- Japanese agreement 
of 1905 ; and it carried the implication of an intention to 
close the door in South Manchuria against railway en- 
terprise in other than Japanese hands. There appears 
in the original agreement by which China authorized the 
building by Russia of the South Manchuria extension of 
the railway a clause (Article IX) which says: "This 
railway concession is never to be . . . allowed to inter- 
fere with Chinese authority or interests." 

When it had become evident that the Fakumen Rail- 
way scheme would not receive the support of the British 
government and would have to be given up, a project 



260 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

was developed by American, British, and Chinese inter- 
ests for the construction of a Chinese government line 
from Chinchou to Aigun. The plan was approved by 
the Chinese government and had the support of the 
American government. It is generally understood that 
the British government when first approached on this 
subject gave its approval, and that it tentatively favored 
the project until Japan and Russia finally signified their 
disapproval. The matter was disposed of by the Rus- 
sians, who vetoed the scheme absolutely on the ground 
that it would be a menace to Russian commercial and 
economic interests. In blocking this project Russia had 
the backing of Japan. Whatever the rights of Russia 
and Japan, the rights and interests of China received 
no consideration; and the Chinese government, Ameri- 
can capital, and British engineers were forbidden to 
construct on Chinese soil a railway which would have 
been to the advantage of all three and greatly to the 
advantage of Manchuria. 

While the negotiations for the building of the Chin- 
chou- Aigun Railway were in progress, Mr. Knox, then 
Secretary of State, resolved to submit to the consid- 
eration of the powers his scheme for the neutralization 
of the railways, both existing and to be built, in Man- 
churia. Mr. Knox's plan contemplated rendering Man- 
churia a neutral area, as far, at least, as railways and 
commercial facilities were concerned, wherein all pow- 
ers should have and be guaranteed as nearly as possible 
equal opportunities. What he actually proposed was 
that the powers, including Russia and Japan, should 
together loan China the money which would be neces- 
sary to purchase the interests of Japan and Russia and | 
to construct further railway lines in Manchuria. All 
these lines were to be the property of the Chinese gov- 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 261 

ernment; but their administration was to be, for the 
time being, at least, under some sort of an international 
commission. 

It has been understood that Secretary Knox's mem- 
orandum received the tentative approval of the British 
and the German governments. At St. Petersburg its 
contents were made public, and it at once became every- 
thing from a red flag to a football for the Russian and 
the Japanese press. The Russian and the Japanese 
governments promptly announced their disapproval of 
the scheme, and they followed this action a few months 
later (July, 1910) with a convention looking to the mu- 
tual safeguarding of their common and their respective 
interests in Manchuria. Marquis Komura, then For- 
eign Minister in Japan, expressed the attitude of his 
government in a speech in the Diet in the course of 
which he said : "... In the regions affected in South 
Manchuria there have grown up numerous undertakings 
which have been promoted in the belief that the rail- 
way would remain in our possession, and the Imperial 
Government could not . . . agree to abandon the rail- 
way." 

What, at bottom, is the principle of the open door 
and equal opportunity? Does it not imply, is it not 
practically synonymous with, the idea of commercial 
neutralization? Whatever the merit of Mr. Knox's 
proposal, whatever his motives in presenting it, the 
prompt and summary rejection of the neutralization 
scheme demonstrated that Russia and Japan did not 
intend to allow any meddling with what they considered 
their special privileges and assumed as their rights in 
Manchuria. More than that, it showed that they were 
united in their determination to keep other nations 
out. 



262 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

While the exclusion of Chinese and of other foreign 
interests from Manchuria was being effected, Japan 
went ahead with railway and other construction of her 
own. She completed her title to the branch line from 
Tashichao to Newchwang. At the point of the bayonet 
she forced China to allow her to build the new Antung- 
Mukden line. She furnished China half the capital for 
the completion of the Hsinmintun-Mukden line and for 
the Kirin-Changchun line, securing the pledge in con- 
nection with the latter that, if it were to be extended, 
application for assistance should be made to the South 
Manchuria Railway Company. The agreements are 
such that all these lines are virtually in pawn to the 
Japanese government. In course of time the control 
of the South Manchuria lines was vested in the Jap- 
anese Ministry of Communications. The Japanese also 
secured complete control of the working of the Fushun 
Mines (near Mukden) — the greatest coal mines in all the 
Far East — and virtual control of the Yalu River timber 
concessions. 

Along with these developments, Japanese official- 
dom, from its base in the Leased Territory and through 
the consulates and the Railway Company, went on ef- 
fectively consolidating and extending its influence. The 
result is that the Japanese authority has become prac- 
tically absolute, not alone in the Leased Territory and 
along the Railway Zone, but, indirectly, throughout all 
of Southeastern Manchuria; for, while the Chinese ad- 
ministration still functions, the Chinese officials submit 
to the exercise of a veto power by the Japanese which 
renders Japan for practical purposes the final authority 
in determining issues of importance. 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 263 

2. ADMINISTRATION AND COMMERCIAL POLICIES 

Turning now to certain manifestations of Japanese 
policy which are less of an official nature but which can- 
not be dissociated from official responsibility: after the 
war the Japanese military authorities remained in con- 
trol of South Manchuria for a period of eighteen months. 
Japanese were on the ground, in numbers and in force ; 
they had occupied the country ; they owned the railways ; 
their ships had been the only ones, with the exception of 
blockade runners, which for several months had been 
entering South Manchurian ports — other than New- 
chwang. Naturally, Japanese traders got the first 
chance/ The Japanese government began at once a 
systematic policy of encouraging Japanese immigration 
and Japanese business. Up to August, 1906, special 
obstacles were put in the way of other foreigners wish- 
ing to enter South Manchuria, while Japanese were al- 
lowed entry in large numbers. The result was that Jap- 
anese subjects and Japanese shipping and trading com- 
panies secured at once a temporary monopoly of the 
Manchurian export trade. The shipping companies, the 
South Manchuria Railway, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, 
and the Yokohama Specie Bank — with all of which the 
Japanese government is financially allied — became the 
great instruments for the consolidation of the position 
of the Japanese immigrants. Special rates by sea and 
on the railway, special facilities for the handling of 
goods, and special rates of interest on loans were ex- 
tended to Japanese. 

The establishing of foreign consulates, authorized by 
the treaties of 1903 with China, was delayed until the 
fall of 1906. Arrangements for the operation of the 

^ The same thing occurred after the capture of Tsingtao in 1914. 



264 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Chinese Customs Office at Dairen were not made until 
April, 1907; and after that office was opened it was put 
in charge of a commissioner of Japanese nationality. 
It was later charged that for a considerable period Jap- 
anese goods were allowed to pass northward from the 
Leased Territory without paying the customs duties. 
It has never been possible to prove this contention abso- 
lutely ; but the practically unanimous opinion of foreign 
merchants, foreign consuls, and foreign journalists who 
investigated at first hand, together with the circumstan- 
tial evidence of statistics of the Chinese Customs Re- 
ports, stand in support of the charge. 

That the tariff of the South Manchuria Railway did 
and does discriminate against the port of Newchwang 
in favor of Dairen no one denies. That there was in- 
augurated a system of rebates of which, in the nature of 
things, only Japanese could take advantage, and that, 
in view of the volume of complaint against it, the Jap- 
anese government abolished- this system in September, 
1909, is a matter of common knowledge. That the Rail- 
way and the Yokohama Specie Bank have devised a sys- 
tem for handling the produce of the country which 
brings practically all of the bean business into their 
hands — a system which is to their credit and to the ad- 
vantage of the Manchurian farmers^ — has been pointed 
to as another instance of the governmental participa- 
tion in a field of activity which is usually left to private 
enterprise. That the Japanese banks advance money at 
unusually low rates of interest has occasioned adverse 
comment — a criticism which would not be warranted but 
for the facts that a distinction is made in favor of Jap- 
anese borrowers and that the Japanese government gives 
the banks special assistance which makes it possible for 
them to carry on business in this way. 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 265 

None of these methods of doing business can be de- 
clared to be a direct violation of the principles of the 
open door. They do, however, constitute an indirect 
interference — on the part of the Japanese govern- 
ment — with the natural course of equality of opportu- 
nity. 

Now to turn to an instance or two of practices whose 
effect is more direct : Before the war the tobacco trade 
in Manchuria was largely in the hands of the British- 
American Tobacco Company. When the Japanese 
government compelled the company to sell to it its fac- 
tories in Japan, the company began the erection of fac- 
tories in China. The Japanese Government Tobacco 
Monopoly soon became a serious competitor of the Brit- 
ish-American company, particularly in Manchuria. 
After the war, artificial obstacles were placed in the way 
of the business of the latter. For instance, the return 
of its agents was delayed; the hawkers of its products 
were interfered with in the Railway Zone ; and the trade- 
marks of the company were imitated. 

More serious than this, however, when the Chinese in 
1906 increased the production tax on tobacco prod- 
ucts sold in Manchuria, the Japanese at first refused to 
pay the tax and later represented that they were com- 
pounding it in lump sums by private arrangement with 
the Chinese officials. When the British- American com- 
pany established its large factory in Mukden, the man- 
agement entered into negotiations with the Chinese of- 
ficials with regard to the tax which should be levied on 
the product of the factory, and an agreement satisfac- 
tory to both sides was arrived at. From the outset the 
factory management has kept the Chinese authorities 
notified as to the amount of their output — for the pur- 
pose of the tax record. Soon after the building of the 



266 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

British- American factory the Japanese Government To- 
bacco Monopoly built a factory at Newchwang. This 
factory distributed its goods without paying any pro- 
duction tax. The manager of the British- American 
company repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese 
officials to this fact, and the latter took the matter up 
with the Japanese authorities. The Japanese set forth 
various contentions as reasons why they should not pay, 
never categorically saying that they would not pay but 
always "referring the matter to Peking" and otherwise 
deferring a settlement. 

As to another tax, the consumption tax on tobacco, 
the Japanese agents and shopkeepers — who handle the 
Japanese product exclusively — have refused outright to 
pay this and have in some instances even threatened the 
Chinese tax collectors who have tried to collect it from 
them; while the Chinese merchants handling the British- 
American product have submitted, as they should, to 
the collection of the tax. In their refusal to pay this 
tax, the Japanese shopkeepers have regularly had the 
backing and protection of their consular officials. 

It has been the not infrequent practice of the agents 
of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, the largest importing and 
exporting firm operating in Manchuria, to compound the 
taxes and secure certificates from the Chinese officials 
that all taxes on certain lots of goods have been paid. 
These certificates are then handed down to the Chinese 
merchants who purchase the goods, and they serve to 
protect them against any further descents of the tax 
collectors. By this system not only is the cost to the 
Chinese merchant per unit of the Japanese goods re- 
duced, but the handling of these goods is made attrac- 
tive to him because the possession of the tax certificate, 
with the protection of the Mitsui Company, relieves him 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 267 

from the fear of conflicts with the local taxation officers 
which are otherwise inevitable. 

All these practices inevitably establish inequalities in 
favor of Japanese products and Japanese traders. 

Private observation aside, that the era of officially- 
fostered, special opportunity for the Japanese subject 
has not passed is testified to unequivocally in the latest 
American Consular Reports from Mukden. In the 
course of the 1914 report of the Consul- General at Muk- 
den, published in the United States Commerce Reports, 
February 20, 1915,^ appear the following notes: 

The only bank in Mukden doing foreign business is the Yoko- 
hama Specie Bank. ... A general preference is given to Jap- 
anese merchants and traders. Rates for advances on cargo 
expected are as follows : Japanese, seven per cent. ; foreigners, 
eight per cent. ; Chinese, ten per cent. 

In selling their products, the Japanese have been favored by 
cheap home labor, government subsidies, special railway rates, 
preferential customs treatment and exemption from internal 
taxation. . . . The main-spring of all Japanese influence in 
Manchuria is the South Manchurian Railway Company, a serai- 
government concern, which is lavishly expending money on its 
railway property and in the numerous Japanese settlements, 
constructing administration buildings, schools, colleges, hospi- 
tals, hotels, developing houses, and various works connected 
with founding towns on modern lines. . . . 

. . . All imports for and exports from South Manchuria via 
Dairen (Dalny) or Antung must be handled by the South Man- 
churia Railway. 

3. ADMINISTRATION AND COLONIZATION 

The Japanese actually administer in Manchuria the 
Leased Territory, including an area of 1,303 square 

^ Report of Consul-General P. S. Heintzleman, December 21, 
1914, 



268 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

miles, and the Railway Zone, embracing an area of 
70.54 miles. In the former are the important cities of 
Dairen and Port Arthur; in the latter are some fifty- 
five railway stations, at most of which the Japanese have 
settlements. There were in the Leased Territory at the 
end of 1912 some 456,000 Chinese and 45,000 Jap- 
anese; in the railway settlements some 28,000 Chinese 
and 25,500 Japanese. There were also about 10,000 
Japanese living in the Chinese "treaty ports" in Man- 
churia ; and an exhaustive comparison of various sets of 
Japanese statistics leaves it to be inferred that some- 
where between 2,000 and 5,000 Japanese were living 
in the Interior.^ There were, in addition to this, some 
250,000 Koreans in Manchuria, most of whom remained 
Japanese subjects; of this number a great many had 
come since the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, 
and the immigration from Korea was on the increase. 
Although there are twenty-five open ports in Manchuria, 
while the whole of the Leased Territory and the Rail- 
way Zone also offer places of residence and business, a 
certain number of Japanese have insisted, as indicated 
above, on establishing themselves at points outside. All 
this outer region is technically spoken of as the "In- 
terior," and the provisions of China's treaties have not 
allowed foreigners to reside or trade in the Interior. 

This penetration of the Interior, and the unauthorized 
opening of shops in remote towns by these commercial 
pioneers has been a matter of annoyance to the Chinese 

■*■ The latest available figures indicate that at the end of 1915 there 
were approximately 100,000 Japanese in all Manchuria. The figures 
for the past eight years show an average annual increase of almost 
10 per cent, with a gradual relative falling off in the later years. 
There are now, therefore, more Japanese in Manchuria than there 
are foreigners of all other nationalities — including Russians — in all 
of China. 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 269 

officials, especially on account of the numerous con- 
flicts with the local Chinese and consequent controver- 
sies with the Japanese officials to which the practice 
gives rise. The Manchuria Daily News^ prints every 
little while accounts of such conflicts, the blame always 
being" laid upon the Chinese. 

One of the chief causes for complaints made against 
Japanese methods both by the foreigners who live in 
Manchuria and by the Chinese, and perhaps foremost 
among the causes of personal clash and official contro- 
versy, has been the officiousness and brutality of the po- 
lice and soldiers. The Japanese have full administra- 
tive control, including exclusive police jurisdiction, 
within the Railway Zone; at the same time they fre- 
quently and without hesitation encroach upon Chinese 
rights outside the Zone. Thus, for instance, Japanese 
soldiers pass freely under arms throughout the regions 
adjoining the Railway Zone, while Chinese police and 
soldiers are only on rare occasions and after obtaining 
express permission from the Japanese allowed to enter 
the Zone. 

It is from the Japanese police, however, and from 
Chinese detectives in their employ, that trouble usually 
comes. A huge list could be made of instances which 
have been reported during the past ten years, and it is 
well known that a great many instances never attain 
publicity. The notorious incident which occurred at 
Changli, just outside of Manchuria and on undisputed 
Chinese soil, in September, 1913, was reported beyond 
the confines of the Far East. Here, as a result of a 
quarrel between a soldier of the Japanese railway guard 
and a Chinese fruit-vender, the former refusing to pay 
the latter for wares he w^as consuming, Japanese guards 

^ A Japanese semi-official organ printed in English at Dairen. 



270 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

set upon and killed five Chinese policemen. The investi- 
gation which followed showed that the Japanese were 
clearly the aggressors and had acted with wanton bru- 
tality. 

It is not to be inferred that the higher Japanese 
officials encourage these things ; but it cannot be denied 
that they tolerate them, while their regular defense of 
their subordinates when the incidents occur amounts to 
an indirect countenancing of the attitude of contemptu- 
ous superiority which the latter invariably assume in 
their dealings with the Chinese. 

Japanese colonization of Manchuria has not pro- 
ceeded as rapidly as the Japanese government had 
hoped. The vast, wind-swept plains, fertile though 
they are, do not seem to attract the Japanese farmer. 
From the indications of ten years' experience, it would 
seem that if Manchuria passes into the possession of 
Japan it will serve the purposes of an exploitation rather 
than of a settlement colony. When, however, we turn 
to the question of Korean immigration, we find a differ- 
ence. We discover that, simultaneously with a consid- 
erable influx of Japanese into Korea, there is occurring 
a considerable exodus of Koreans, who, selling their 
property to the Japanese, leave their native land, cross 
the Yalu, and settle in South Manchuria. The Jap- 
anese government is officially encouraging this move- 
ment. At the same time, whereas it was formerly a 
common practice among the Korean immigrants in Man- 
churia to become naturalized as Chinese subjects, the 
Japanese authorities are now putting all possible ob- 
stacles in the way of their doing this. Naturally, the 
Japanese policy in this matter is based upon two prin- 
ciples: that Manchuria shall be colonized by Japanese 
subjects, and that Japan shall retain the allegiance of 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 271 

these emigrating and colonizing subjects. It might be 
added, also, that the idea is to be encouraged that South 
Manchuria is a projection of Japanese territory. These 
Korean farmers become real settlement colonists and 
contribute materially to the consolidation of the Jap- 
anese political hold upon the regions in which they 
establish themselves; at the same time their extraterri- 
torial status as Japanese nationals has contributed to 
the complication of the political situation. Thanks to 
their presence to the number of about 250,000, Japan 
can point out that she has the interests of some 
350,000 of her subjects resident in Manchuria to look 
after. 

While strategically and politically Manchuria pre- 
sents problems for each of the three countries whose ter- 
ritories converge on its borders, when considered as a 
field for colonization its importance commands more 
specifically the attention of China and Japan. Told, 
as we have been over and over, that Japan must have 
an outlet for her excess population and that Manchuria 
is the natural outlet, it is well to bear in mind that China 
also has a crowded population and that in the new con- 
dition in which the awakening Chinese people find them- 
selves a movement toward the relief of the present con- 
gested conditions is bound to manifest itself in an at- 
tempt at redistribution. This will mean pressure out- 
ward. Manchuria is a natural outlet for the excess of 
China's population more truly than for that of Japan; 
and, as far as rights to this open field are concerned, 
China has the better claim. The pressure of excess pop- 
ulation seeking an emigration outlet will probably be 
greater from China than from Japan — for there are 
400,000,000^ Chinese as compared with 70,000,000 Jap- 

^ Estimates run all the way from 325,000,000 to 450,000,000. 



272 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

anese and Koreans, and the former are no less adept at 
"replenishing" the earth" than are the latter. 

Manchuria has an area of 363,700 square miles, a 
part of this area being immensely fertile, other portions 
being rich in timber and in mineral resources. Experts 
are agreed in the estimate that this region is capable of 
supporting a population of 100,000,000. The population 
today numbers perhaps 17,500,000 persons. Of these 
about 17,000,000 are Chinese subjects, some 13,000,- 
000 of them being of Chinese and perhaps as many as 
4,000,000 of Manchurace; 250,000 are Koreans; about 
100,000 are Japanese; and about 50,000 are Russians. 
To enterManchuria the Chinese have but to step through 
the breach in the Great Wall at Shan-hai-kwan or to 
sail across the ninety miles of water between the Shan- 
tung Peninsula and the Liaotung Peninsula. As many 
Chinese farm hands come and go between Chili and 
Shantung Provinces and Manchuria each year as there 
are Japanese in South Manchuria after ten years of oc- 
cupation. What people, then, would it seem, have the 
best natural right to Manchuria; and what people, if 
events are left to their natural course, will settle this 
great potential outlet for excess population? 

Though Japan takes South Manchuria, and whether 
she leaves it open to Chinese immigration or whether she 
closes it, her occupation will not settle the question of 
population pressure; nor will it settle finally the ques- 
tion of political domination. Still less will it insure the 
peace of the Far East. 

4. ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 

No account of Japanese activity in South Manchuria 
would be complete or do justice which failed to describe 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 273 

and pay tribute to the material successes which the con- 
querors have achieved — through an efficient administra- 
tion — in the fields of industrial and commercial develop- 
ment. 

When Russia began her forward move in Manchuria, 
she leased the Liaotung Peninsula for a period of 
twenty-five years. The lease which passed to Japan 
would, therefore, expire in 1923, but it was subject to 
renewal. The railway agreements provided that China 
should have the right to buy the lines at the end of 
thirty-six years from 1903 — which would be in 1939 — or 
to secure the reversion, without payment, at the end of 
eighty years — or in 1983. ^ 

The administration of the Leased Territory and the 
Zone is subject to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
Tokyo and is in the hands of a Governor- General with 
official headquarters at Port Arthur. The railway, 
which is now a government enterprise, is controlled by 
the Ministry of Communications in Tokyo. The Gov- 
ernor-General must be an officer of the Imperial army, 
and he has powers which not only include the adminis- 
tration of civil affairs and control of the railway guards 
but extend into the diplomatic sphere for purposes of 
negotiation with the Chinese authorities. 

A large share of the expense of the government of the 
Leased Territory, running to about 5,000,000 yen per 
annum, has been borne by the Imperial exchequer. 

The most conspicuous evidences of Japanese con- 
structive efficiency in Manchuria are to be found in the 
improving of the railways, the building of cities, and the 
developing of mining and commercial enterprises. 

First of all come the railways. Japan inherited from 
Russia about five hundred miles of track and equipment, 

' But see Chapter XVII. ~ ~~* 



274 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

including the main line from Changchung to Dairen 
and branch lines to Port Arthur, to the Fushun Mines, 
and to Newchwang. She has subsequently built the 
line from Antung — on the Yalu River — to INIukden, 
thus linking the Korean frontier with central Manchuria 
and establishing a direct Hne of communication be- 
tween Japan and Europe. She has also participated 
in building the branch line from Changchun to Kirin, 
which she expects to extend to Hoiryong on the North 
Korean coast. 

The Japanese government controls the lines, though 
the actual administration is in the hands of the South 
Manchuria Railway Company. When the Company 
was organized it was authorized to engage in railway 
business, mining, marine transportation, sale on con- 
signment of goods shipped, warehousing, administration 
of land and construction on lands belonging to the rail- 
way, and supplementary enterprises ; to make necessary 
provisions for education, health, and engineering works 
within the Railway Zone; and to collect fees (that is, 
taxes) from residents in the Zone. In short, the Rail- 
way Company has been, except in military affairs, the 
government of the Railway Zone, and it has in addition 
been the greatest factor in the economic life and devel- 
opment of the Leased Territory. 

The South ]\Ianchuria Railway Company has done a 
truly remarkable work. The railway is one of the best 
managed, to outward appearance at least, and best 
equipped in the Far East. Projecting Japan's political 
authority along a narrow line from a triangular base up 
into the center of Manchuria, the company has acted in 
most of the capacities of a colonial administration. It 
owns harbors and mines; it has built cities, towns, and 
settlements, and has installed in them various public 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHUKIA 275 

works — even to parks and summer resorts; it has in- 
stalled factories, gas, electric light and waterworks, tele- 
graph, telephone, and tramway systems. It superin- 
tends immigration, builds hotels, hospitals, schools, and 
laboratories; it conducts a loan business — in connection 
with which it has made several loans to the Chinese for 
joint railway enterprises. 

Money has been lavished on the equipment.^ One 
of the criticisms of the railway has been that the equip- 
ment is above the standard for which the traffic calls, 
the implication being that Japan planned deliberately 
to make the valuation of her holdings so high that China 
could not, when the time should come, afford to buy out 
these interests. 

The direct result of the investment is that the rail- 
way furnishes excellent facilities for both freight and 
passenger traffic. The various enterprises of the com- 
pany have contributed wonderfully to the prosperity of 
South Manchuria, have improved the export trade in 
the great Manchurian staple — beans — and have facili- 
tated the building up of a huge import trade, from all 
of which the profits have accrued especially to Japan. 

The Antung-Mukden line, one hundred and seventy 
miles long, is a beautiful piece of construction, repre- 
senting great expense. Both as to roadbed and equip- 
ment it is far superior to the lines in Japan. Its com- 
pletion brought Mukden within 1,582 miles, or less than 
three dliys' travel, of Tokyo. As soon as it had been fin- 
ished the Japanese secured a reduction in the Chinese 
tariff rates in favor of goods imported by rail from 
south of the Yalu. This line, while affording a great 
convenience for passenger traffic, has appeared, so far, 

^ Much of this money was borrowed in Great Britain and spent in 
the United States. 



276 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

more valuable as a strategic than as an economic instru- 
ment. Its commercial value is, however, increasing. 

Persons who have occasion to use both the Chinese 
and the Japanese railways in South Manchuria regu- 
larly give praise and preference to the latter. Goods 
are said to be safer and to be handled more expedi- 
tiously, and likin and "squeezes" are avoided on the 
Japanese lines. The tariffs are more dependable, and 
paj^ments are made in gold yen or equivalents regularly 
listed at the stations. 

The Fushun Mines, which the Russians had devel- 
oped to some extent and ,of which the Japanese took 
control after some controversy with the Chinese, are a 
very valuable adjunct to the railwaj?" and other enter- 
prises. Here there exists a single vein of coal varying 
in thickness from 80 to 175 feet, about ten miles long 
and estimated to contain 800,000,000 tons of coal. The 
Japanese have installed the most up-to-date machinery 
and methods of mining and have brought the output up 
to over 3,000,000 tons per annum, which exceeds that 
of the best collieries of Japan. The coal is used through- 
out Manchuria, to some extent in Siberia, and is ex- 
ported to Chinese ports, the Philippines, and even as 
far as Singapore and India. The mines employ a great 
number of Japanese skilled and Chinese unskilled la- 
borers. About the pit mouths the Railway Company 
has built a model city. At Penshihu, nearer the Yalu, 
both coal and iron mines are being developed. 
■ In cooperation with the Yokohama Specie Bank and 
the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, which have established bank- 
ing houses and a ramification of trading facilities 
throughout the region, the Railway Company has be- 
come the mainspring of the economic awakening of 
South Manchuria. 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 277 

The most important cities in the Japanese sphere of 
influence are Dairen, Port Arthur, Newchwang, An- 
tung, Liaoyang, Mukden, TiehHng, Changchun, Fu- 
shun, and Yentai. The city of Dairen had been laid 
out by the Russians, who invested many milhons of 
roubles in town and harbor construction. The Japa- 
nese have continued to build upon the foundations laid 
by the Russians. Dairen now stands a beautiful and 
substantial city beside a thoroughly equipped harbor. 
Though a shipping and railway point, it has the appear- 
ance of neither. The port lies away from the city proper 
beyond a low promontory. The railway yards lie in 
a deep cut spanned by a handsome stone viaduct. The 
harbor is sheltered, and the docks have complete modern 
facilities. Vessels berth alongside granite docks, and 
railway trains run on the docks. Ample warehouses 
have been provided, and the bean mills are near at hand. 
The railway has extensive shops and has built a model 
town — a little apart from the city — for employees. The 
Chinese residential quarter is also away from the main 
city. There is an efficient tram system with more than 
twenty-five miles of track; and electric lights, water- 
works, sewers, etc., have been installed as a matter of 
course. 

The streets, laid out according to a geometrical plan, 
are wide, well surfaced and well kept. There is a first- 
class hotel, one of the Yamoto series — of which there 
are others at Port Arthur, Mukden, and Changchun, 
and in Korea, which contribute greatly to the com- 
fort of both travelers and residents. The city is well 
equipped with modern hospitals. Upon a hill overlook- 
ing the residential quarters stands a "White City." 
Within easy reach by tram are extensive recreation 
grounds; and at a distance of four miles is a summer 



278 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

resort, with hotel, bungalows, golf grounds, and beach 
bathing. Practically all the construction, together with 
the administration, is the work of the Railway Com- 
pany. 

Port Arthur has never had such attention from the 
Japanese as was given it by the Russians. It stands 
now as a naval and military depot, not a commercial 
city, though a portion of its harbor is open to the ves- 
sels of all nations. 

At the other cities named above, with Japanese popu- 
lations running from one to five thousand, as also at 
some of the fifty smaller settlements, the Railway Com- 
pany has laid out town sites, built streets, installed sew- 
ers, electric lighting and telephone systems, erected nu- 
merous buildings and, in some cases, waterworks, hos- 
pitals, and schools. Japanese residents in the Zone are 
better provided for than are their countrymen at home. 
Subjects of every nationality are permitted to reside and 
carry on business in the Zone, subject to the rules and 
regulations laid down by the Railway Company. ^ 

The settlements conduct schools, and to the schools 
Chinese pupils and students are admitted along with 
Japanese. At several important points there are hos- 
pitals. Provision is made for medical education and the 
training of nurses. Foreigners and Chinese, as well 
as Japanese, are given medical and dental treatment at 
these hospitals, and the fees charged are very low. The 
work which the Japanese, along with foreigners and 
Chinese, did in combating the great plague of 1910 
is well known. Japanese and Chinese experts have 
since been constantly at work studying the causes and 

^ Mr. E. J. Harrison gives an excellent account of the adminis- 
tration and development of the Railway Zone, in his "Peace or 
War East of Baikal/' pp. 248-282 passim. 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 279 

methods of preventing local diseases, and methods of 
conserving the public health. 

The Japanese have established a satisfactory tele- 
graph and telephone system throughout the Zone and 
in the settlements and adjoining regions. They have 
also introduced Japanese post-offices. These services 
of course compete with the Chinese services; and they 
become instruments for diminishing the volume of the 
business of the latter. 

All told, the Japanese investment in Manchuria has 
been enormous, and as a consequence the "vested inter- 
ests" of which Japanese publicists and diplomats speak 
are a reality. Everything is built solidly and substan- 
tially, often unnecessarily so. In addition to industrial 
enterprises, there has been a heavy investment in gov- 
ernment buildings. Consulates at Liaoyang, Muk- 
den, Changchun, Newchwang, and other points have 
cost from 100,000 to 250,000 yen each. The consulate 
at Changchun is equipped with a dining-room capable 
of seating a hundred guests. 

A large garrison is maintained at Port Arthur, and 
smaller garrisons and artillery divisions at a number 
of points, with railway guards throughout the Railway 
Zone. 

The Japanese have without question efficiently de- 
veloped their holdings, they have greatly increased the 
trade of South Manchuria, and they have established fa- 
cilities which are appreciated by every foreigner and 
enlightened Chinese. Their progressive commercial and 
industrial activity, their insistence upon building well, 
their application of modern methods and principles, 
their regard for sanitation and health measures, and the 
success which attends their efforts stand as a constant 
object lesson to the Chinese. They also illustrate, in- 



280 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

cidentally, what a benevolently disposed, paternalistic 
government can do to advance the interests of its sub- 
jects. 

Still, Japan appears to have directed her energies in 
Manchuria much more effectively in the fields of com- 
mercial and industrial development than toward the so- 
lution of the problem of accommodating her excess pop- 
ulation, and she has certainly not sought to improve the 
political condition of the Chinese. The Japanese look 
down upon the Chinese and are disposed to regard them 
as natural burden bearers, the "hewers of wood and 
drawers of water," to whom the Japanese should, in the 
nature of things, stand in the relation of directors and 
overlords. Reference has been made above to the bru- 
tality of the Japanese petty officials and guards in deal- 
ing with the Chinese. It is in this connection in particu- 
lar that the Japanese domination is — as in Formosa and 
in Korea — unsatisfactory. 

Japan did not, in Korea, help the Koreans to help 
themselves. She has not, so far, in Manchuria shown 
an inclination to cooperate with the Chinese in such a 
way as to render the administrative problems of the 
latter simpler, to train them in efficiency, to make them 
better able to do things for themselves. Where there 
comes a conflict of ideas, arbitration and compromise 
are not the order of the day; the Japanese will and the 
Japanese way must prevail. Compulsion takes prece- 
dence over persuasion. Obstacles are placed in the way 
of the efforts of the Chinese police to deal with various 
classes of disturbers, and then complaint is made be- 
cause the disturbances continue. Japanese traders are 
known to supply arms to Chinese desperadoes and out- 
laws, though it is unlawful to import arms into China 
except to private order and with a permit signed by a 



JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 281 

consul of the importer's nationality. Whenever Japa- 
nese and Chinese subjects become party to private con- 
troversies of such nature as to come to official attention, 
the chances are that in the settlement the Chinese will 
get the worst of it. 

If Japan wishes to convince the Chinese and the world 
that her presence and her activities on the mainland are 
for the good of the world, that she is seeking to pro- 
mote the welfare of the Chinese along with her own 
interests, and that she is sincerely concerned with the 
problem of establishing and maintaining the peace of 
the Far East, it will be necessary not only that she con- 
tinue her course of excellent, material, constructive ef- 
fort, but that she put a check upon various practices 
which are unfair to the subjects of other nations, put 
an end to various abuses which have so far characterized 
her diplomatic and political dealings with China, and 
demonstrate in her treatment of the Chinese, by a pol- 
icy of cooperation and helpfulness, that she is disposed 
to be and is capable of becoming a moral as well as a 
material benefactor. 



CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS: CHINA, JAPAN AND 
THE UNITED STATES 

THE RECENT PAST AND THE PRESENT 



CHAPTER XVI 

JAPAN AND GERMANY: THE PEACE OF THE EAR EAST 

When in July, 1914, the war broke out in Europe, 
China was in no sense directly interested, and at the 
first opportunity she declared her neutrality. To Ja- 
pan, however, the fact that England, her ally and com- 
mercial competitor, Russia, her partner and political 
competitor, and Germany, a commercial competitor, 
were at war was a matter of vital and immediate in- 
terest. England, Germany, and France all had naval 
bases on the China coast, all had possessions and com- 
merce in the Pacific. Russia also had her naval base, 
and all four powers had fleets of greater or less strength 
in the Pacific. Hostilities of some sort were bound to 
occur in the Far East, and somebody's trade, shipping, 
and territorial possessions were certain to be objects 
of attack. 

As an ally of Great Britain, Japan had, in the agree- 
ments of 1902, 1905, and 1911, made certain promises. 
By these and her agreements with France, Russia, and 
the United States she was pledged to the maintenance 
of the status quo in the Far East. The agreement with 
England went further: in it Great Britain and Japan 
had undertaken each to protect the interests of the other 
if those interests were threatened by a third power. 
Now Germany had a well fortified naval and military 
base, with about 3,000 soldiers and a small but powerful 
fleet, at Kiaochow. There was also an Austrian cnii- 

285 



286 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ser in Far Eastern waters. But Great Britain had more 
troops in the Far East than had Germany; Russia had 
a garrison of 80,000 men at Vladivostok; Great Britain, 
France, and Russia had sufficient naval strength in the 
Pacific to outmatch the German strength. Kiaochow 
and the German fleet could have been successfully dealt 
with by the European Allies, though until dealt with 
the fleet did in some sense constitute a menace to their 
shipping. To Japan, however, here was a great, an 
unprecedented opportunity. 

There is doubt as to how far the British government 
asked for Japan's assistance. It has been affirmed on 
good authority that it endeavored at first to dissuade 
Japan from taking the offensive against Germany's 
possessions in the Far East. Whatever the facts in 
that connection. Count Okuma's government, which had 
taken office four months before on a platform of peace 
and retrenchment, on August 15 addressed the Ger- 
man government in the following terms: 

Considering it highly important and necessary in the pres- 
ent situation to take measures to remove the causes of all dis- 
turbances of peace in the Far East and to safeguard the general 
interest contemplated by the agreement of alliance between 
Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring 
peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of 
the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sin- 
cerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial Ger- 
man Government to carry out the following two propositions: 
First, to withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese 
waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and 
to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn; and 
Second, to deliver on a date not later than September 15 to 
the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or com- 
pensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view 



THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST 287 

to the eventual restoration of the same to China. The Imperial 
Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the 
event of their not receiving by noon, August 23, 1914, the 
answer of the German Imperial Government signifying uncon- 
ditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial 
Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such 
action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation. 

The language in which this ultimatum was couched 
is an ironical reminder of that in which Germany had in 
1895 addressed Japan when suggesting, along with 
Russia and France, that she restore South Manchuria 
to China. There was no question of Germany's accept- 
ing Japan's "advice." It is understood that Germany 
had already been considering the possibility of "intern- 
ing" Kiaochow, that is, of handing it over to China for 
the period of the war, thus removing it from the field 
of possible hostilities. Whether that was the case or 
not, the Japanese interference rendered such action im- 
possible. 

Germany made no reply to Japan. She acted, how- 
ever, immediately, on the suggestion that she withdraw 
her fleet — and her battleships, thus forced from Kiao- 
chow, soon gave an account of themselves, disconcert- 
ing to the enemy, in the destruction of British shipping. 

On August 23 the Emperor of Japan, in declaring 
war on Germany, said: 

. . . Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the 
calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, we on 
our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the 
Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action 
of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to 
lopen hostihties against that country, and Germany is at Kiao- 
ichow, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike prepara- 



288 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

tions, while its armed vessels cruising the seas of Eastern Asia 
are threatening our commerce and that of our ally. The peace 
of the Far East is thus in jeopardy. 

Accordingly our Government and that of his Britannic Maj- 
esty, after full and frank communication with each other, 
agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the pro- 
tection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement 
of Alliance. ... It is with profound regret that we, in spite of 
our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled 
to declare war. . . . 

Anticipating anxiety in certain quarters, and alive to 
the advantages of cultivating a favorable public opinion 
through the powerful instrumentality of inspired pub- 
licity. Count Okuma cabled for publication in the 
United States: 

Japan's proximity to China breeds many absurd rumors, 
but I declare that Japan acts with a clear conscience, in con- 
formity with justice, and in perfect accord with her ally. Japan 
has no territorial ambition, and hopes to stand as the protector 
of peace in the Orient. 

On August 20, Baron Kato, the Japanese Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, said in a communication to Mr. 
Bryan, as United States Secretary of State: 

. . . The history of the seizure of the place [Kiaochow] by 
Germany and her conduct preceding and including her inter- 
vention, in conjunction with Russia and France, after the 
China-Japanese War, show that it is absolutely necessary to 
eliminate such possession completely if Japan is to restore 
immediately complete peace in the Far East in accordance with 
the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. If Japan is to look 
far enough into the future and adopt measures to insure an 
abiding peace in Eastern Asia she must realize that a strong 



THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST 289 

military base in the hands of a hostile military power right in 
the heart of the country cannot in itself fail to be a menacing 
factor. 

On August 24, Count Okuma cabled to the New 
York Independent a "Message to the American Peo- 
ple," in which he declared: 

. . . Every sense of loyalty ^and honor obliges Japan to co- 
operate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the 
enemies who in the past, the present and the future menace her 
interests, her trade, her shipping, and her people's lives. 

This Far Eastern situation is not of our seeking . . . 

As Premier of Japan, I have stated and now again state to 
the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulte- 
rior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of 
depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now 
possess. ^ 

My Government and my people have given their word and 
their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always 
keeps her promises. 

It will have been noticed that in the ultimatum to 
Germany the Japanese government had demanded that 
Gennany turn Kiaochow over to Japan "with a view 
to the eventual restoration of the same to China." Af- 
ter Japan had by force secured possession of Kiaochow 
the Japanese took the position that the fact of Ger- 
many's failure peacefully to give up the territory, there- 
by necessitating Japan's resort to arms, released Japan 
from any implication of a promise to turn Kiaochow 
over to China. On November 7, Mr. Suzuki, the Vice- 
Minister of the Navy, gave a statement to the press in 
Tokyo saying: "While the European war continues 

^ Italics by S. K. H. 



290 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Tsingtao will be administered by Japan. At the con- 
clusion of the war Japan will open negotiations with 
China." In December Baron Kato declared in the Diet 
that Japan had made "no promise whatever with regard 
to the ultimate disposition of what she had acquired in 
Shantung." In the ultimatum which Japan delivered 
to China later, on May 7, 1915, the Japanese govern- 
ment declared: 

The Imperial Japanese Government, in taking [Kiaochow] 
made immense sacrifices in blood and money. Therefore after 
taking the place, there is not the least obligation on the 
Imperial Japanese Government's part to return the place to 
China. . . . 

Since then the Japanese government has agreed to 
restore Kiaochow to China — under specified conditions 
— after the end of the European War ; but in the inter- 
val everything possible is being done not only to elimi- 
nate all signs of German possession and influence from 
Shantung, but, further, to replace them with Japanese 
institutions and enterprises. 

In the prosecution of the military operations against 
Kiaochow the Japanese landed their forces at a port 
on the northern coast of Shantung nearly one hundred 
miles away and used the intervening Chinese soil as a 
base of operations. There was no suggestion of a "by 
your leave" to the Chinese government; no considera- 
tion was shown either for China's rights as a neutral or 
for the persons and property of the Chinese subjects 
who were so unfortunate as to live along the line of 
march and in the zone of operations. The Chinese gov- 
ernment protested against the violation of its sovereign 
rights but made no resistance, and then, following the 
precedent set in the Russo-Japanese War, voluntarily 



THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST 291 

declared the area within which the Japanese had begun 
to carry on their operations a war zone. Before long, 
however, the Japanese sent military forces westward, 
first to Weihsien, which was outside the war zone, and 
then on to Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung, thus oc- 
cupying the whole of the line of railway to the capital. 
As Tsinanfu is 256 miles from Kiaochow, and as all 
the Germans who could have anything to do with the 
war were shut up in Kiaochow, anyone with a little 
knowledge of Shantung Province and of the conditions 
of the war will realize that the occupation of Weihsien 
and points west was not at all necessary to the reduction 
of Kiaochow and the destruction of the German mili- 
tary base. Observers who were familiar with the his- 
tory of Manchuria now began to point out that Japan 
was bent upon much bigger things than merely the de- 
fense of the interests of her ally and the peace of the 
Far East. 

Soon the Japanese naval and military forces, the lat- 
ter aided by a British contingent of about a thousand 
men, had invested Tsingtao. The British troops were 
subject to the orders of the Japanese commander-in- 
chief. On November 7, General Kamio received the 
capitulation of the German garrison — thus completing 
the physical control by the allied forces of all that had 
been German in Shantung Province. The administra- 
tion was taken in hand by the Japanese, and in the ne- 
gotiations which have ensued there has been nothing to 
indicate that the British ever had anything to do with 
the matter. 

It was, of course, necessary that Tsingtao should re- 
main for some time a closed port and under military 
control. But a Japanese line of steamers was imme- 
diately granted permission to use the port, while no 



292 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

other vessels, not even British, were allowed to enter 
until several weeks had elapsed. 

In the interval the question of reopening the Mari- 
time Customs office arose, and in their handling of this 
matter the Japanese officials promptly made it evident 
that, whatever Japan's motives two months earlier when 
entering the war, she intended now to play a role of 
her own choosing. 

It will be remembered that the post of Inspector- 
General in the Chinese Maritime Customs service is, in 
accordance with an agreement between China and Great 
Britain, filled by a British subject. When, after the 
Germans were given the lease of Kiaochow Bay, the 
Chinese Maritime Customs office was established at 
Tsingtao, an agreement was made between the Chinese 
and the German governments, in which it was provided 
that : the Commissioner of Maritime Customs at Tsing- 
tao should be a German ; in case of the appointing of a 
new commissioner an understanding should be reached 
between the Inspector-General of the Chinese Customs 
and the German Legation at Peking; the members of 
the European staff of the Customs at Tsingtao should 
as a rule be of German nationality; and the Inspector- 
General of the Chinese Customs should inform the Gov- 
ernor of Kiaochow beforehand about all proposed 
changes in the staff at Tsingtao. In other words, the 
Chinese Customs administration was by this agreement 
to have control of the Tsingtao Customs, subject to the 
limitations prescribed. 

When Japan ousted the Germans, everyone had a 
right to suppose, inasmuch as Count Okuma had al- 
ready declared that Japan had no thought of taking 
from any third country anything which it already pos- 
sessed, that Japan would at most expect to succeed to 



THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST 293 

rights and privileges in Shantung not greater than those 
which the Germans had possessed. There had also been 
the intimation that Japan contemplated the restoration 
of Kiaochow to China. At any rate, from the legal 
point of view she had no right to anything more than 
the substitution of "Japan" and "Japanese" for "Ger- 
many" and "Germans" in the treaties and agreements. 
The German officials of the Chinese Customs staff at 
Tsingtao having of course been removed from their 
posts, the Chinese government, through the Inspector- 
Ceneral of the Chinese Customs, nominated the Com- 
missioner then at Mukden, a British subject, for the 
commissionership at Tsingtao. The Japanese objected. 
China then proposed a Japanese who was at the time 
Commissioner at Soochow, with a British subject as 
Deputy Commissioner. Again Japan objected. China 
then proposed to have a Japanese commissioner, with a 
staff half Japanese and half British, and nominated 
a Japanese, then Commissioner at Dairen. Still Japan 
objected. The Japanese contended that the only satis- 
factory solution would be for the Japanese government 
to appoint a Japanese commissioner and a full Japa- 
nese staff. To understand the significance of this it 
must be remembered that the Chinese customs revenue 
is hypothecated to the service of the Boxer indemnity — 
which is a debt to the powers ; that Kiaochow, though in 
German occupation, has been Chinese territory; that 
the customs revenue from there went — after deducting 
twenty per cent, for local purposes — into the Chinese 
treasury; that the Chinese Customs service is interna- 
tionally recruited; and that positions in the Customs 
service have been held by a regular process of entrance 
and promotion. 
Hence the Japanese demands meant either the estab- 



294 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

lishing of a separate Japanese Customs regime on Chi- 
nese soil, with the subtraction of the Tsingtao revenues 
from the Chinese revenues — thus involving an invasion 
of China's sovereignty and a detriment to the financial 
rights of the powers ; or an infraction, in favor of Jap- 
anese subjects, of the rules and system of the Chinese 
Customs service, placing Japanese by appointment, and 
without the authority of the Inspector-General, over 
the heads of other foreigners who, being already in the 
service, had precedent rights to promotion. 

The Inspector- General, a subject of Japan's ally, 
of course resisted these Japanese pretensions. Finally 
the Japanese proposed that all the posts in the staff 
at Tsingtao should be filled by Japanese already in the 
Chinese Customs service and the places vacated by the 
latter be filled by newly appointed Japanese. The In- 
spector-General took the position that this course could 
be followed only in part; that any Japanese who came 
newly into the Chinese Customs service must enter the 
lowest ranks, as do all other foreigners, and gain pro- 
motion according to the rules of the service. 

For several months the settlement of this question 
was deferred while the negotiations over the twenty- 
one demands of January, 1915, were in progress. In 
July it was taken up again, and finally on August 5, 
1915, an agreement was signed between the Inspector- 
General and the Japanese Minister. The new situation 
and various considerations had in the interval effected 
a modification in Japan's attitude. The agreement 
provides: 

First, that the Chinese Maritime Customs shall resume its 
functions at Tsingtao; secondly, that business shall be con- 
ducted, pending a settlement of Tsingtao affairs after the war, 



0-1 ( - 

P. ^ -2- 1_ 



J S'^-ii^a 



-_ /fi-*-*-^^*-!-^ .jS^^^Jm-^- 



//^^^T" -. / J" - /P.^J. t''^'*^ c<;c^- 

(1 ) 



THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST 295 

in accordance with the arrangements made with Germany, ex- 
cept that Japanese officials shall be employed instead of Ger- 
mans ; thirdly, that the Japanese military government shall 
hand over the Customs property, archives, and funds, etc., 
acquired at the time of the occupation of Tsingtao; and 
fourthly, that the Japanese military government shall hand 
over the revenue collected since the occupation, less the propor- 
tion due to the local government in accordance with the ar- 
rangement made with Germany. 

There is also an arrangement for increased Japanese repre- 
sentation in the Customs Service/ 

A brief account of Germany's holdings in Shantung 
and of what she had made of her opportunity will serve 
both as an inventory of what Japan has acquired there 
and as a commentary upon the justification which the 
Japanese offer for the eviction of the Germans. 

The territory leased to Germany in March, 1898, in- 
cluded the Bay of Kiaochow and its immediate environ- 
ment, some 400 square miles in all, to be held and ad- 
ministered by Germany for 99 years. In the immediate 
hinterland a neutral zone involving some 2,500 square 
miles was established. Germany was given the right to 
build two lines of railway in the province and to open 
mines along the lines; also a guaranty that German 
capital, assistance, and materials should be sought first 
in case the Chinese chose to develop the province with 
foreign aid. 

Within a few months the German government de- 
clared the Leased Territory a free port, open on equal 
terms to the trade of all nations ; and a few months later, 
by agreement, a station of the Chinese Maritime Cus- 
toms was opened at Tsingtao (the port) to collect duties 
on goods passing to or from the hinterland. 

■■• Far Eastern Revierv, August, 1915, p. 100. 



296 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Intent upon making Tsingtao both a commercial and 
a naval base, the lessees set about the equipping of a 
first-class harbor. The bay offered magnificent anchor- 
age, and Tsingtao was a natural port. Before long 
a substantial breakwater, granite docks — with complete 
equipment — and a floating dock capable of handling 
vessels of 16,000 tons displacement had been installed. 
At Tsingtao there soon appeared a modern German 
city, carefully planned, artistically and substantially 
built. Forts, shops, military departments, and well 
equipped barracks gave the character of a fortified base ; 
but Kiaochow was never given the military equipment 
or aspects of a Port Arthur or a Vladivostok — as the 
comparative ease with which it was recently taken shows. 

German-Chinese companies were organized and au- 
thorized by the German government to build the rail- 
way lines and to prospect for minerals and petroleum; 
and the first line of railway was built to Tsinanfu, the 
capital, reaching that city, two hundred and fifty-six 
miles inland, in 1904. An agreement was made with 
British interests concerned, whereby the Germans were 
to construct for the Chinese government that portion 
of the great north and south Tien-tsin-Pukow Line 
which would cross Shantung. Though constructed by 
British and German firms, the Tien-tsin-Pukow Rail- 
way is a Chinese government line, not British or Ger- 
man property. 

At first the Germans appeared bent upon asserting 
themselves politically in Shantung. Practically every- 
thing in connection with the railway was kept in Ger- 
man hands. German guards were installed for the 
"protection" of the railway. A German post-office was 
established. Germany seemed to be following a policy 
similar to that which Russia had pursued in Manchuria. 



THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST 297 

But at the end of 1905 they began to withdraw their 
troops; they handed over their post-offices to the Chi- 
nese; they made an agreement whereby the Chinese 
Customs administration was to function at Tsingtao 
much as elsewhere in China — with the special provision 
that twenty per cent, of the duties collected be con- 
tributed toward the expenses of the local Tsingtao ad- 
ministration; and they began to employ Chinese in 
various capacities. 

The Chinese government voluntarily opened areas at 
Tsinanfu, Weihsien and Choutsun as commercial posts. 
At Tsinanfu they laid out and built roads, drains, etc. 
— and undertook policing. Other public works were in- 
trusted to and have been looked after by a combined 
Chinese and foreign commission. Before long the 
Tsinanfu settlement had become an important and at- 
tractive commercial and residential center wherein the 
Chinese and foreigners, the latter mostly German busi- 
ness men, have gotten on most agreeably and to mutual 
profit. 

At Tsingtao and in its environs more than 60,000 
meters of excellent roads were built. Systematic affores- 
tation was undertaken both there and in the hinterland. 
Schools of all sorts were established, including a 
German High School with well equipped labora- 
tories and library, and several faculties. For the sup- 
port of the last mentioned, the German and the Chinese 
governments agreed to contribute together and equally, 
while China was given a share in the administration, 
this being the first instance in which there has been 
such a combination for the support and administration 
of an educational institution in China. 

The population was, in 1913: at Tsingtao 60,500; 
in the Leased Territory 192,000; in the Zone 1,200,000. 



298 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Of these only 4,470 were Europeans, 3,806 being Ger- 
mans — this figure including both civilians and soldiers. 

It was declared in Berlin in 1903 that the government 
had already spent 50,000,000 marks on the new colony, 
and the expenditure seems to have averaged in the 
neighborhood of 14,000,000 marks per year ever since, 
an increasing proportion — but never more than half — 
of this being paid from the local revenues. 

Although the railway proved a reasonably paying 
investment the Mining Company did not. In 1912 the 
latter was turning out 600,000 tons of coal and had in 
its employ 60 Germans and 7,000 Chinese, but it had 
never paid a dividend. Its interests were bought by 
the Railway Company, and in 1914 it was decided to 
build iron and steel works near Tsingtao. 

In December, 1913, the Germans signed an agree- 
ment with the Chinese for the building of two new Ger- 
man-Chinese lines, one entirely and the other partly 
in Shantung, the latter to extend west beyond the bor- 
ders of the provmce to join the Peking- Hankow line. 
Both were to be financed by German capital but to be 
Chinese owned. In having previously given up railway 
building rights which they possessed under the agree- 
ment of 1898, and in the terms which they now made 
China, the Germans gave evidence of having relin- 
quished the last vestiges of an actively aggressive polit- 
ical policy, in favor of conomercial cooperation. 

Since the original seizure of Kiaochow the Germans 
had made no additional attempt to extend their terri- 
torial holdings or special privileges in China. They had 
not undertaken to extend their administration over 
Shantung — or even over the Railway Zone. The Shan- 
tung Railway Company had never attempted to assume 
a political status and perform political functions. The 



THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST 299 

German government had not sought to stretch the terms 
of the Convention of 1898. There had been no creating 
of issues and demanding of immediate settlement such 
as has characterized the progress of the Japanese in 
Manchuria. German subjects had not exceeded their 
plainly stipulated rights ; they had not invaded the inte- 
rior ; they had not become engaged in personal and police 
conflicts with the Chinese. 

There was in the later years of German presence in 
Shantung little of which, from the point of view of the 
open door policy, complaint could be made. For ten 
years past the Germans had done practically nothing 
calculated to complicate the politics of the Far East, 
and, except conmiercially, they disturbed no peace in 
the Far East but the peace of mind of Japanese expan- 
sionists. Judged upon the basis of substantial accom- 
plishment, successful and just administration, and real 
contribution to the economic and social welfare of the 
people who fell within the range of their influence, none 
of the powers holding bases on the China coast can offer 
better justification for its presence than could the Ger- 
mans. 

If it was necessary for Japan to drive the Germans 
out in order to "restore the peace of the Far East," to 
aid China, and to remove a menace to her own security, 
it follows in logic that she will have to drive out the 
English, the French, and the Russians — for the same 
ends and in due course. If she proceeds with such a 
program, what sort of a countenance will the "peace of 
the Far East" present during the process? Should she 
succeed, it is to be presumed that she would, as she has 
already done with Russian and German holdings, con- 
stitute herself legal successor to the tenants whom she 
evicts. Thus established and intrenched, she would be 



300 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

in a position without question to dominate China, and, 
dominating China, to control the whole Far East. Then 
at least we should have peace! There are those who 
think that a Paw Japonica extending over East Asia 
and the Western Pacific would be a real peace. But 
would it? Established only by and at the Qost of a 
succession of wars with individual Western powers, such 
a peace would probably be but the prelude to a greater 
war of the East against the West. 

Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War did not 
insure the peace of the Far East; now ten years later 
Japan has attacked and defeated the Germans in order 
to insure that peace. But no sooner has she defeated 
the Germans than she finds it necessary to fall upon the 
Chinese, likewise to "insure peace." The process is 
cumulative. The peace of the Far East will, it would 
appear, only be assured when there is no one left to dis- 
turb Japan's peace of mind ; that is, when all of Japan's 
rivals for commercial and political influence have been 
eliminated. And then, when the peace of the Far East 
has been established to Japan's satisfaction — what about 
the peace of the world? 



CHAPTER XVII 

JAPAN AND CHINA. 
NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF 1915 1 

As has already been indicated, when Japan began her 
mihtary operations for the reduction of Kiaochow by 
making eastern Shantung a field of operation, the Chi- 
nese government, unable successfully to object, resorted, 
for the convenience of all concerned, to the declaration 
of a war zone. The Japanese, however, did not limit 
their operations to this zone; instead, they proceeded 
to seize whatever had been German or was affected by 
connection with the Germans throughout the province. 
After the reduction of Kiaochow had been accomplished ; 
with the Japanese military forces in undisputed author- 
ity, the Germans of the garrison removed to Japan, and 
peace restored ; the Chinese government, reasoning that 
there was no further need of maintaining the war zone, 
sent a note to the Japanese government to the effect that 
it proposed to declare the existence of the zone at an 
end. This became the signal for a violent outburst by 

^ For documents and discussion, see : 

"China's Official History of the Recent Sino-Japanese Treaties," 
Pamphlet. 

Rea, G. B. : "Analysis of the China- Japanese Treaties." 

The Japan Year Booh, 1915. 

Jones, J.: "The Fall of Tsingtao." 

The Far Eastern Review, especially numbers from February to 
July, inclusive, 1915. 

301 



302 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the Japanese press. It was declared that China had 
"insulted" Japan; it was demanded that China be pun- 
ished. The opposition forces in Japanese politics called 
upon the government to assume a stronger attitude in 
its foreign policy: Japan's "rights" in China must be en- 
forced. Whether because of this pressure or because 
it had already decided upon a forward policy, the Japa- 
nese government replied to China on January 18, 1915, 
by the presentation of the now famous Twenty-one De- 
mands, in the course of which it was required — though 
as but a small part of the whole — that the sum total of 
Germany's holdings, rights, and privileges in Shantung 
province be left to such settlement as might ultimately 
be made between Japan and Germany. 

This was in strict accordance, judging from the ut- 
terances and published words of prominent men of all 
classes, with the prevailing Japanese opinion that Japan 
must take full advantage of the opportunity which the 
preoccupation of the powers and her own successful par- 
ticipation in the war had given her. 

Only five months before, in August, 1914, Count 
Okuma had declared to the world; 

"... Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to se- 
cure more territory, no thought of depriving China or 
other peoples of anything which they now possess." 
Two months later, however, in November, he is repre- 
sented to have said : ^ 

"... Those who are superior will govern those who 
are inferior. I believe that within two or three centuries 
the world will have a few great governing countries and 
others will be governed by them, will pay homage to the 
mighty. In other words, about four or five great coun- 

^ Article in the Shin Nippon, November, 1914, dictated to the 
editor by Count Okuma. 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 303 

tries . . . will be developed, and the other countries will 
be attached to these great ones. For instance, England, 
Russia, Germany and France may be such countries.^ 
We should from now on prepare ourselves to become 
a governing nation. . . . But," Count Okuma contin- 
ued, "we will strive by all means to stand upon the 
foundation of justice and humanity as becomes the vic- 
tors in peaceful competition." Does not this utterance, 
in spite of the concluding sentiment, ring clearly the 
note of imperialism? 

To assure the victory of "peaceful competition," 
Count Okuma declared in the Diet on Christmas day: 
". . . To make our diplomatic dealings more effective, 
as you desire, we need more force to back our diplomatic 
activities. For this reason the government has pre- 
pared its program for the expansion of both the army 
and the navy." The Diet that evening, December 25, 
refused by a vote of 213 to 148 to approve the army 
appropriation called for in the government's budget. 
The government thereupon resorted to the repeatedly 
honored expedient of an Imperial dissolution of the 
Diet, followed by orders for a new election to be held on 
March 25, 1915. 

In the interval the government went on with its China 
policy. The series of demands referred to above was 
delivered to the Peking government in January, 1915. 
These called, next after the transfer of Germany's Shan- 
tung holdings, for the extension of the leases which Ja- 
pan holds in South Manchuria. Is this consistent with 
Count Okuma's declaration of August 24, that Japan 
had "no thought of depriving China or other peoples 
of anything which they now possess?" China pos- 
sessed at that time, by the treaties made with Russia, 

^ Are these, and Japan, to be all .f* 



304 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the right to the reversion of the Liaotung Peninsula to 
her control in 1923. It had, of course, been for a long 
time considered a foregone conclusion that Japan would 
sooner or later insist upon the extension of this lease. 
That does not, at the same time, alter the fact that to 
exact such a concession would be to deprive China of 
something which she up to that moment possessed. 

With regard to Shantung, it was not unnatural that 
Japan should demand the transfer to herself of Ger- 
many's holdings. She had precedent to go by — ^the 
transfer to herself in 1905 of Russia's holdings in South 
Manchuria. But in both cases her rights are based on 
conquest; and in both cases she had declared in going 
into the armed conflict that she was doing so in defense 
of China's rights. 

Japan's demands upon China went, however, far be- 
yond these matters of Shantung and Manchuria. She 
now demanded new and special privileges not alone in 
Shantung and in Manchuria, but also in Eastern Inner 
Mongolia, in Fukien Province, and in the Yangtse Val- 
ley. She demanded that in future China give no conces- 
sions on her coasts to any foreign power without the 
consent of Japan. She demanded that China take for 
herself Japanese advisers and Japanese policemen, thus 
asking that the Peking government subordinate itself in 
a measure to the will of Tokyo. 

Japan's methods in connection with the presentation 
of the demands, and the manner in which she prosecuted 
the negotiations which ensued, antagonized the Chinese 
and provoked criticism from every quarter — including 
even a significantly critical opposition in Japan.^ To 
begin with, there was no particular justification for the 
making of demands. China had done nothing against 

^ See Chapter X, supra. 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 305 

Japan; there had been no war and there was no par- 
ticular contention between the two countries. In pre- 
senting the demands, the Japanese Minister went di- 
rectly to the President of China, which is contrary to 
diplomatic usage. Then, the Japanese demanded of 
China secrecy and did their utmost to keep the world 
uninformed as to the content and character of the de- 
mands. When finally the news leaked out, information 
came from China to the effect that twenty-one demands 
had been made, and a precis of the content of the de- 
mands was made available. The Japanese declared to 
the world that only eleven demands had been made. 
Japanese publicists and Japanese apologists all over the 
world asserted that China was misrepresenting the sub- 
stance of the demands. The public was instructed to 
believe no reports except those which emanated from 
Tokyo ; above all, to pay no attention to news from Pe- 
king ; it was impossible that Japan could think of taking 
advantage of China or of doing anything other than 
scrupulously observe her treaty pledges. Ultimately, 
the documentary evidence showed that the Peking ac- 
count of the demands was the true version. 

Unfortunately — and especially so for China — there 
is no comparison between the skill and assiduity which 
the Japanese and the Chinese manifest respectively in 
matters of self -explanation and publicity. The Japa- 
nese are organized and the Chinese are not. The Japa- 
nese realize the power of the press and the value of 
world public opinion and the Chinese do not. The Jap- 
anese put facilities at the disposal of visitors, especially 
of officials, commissions, and press men, and the Chinese 
do not. The Japanese put themselves in the position 
of hosts and guides for travelers. The Chinese do not. 
The Japanese have many able publicists in foreign 



306 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

countries. The Chinese have almost none. Number- 
less books have been written about Japan by foreigners 
upon the basis of materials supplied abundantly and in 
large part by the Japanese. Practically no such books 
have been written about China. The Japanese publish 
several newspapers and are constantly producing vari- 
ous attention-commanding books in foreign languages. 
The Chinese have produced as yet almost no such liter- 
ature. The Japanese government exercises a strict cen- 
sorship of the news prepared in Japan both for internal 
and for external consumption and is in a position to in- 
spire such reports as it sees fit. Thus, information — 
and quite as often misinformation — about Japan is read- 
ily accessible; while information about China — ^espe- 
cially in matters of contemporary politics — is scarce and 
to be had with difficulty. 

In this case it was weeks before the real facts of the 
situation were put before the public. Even then — so 
favorable has been the world's opinion of Japan, so im- 
plicit has been the general confidence in Count Okuma 
both as the head of the Japanese administration and as 
spokesman for his country — the world refused to con- 
sider the full significance of the demands until the Jap- 
anese government went to the length of issuing an ul- 
timatum and giving the appearance of being ready to 
make war upon China to secure the granting of the full 
measure of what had been asked. As a crowning evi- 
dence of their indifference to Chinese susceptibilities, 
the Japanese officials delivered the ultimatum in the 
form of a document written in Japanese only. 

A comparison of the text of the original twenty-one 
demands presented by the Japanese minister to China 
on January 18 with the statement regarding the con- 
tent of the demands which the Japanese government 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 



307 



furnished the governments of the other powers four 
weeks later should preface any attempt at an analysis 
and will serve in itself as a suggestive commentary upon 
the negotiations. 

PARALLEL TEXTS OF JAPANESE DEMANDS MADE ON CHINA ^ 



DOCUMENT HANDED TO 
PRESIDENT YUAN SHIH-KAI 
BY MR. HIOKI ON JANUARY 
18, 1915: 



Sectiok I. 

The Japanese government and the 
Chinese government, being desirous 
of maintaining the general peace of 
eastern Asia and further strengthen- 
ing the friendly relations and good 
neighborhood existing between the 
two nations, agree to the following 
articles : 

Article 1, The Chinese govern- 
ment engages to give full assent to 
all matters upon which the Japanese 
government may hereafter agree 
with the German government relat- 
ing to the disposition of all rights, 
interests, and concessions which, by 
virtue of treaties or otherwise, Ger- 
many now possesses in relation to 
the province of Shantung. 

Article 2. The Chinese govern- 
ment engages that within the prov- 
ince of Shantung and along its coast 
no territory or island will be ceded 
or leased to a third power under any 
pretext whatever. 

Article 3. The Chinese govern- 
ment consents to Japan's building a 
railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to 
join the Kiau-Chau-Tsinan railway. 



STATEMENT OF JAPAN'S DE- 
MANDS ON CHINA FUR- 
NISHED TO FOREIGN GOV- 
ERNMENTS BY JAPAN ON 
FEBRUARY 14, 1915: 

Sectiok I. 
[No preamble.] 

In relation to the province of 
Shantung: 

1. Engagement on the part of 
China to consent to all matters that 
may be agreed upon between Japan 
and Germany with regard to the 
disposition of all rights, interests, 
and concessions which, in virtue of 
treaties or otherwise, Germany pos- 
sesses in relation to the province of 
Shantung. 



2. Engagement not to alienate or 
lease upon any pretext the province 
of Shantung, or any portion thereof, 
or any island lying near the coast of 
the said province. 

3. Grant to Japan the right of 
construction of a railway connecting 
Chefoo or Lungkow with the Tsinan- 
Kiau-Chau railway. 



^ The use of this arrangement, prepared by Mr. Oscar King 
Davis, is permitted by the courtesy of the Chicago Tribune. 



308 



POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 



Article 4. The Chinese govern- 
ment engages, in the interest of trade 
and for the residence of foreigners, 
to open by itself, as soon as possible, 
certain important cities' and towns 
in the province of Shantung as com- 
mercial ports. What places are to 
be opened are to be decided upon 
by the two governments by separate 
agreement. 

Sectiok II. 
The Japanese government and the 
Chinese government, since the Chi- 
nese government has always recog- 
nized the special position enjoyed by 
Japan in south Manchuria and east- 
ern inner Mongolia, agree to the fol- 
lowing articles: 

Article 1. The two contracting 
parties mutually agree that the term 
of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, 
and the term of lease of the South 
Manchurian railway and the An- 
tung-Mukden railway, shall be ex- 
tended to the period of ninety-nine 
years. 

Article 2. Japanese officials and 
common people in south Manchuria 
and eastern inner Mongolia shall 
have the right to lease or own land 
required either for erecting suitable 
buildings for trade and manufac- 
ture or for farming. 

Article 3. Japanese officials and 
common people shall be free to re- 
side and travel in south Manchuria 
and eastern Mongolia, and to engage 
in business and in manufacture of 
any kind whatsoever. 



Article 4. The Chinese govern- 
ment agrees to grant to Japanese 
officials and common people the min- 



[No corresponding article.] 



Section II. 
In relation to south Manchuria 
and eastern inner Mongolia. 
[No preamble.] 



1. Extension of the terms of the 
lease of Kwantung, the South Man- 
churian" railway, and the Antung- 
Mukden railway. 



2. (a) Acquisition by the Japa- 
nese of the right of residence and 
ownership of land. 

(b) Grant to Japan of the min- 
ing rights of the mines specified by 
Japan. 

3. Obligation on the part of 
China to obtain in advance the con- 
sent of Japan before she grants 
railway concessions to any third 
power, procures the supply of capi- 
tal from any power for the con- 
struction of a railway, or raises 
from any third power a loan on 
security of any duties or taxes. 

4. Obligation on the part of 
China to consult Japan before em- 
ploying advisers or tutors regarding 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 



309 



ing rights of all mines in south Man- 
churia and eastern inner Mongolia. 
What mines are to be opened shall 
be decided upon by the two govern- 
ments jointly. 

Article 5. The Chinese govern- 
ment agrees that in respect of the 
two cases mentioned herein below 
the consent of the Japanese govern- 
ment shall first be' obtained before 
action shall be taken: 

(a) Whenever permission is grant- 
ed to a subject of a third power to 
build a railway or to make a loan 
with a third power for the purpose 
of building a railway in south Man- 
churia or eastern inner Mongolia. 

(b) Whenever a loan is to be 
made with a third power pledging 
the local taxes of south Manchuria 
or eastern inner Mongolia as se- 
curity. 

Article 6. The Chinese govern- 
ment agrees that if the Chinese gov- 
ernment employs political, financial, 
or military advisers or instructors 
in south Manchuria or eastern inner 
Mongolia the Japanese government 
shall first be consulted. 

Article 7. The Chinese govern- 
ment agrees that the control and 
management of the Kirin-Chang- 
chun railway shall be handed over 
to the Japanese government for a 
term of ninety-nine years, dating 
from the signing of this agreement. 

Section III. 
The Japanese government and the 
Chinese government, seeing that 
Japanese financiers and the Han- 
yehping company have close rela- 
tions with each other at present, and 
desiring that the common interests 
of the two nations shall be ad- 
vanced, agree to the following ar~ 
tides : 



political, financial, or military mat- 
ters. 



5. Transfer of the management 
and control of the Kirin-Changchun 
railway to Japan. 



SECTioisr III. 
[No preamble.] 
Agreement in principle that at an 
opportune moment in the future 
the Hanyehping company should be 
placed under Japanese and Chinese 
cooperation. 



310 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Article 1. The two contracting 
parties mutually agree that when 
the opportune moment arrives the 
Hanyehping company shall be made 
a joint concern of the two nations, 
and they further agree that with- 
out the previous consent of Japan, 
China shall not by her own act dis- 
pose of the rights and property, of 
whatsoever nature, of the said com- 
pany, nor cause the said company to 
dispose freely of the same. 

Article 2. The Chinese govern- 
ment agrees that all mines in the 
neighborhood of those owned by the 
Hanyehping company shall not be 
permitted, without the consent of 
the said company, to be worked by 
other persons outside of the said 
company, and further agrees that if 
it is desired to carry out any under- 
taking which, it is apprehended, may 
directly or indirectly affect the in- 
terests of the said company, the 
consent of said company shall first 
be obtained. 



Section IV. 

The Japanese government and the 
Chinese government, with the object 
of effectively preserving the terri- 
torial integrity of China, agree to 
the following articles: 

The Chinese government engages 
not to cede or lease to a third power 
any harbor, bay, or island along the 
«oast of China. 



Sectiok IV. 
[No preamble.] 
Engagement, in accordance with 
the principle of maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of China, not to 
alienate or lease any ports or bays 
on or any island near the coast of 
China. 



Section V. 

Article 1. The Chinese govern- 
ment shall employ influential Japa- 
nese as advisers in political, finan- 
cial, and military affairs. 

Article 2. Japanese hospitals, 
churches, and schools in the interior 
of China shall be granted the right 
of owning land. 



Section V. 
[No corresponding section.] 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 311 

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Jap- 
anese government and the Chinese 
government have had many cases of 
dispute between Japanese and Chi- 
nese pohce to settle, cases which 
have caused no little misunderstand- 
ing, it is for this reason necessary 
that the police departments of the 
important places in China shall be 
jointly administered by Japanese 
and Chinese, or that the Chinese 
police departments of these places 
shall employ numerous Japanese, so 
that they may at the same time help 
to plan for the improvement of the 
Chinese police service. 

Article 4. China shall purchase 
from Japan a fixed amount of mu- 
nitions of war, say 50 per cent, or 
more of what is needed by the 
Chinese government, or there shall 
be established in China a Sino- 
Japanese jointly worked arsenal. 
Japanese technical experts are to 
be employed and Japanese material 
to be purchased. 

Article 5. China agrees to grant 
to Japan the right of constructing > 

a railway connecting Wuchang with 
JCiukiang and Nanchang, another 
line between Nanchang and Hang- 
chou, and another between Nan- 
chang and Chao-chou. 

Article 6. If China needs foreign 
capital to work mines, build rail- 
ways, and construct harbor works, 
including dockyards, in the prov- 
ince of Fukien, Japan shall be first 
consulted. 

Article 7. China agrees that Jap- 
anese subjects shall have the right 
to propagate religious doctrines in 
China. 

In the course of the contest which ensued and which 
was brought to a close — in some respects only — by the 



312 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

signing of treaties on May 25, the substance of Groups 
I and II of these demands underwent practically no 
changes. Certain modifications were made in Group 
III. Group IV was retained as it stood. And it was 
ultimately agreed that the discussion of Group V, with 
the exception of the provision regarding Fukien Prov- 
ince — which was retained — should be postponed. 

Several features stand out with simple and peculiar 
prominence. Four of the groups were introduced by 
special, cleverly constructed preambles. There was no 
introduction or explanation attached to Group V. 
Baron Kato later declared in the Japanese Diet that 
Group V had represented not "demands" but an expres- 
sion of Japan's "wishes" with a view to ascertaining 
China's attitude upon the points involved. No such ex- 
planation had been vouchsafed the Chinese government ; 
Group V had been included, with no indication of spe- 
cial character or reservation, in the original document 
presented to the President of China as a summary of 
Japan's demands. That they were thus included in the 
document as presented to China and were entirely omit- 
ted from the account given the powers is significant 
and, instead of minimizing, serves greatly to increase 
their importance. 

The concessions which Japan sought may be divided 
into three classes: in some cases she was asking for op- 
tions; in others she was asking the right to exercise a 
veto power with regard to actions of the Chinese gov- 
ernment; in the third class she was asking for herself 
a position of definite, immediate, direct, and important 
special privilege. 

Group I related to Shantung. It required not only 
that all German holdings be turned over to Japan, but, 
in addition, that China pledge — as she had not been re- 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 313 

quired to do by Germany — that she would not lease to 
other countries any territory on the coast of Shantung. 
Still further, China was to grant Japan the right to con- 
struct a new railway in Shantung, a line from Tung- 
chow — near Chefoo — to Weihsien. The importance of 
this latter demand arises from three facts. In the first 
place, the Chinese have for a long time been planning to 
construct the line in question for and by themselves. 
In the second place, it has become China's railway policy 
no longer to give railway concessions to foreign powers ; 
to have railways built by foreigners and v»^ith foreign 
capital, yes, but as Chinese lines. In the third place, 
China and the world have learned from the experience 
of Manchuria that railways in Russian and Japanese 
hands are not alone economic instruments but are used 
as weapons for the furtherance of political ends — al- 
ways at China's and sometimes at other countries' ex- 
pense. 

The preamble to Group II stated that "the Chinese 
government has acknowledged the special position en- 
joyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern In- 
ner Mongolia." As a matter of fact, Japan never had 
a special position in either region until ten years ago; 
China has only step by step and reluctantly recognized 
the position which Japan has acquired in Manchuria; 
and on no basis except that of her own unauthorized 
forward movement, and with no recognition of right by 
any nation has Japan acquired a "special position" in 
Eastern Inner Mongolia. 

The requirement that China extend the lease on "Port 
Arthur and Dalny" has subsequently been interpreted 
by Japan to mean the "Leased Territory." This, to- 
gether with the extension of the railway leases, is all but 
equivalent to the cession of South Manchuria to Japan. 



314 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

If there is any question upon that point, the remaining 
clauses in this ^roup remove all doubt. If China seeks 
advisers upon affairs in these regions, Japan is to be 
the final authority as to their selection; if China wishes 
to build railways with foreign capital here or to take 
foreign loans on the security of the local taxes, Japan's 
consent must be obtained. Japanese subjects are to be 
free to travel, reside, engage in business and in manu- 
facture of any sort, lease or own land and erect build- 
ings, and to open mines throughout the region. These 
last mentioned provisions are the most novel and most 
far-reaching in what will be their immediate eff'ect. It 
has not heretofore been legal for foreigners, with the 
exception of missionaries, to own land and buildings, 
reside, and carry on business at places other than the 
treaty ports. There have been many factors responsi- 
ble for the origin and continuance of this practice, prom- 
inent among which are three: first, the earlier Chinese 
hostility — which developed only after conflicts — to for- 
eigners ; second, the embarrassing situations which arose 
from China's inability to protect foreigners; third — 
and of fundamental importance — the fact that, in view 
of the comparative poverty of the Chinese and affluence 
of the foreigners, with the concomitant cheapness of 
land in China, "free trade" as between foreign money 
and Chinese land was as a matter of sound policy highly 
undesirable. 

Japan herself still retains such a policy of self -pro- 
tecting exclusion. Neither Chinese nor any other for- 
eigners can independently open or own mines in Japan, 
nor can they freely acquire and own land. In the cases 
of both China and Japan there are good reasons for 
restrictions in these matters.^ 

^ A modification of the Japanese Law was arranged in April^ 1910^ 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 315 

Restricted in the exercising of the rights of residence, 
occupation, and acquiring real property, to certain lo- 
cahties, the foreigner has nevertheless in certain other 
respects been, in China, in a highly privileged position. 
Extraterritoriality has given him rights, privileges, and 
a position of security not possessed by either native or 
naturalized citizens. Without extraterritoriality the for- 
eigner must long since either have left China or have 
conquered and subjugated the Chinese people. With it, 
he and his government and the Chinese government have 
been relieved of many difficulties. Possessed of extra- 
territorial rights, the foreigner is subject in most mat- 
ters to the laws of his own country more than to those 
of China, he is amenable as a defendant only to courts 
presided over by officials of his own country, and he is 
constantly under the protection of those officials. But 
along with this privileged status and its rights have gone 
necessary restrictions and obligations. The system 
would not work unless the foreigner and his official 
were in comparative proximity. To allow the foreigner 
to go where he wished, to own land and to carry on 
business where he wished, would require one or the 
other of two things: either abolish extraterritoriality, 
leaving the foreigner amenable entirely to Chinese laws 
and courts; or increase the number and dispersion of 
foreign officials, with, where necessary, their "guards." 

With the exception of Kussia in her activities in Man- 
churia before 1904, no country has, since the establish- 
ing of extraterritoriality, attempted to upset the work- 
ings of that system. The Japanese demands involve not 
alone a distinct, but a very great invasion of the prin- 

granting to foreigners the right — under very considerable restric- 
tions — to own land, but "the date of putting the law in operation 
still remains unfixed." Japan Year Book, 1915. 



316 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ciples upon which the privileged position of the for- 
eigner has been based and by which it is justified. In 
theory the rights which accrue to the Jaj)anese will, of 
course, under the operation of the most-favored-nation 
clauses in their treaties, extend likewise to all other for- 
eigners, but in practice the Japanese almost alone will 
profit by them. This in itself would not be objection- 
able or exceptionable were it not that w^here Japanese 
traders go, there Japanese officials will go; where the 
officials go, soldiers will go ; at every turn the authority 
of China will be diminished and that of Japan increased. 
In the guise of peaceful commerce and colonization, the 
process is really one of military and political invasion, 
preparing the way for absorption without battle. Very 
valuable to Japan, the abolition of extraterritoriality in 
Manchuria will be of no particular benefit and in some 
ways a burden to Western nations, decidedly disadvan- 
tageous to the Chinese, and a potential source of friction 
between China and Japan. 

Group III relates to the great Hanyehping Company 
whose interests included the Hanyang iron works, the 
Linghsiang coal mines, and the Tayeh iron mines. The 
Hanyehping iron and steel mills are located at Hankow, 
"the Chicago of China," seven hundred miles up the 
Yangtse, while the coal and iron mines are near at hand, 
all being in the very heart of the British sphere of in- 
fluence. The company is Chinese. During recent 
jT^ears it has borrowed certain sums of money from Jap- 
anese sources. Now, in the form in which this demand 
was presented, Japan asked not only a partnership in 
the company, but what would amount to control; not 
that alone, but the right to prevent by Japanese veto the 
opening up, whether by other foreigners or by Chinese, 
of any mines in all the region round about ; even more — 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 317 

the interdiction of any enterprise which would, in the 
opinion of the Japanese, be held likely "directly or in- 
directly" to affect the interests of the company. Here 
was a demand for a concession not only special and ex- 
clusive in itself but carrying with it provisions capable 
of indefinitely wide interpretation as instruments for ex- 
cluding other nations from and intrenching Japanese 
interests in the industrial development of the Middle 
Yangtse region. This concession and the important 
railway concessions asked for in Group V Japan was 
demanding in the region which is recognized, in theory 
at least, as the special preserve of her ally, Great Britain. 

The demand which constituted Group IV, that China 
should engage "not to cede or lease to any third power 
any harbor or bay or island along the coast," carries with 
it a significant implication and, should it be acceded to, 
two particular consequences, one negative and one posi- 
tive. The implication is that China is responsible to 
Japan in the matter of disposing of her territories ; that 
is, that a new limitation of China's sovereign rights, in 
favor of Japan, is to be recognized. The consequences 
would be that China would stand pledged on the one 
hand to refrain from giving territorial concessions to 
any third power, whence it would follow that no third 
power might obtain such concessions ; while on the other 
hand as between China and Japan no such prohibition 
would be established. 

In Group V, concessions of the most unprecedented 
and wide-reaching nature were required. China was to 
employ Japanese advisers in political, financial, and 
military affairs ; to admit Japanese to joint participation 
in the policing of "important places" ; to purchase from 
Japan "say fifty per cent, or more" of her munitions of 
war, or allow the establishing of an arsenal in China 



318 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

under Japanese supervision ; to grant Japan the right to 
construct important designated railway lines in the 
Yangtse Valley, some of which w^ere already promised 
to British concessionaires; to specify that Japanese 
might carry on missionary propaganda and own lands 
for hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior; and 
to give Japan first option for the furnishing of capital 
for developments, "including dock yards," in Fukien 
Province. This last item was evidently intended to set- 
tle forever and adversely the fate of an American project 
in that region — as will be explained in due course. 

The most astonishing of the demands of this group 
were those regarding police and the purchase or manu- 
facture of arms. The granting of the first of these 
would connote an extensive abrogation of sovereign 
rights, would imply a consciousness on China's part of 
inability to administer her own affairs, and would in- 
evitably lead to acute and intolerable friction. The 
granting of the second would involve a more conspicu- 
ous disregard of the principle of equal opportunity in 
China's markets than has ever in a single instance been 
shown. It would necessitate China's making familiar 
to Japan every detail of her military preparations and 
equipment, thus substantially subordinating herself in 
these vitally important matters to the will and conveni- 
ence of Japan. The two together would, in the course 
of a few years, not only put China absolutely at the 
mercy of Japan but would produce conditions to which 
Japan could point as ample justification for such meas- 
ures as she might choose to take for the ostensible pur- 
pose of removing those conditions. If China assented 
to these along with the other demands she would be 
assigning herself as a protectorate, immediately, to 
Japan. 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 319 

The reaction in China was quite different from what 
the Japanese government seems to have expected. Even 
the members of the Kwo-ming Tang, hitherto irrecon- 
cilably opposed to Yuan Shih-kai, laid aside internal 
political strife and rallied to the support of their gov- 
ernment in opposition to Japan. Outside China there 
was a split in the Kwo-ming Party, but the principal 
leader, Huang Hsing, gave his support, and most of 
his party followed his lead. 

Among the many reasons for the attitude of the Chi- 
nese, three stand out perhaps most clearly: the Chinese 
realize that the granting of special concessions and priv- 
ileges to single foreign powers has always been fatal to 
their own interests and disturbing to the peace of the 
Far East; they have no faith in the Japanese protesta- 
tions of disinterested friendship ; and they are unwilling 
to grant to any country the right, especially when it 
is sought to make that right exclusive, to dictate to them 
with regard to the disposition of their territories and the 
administration of their affairs. Is it to be inferred that 
all Chinese have been blind to the fairness of Japan's 
proposals and to the real interests not alone of their 
own country but of the whole Far East ; or is another, 
more disconcerting conclusion more warrantable? 

The Japanese Minister in Peking sought at the out- 
set to get the Chinese officials to agree "in principle" to 
all the demands. To this the Chinese refused to commit 
themselves. Long weeks of negotiation followed. The 
Chinese early agreed to a proposal made by the Jap- 
anese that no official minutes be kept of the meetings. 
The demands regarding Shantung were as good as con- 
ceded from the outset. On February 12 the Chinese 
submitted a formal statement of their opinion with re- 
gard to each of the demands, intimating their willing- 



320 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ness to agree to twelve of the twenty-one items. On 
February 20 the Japanese Minister replied that his gov- 
ernment insisted upon the whole twenty-one items be- 
ing made the basis of negotiation. On February 22 
the Chinese proposed that Japan — in accordance with 
the intimations in her ultimatum to Germany — give 
Kiaochow over to China and restore the status quo in 
Shantung. On February 25 and 28 the Chinese pointed 
out that the demands concerning Inner Mongolia were 
not warranted by any agreements which China had ever 
made with Russia or Japan and that the effect of grant- 
ing those demands in connection with the ones concern- 
ing South Manchuria would be either to give Japan a 
position of exclusive privilege — which would conflict 
with the treaty rights of other nations — or to make the 
whole region an open port, which procedure would have 
obvious disadvantages. Early in March the Chinese ac- 
ceded to the demands for the extension of the leases in 
South Manchuria.^ At the same time they agreed in 
principle, though with some modifications, to the de- 
mands regarding loans and mining rights and advisers 
in South Manchuria. Later in March they declared 
themselves willing to yield on the point of Japanese 
subjects settling and owning land in the interior of East- 
ern Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria, provided the 
Japanese would forego extraterritoriality and submit to 
Chinese jurisdiction. At this juncture the Japanese 
began to dispatch troops to ISIanchuria, explaining that 
these contingents were being sent to relieve the garri- 
sons. This was in advance of the regular time for the 

^ It is reasonable to suppose that Russia will, in due course, ask 
for and require, by way of "compensation," a similar extension of 
the lease on the 1,000 miles of the Chinese Eastern Line which she 
retains in North Manchuria, 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 321 

changing of the garrisons, and as the new troops ar- 
rived the old were not withdrawn. Before the negotia- 
tions were completed some 60,000 Japanese troops had 
been sent not only into Manchuria but to points in Shan- 
tung and on the Yangtse, while artillery had been 
mounted at Mukden, Tsinanfu, and Hankow. 

At the fourteenth conference,^ the Chinese professed 
their willingness to agree in principle, but not in detail, 
to the demand concerning the Hanyehping Company. 
The Japanese Minister said Japan would not be content 
with that. With regard to the demand of Group IV, 
that China should promise Japan that she would not 
alienate any island, port, or harbor on the coast to any 
third power, the Chinese offered to make a declaration, 
on China's own responsibility, on that subject, but they 
were unwilling to make an "agreement" which would 
carry the implication that Japan had a "special interest 
in" or the right to require such a declaration. Obvi- 
ously the making of an "agreement" on such a point 
would imply that China was in a sense under the pro- 
tection of Japan, and, with the "third power" provision, 
would entirely upset the principle of equality of oppor- 
tunity to which China, along with Japan and the other 
powers, is pledged by treaties. 

At this conference, too, the Japanese Minister took 
up and pressed one of the demands in Group V, the 
group which Japan had not mentioned in her communi- 
cation to the powers and which Baron Kato declared 
later to represent merely "wishes." The Chinese Min- 
ister of Foreign AiFairs explained at length and very 
cogently why China was unwilling to give to Japanese 
(Buddhist) missionaries a special warrant to carry on 
their propaganda in China. The chief objections were 

^ On March 25. ' 



322 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

on the score of suspicions and possible political complica- 
tions which would arise. The Japanese Minister ad- 
mitted the force of the arguments and explained the de- 
mand in a way which indicated that its inclusion had a 
direct bearing upon the election campaign in Japan. 
On March 30 the Japanese Minister pressed for an 
agreement on all twenty-one of the demands. 

During the next few conferences the question of right 
of residence, and so forth, for Japanese in South Man- 
churia was brought up over and over, the Chinese offer- 
ing all sorts of modifications in detail to the proposals 
urged by the Japanese. The demands regarding Fu- 
kien Province and the railways in the Yangtse Valley 
were pressed and argued. Finally^ Mr. Hiold asked 
whether the Chinese refusal to discuss the subject of the 
railway concessions was on account of engagements with 
Great Britain. The Chinese Minister replied in the 
affirmative, whereupon the Japanese suggested that 
China should make the concessions to Japan and leave 
it to Japan to settle with Great Britain. This in spite 
of the fact that China had already and but recently ar- 
ranged to accept British assistance in the building of 
these railways and that the lines lay within the British 
sphere of influence. 

No conferences were held between April 17 and April 
29. On the former date the Japanese Minister had an- 
nounced that he and his government were exchanging 
communications and that when he had full instructions 
he would inform the Chinese as to when the next con- 
ference would be held. There were rumors that Japan 
was contemplating drastic action. Military and naval 
preparations were going forward in Japan, and vessels 
and additional troops were being dispatched to China. 

iQn April 13. 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 323 

It was generally believed that Japan was waiting to 
hear what reply Sir Edward Grey would make to the 
questions which were being asked in the British House 
of Commons. British interests had been bestirring 
themselves and the British government was at last being 
forced to recognize something of the importance and the 
seriousness of the Far Eastern situation. The facts 
had also at last gotten before the American public, and 
from the utterances of both the British and the Ameri- 
can press it began to be apparent that, now that the 
real nature of the demands was understood, the sym- 
pathy of the world was with China. Vigorous pub- 
licity and the time element had come to China's as- 
sistance with unprecedented effectiveness. True, the 
Japanese government had won in the recent elections, 
but it now had to answer questions which were being 
raised insistently and pertinently both at home and from 
abroad. On April 23 it was announced by the Kokusai 
News Agency of Tokyo, officially inspired, that the Jap- 
anese government intended to change and modify some 
of its demands. On April 26 this announcement was 
made good by the presentation of a revision comprising 
twenty-four demands, the Japanese Minister announc- 
ing that this communication was final and that if China 
would consent to the whole group without revision Japan 
would restore Kiaochow to China at an opportune time 
and subject to certain conditions. 

In the revision^ several of the items which had ap- 
peared in the original Group V were retained in one 
form or another — although this group had in the inter- 
val been explained as representing only "wishes." The 
Chinese replied on May 1, agreeing to nearly all of what 
was asked in the revision, but rejecting one demand con- 

^ See Appendix. 



324 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

cerning Eastern Inner Mongolia and that which called 
for the concession to Japan of the right to construct the 
railway lines in South China. The Chinese also asked 
again that Japan agree to the retrocession of Shantung 
and provide indemnification for the losses caused to Chi- 
nese subjects by the military campaign in that province; 
and that Japan recognize the right of China to par- 
ticipate in the negotiations which would take place be- 
tween Japan and Germany with regard to Shantung. 

When he presented the reply of his government/ the 
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs read a memoran- 
dum containing a resume of what had been China's at- 
titude and a summary of the concessions which she had 
made in the course of the negotiations. After state- 
ments intended to show that China had on practically 
all other points done her utmost to comply with what 
Japan demanded, this memorandum declared: 

As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all infringe 
China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers, or the 
principle of equal opportunity. Although Japan did not indi- 
cate any difference between this group and the preceding four 
in the list which she presented to China, . . . the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, in view of their palpably objectionable features, per- 
suaded itself that these could not have been intended by Japan 
as anything other than Japan's mere advice to China. Accord- 
ingly, China has declared from the very beginning that while 
she entertains the most profound regard for Japan's wishes she 
was unable to admit that any of these matters could be made 
the subject of an understanding with Japan. Much as she 
desired to pay regard to Japan's wishes, China cannot but 
respect her own sovereign rights and the existing treaties with 
other Powers. In order to be rid of the seed for future mis- 
understanding and to strengthen the basis of friendship, China 

^May 1. 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 325 

was constrained to iterate the reasons for refusing to negotiate 
on any of the articles in the fifth group, yet in view of Japan's 
wishes China has expressed her readiness to state that no 
foreign money was borrowed to construct harbor works in 
Fukien Province. Thus it is clear that China went so far as 
to seek a solution for Japan of a question that really did not 
admit of negotiation. Was there, then, evasion on the part of 
China.? 

Now, since the Japanese Government has presented a revised 
list of demands and declared at the same time that it will re- 
store the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Chinese Government 
reconsiders the whole question and herewith submits a new reply 
to the friendly Japanese Government.^ 

The memorandum also contained the following inter- 
esting statement, implying that the injunction of se- 
crecy was first disregarded in Japan: 

There is one more point. At the beginning of the present 
negotiations it was mutually agreed to observe secrecy, but 
unfortunately a few days after the presentation of the demands 
by Japan an Osaka newspaper published an "Extra" giving the 
text of the demands. 

The Japanese Minister replied at once by withdraw- 
ing the conditional offer for the restoration of Shan- 
tung, and the Japanese government prepared an ulti- 
matum which it put in its Minister's hands on May 6. 
The Chinese people were by this time urging the gov- 
ernment to resist Japan, if necessary by force of arms, 
but Yuan Shih-kai, knowing that such a course would 
be futile, authorized his ministers to make further con- 
cessions. Overtures to that effect were rejected by the 

^ "China's Official History of the Recent Sino-Japanese Treaties," 
pp. 29-30. 



826 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Japanese, and the ultimatum was presented on May 7, 
giving- China forty-eight hours in which to accede to 
the demands. War vessels had been dispatched, and 
additional troops were embarking at Japanese ports for 
service against China. 

At some time between May 1 and May 7 the Japanese 
government seems to have undergone a considerable 
change of mind, if not of heart, for the requirements 
embodied in the ultimatum represented a modification 
of what had been put forward in the document of April 
26 as Japan's last and final demands. It has been sug- 
gested that counsels to restraint had been forthcoming, 
in the interval, from Japan's Occidental ally. 

The ultimatum was accompanied by an explanatory 
note in which it was indicated that five matters : namely, 
(a) the emplojrment of advisers, (b) the establishing of 
schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in 
South China, (d) the supply of arms and ammunition 
and the establishing of arsenals, and (e) the propaga- 
tion of Buddhism, were to be postponed for later negoti- 
ation — thus making it a matter of record that these de- 
mands were not to be considered as definitely waived. 
"If the Chinese Government accepts all the articles as 
demanded in the Ultimatum, the offer of the Japanese 
Government to restore Kiaochow . . . will still hold 
good." The note also made specifications with regard 
to certain changes in phraseology which might be ef- 
fected, and left the disposal of a few minor matters to 
the future. 

The ultimatum found fault with China's unsatisfac- 
tory attitude regarding Shantung. "From the com- 
mercial and military points of view Kiaochow is an im- 
portant place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese 
Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 327 

acquisition, the Empire incurs no obligation to restore 
it to China." Declaring that "the articles relating to 
the employment of advisers, the establishment of schools 
and hospitals, the supply of arms and ammunition and 
establishment of arsenals, and railway concessions in 
South China in the revised proposals are not in the least 
in conflict either with China's sovereignty or her treaties 
with the Foreign Powers," it complained that "the Chi- 
nese Government, alleging that these proposals are in- 
compatible with their sovereign rights and the Treaties 
with the Foreign Powers, defeat the expectations of the 
Imperial Government." The Japanese government 
would undertake to detach Group V for future discus- 
sion; "therefore the Chinese Government should appre- 
ciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government 
by immediately accepting without any alteration all the 
articles of Groups I, II, III, and IV and the exchange 
of notes in connection with Fukien Province in Group 
V, as contained in the revised proposals presented on 
the 26th of April." 

The ultimatum demanded little of importance to 
which China had not already agreed. Was it then really 
nothing but a stuffed club, a mere blufl*, its presenta- 
tion a "grand-stand play"? Was the threat of war made 
simply to save the face of the Chinese government be- 
fore the Chinese people, to enhance the prestige of the 
Japanese government with the Japanese people, to 
place before the world a picture of Japan provoked by 
Chinese obstructionist tactics to the point of raising the 
sword and then, rather than break the peace, magnani- 
mously foregoing the eas)^ glory of an easier conquest 
and the full fruits of an assured and early military suc- 
cess? Or was Japan really asking for a little more in 
addition to the very much which China had already con- 



328 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ceded, and, having asked, actually ready to go to war 
rather than be denied ? 

On May 7 the Japanese issued (through Renter's 
Telegraph Agency) a statement to the world by way 
of explaining and justifying the demands. According 
to this, Japan's main objects had been "to adjust mat- 
ters to meet the new situation created by the war between 
Japan and Germany," "to bring closer the friendly rela- 
tions subsisting between Japan and China," and "thus 
to insure the permanent peace of the Far East." In 
formulating the demands the Japanese government had 
"taken special care to avoid those which might have been 
deemed to conflict with the principles of territorial in- 
tegrity and the open door, which Japan has, from time 
to time, declared to the Powers in regard to China." 
Taking this assertion at its face value and examining 
the summary of the content of the demands to which it 
serves as a preface, one can only conclude that the Jap- 
anese conception of the principles referred to is rad- 
ically different from that of the average Occidental ob- 
server. It would seem, too, as though the framers of 
this communique were quite unaware of or had entirely 
overlooked various previous statements which had been 
made with regard to the demands. The internal evi- 
dence of this inspired explanation negatives the earlier 
declarations to the effect that only eleven demands had 
been made at the outset; it shows that the Chinese ver- 
sion of the content and the nature of the demands was 
a true version; it proves that Count Okuma's manifes- 
toes to the world asserting the innocuous character of 
the demands were misleading; and it attributes to the 
Japanese government statements plainly and flatly con- 
tradictory of each other. 

At one point appears : "The Central Chinese govern- 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 329 

ment must engage influential Japanese as political, 
financial, and military advisers." Five weeks earlier, 
and two months after the negotiations had begun, Count 
Okuma, on April 3, had declared: "Japan has not de- 
manded the appointment of Japanese advisers." At an- 
other place the communique declares: "... It is an 
undeniable fact that the Chinese authorities failed to 
appreciate the friendly attitude of Japan and persisted 
in protracting the negotiations." On April 3 Count 
Okuma had said: "It is untrue that the Chinese govern- 
ment has endeavored unduly to delay the adjustment." 
Count Okuma also said on that occasion: "In Shan- 
tung Japan is only asking for what China has already 
granted to Germany." As a matter of fact, Japan was 
asking for at least three specified things in relation to 
Shantung — and the communique includes them — which 
China had never granted or been asked to grant to Ger- 
many. 

In all, there were included in the summary of what 
was originally demanded not less than nine items whose 
import is directly or indirectly in conflict with the princi- 
ples of the open door, and whose realization would estab- 
lish inequalities to the detriment of the interests of other 
powers. Among these were, for instance, the following: 

The Chinese government shall engage not to alienate or lease 
to a third Power any ports or bays on, or islands off, the coast 
of China. 

China must obtain from Japan a supply of a certain quan- 
tity [the original demand had read "fifty per cent, or more"] 
of arms, etc. 

Japan must be given the right to construct a railway con- 
necting Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line and with 
the Nanchang-Hangchow railways. [The railway construc- 
tion referred to had already been promised to the British.] 



830 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Certain statements were obviously made for the im- 
pression which, being plausible, they would make upon 
the uninformed public. Thus: 

Japan's relations with Manchuria have always been espe- 
cially close geographically, politically, and from the point of 
view of commercial and industrial interests. Since those rela- 
tions have been strengthened by two successive wars the pre- 
dominant position of Japan in that region has been recognized 
both at home and abroad. 

For "always" there should be substituted "ten years." 

The case is almost similar in regard to Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia. 

This goes utterly beyond the facts. 
Perhaps the most suggestive statement in the whole 
document is the following: 

. . . The Chinese government . . . objected to . . . vari- 
ous questions enumerated under Group V, on the ground that 
they were derogatory to the sovereign rights of China or con- 
flicted with treaties with other Powers, and although the Jap- 
anese Minister explained that such was not the case, they 
refused to listen. 

This little sentence contains a whole volume. Here 
we have it : Group V, not communicated to the powers, 
representing only "wishes," comprising concessions for 
which Japan never asked — and yet which the reports 
of the conferences show to have been urged repeatedly ; 
the Chinese contend that these items conflict with 
China's sovereign rights — which Japan has no thought 
of infringing — or with the treaty rights of other powers 
— which it has been Japan's care scrupulously to safe- 
guard; the Japanese Minister explains to the Chinese 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 331 

that they are mistaken in their view of their sovereign 
rights and the obligations of their treaties ; Japan then, 
not China, is to detennine what are and what are not 
China's rights and treaty obHgations; but the Chinese 
refuse to accept the Japanese view; what is there then 
to do but deliver an ultimatum, compel these recalcitrant 
Chinese — if necessary by force of arms — to accept that 
which, though they in their ignorance cannot see it so, 
is for their own good and for the interest of all the 
powers concerned? 

Before daybreak on the morning of May 9 the Chi- 
nese government agreed to the terms laid down in the 
ultimatum. 

The Chinese Government, with a view to preserving the peace 
of the Far East, hereby accepts, with the exception of those 
five articles of Group V, postponed for later negotiation, all the 
articles of Groups I, II, III and IV and the exchange of Notes 
in connection with Fukien Province in Group V, as contained 
in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April and in 
accordance with the Explanatory Note of seven articles accom- 
panying the Ultimatum of the Japanese Government, with the 
hope that thereby all outstanding questions are settled, so that 
the cordial relationship between the two countries may be 
further consolidated. 

It remained to draft the necessary treaties, agree- 
ments, exchanges of notes, and declarations. Several 
conferences were held before this work was completed, 
and at these the Japanese Minister brought up certain 
points which the Chinese claim went beyond the provi- 
sions of the ultimatum. 

Finally, on May 25, the arranging and phrasing of 
the documents having been completed, the signatures 
of the ministers were affixed ; and on June 8 the ratifi- 



332 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

cations were exchanged, terminating the diplomatic con- 
test which had lasted for five months. 

The simplest way to arrive at an understanding of 
what was actually conceded will be to follow the docu- 
ments through in outline. 

Treaty Respectmg the Province of Shantung 

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full as- 
sent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may 
hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the 
disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Ger- 
many, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to 
the Province of Shantung. 

Article '2. The Chinese Government agrees that as regards 
the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lung- 
kow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Ger- 
many abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien 
line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for 
a loan. 

Article 3. The Chinese Government agrees in the interest of 
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China her- 
self as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province 
of Shantung as Commercial Ports. 

Article 4" The present treaty shall come into force on the 
day of its signature. 

Exchange of Notes Respecting Shantung 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honour to 
make the following declaration to your Government : — "Within 
the Province of Shantung or along its coast no territory or 
island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any 
pretext." 

I avail, etc., 

{Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 333 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Opening of Ports in 
Shantung 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be 
opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in 
Article 3 of the Treaty respecting the Province of Shantung 
signed this day, will be selected and the regulations therefor will 
be drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision con- 
cerning which will be made after consulting the Minister of 
Japan. 

I avail, etc., 

{Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 



Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased 

Territory of Kiaochow Bay 
Excellency, 

In the name of my Government I have the honour to make the 
following declaration to the Chinese Government : — 

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased 
territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free dis- 
posal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said 
leased territory to China under the following conditions : — 

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commer- 
cial Port. 

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to 
be established at a place designated by the Japanese Govern- 
ment. 

3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international conces- 
sion may be established. 

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and 
properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure re- 
lating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Gov- 



334 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ernment shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before 
the restoration. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Chinese Minister of For- 
eign Affairs.] 



Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner 
Mongolia 

Article 1. The two High Contracting Parties agree that the 
term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the 
South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, 
shall be extended to 99 years. 

Article '2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by 
negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings 
for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural en- 
terprises. 

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and 
travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manu- 
facture of any kind whatsoever. 

Article 4- In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring 
jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries in- 
cidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its per- 
mission. 

Article 5. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding 
three articles, besides being required to register with the local 
Authorities passports which they must procure under the ex- 
isting regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and ordi- 
nances and taxation of China. 

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese 
shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul; those 
in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudi- 
cated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer may be 
deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed 
civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 335 

be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations con- 
jointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. 

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is com- 
pletely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japa- 
nese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chi- 
nese law courts. 

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of 
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China 
herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern 
Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports. 

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make 
a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan 
Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan 
agreements made heretofore between China and foreign 
financiers. 

When in future, more advantageous terms than those in ex- 
isting railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers 
in connection with railway loans, the above agreement shall 
again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes. 

Article 8. All existing treaties between China and Japan re- 
lating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided 
for by this Treaty, remain in force. 

Article 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on the 
date of its signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified by 
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and 
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications 
thereof shall be exchanged at Tokyo as soon as possible. 

[Signed by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.] 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Terms of Lease of Port 

Arthur and Dalny and the Terms of South Man- 

churia/n and Antung-Mukden Railways 

Monsieur i.e Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that, respecting the provisions 
contained in Article 1 of the Treaty relating to South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term 



336 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year 
of the RepubHc or 1997. The date for restoring the South 
Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of 
the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Man- 
churian Railway Agreement providing that it may be redeemed 
by China after 36 years from the day on which the traffic is 
opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden 
Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Opening of Ports in Eastern 
Inner Mongolia 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be 
opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in 
Article 6 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and East- 
ern Inner Mongolia signed this day, wiU be selected, and the 
regulations therefor will be drawn up, by the Chinese Govern- 
ment itself, a decision concerning which will be made after con- 
sulting the Minister of Japan. 

I avail, etc., 

{Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 

South Manchuria 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that Japanese subjects shall, as 
soon as possible, investigate and select mines in the mining 
areas in South Manchuria specified hereinunder, except those 
being prospected for or worked, and the Chinese Government 
will then permit them to prospect or work the same ; but before 
the Mining regulations are definitely settled, the practice at 
present in force shall be followed. 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 337 

Fengtien 

Locality. District. Mineral. 

Niu Hsin T'ai Pen-hsi Coal 

Tien Shih Fu Kou Pen-hsi Coal 

Sha Sung Kang Hai-lung Coal 

T'ieh Ch'ang Tung-hua Coal 

Nuan Ti T'ang Chin Coal 

An Shan Chan region F^ om Liaoyang to Pen-hsi Iron 

KiRiN (southern portion) 

Sha Sung Kang Ho-lung Coal and iron 

Kang Yao Chi-lin (Kirin) Coal 

Chia P'i Kou Hua-tien , Gold 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 



Exchange of Notes Respecting Railways and Taxes in South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of my Government, I have the honour to make 
the following declaration to your Government: — 

China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary 
railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia ; if 
foreign capital is required China may negotiate for a loan with 
Japanese capitalists first: and further, the Chinese Govern- 
ment, when making a loan in future on the security of the taxes 
in the above-mentioned places (excluding the salt and customs 
revenue which have already been pledged by the Chinese Central 
Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists 
first. 

I avail, etc., 

{Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 



338 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Employment of Advisers in 
South Manchuria 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of the Chinese Government, I have the honour 
to make the following declaration to your Government : — 

"Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, 
financial, military or police matters are to be employed in 
South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." 

I avail, etc., 

{Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister,] 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the ExplaTiation of "Lease hy 

Negotiation'' in South Manchuria 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to state that the term "lease by negotia- 
tion" contained in Article 2 of the Treaty respecting South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day shall 
be understood to imply a long-term lease of not more than 
thirty years and also the possibility of its unconditional re- 
newal. 

I avail, etc., 

{Signed) Hioki Eki. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Chinese Minister of For- 
eign Affairs.] 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Arrangement for Police 
Laws and Ordinances and Taxation in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that the Chinese Authorities will 
notify the Japanese Consul of the police laws and ordinances 
and the taxation to which Japanese subjects shall submit ac- 
cording to Article 5 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 339 

and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day so as to come to 
an understanding with him before their enforcement. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 

The Postponement of Articles 2, 3, 4- «^<^ ^ o/ the Treaty 
Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that, inasmuch as preparations 
have to be made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty 
respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 
signed this day, the Chinese Government proposes that the 
operation of the said Articles be postponed for a period of three 
months beginning from the date of the signing of the said 
Treaty. 

I hope your Government will agree to this proposal. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that if in future the Hanyehping 
Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon cooperation, 
the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations sub- 
sisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, 
will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government 
further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, with- 
out the consent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert it into a 
state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital 
other than Japanese. 

I avail, etc., 

(^Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.] 



340 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fukien Question 

Excellency, 

A report has reached me to the effect that the Chinese Gov- 
ernment has the intention of permitting foreign nations to 
establish, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coahng 
stations for mihtary use, naval bases, or to set up other mili- 
tary establishments ; and also of borrowing foreign capital 
for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establish- 
ments. 

I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will be 
good enough to give me a reply stating whether or not the Chi- 
nese Government really entertains such an intention. 

I avail, etc., 

(^Signed) Higki Eki. 

MONSIETJR LE MiNISTRE, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excel- 
lency's note of this day, which I have noted. 

In reply I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government 
hereby declares that it has given no permission to foreign na- 
tions to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, 
coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other 
military establishments ; nor does it entertain an intention of 
borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the 
above mentioned establishments. 

I avail, etc., 

{^Signed) Lou Tseng-tsl\ng. 

Throughout the months while the Japanese- Chinese 
negotiations were in progress there was curiosity in 
many quarters, apprehension in some, and hope in a 
few as to what the United States government would 
do. China in particular sought to secure some intima- 
tion that the United States could be counted on to back 
her, morally at least, in opposition to the demands. All 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 341 

other powers were elsewhere occupied. The United 
States alone was free to give attention to the affair and 
in a position, if it felt so inclined, to take a hand. More- 
over, as the original enunciator of the open door policy 
and the holder of the pledges of the powers with regard 
to that policy, the United States was naturally looked 
to as having special responsibilities, not to mention 
special interests, when allegations were being made that 
the open door principles were being infringed. 

In the third week in March, Chinese and Japanese 
press dispatches reported that the United States gov- 
ernment had asked questions of the Japanese govern- 
ment with regard to the demands, and the Japanese 
papers reported that the Japanese government had re- 
plied stating that the demands did not in the least in- 
fringe upon the principles of equal opportunity and the 
preservation of the integrity of China, while Japan stood 
to guarantee these principles with all her forces. The 
Japanese newspapers reported further that Baron Kato 
had on his own initiative interviewed the ambassadors of 
all the powers, the consequence being that no exception 
had been taken by any European or American power 
to Japan's claims or attitude. Whatever may have been 
the truth of these reports and whatever the atti- 
tude assumed and the efforts made by the American 
government, no intimation with regard to the pol- 
icy of the government was given the people of the 
United States until May 6, upon which date Mr. Bryan 
gave to the press in Washington the following state- 
ment : 

In order that there may be no misunderstanding of the posi- 
tion of the United States in reference to the negotiations pend- 
ing between Japan and China, this announcement is made : 

At the beginning of negotiations the Japanese government 



342 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

confidentially informed this government of the matters which 
were under discussion and accompanied the information by the 
assurance that Japan had no intention of interfering with 
either the political independence or territorial integrity of 
China, and that nothing that she proposed would discriminate 
against other powers having treaties with China or interfere 
with the "open door" policy to which all the leading nations 
are committed. 

This government has not only had no thought of surrender- 
ing any of its treaty rights with China, but it has never been 
asked by either Japan or China to make any surrender of these 
rights. There is no abatement of its interest in the welfare 
and progress of China and its sole interest in the present nego- 
tiations is that they may be concluded in a manner satisfactory 
to both nations and that the terms of the agreement will not 
only contribute to the prosperity of both of these great oriental 
empires but maintain that cordial relationship so essential to 
the future of both and to the peace of the world. 

After the Japanese and Chinese had reached their 
agreement of May 9, the United States government 
sent identical notes on May 11 to the two governments, 
of which that to China read as follows: 

In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have 
taken place and which are now pending between the Govern- 
ment of China and the Government of Japan and of the agree- 
ments which have been reached as a result thereof, the Govern- 
ment of the United States has the honour to notify the Govern- 
ment of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any 
agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which 
may be entered into between the Governments of China and 
Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and 
its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the 
Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China 
commonly known as the Open Door policy. 



JAPAN AND CHINA— 1915 343 

Some indication has been given above, and more will 
be given in the following chapters as to whether and to 
what extent the agreements which were reached impair 
or threaten to impair sundry of the rights to which the 
American note refers. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

japan's MONROE DOCTRINE FOR ASIA 

Among publicists who have followed the recent nego- 
tiations perhaps none has made a more searching analy- 
sis of the treaties and agreements than has Mr. George 
Bronson Rea/ 

In a recent brochure^ in which he discusses the treaties, 
Mr. Rea, having quoted the American note referred to 
at the end of our preceding chapter, says: "The thought 
at once arises : if Japan's demands did not impair Amer- 
ican rights under the existing treaties, why should the 
pacific and friendly American Government feel con- 
strained to issue such an unmistakable warning to both 
governments?" ^ He then quotes from the communique 
issued by the Chinese government on May 7 for the pur- 
pose of explaining China's position to the world. The 
Chinese communique concludes: 

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the 
fullest extent possible to make concessions. In considering the 
nature of the course they should take in reference to the ulti- 
matum the Chinese Government was influenced by its desire to- 
preserve the Chinese people, as well as a large number of for- 
eign residents in China from unnecessary suffering, and also to 
prevent the interests of other friendly Powers from being im- 
periled. 

^ Formerly editor and now publisher of the Far Eastern Review. 
^ "Analysis of the China- Japanese Treaties." 
^ Op. cit., p. 4. 

344 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 345 

For these reasons the Chinese Government was constrained 
to comply in full with the ultimatum, but in complying, the 
Chinese Government disclaims any desire to associate itself with 
any revision which may thus be effected in the various conven- 
tions and agreements concluded between other Powers, with re- 
spect to the maintenance of China's territorial independence 
and integrity, the preservation of the status quo, and the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of 
all nations in China. 

Mr. Rea comments as follows: 

. . . America notified China and Japan of her determination 
to retain all her rights under these treaties, and China has an- 
nounced that if these or other rights are impaired, Japan is 
solely responsible. 

If there is no impairment of previous treaties in the new 
arrangements between China and Japan, there can be no just 
reason for criticism, or future interference of other Powers.^ 

Taking up then the substance and the effect of the 
Japanese policy and the treaties and agreements which 
were concluded, Mr. Rea presents evidence to show that 
Germany's policy in Shantung has in recent years be- 
come more and more liberal, tending to nullify the ef- 
fects of the doctrine of exclusive privilege and to en- 
courage respect for China's sovereign rights. He con- 
tinues : 

Japan's succession to Germany's rights destroys the last 
hope that China will ever be liberated from those provisions, 
for in the present treaties this principle [of exclusive privi- 
leges] has been expanded and perpetuated in Manchuria, and 
the attempt made to extend them to Fukien and apply to the 
iron and steel industry in the Yangtse Valley 

^ "Analysis of the China-Japanese Treaties/' p. 5. 



346 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The revival of the "Spheres of Influence" policy by Japan, 
which undermine and subvert the authority of the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, and tend to close the door to others, sounds the death 
knell to the Open Door doctrine. The American Note to China 
and Japan states, in no uncertain terms, that our Government 
cannot recognize any impairment of this policy. The issue is 
created. It exists today as an actual force, and sooner or later 
must be faced.^ 

Whatever her intentions, Japan has accomplished in 
regard to China at least five things : she has consolidated 
her own position in her northern sphere of influence, 
Manchuria; she has driven the Germans out of their 
former sphere of influence, Shantung, and has consti- 
tuted herself successor to Germany's rights; she has 
given warning that she considers Fukien Province an 
exclusive sphere for Japanese influence; she has under- 
taken to invade the British sphere of influence ; and she 
stands in a position to menace and to dictate to the Pe- 
king government. A glance at the map of North China 
will show how completely Peking is at Japan's mercy. 
In control of Port Arthur and of the Shantung Penin- 
sula, Japan commands the entrance to the Gulf of 
Pechili, which is the doorway by sea to Tien-tsin and 
Newchwang. In possession of Tsingtao, Dairen, and 
(virtually) of Antung and Newchwang, Japan thus 
commands every important port and harbor north of 
the Yangtse. With the Manchurian railways penetrat- 
ing the heart of Manchuria and the Shantung Railway 
extending to the heart of Shantung — and with the right 
to extend the latter line to join the Peking-Hankow 
line, Japan is in a position, should she so choose, at any 
moment to grind Peking between the millstones of her 

^ "Analysis of the China-Japanese Treaties," pp. 11-12. 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 347 

military machine. So far as strategy is concerned, 
Japan has North China commercially, militarily, and 
politically at her mercy. 

The Japanese statesmen, official spokesmen, and pub- 
licists affirm that Japan is bent on commercial conquest 
only. But can a commercial conquest be prosecuted as 
Japan has been prosecuting hers without injury to the 
rights of other nations? 

Granting for the moment that the conquest may be 
commercial only, if it succeeds one result must be that 
European nations along with the United States will 
suffer, relatively, in their trade with China. This will 
inevitably drive them to seek other markets. The first 
alternative markets to be sought will be, logically, in 
South America. This will increase the competition for 
the South American trade. The increased competition 
will tend to produce increased complications — and those 
complications will be very likely to involve the Monroe 
Doctrine. 

Thus, inevitably, the two leading principles in the 
foreign policy of the United States, that of the Monroe 
Doctrine in application to the American continents, 
and that of the open door in application to China, 
must be taken into consideration in any attempt to 
estimate the possible or probable effects of Japan's 
policy. 

In an article entitled "Economic Effect of the Ex- 
tension of Japan's Spheres of Influence in China?" the 
editor of the Far Eastern Review says: 

Experience has shown that in regions in China in which 
political control is exercised by the Japanese the tendency is 
for foreign trade other than Japanese to diminish. . . . 

It can be seen from the figures . . . that Japanese goods, 
even when there was some limitation to the control exercised by 



348 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Japan over South Manchuria, succeeded in displacing those 
from other countries. When we turn to Korea ... it is found 
that the trade of countries other than Japan is steadily dimin- 
ishing. . . . 

When it is found that in one region in China in which the 
Japanese exercise political control or influence, the trade of 
European and American nations succumbs to Japanese state- 
aided attacks, it is fair to assume that similar results will fol- 
low the acquisition of special interests by Japan in other 
localities. Japan desires to extend her political influence over 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien. Her avowed 
ambitions are confined for the moment to the regions named, but 
there is no guarantee that she will not seek, if opportunity 
ofl'ers, still further extension. As she claims to have acquired 
as one of the spoils of war the right secured by Germany to 
extend the railway from Tsinanfu to a point on the Peking- 
Hankow line, this brings her into Chili, the metropolitan prov- 
ince. If, eventually, she succeeds in obtaining the right to con- 
struct the railways connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and 
Nanchang, between Nanchang,, and Hangchow, and between 
Nanchang and Chaochow, her influence will be extended over 
Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung. . . . 

. . . Japan has the advantage of proximity ; of cheap labor 
in factory and steamer ; of state aid in the shape of reduced 
freight charges on the Imperial Railways of Japan, of subsidies 
to steamship companies, of cheap financial accommodation. 
. . . Japan's trade with China increased from ninety-six mil- 
lion Haikwan taels in 1905 to one hundred and eighty-five 
million Haikwan taels in 1913. Her percentage of the foreign 
trade of China increased from 14 per cent, to nearly 19 per 
cent., while during the same period the percentage of the tr^de 
of the United Kingdom and Hongkong fell from 48 per cent, to 
less than 41 per cent. . . . 

. . . Some Japanese publicists are quite candid in regard to 
Japan's ambitions. They state that Japan is sufficiently 
powerful to compel the European and American merchant to 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 349 

surrender the China market to exclusive Japanese exploita- 
tion. Japan professed belief in the open door policy as long 
as she thought it was advantageous for her to do so, but the 
time, they declare, has come when Japan can disclose her real 
policy, that of exclusion. . . . 

. . . Japan has revived the policy of Spheres of Influence 
in China. ... Is it in the interest of the world that Japan 
should be allowed to establish a political and commercial 
hegemony over Asia ? The answer is obvious.^ 

As an illustration of the effect of the spheres of in- 
fluence policy, the recent experience of an American at- 
tempt to invest money and give assistance to the Chinese 
government serves admirably as a case in point. 

Several years ago, tentative arrangements were made 
between the Chinese government and the Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation, whereby the latter was to loan the 
former approximately $20,000,000 and to assist in the 
construction of a dockyard and naval base. Now it hap- 
pens that Fukien Province is opposite and about a hun- 
dred miles distant from the Island of Formosa; that 
Formosa is Japanese territory (taken from China in 
1895) ; and that Japan never lets it be forgotten that 
she looks upon Fukien as one of her spheres of influence. 
As soon as it became known that negotiations were 
under way between an American company and the Chi- 
nese for the perfecting of a naval base on the Fukien 
coast, the Japanese press began to disseminate the im- 
pression that the American government was interested 
in the project and was seeking to establish a base for 
itself in Chinese waters. The confusion of this conclu- 
sion has not been without its effect upon the reasoning 
of certain American publicists. 

^ Far Eastern Revierv, May, 1915, pp. 487-491. 



350 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The Japanese government knew very well that the 
United States had no such design, but it was at the 
same time by no means minded to allow American finan- 
cial interests to gain a foothold in this heretofore little 
developed sphere of Japanese influence. Consequently, 
the Japanese Minister at Washington addressed Mr. 
Bryan, as Secretary'- of State, to the eiFect that his gov- 
ernment would consider it an unfriendly act if Ameri- 
can capital should be loaned to China for the construc- 
tion of dockyards in Fukien Province. We have not 
as yet the documentary evidence, but we have the state- 
ments of the Japanese to the effect that Mr. Bryan ac- 
cepted the Japanese representations in the matter, rec- 
ognized the precedence of Japan's claims with regard 
to Fukien, and let it be understood that his government 
would not countenance the loan. The Chinese govern- 
ment thereupon diplomatically announced that it had 
no thought of applying the loan in question to the build- 
ing of a dockyard in Fukien; and the Japanese an- 
nounced, also diplomatically and through the proper 
diplomatic channels, that they were glad to have this 
assurance. With this the matter might have been con- 
sidered settled — the project for a Chinese dockyard built 
by an American firm on the Fukien coast was "off*." 
But no, this was not enough. Japan must have assur- 
ances for the future, and slie must emphasize again as 
a warning to poachers — especially to the innocently ig- 
norant — the fact that Fukien is to be considered a Jap- 
anese preserve. Hence, the insertion — among the re- 
cent demands — of Article 6 of Group V: "If China 
needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and 
construct harbor- works (including dockyards) in the 
Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted." 
China subsequently undertook, among the recent agree- 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 351 

ments, not to seek any foreign capital for developments 
in that province. 

First, by diplomatic pressure an American enterprise 
had been warned away from Fukien. Then the prov- 
ince was hermetically sealed against any foreign enter- 
prise. Yet the Japanese government has declared over 
and over that its policies in no way interfere with the 
principles of equality of opportunity, and, after the ne- 
gotiations with China had been concluded, after the 
American notes to China and Japan had been deliv- 
ered. Baron Kato declared in the Japanese Diet: "They 
[the demands] include no item which is incompatible 
with the principle of territorial integrity, equal oppor- 
tunities and the open door, which the Imperial Govern- 
ment have in the interest of China declared from time 
to time." 

The Japanese have justified each and all of the fea- 
tures in their China policy by one or more of the follow- 
ing contentions : ( 1 ) that Japan must have room for col- 
onization, and that Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia are legitimate fields for her expansion; (2) that 
Japan must have room for commercial expansion, and 
all China is a legitimate field for that expansion; (3) 
that in her political activities Japan is merely endeavor- 
ing to protect China against her own weakness which 
is a menace at once to China and to Japan; and (4) 
that it is Japan's duty and her purpose to maintain the 
peace of the Far East. 

The purport of these propositions has been unofficially 
embodied in a convenient phrase which has been most 
curiously exploited of late: "Japan's Monroe Doc- 
trine for Asia." ^ 



^ It must be understood that there has been no official enunciation 
of any "Doctrine." 



352 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Mr. Hudson Maxim, in his book on "Defenseless 
America," ^ relates how several years ago a Japanese 
diplomat remarked to him that some day Japan would 
set up a Monroe Doctrine for Asia, but that, unlike 
ourselves, Japan would be able to defend and enforce 
her doctrine. Well, the sanction of such a doctrine is 
now being" invoked. 

Let us examine this "Monroe Doctrine": is there an 
analogy between Japan's position and attitude with 
regard to China — and Asia — and the position and atti- 
tude of the United States in reference to the countries 
of Central and South America? Does Japan propose 
to pursue a policy in relation to China and the powers 
such as the United States has pursued under the aegis 
of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to South America 
and Europe? 

The Monroe Doctrine was originally enunciated as the 
"result of apprehensions" that a combination of Euro- 
pean powers was about to interfere in South America 
to restore the authority of Spain over colonies which had 
by revolution effected their independence. 

We declared, not to the American states but to the 
European governments, that (1) "by the free and in- 
dependent condition which they have assumed and main- 
tained, [the American continents] are henceforth not 
to be considered as subjects for future colonization by 
any European powers"; and (2) "that we should con- 
sider any attempt [on the part of the European states] 
to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the ex- 
isting colonies or dependencies of any European state, 
v/e have not interfered and shall not interfere." 

We sought defense — both for ourselves and for the 

1 P. 62. 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 353 

other American states. We did not endeavor in any 
way to restrain or coerce the other American states. 

Ourselves the largest, the most populous, and the rich- 
est country in America, we sought to protect the smaller, 
weaker, less wealthy countries against foreign aggres- 
sion. Of course this was for our own benefit. But we 
asked for no position of splecial privilege for ourselves 
at the expense either of these smaller nations or of 
Europe. 

Japan, infinitely smaller, less populous, less rich than 
China and India, sets herself up and demands — not of 
Europe that it keep hands off, not of all Asia that it 
bar Europe — but of China that she simultaneously grant 
great and special privileges to Japan and agree not to 
give favors to other countries. 

Can Japan set up a Monroe Doctrine — for Asia? 
The Russian Empire includes 6,500,000 square miles of 
territory in Asia; the British Empire includes 2,000,000 
square miles, with a population of 325,000,000. The 
total of European possessions in Asia is 9,500,000 square 
miles, or more than one-half of the total area, with a 
population of 400,000,000, or four-ninths of the total 
900,000,000. The Chinese Empire alone is territorially 
sixteen times as large as the Japanese Empire; and 
China proper, i. e. the Middle Kingdom, is more than 
ten times the size of Japan; while China's population 
is from six to eight times that of Japan. Yet Japan 
talks of protecting Asia against European and other 
foreign aggressions! 

It was a part of American foreign policy, and it has 
been substantially a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, 
that we keep out of "entangling alliances" and refrain 
from participation in European politics. We recog- 
nized the status quo in South America and declared that 



854 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

the Monroe Doctrine was to apply to the future only.^ 
Japan has made the existence of her entanghng alhance 
with one European power the chief excuse for going to 
war with another. She has upset the status quo in 
China and has made the doctrine retroactive. If she can 
employ these instruments and doctrines today to the 
driving out of one set of European interests, why not 
tomorrow for another? 

The United States has never asked any American 
state for special privileges or self-denying promises in 
any way comparable to those which Japan has exacted 
of China. True, we asked for and secured the Canal 
Zone in Panama and we have assumed a quasi-protec- 
torate over Haiti and San Domingo and in a sense over 
Cuba — but consider the circumstances ! 

Japan is setting up this new doctrine against whom? 
Against Europe in particular — but in general against 
the Occident. "Asia," we are told, is to be preserved 
"for Asiatics." But what Occidental nations have inter- 
ests in the Far East? First Great Britain, Japan's ally. 
The British have a huge empire and enormous commer- 
cial interests in Asia. Next, France — now Japan's 
temporary ally. Then, Russia — every step in whose 
China policy since 1905 has been taken with the approval 
of and hand in hand with Japan. Finally, Germany — 
all of whose possessions in the Far East have, tempo- 
rarily at least, been taken away from her. None of 
these countries, except Russia, has made any forward 
move at China's expense since 1900. Not one — except 
Russia — has in recent years manifested a desire to as- 
sume political control in any part of China. The most 
important of all. Great Britain, can be shown to be de- 

^ "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere." 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 355 

cidedly averse to burdening herself with any adminis- 
trative responsibilities in China. The United States 
has possessions in the Pacific but has never attempted 
to get a territorial foothold on the continent of Asia. 

It is true that the American Monroe Doctrine has ap- 
parently meant different things at different times and 
to different people; but it does not require a profound 
knowledge of history to understand that certain things 
have not been done either in the name of or in spite of 
that doctrine. We have never, for instance, made par- 
ticular demands upon a neighboring state, requiring 
that it refrain from granting concessions to any third 
power and at the same time turn over to us concessions 
already granted to another power and give us new and 
special privileges in addition. We have never, in time 
of peace and when there was no offense on the part of 
a neighbor, said: "You are weak, your administration 
is ineffective ; therefore for your good and ours we con- 
sider it our duty to come in and see to it that you 
manage your affairs as we think they ought to be 
managed." 

When we are told that Japan is simply establishing 
a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East, we may be in- 
clined, or we may not, to approve. But we should not 
be misled by the implication of a name. We should 
recognize this difference: the American Monroe Doc- 
trine is defensive and all excluding; the Japanese Mon- 
roe Doctrine is aggressive and not self-excluding.^ 

Japan makes much of the proposition that it is her 
desire and purpose to help China, to interpret the West 
to the East, to be the leader in the regeneration of Asia. 

^ See further upon this point the quotations from Mr. Frederick 
MeCormick and Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks at the end of this 
chapter-. 



356 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The order is a large one. Is the undertaking practical? 
Between the social and political ideas and ideals of the 
Japanese and the Chinese, there is a wide gulf; the back- 
grounds in the two countries are as unlike as are those 
of the United States and Prussia. China was for cen- 
turies Japan's tutor in ethics, philosophy, literature, and 
art. What Japan knows of the West she has learned 
only in recent years. Japan can give China lessons in 
efficiency, in system, and in military organization; but 
what else has she to contribute ? 

Japan has no money to invest in China. Are the 
methods which she has been pursuing likely to make hei 
popular with the loaning countries — England, France, 
and the United States ? Can she persuade them to fur- 
nish capital and become silent partners in her undertak- 
ings? Comparing assets and liabilities, China is better 
off financially than is Japan. Japanese merchants can 
give the Chinese useful lessons in the conduct of big 
business and cooperative enterprise, but not in com- 
mercial honesty and routine trade. 

The Japanese have not yet worked out a harmoniously 
operating, modernized governmental system for them- 
selves. Japanese politics are not free from some of 
the corrupt practices which are criticized in those of 
China. Japanese court procedure and administration 
of justice are still below Occidental standards. Japan 
has anything but a happy course to run in public finance. 
Is it to be wondered at that the Chinese hesitate to em- 
brace Japan's profession of friendship and to accept 
the Japanese as their political mentors and commercial 
guides ? 

Peace advocates have caught at Japan's repeated dec- 
larations that her great object is to insure the peace of 
the Far East. It can readily be demonstrated from 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 357 

history that Japan has not up to date been the preserver 
of peace in the Far East, but the contrary. 

The question of the peace of the Far East lies with 
the fate of China. If China can develop strength to 
defend her own integrity, the peace of the Orient may 
be preserved. If the partition of China once seriously 
begins, nothing will save the Far East for the next sev- 
eral decades from being a theater of aggression, con- 
flict, and political redistribution. 

In taking advantage of the distraction of the Euro- 
pean powers as she has done, Japan has upset the bal- 
ance which it was one of the principal objects of the 
powers in their activities from 1897 to 1901 to preserve, 
and she has created a situation which will almost surely 
lead to further upset as soon as the European nations 
have concluded the war and reestablished peace among 
themselves in the West. Each and all of the treaty pow- 
ers have, under the operation of the most-favored-na- 
tion clause, the right to demand of China concessions by 
way of compensation for what any one gets. 

The powers may, then, come forward and demand 
compensations— always at China's expense, in spite of 
Japan's No Trespass sign. Or, some of them may at- 
tempt to restrain Japan. Or, they may choose or find 
it necessary to leave the Far East alone and let Japan 
pursue her policies unmolested. Unless the powers do 
interfere in one way or another, it would seem that one 
of two things must happen : either China will pass under 
the tutelage — if not the vassalage — of Japan ; or China 
will have to fight to preserve herself from national ex- 
tinction. 

In any case, the unfolding of Japan's Monroe Doc- 
trine policy will have very different effects in the sphere 
to which it is intended to apply from those which have 



358 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

been consequent upon the enunciation of President Mon- 
roe's American doctrine nearly one hundred years ago. 

extract from an article, "getting rid of the 

united states in far east," by frederick 

Mccormick, new yobk times, may is 1915. 

After the Treaty of Portsmouth, when Secretary Root let 
go the reins of power which Secretary Hay had held In East 
Asia, allowing Komura to seize them, and turned his attention 
to Latin America, the idea of a "Monroe Doctrine" for East 
Asia was invented in Japan. The idea was grotesque and its 
merits rested solely in its appeal to the vanity and credulity 
of the great English-speaking people of America. To carry out 
Komura's plan of state for unrestricted and indefinite expan- 
sion upon the continent Japan had to eliminate us — the open- 
door country. It was a kind of swallowing act, ludicrous, and 
showing that the champions of national policy were rather hard 
put in order to name Komura's plan of state before the world. 

The attempt of turning the open door into a "Monroe Doc- 
trine" had its awkward side. Monroeism in the Western Hemi- 
sphere is guardianship of the weak in their right of unham- 
pered self-development. Japan's needs — she had everything to 
ask — which are the soul of her policy, were the exact negative 
of this. Komura in the beginning declared before the Diet the 
policy of relieving the overcrowding at home in Japan by free 
immigration into Korea and South Manchuria as a part of the 
new plan of state. Not long after this began, Korea was 
annexed! In five years Japan's immigration had expanded 
beyond her concessions in South Manchuria, and she has now 
forced upon China land and industrial rights for Japanese, not 
only throughout South Manchuria but Eastern Mongolia. 

In Latin America there is no such thing as extra- 
territoriality, or any division of sovereignty, or any interfer- 
ence of any outsiders in the foreign affairs of its countries. 
Backed by military force, Japan not only exercises but extends 
in China all of these, to which she adds control of all com- 



JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE 359 

merce, industry, and development in the line of her expansion. 
Lacking everything which China has to give, Japan, therefore, 
in the disguise of the "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia is a 
veritable wolf in sheep's clothing. The absurdities of the ad- 
venture have prevented any authoritative enunciation of it in 
Japan, and its most intelligent champions grasped the nettle at 
the outset by admitting that from the point of view of the 
Japanese a "Monroe Doctrine" in East Asia would mean the 
control of China by Japan to the exclusion of all other States. 
Between the "wolf in sheep's clothing" and the "dog in the 
manger" thus offered to her, the "Monroe Doctrine" of East 
Asia holds out no tenable position. 

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER BY PROF. JEREMIAH W. JENKS. 
NEW YORK TIMES, DECEMBER 10, 1915. 

With regard to the alleged analogy between China's position 
toward Japan and Mexico's position in relation to the United 
States, I should like to say just this: What is frequently re- 
ferred to as the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, if it were for the 
protection and not for the molestation of China, would not be, 
I think, unacceptable to Americans who desire to help maintain 
a lasting peace in Asia. Such a doctrine was, in fact, pre- 
scribed and promoted by Mr. Hay and by Mr. Root. But the 
trouble is that certain Japanese who are now advocating what 
they call a Japanese Monroe Doctrine regarding China inject 
into their arguments and policies arguments and policies which 
Americans have never applied nor would they now apply toward 
our Latin-American neighbors. China is not assisted toward 
an acceptance of Japanese intervention by Japan's record in 
Korea and Southern Manchuria. Any extension of political 
influence of this sort is naturally regarded in China as an 
assault, deliberately intended, upon China's sovereignty. 



CHAPTER XIX 

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, 
the United States and Japan had enjoyed a period of 
just fifty years of close and substantially unbroken 
friendship. A half-century before, the United States 
had persuaded Japan to give up her isolation, renounce 
her hermit habits, and become a participant in the so- 
ciety of nations. Japan was not seeking international 
relations ; she wished to be left alone. The United States 
forced her to accept a proffer of "firm, lasting and sin- 
cere friendship," which meant the opening of her doors 
and the abandoning of her long-established policy of 
seeking national security by avoiding international rela- 
tions. 

Disgruntled and dismayed at first, the Japanese soon 
determined to make the best of the new situation; be- 
fore long they began to enjoy their new outlook and 
their new opportunities. Finally they came to regard 
the United States as a friend, a nation which had done 
them a favor, a teacher, a source of new inspiration. 

The United States first among Western nations made 
a treaty of amity with Japan (1854). It was the 
United States which made, three years later, the first 
of the series of Japan's commercial treaties. The United 
States was subsequently the first nation ready to grant 
Japan the revision of treaties for which she asked.^ It 

^ The United States made a treaty revision with Japan in 1878 

360 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 361 

was to the United States that Japan's first formal dip- 
lomatic embassy to a Western country was sent. The 
United States was foremost in giving assistance to the 
Japanese during the period in which they were work- 
ing for the complete recognition of their international 
majority. In dealing with Japan, as with China, the 
United States has been the last among the nations to 
think of resorting to force or harsh measures. Here, as 
in China, the American people have an enviable record 
as educators. Commodore Perry took to Japan among 
the gifts of his government to the Emperor a complete 
miniature railway, an electric telegraph outfit, telescopes, 
sewing-machines, clocks, stoves, agricultural implements 
and machinery, standard scales, maps, charts, etc. He 
laid railway tracks on the shore of Yedo Bay and ran 
a real locomotive, which pulled real cars, demonstrating 
for the first time to the astonished Japanese the power 
of steam. Ever since, we have been offering and giv- 
ing to Japan, along with China, all that either has wished 
to have of the best products — along with some not 
the best — of Western thought and Western science. A 
very considerable number of Japan's most influential 
and most useful advisers, both official and unofficial, 
have been Americans. 

When the United States failed and Japan succeeded 
in opening up Korea, the American government was 
pleased with the Japanese success. When Japan and 
China were about to go to war over interests in Korea, 
the United States government refused to join England 
in a proposed joint offer of mediation, which, had it 
been presented, would have put restraint upon Japan. 

which did not go into effect because the other powers were not dis- 
posed to make similar revisions. Hence the British treaty of 1894 
was actually the first of the revised treaties whijch became effective. 



362 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Left alone, Japan defeated China and thereby pre- 
pared the way for the second phase of her career of ex- 
pansion. From 1899 to 1905 the United States, Great 
Britain, and Japan cooperated in opposing the aggres- 
sive movements of Russia in Manchuria — which were a 
menace to Japan's interests more than to those of any 
other country after China. England's financial and 
moral backing made possible Japan's attack upon and 
victory over Russia in 1904-1905, and during the war 
the sympathies of the United States were with Japan 
and such material assistance as may come from the sub- 
jects of a neutral nation was freely given her. But for 
the intervention of President Roosevelt and the aid of 
other Americans at the Portsmouth conference, the war 
might easily have gone on, Japan's exhaustion have be- 
come apparent, and Japan ultimately have been de- 
feated by Russia. If ever a country has owed a debt 
of gratitude to other nations, Japan owes such a debt 
to the United States and England, for the friendship 
and assistance of these two nations have contributed 
enormously among the elements which have made pos- 
sible Japan's rapid rise as a modern nation and a world 
power. 

Thus, Japan had up to 1905 reasons for nothing but 
good will toward the United States, and the two coun- 
tries were at that time on the best of terms with each 
other. Since 1905 there has come a change. 

What, then, has wrought the change? Why the re- 
cent sporadic evidences of a decline in the cordiality of 
our relations? Why have we come to distrust Japan? 
What are the Japanese complaints against us? Why 
is there friction and why in some quarters the assertion, 
met in others by the denial, of the possibility of war be- 
tween the two countries? 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 363 

The fault lies partly with Japan and partly with the 
United States — in proportions about v/hich there is am- 
ple difference of opinion. Before considering the im- 
mediate causes of the difficulty it will be well to have 
an understanding of certain fundamental and under- 
lying facts which will show why it is essentially inevit- 
able that there should be some friction between us. 

Japan is an island country. Its relation to the con- 
tinent of Asia is like that of England to the continent 
of Europe. In territory Japan proper embraces an 
area a little larger than that of the British Isles. Its 
population exceeds that of the United Kingdom. It has 
less of arable land. The British have long had to seek 
beyond their own borders room and opportunities for 
their excess population. A seafaring people, they took 
naturally and with success to the building up of an 
empire, of two empires, one territorial, the other com- 
mercial. 

Situated like the English — the Japanese felt the in- 
ternal pressure and the outward call and have entered 
upon a career of expansion. Having studied the his- 
tory of Europe, they have taken to applying the meth- 
ods of Europe. There is a great difference, however, 
in the circumstances. The English began their expan- 
sion in the early years of the seventeenth century and 
the Japanese theirs at the end of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. The world, in the interval, has greatly changed 
and conditions are vastly altered. 

During the fifty years in which Japan was readjust- 
ing herself to the new situation which was thrust upon 
her in 1853, the people of the United States were busily 
engaged in the settlement of their great West and in 
establishing themselves as an industrial nation. Some 
of our statesmen had earlier foreseen that ultimately 



364 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

we would have a great interest in the destinies of the 
Pacific Ocean. But it was not until after the Japanese 
defeat of China — which marked Japan's first important 
step on the road toward empire — ^that we, through the 
war with Spain and the acquisition of Hawaii and the 
Philippines, acquired a political interest in the Pacific 
beyond our own shores. 

John Hay saw something of what the future had in 
store; he had a vision of the commercial possibilities of 
the Orient and of our needs ; he realized that the expan- 
sion of American trade interests in the Pacific was as 
logical as it was right. He was at the same time a 
high-minded and just statesman. He did not desire for 
his country the domination of the Pacific. He was bent 
upon no political aggression. He was opposed to Eu- 
ropean, and he had no thought of American conquests in 
Asia. With the English, he looked with apprehension 
upon Russia's forward move as directed against China 
and Korea and menacing Japan. He disliked the con- 
cession-getting competition of the European nations be- 
tween 1895 and 1898, which seemed to foreshadow the 
partition of China. 

It was for these reasons that he came forward in 1899 
with his open door policy. It was on this account that 
he led in 1900 in the endeavor to safeguard the terri- 
torial integrity of China. 

The great nations of Europe, together with the 
Japanese, accepted Secretary Hay's suggestions and 
! pledged their adherence to the open door and the in- 
tegrity of China policies, thus becoming bound by for- 
mal diplomatic exchanges with the United States, and 
in some cases by notes between themselves, to these pol- 
icies. 

Thejpi came the Russian aidvance in Manchuria . The 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 365 

United States, Japan, and England protested. Japan 
and England formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
Russia refused to discuss the Manchurian question with 
Japan. Japan, declaring that she was doing so in de- 
fense of the open door policy, in defense of Korea's in- 
tegrity, in defense of China's rights in Manchuria, and 
in defense of her own future existence, took up arms 
against Russia. The Japanese defeated the Russian 
forces both on land and at sea, but their victory was not 
decisive. Russia, though her armies were routed at 
Mukden, was not beaten. Then came President Roose- 
velt's suggestion of a truce — followed by his mediation 
■ — which brought the peace of Portsmouth. 

By the treaty Russia recognized Japan's exclusive in- 
terest in Korea, divided her own interests in Manchuria 
with Japan, and agreed, mutually with Japan, to ob- 
serve the open door principles. The Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance was renewed, England recognizing the para- 
mount interest of Japan in Korea, and both parties re- 
affirmed the principles of the open door and the integ- 
rity of China. The Japanese then got the Chinese to 
confirm the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty in so far 
as Chinese territory and interests were concerned, and, 
going further, drafted the secret protocols which were 
soon to become a source of great embarrassment to 
China, of annoyance to other countries — especially 
the United States — and of general suspicion toward 
Japan. 

In the ten years which have ensued, Japan's Korean 
and Manchurian policies have given constantly broader 
intimations of the existence of an imperialistic purpose. 
Suspicions have been confirmed by the rapid unfolding 
of Japan's plans since she stepped last August into the 
present world war. 



366 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

To disinterested observers who have followed the 
course of events in Manchuria, with Russia in the North 
and Japan in the South, the two working now sepa- 
rately, now together, the evidences lead to but one con- 
clusion: that these two countries are bent upon the 
absorption of that region. Whether it is to be divided 
between them or all to be taken by one of them, or 
whether China will be able to retain a part, remains for 
time to tell. The Russian and the Japanese govern- 
ments, though pledged to both, approve of neither of 
the two fundamental principles of American policy in 
the Far East — the open door and the integrity of 
China. 

The high-handed methods by which Japan has had 
her way in the numerous controversies in which she has 
been engaged with China almost continuously during 
these years have driven the sympathy of American ob- 
servers to the side of China and rendered them antag- 
onistic to Japan. In addition to the repeated instances 
of resort to force or threats of force to gain her points 
in Manchuria and in diplomatic controversies over other 
matters elsewhere, it is well known that Japan played 
a double game with the Chinese government during the 
revolution, that certain Japanese oJfficers gave assistance 
to the rebels in 1913, that the Japanese made exorbitant 
demands for indemnity for the losses to their trade occa- 
sioned by the Chinese Revolution, and that they have put 
obstacles in the way of the success of the new govern- 
ment. Last of all, there has come the conquest of Shan- 
tung and the subsequent attack, through the Twenty- 
one Demands, upon China's sovereignt}^ 

There is, however, as between the United States and 
Japan, another side to the account. The Japanese have 
their grievances against the United States. 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 367 

To the fundamental fact referred to earlier in this 
chapter — that Japan requires room for her excess pop- 
ulation and outlets for her expanding commerce — we 
must link another consideration which is inherent and of 
inevitable consequences. The Japanese are one of the 
proudest and probably the most sensitive of nations. In 
addition, they are polite — very polite. Chivalry is a 
part of their social code. Japanese chivalry is, however, 
not unlike chivalry as it was practiced in medieval Eu- 
rope, a code which calls for a very nice regard for equals 
but not so much consideration for inferiors. 

We of the United States are not conspicuously po- 
lite. Our methods have a directness which is often dis- 
concerting, especially so to people used to formality and 
elaborate courtesy. The more sensitive the people whom 
we are addressing, the greater the likelihood that they 
will take offense — even though we mean no offense. 
We have been brusque with some countries and they have 
not minded. We have been anything but polite in 
some of our dealings with the Chinese, and they have not 
bothered very much about it.^ But when we became 
impolite to the Japanese, they minded. Both proud 
and sensitive, used to politeness between equals, the Jap- 
anese, finding us impolite, have been hurt and incensed. 
To be treated impolitely was to be treated as inferiors. 
The Japanese consider themselves the superiors of other 
Oriental nations. They have even taken exception to 
being classed as "Orientals." They reason as follows: 
Have we not won our way into the family of nations? 
Have we not defeated a great Western nation in battle ? 
Are we not and have we not demonstrated ourselves the 
equals in civilization and achievement of the white races ? 
Are we to stand the insult of impolite treatment; of dis- 

^ The Boycott of 1905 was a notable exception. 



368 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

criminatory legislation which conveys the implication 
that we are inferior or undesirable and puts us in a com- 
mon class with other Orientals? 

The laws of the United States authorize the natural- 
ization of white men and black men as American citi- 
zens. Our courts have classed Japanese as of the yel- 
low race and therefore not entitled to the privilege of 
naturalization. This, however, was not enough. After 
our annexation of Hawaii, Japanese immigrants began 
to come to our shores in increasing numbers. Most of 
these newcomers settled in the western coast states. Just 
as the influx of the Chinese half a century before had 
resulted in a competition in the labor market which led 
to agitation by the labor elements in the western states 
which ultimately resulted in our Chinese exclusion laws, 
there soon sprang up an anti- Japanese agitation — 
chiefly in California. This agitation arose out of an 
economic situation. It is true, there is something of 
race prejudice in it — ^but that was not the origin of 
the difficulty. We had welcomed the Japanese gentle- 
men who came among us, the diplomats and students, 
just as we welcome the Chinese of the same classes ; and 
we have gotten on well with them. It was the coming 
into competition of the Japanese laborer and the Amer- 
ican laborer that caused trouble. Race prejudice was 
evoked and made an instrument in the battle which the 
white laborer began to wage against the new competitor. 
The people of the United States, the people of Califor- 
nia did not mean to insult the Japanese nation. But 
the methods which the people of California used were 
impolite and were taken by the Japanese as an 
insult. 

The San Francisco School Board was prevailed upon 
by local influences to make rulings which discriminated 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 369 

against Japanese — no, against all Orientals — to the ex- 
tent of requiring that they attend schools separate from 
those attended by white children. 

The immediate contention was settled by the inter- 
vention of President Roosevelt in 1907. It was agreed 
between the San Francisco School Board and Mr. 
Roosevelt that the former should require examinations 
of all "alien" children and might, if they were above 
ten years of age, send them to a special school. No spe- 
cific mention was made of "Japanese." At the same 
time the President undertook to secure by some method 
a limitation of Japanese immigration. 

In pursuit of this policy, and with the approval of 
Japan, there was inserted in our new Immigration Act 
of February 25, 1907, a clause providing that the Presi- 
dent might refuse entrance to the United States to cer- 
tain classes of inmiigrants. Then by the so-called "gen- 
tlemen's agreement" ^ between the two countries, the 
Japanese government undertook to prevent the emigra- 
tion from Japan of laborers seeking to go to the United 
States. There was thus avoided on the part of the 
United States any specific discrimination against Jap- 
anese. 

When, soon after this, the Japanese government un- 
dertook to revise its commercial treaties with European 
countries to replace treaties which were expiring in 1911, 
it requested the American government to negotiate for 
the revision of the United States-Japanese Treaty. Al- 
though the American treaty was not to expire until 
1912, our government promptly acceded to the Jap- 
anese request, thus enabling Japan to put her new tariffs 
into effect earlier than she could otherwise have done. 
In the treaty which was then drawn up and ratified 

1 1908. 



370 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

no mention was made of the immigration question, but 
in an appended declaration the Japanese Plenipoten- 
tiary affirmed on behalf of his government that Japan 
was "fully prepared to maintain with equal effective- 
ness the limitation and control which they have for the 
past three years exercised in regulation of emigration 
of laborers to the United States." 

The 1907 settlement of the school question did not, 
however, end the anti-Japanese agitation, and various 
methods were employed in California to make the Jap- 
anese uncomfortable. Finally, in January, 1913, vari- 
ous anti-Japanese bills, in all about forty, were intro- 
duced in the California legislature. The legislature 
adjourned in March for a month's recess. Reports of 
these bills went to Tokyo and throughout the United 
States. In Japan the jingo press began to talk war, 
and in the United States the Eastern newspapers de- 
nounced the California legislature and the people of 
California. Certain observers have declared that it was 
the Japanese threats and the Eastern criticism that 
crystallized the determination of the California legisla- 
ture to pass some of these bills. Be that as it may, in 
spite of threats and protests, in spite of President Wil- 
son's representations and of Mr. Bryan's personal ap- 
peal, the legislature passed that one of the bills to which 
most exception was taken, namely, the Heney-Webb 
Bill — which provided that aliens not eligible to citi- 
zenship should not hold or acquire land in Califor- 
nia, and the Governor signed the act on May 19, 
1913. 

The actual provisions of this law were framed in such 
a way as to contain no express reference to Japanese 
and thus not to constitute in form a discrimination 
against Japanese. They read as follows: 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 371 

Section 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws 
of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and 
inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this state in 
the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the 
United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this 
state. 

Section 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in Section 
1 of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy and transmit real 
property or any interest therein, in this state in the manner 
and the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty 
now existing between the government of the United States and 
the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or sub- 
ject, and not otherwise, and may, in addition thereto, lease 
lands in this state for agricultural purposes for a term not 
exceeding three years. 

The Japanese public was greatly incensed and there 
was again talk in the Japanese press of war. It was 
known in the Far East, and it has recently been de- 
clared in Congress, that the United States military 
forces in the Philippines were apprehensive of a descent 
upon the Islands and that they were in constant readi- 
ness for action. Viscount Chinda, the Japanese Am- 
bassador at Washington, made repeated representa- 
tions to Mr. Bryan, and the matter was discussed be- 
tween the two for over a year. The correspondence in 
the case was, upon the suggestion of Japan, made pub- 
lic in June, 1914. The two governments had at one 
time entertained a proposal to conclude a special con- 
vention to cover the case, but when the Okuma Cabinet 
assumed office in Japan in April, 1914, it was, appar- 
ently, averse to this. It had been proposed also, and 
it was popularly expected for a long time, that the Jap- 
anese would bring a test case into the United States 
courts to test the constitutionality of the law. Japan 



872 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

declined to follow this course, on the ground that the 
issue lay between the two governments, and was there- 
fore properly amenable to diplomatic processes; and 
that, inasmuch as the burden of such litigation was not 
put upon other aliens, the very fact of resorting to it 
would be to the disadvantage of Japanese and thereby 
constitute a discrimination. It was even suggested as 
a counterproposal that legal procedure looking to the 
preservation of treaty rights ought to be initiated by 
the United States government. 

The treaty clause to which the Japanese looked for 
their rights reads as follows: 

Article 1. The citizens or subjects of each of the High Con- 
tracting Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel, and reside 
in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and 
retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, ware- 
houses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease 
land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to 
do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same 
terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves 
to the laws and regulations there established. 

They shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to 
pay any charges or taxes other or higher than those that are 
or may be paid by native citizens or subjects.^ 

Articles IV and XIV of the treaty guarantee recip- 
rocal "most-favored-nation treatment" in commerce and 
navigation. Nothing is specified, however, as to the 
holding of the land for agricultural purposes. The 
Court would have to rule as to whether "commercial 
purposes" include agricultural, and perhaps as to the 
authority of the state legislature. It is not likely that 

^ Treaty of Commerce and Navigation^ United States— Japan, Feb- 
ruary 21, 1911. (Proclaimed on April 5, IPH-) 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 373 

the law would be declared unconstitutional — but if it 
were, other laws, both federal and state, would be called 
in question. 

As the sponsors for the legislation pointed out to Mr. 
Bryan, the California statute is so drawn that it does 
not in itself discriminate against Japanese; it applies 
equally and alike to all "aliens ineligible to citizenship" ; 
and the qualifications as to eligibility to citizenship have 
been established by the federal government. 

This does not alter the fact that as between the 
United States and Japan the law raises an issue. The 
question of discrimination against Japanese, or against 
people of any other nation, is a question which involves 
the whole United States, and laws whose practical ef- 
fect is that of discrimination raise an issue for which 
the people discriminated against hold the United States 
responsible. 

It is the establishing of distinctions that annoys the 
Japanese. They care a very great deal for what they 
consider their rights. They are sensitive to anything 
which appears to them to affect their national honor. 
They object to any barriers which establish for them 
a less favored treatment than that accorded to other 
nations. They insist upon recognition of the complete 
legal equality of Japan and Japanese subjects with 
other states and other nations. 

The point at issue is thus clear, but the problem is 
not the less complicated. Politically, there is the ques- 
tion of the right of the United States to make discrimi- 
natory immigration laws, and of the expediency of do- 
ing so; there is the question of the respective rights of 
the federal and the state governments in dealing with 
aliens. Economically, there is the question of compe- 
tition. Sociologically, there is the question of race 



374 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

prejudice. This is the hardest of all to deal with. You 
may coerce states by legislation, you may regulate com- 
petition. But you cannot eliminate race prejudices ex- 
cept by educational, affecting psychological, processes 
— if then. It is suggested by some authorities that race 
prejudices are due to ineradicable physiological differ- 
ences. This much is certain: it is futile for the people 
of the other parts of the United States, who have no 
Japanese problem among themselves, to rail at the peo- 
ple of the west coast and denounce them as unreason- 
able and unthinking — just as futile as for the North- 
erner to condemn and scold the Southerner for his feel- 
ing with regard to the negro problem. Races exist, 
race prejudices exist. We cannot eliminate races. We 
may be able to resolve the prejudices — ^but not by mere 
legislation or judicial interpretation, and not in a day. 
The California legislation may be very unwise; that it 
was passed may be very regrettable. But the Japanese 
problem is for the United States a far greater problem 
than that of resolving these immediate difficulties — and 
it will have to be dealt with in a greater way than by 
denunciation and coercion. The problem of Japanese 
immigration and the rights of Japanese in the United 
States will have to be worked out on a basis of patience 
and by a process of real education of the public on both 
sides. 

The Japanese government is not desperately solici- 
tous that its subjects shall possess the privilege of hold- 
ing land in California. Japan's interests do not lie on 
this side of the Pacific. The Japanese government has 
no desire to encourage emigration of its subjects to a 
foreign soil, still less to encourage their expatriation. 
Expansion in Asia, colonization under the Japanese 
flag, are what it seeks to promote — and for this pur- 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 375 

pose Korea and South Manchuria are at Japan's dis- 
posal. The Japanese g-overnment, Hke the German, 
wishes to keep its subjects within its dominions. But 
the California issue supplies Japan with a convenient 
political weapon. This it can hold over the head of 
the American government — and it has done so — caus- 
ing the latter nervousness and embarrassment. This it 
can use to divert the attention of the American people 
from the Far East. When we incline to become queru- 
lous on the subject of the open door, Japan can say: 
"Look at your own discriminatory legislation." When 
we presume to complain of Japan's treatment of the 
Chinese, Japan can refer us to the beam in our own 
eye. Above all, the Japanese are determined that we 
shall not interfere with them in their Asian policies — 
and to that end they will make the most of such situa- 
tions within our borders as may serve to put us on 
the defensive and keep our thoughts on our own side 
of the Pacific. 

At the same time, ironically enough, the character of 
Japan's activities, rather than any inclination of ours 
to interfere in the affairs of other people, is what keeps 
calling our attention to the far side of the Pacific. The 
Japanese advance in Manchuria served, until August, 
1914, perhaps more effectively than did any other fea- 
ture in contemporary developments, to keep our atten- 
tion critically fixed upon problems of Far Eastern 
politics. 

New problems as between ourselves and Japan have 
been created as a result of Japan's conquest of Ger- 
many's holdings in China and the German colonies in 
the Pacific, and through Japan's recent diplomatic vic- 
tory over China. 



376 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

Their descent upon Kiaochow, together with the de- 
clared reasons for that action and the subsequent in- 
crease in Japan's naval and military appropriations, 
have given rise to renewed apprehensions. The acquisi- 
tion of the German islands brings Japan nearer our 
holdings in the Pacific. 

If Japan has felt it necessary to drive the Germans 
from Shantung and the islands of the Pacific in order 
to remove a menace to her own security and to insure 
the peace of the Far East, may she not feel that she 
must drive the Americans from the Philippines to the 
same end? 

Must not the American possession of the Philippines 
be a menace in the eyes of Japanese strategists to the 
security of Japan and Japan's policies? Are not the 
Philippines the vulnerable spot at which the Japanese 
can strike the United States, either tentatively — in di- 
plomacy — or actually — with armed force? It matters 
not whether the Japanese "want" the Philippines. The 
United States did not want them — but we took them. 
We did not need them, but we have them. If Japan 
feels that our possession of them is a menace to her, she 
will wish that menace removed. Should she conclude 
to strike us, she would as a matter of course seize them, 
and then it would be the unpleasant and difficult task 
of the United States to fight on the offensive for their 
recovery. It may or may not be true that we do not 
want the Philippines, or that we would profit by being 
rid of them; we would, nevertheless, resent and resist 
any effort to take them away from us. The same line 
of reasoning might be applied, though with less imme- 
diate significance, to the case of the Hawaiian Islands. 

From the point of view of legitimate needs, Japan 
can with far more reason claim the Philippines as a 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 377 

necessary and natural field for Japanese civilizing ac- 
tivities than can we for ours. As to Hawaii : Honolulu 
is 2,100 miles from San Francisco and 3,200 from Yoko- 
hama. If, from the point of view of naval strategy, we 
need the Hawaiian Islands as a defensive outpost and 
mid-Pacific naval base, may not the Japanese feel the 
need for themselves of the same islands for the same 
purposes ? 

Japan has her grievances against the United States, 
as we have shown above, and recently no less re- 
sponsible men than Count Okuma, the Premier, and 
Baron Shibusawa, the foremost financier of the Em- 
pire, have openly declared that the United States must 
mend its methods in dealing with the Japanese as a 
people and must recognize Japan's determination to 
predominate in the commercial development of the Far 
East. 

We have seen elsewhere how the conclusion of the 
recent Japanese- Chinese agreements affects adversely 
at least one American attempt at investment and how 
Japan's policies run counter at many points to the tra- 
ditional policy of the United States in China. 

It has been suggested, also, that, just as surely as 
Japan's trade is by political fostering enabled to gain 
an artificial and disproportionate increase in China's 
markets, or as the commerce of other nations is actually 
driven away or excluded from China, just so surely will 
the United States be prominent among the sufferers, 
and just so surely will the likelihood of friction among 
the nations be increased, not only in the Far East but, 
as an indirect result, in the Western Hemisphere as 
well. 

Economic, commercial, racial, and political features 
and considerations; the facts of competition; and di- 



878 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

versity in ideals enter into the problem of Japanese- 
American relations. The private persons, the socie- 
ties, the statesmen in both countries who are interested 
in the furtherance of the cause of amicable relations 
must bring themselves to an understanding of the facts, 
and must face the realities. Sentimental theorizing; 
the exchange of pretty compliments and polite assur- 
ances of mutual good will; the publication of none but 
pleasing truths; campaigns of education by inspired 
and expurgated accounts — in essence a process of de- 
liberate deception; magnification of historical virtues 
with a view to establishing by implication a character 
for contemporary rightness and righteousness — a log- 
ical non sequitur; dogmatic optimism; denunciation of 
those who — being inquisitively and analytically minded 
- — refuse to accept mere assurances as conclusive; these 
processes may postpone possible clashes, but they will 
not remove the latent and potential causes of friction 
inherent in the respective situations, the economic needs, 
and the diversity in institutions, ideals, and aspirations 
of our two peoples. 

Nothing but honest education, an approximation of 
like standards and ideas, fairness, patience, sympathy, 
recognition, on each side, of the political necessities and 
the legitimate interests of the other, and mutual de- 
termination neither deliberately to give nor deliberately 
to take offense will enable the people of the United 
States and of Japan — while continuing in the course of 
competition and rivalry which they must inevitably pur- 
sue — to remain friends and at peace. 



JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 379 

BARON KATO ON JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CALI- 
FORNIA QUESTION 

Extract from a speech hy Baron Ket,to, Japanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, at a dinner given by the Association Concordia 
in honor of Professor Shailer Mathews and Dr. Sydney L. 
Gulick (February 10, 1915). 

That [California] question is not, I believe, of any great im- 
portance so far as the material interests involved are con- 
cerned; nor do I believe that it will lead to any really serious 
issues between the two nations. Nevertheless, the question, I 
must confess, is a very irritating one to the Japanese. . . . 

What we regard as very unpleasant about the California 
question is the discrimination made against our people in dis- 
tinction to some other nations. We would not mind disabilities 
if they were equally applicable to all nations. We are not vain 
enough to consider ourselves at the very forefront of civiliza- 
tion; we know that we still have much to learn from the West. 
But we may be pardoned if we think ourselves ahead of any 
other Asiatic people and as good as some of the European 
nations. 

But questions like this require time to settle. It must at the 
same time be remembered that we cannot rest satisfied until this 
question is finally and properly settled. I have, however, no 
doubt that, as the American and Japanese Governments are 
actuated by a genuine desire to come to an amicable agreement, 
the question under consideration will ultimately be satisfac- 
torily solved. 



CHAPTER XX 

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 

The people of the United States began to take an 
interest in China just a century and a quarter ago, 
when, in 1784, our traders first reached Canton in the 
fast saihng ship. Empress of China. We began our 
relations with Japan just one-half that time ago. We 
assumed our first obligations in the Philippines less than 
twenty years ago. Now there are about 4,000 Ameri- 
cans in China, some 1,600 in Japan, and about 8,000 
civilians and 12,000 soldiers in the Philippines. 

We went to the Far East last among the six Western 
peoples who have influenced its course of modern de- 
velopment. We were not at the beginning, nor have 
we been at any time since, moved by the spirit of con- 
quest and exploitation. Our interests have been com- 
mercial, our disposition friendly, our inclination toward 
helpfulness. Some of our statesmen, though apparently 
none too many, have seen the great importance which 
the Pacific is destined to have for us. Secretary Sew- 
ard, in referring particularly to the great commercial 
future which he believed was to be realized by the United 
States, said: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, 
and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief the- 
ater of the world's great hereafter." Secretary Hay 
fifty years later had a large and clear vision of the 
future importance of the Far East. 

One feature particularly has characterized the atti- 

380 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 381 

tude of our government toward the countries of the 
Far East, from first to last — that of persistent good 
will. Without disparagement to others, it may fairly 
be claimed for our political activities in the Orient that 
they have been less open to and less subjected to criti- 
cism from the point of view of the East than have been 
those of any other nation. Our diplomats have made 
some errors, but they have been errors, generally, on the 
side of too great, rather than too little, international 
forbearance — errors on the side of humanity. What 
we have gotten we have gotten by straightforward 
methods; what has been ours to give we have given 
freely, with almost unstudied, and in some cases ques- 
tionable, generosity. Along with the British we stand 
preeminent as instructors of the Orient in the mysteries 
and advantages of Western civilization. Along with 
them, we have stood as friends and helpers of the peo- 
ples of the East, especially the Chinese, in moments of 
internal disorder and external crisis. 

Seventy years ago Caleb Cushing was given instruc- 
tions for negotiating, and he did negotiate, our first 
treaty with China, that of 1844. The letter which Cush- 
ing bore, written by the President of the United States 
and directed to the Emperor of China, stands as an ex- 
hibit in the annals of American diplomacy, of which, 
in spite of its patronizing naivete, Americans may well 
be proud.^ Among other things President Tyler said : 

Now my words are that the governments of two such great 
countries should be at peace. . . . 

There shall be rules, so that the traders shall not break your 
laws and our laws. . . . Let there be no unfair advantage on 

^ The writer is not unaware of the fact that this document has 
provoked caustic comment on the part of more than one critic. 



382 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

either side. . . . We shall not take the part of evil doers. We 
shall not uphold them that break your laws. 

Along with this, more dignified but in the same 
straightforward vein, Webster's letter of instructions 
to Gushing: 

You will say . . . that you would deem yourself quite un- 
worthy to appear before His Majesty, as peace bearer from a 
great and powerful nation, if you should do anything against 
religion or against honor, as understood by the government 
and people of the country from which you come. . . . You will 
represent, nevertheless, that you are directed to pay to His 
Majesty . . . the same marks of respect and homage as are 
paid by your government to [other governments]. 

The spirit of these letters has been the spirit of our 
later diplomacy — a bit patronizing, but sincerely well 
disposed, sympathetic, tolerant, generous. 

The United States had been last, in every case, to re- 
sort to force or harsh measures with China, and the 
United States has invariably stood against any move- 
ment which looked toward impairing the territorial 
sovereignty of China. In 1900, when China stood be- 
fore the world a guilty culprit — both perpetrator and 
victim of the Boxer effort to destroy the legations — 
John Hay, as Secretary of State, was able and pleased 
to declare it the policy of the United States "to seek 
a solution which will bring* about permanent peace and 
safety to China, preserve China's territorial and admin- 
istrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly 
powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard 
the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts 
of the Chinese Empire." 

Our treatment of China, however, and our attitude 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 383 

toward the Chinese people in their own land must be 
distinguished from our actions in dealing with Chinese 
immigrants. The treatment which we have accorded 
some Chinese who have come and others who have 
sought to come to us has in various ways laid us open 
to and brought upon us just reproach. Having at one 
time gone so far as to declare in a treaty with China 
(in 1868) that emigration and immigration^ were nat- 
ural rights of all mankind, we later step by step receded 
from that position until we had arrived at a policy of 
Chinese exclusion — which, as represented in our latest 
legislation, prohibits entrance to practically all Chinese 
laborers, in fact to all but students, officials, and mer- 
chants. Our anti-Chinese legislation, unlike our anti- 
Japanese, is specific. As with the Japanese, we do not 
allow Chinese to naturalize as United States citizens; 
but in other matters where there is a distinction we dis- 
criminate against the Chinese more than against the 
Japanese. At the same time there has been little com- 
plaint from the Chinese against our laws except as to 
the method of their administration. The Chinese gov- 
ernment was not in former days disposed to pay much 
attention to the interests or fate of those of its subjects 
who chose to wander beyond the confines of the Middle 
Kingdom. In recent years, however, seeing how other 
countries protect their citizens abroad, there has begun 
to grow among the Chinese people an inclination to 
take notice of harsh, discriminatory and unjust treat- 
ment of their fellow-citizens. (Thus the Boycott of 
1905.) But as far as the law itself is concerned, the 
Chinese government has accepted our view as to what 
are our necessities in the case — and there is no Chinese 

^The treaty guaranteed, however, only most-favored-nation privi- 
leges. 



384 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

problem to bother us in the domestic phases of our for- 
eign policy. 

Turning then to our dealings with China on China's 
side of the Pacific: It was in the making of the first 
American treaty with China, in 1844, that for the first 
time a clear and specific agreement as to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction was sought and obtained from China. At 
the same time we agreed to prohibit American citizens 
from engaging in the opium trade which was occasion- 
ing China much annoyance. In our next treaty with 
China (1858), we included the clause which provides 
for religious toleration. Our legation at Peking was 
established shortly after 1860. With the appearance at 
the Chinese capital of our second minister, Anson Bur- 
lingame, a new chapter in Far Eastern diplomacy was 
begun. Burlingame became the champion of a policy 
of concerted action on the part of the powers, and at 
the same time he pleaded from first to last, eloquently 
and not without effect, for a "square deal" for China 
and the Chinese people. So completely did he win the 
confidence of his colleagues that Mr. Robert Hart (af- 
terwards Sir Robert) suggested and the Chinese gov- 
ernment requested that he go as a special envoy to the 
Western powers to present China's cause and ask for 
treaty revision and amendment. Burlingame gave his 
life to that mission. His conception of what should be 
the relations of the United States and China was writ- 
ten into our treaty of 1868. His death while serving :i 
China should be remembered in connection with that of " 
another worthy servant of two governments, the Hon. 
W. W. Rockhill, who, having been appointed special 
adviser to the President of China, and having started 
for Peking, died at Honolulu a few months ago while 
on his way to his post. 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 385 

Before Burlingame had left the employ of his own 
government, he and other Americans rendered China 
an effective service in the assistance which they gave 
in getting the powers to put an end to the so-called 
"coolie trade" which had had Macao, the Portuguese 
port on the South China coast, as its base. 

After Burlingame's death the practice of concerted 
action between the powers in their activities at Peking 
fell into disregard. By 1885 it had practically been dis- 
carded. Independent action by the British, the rise of 
Japanese imperialism, the forward movement of France 
in Indo-China, the sweep of Russia over eastern Siberia 
and her pressure toward ice-free waters on the Pacific, 
and finall}'^ the scramble for concessions which marked 
the years 1895-1898, culminating in the German, the 
Russian, the French, and the British territorial leases, 
marked a complete return to individualism. The par- 
tition of China seemed to impend. It was then that, 
through the Spanish- American War, the United 
States acquired a territorial interest in the Oriental side 
of the Pacific, and it was after we had taken the Philip- 
pines that Secretary Hay came forward in 1899 with 
the enunciation of the open door policy. In 1900 he 
added to this, as has been indicated above, the principle 
of preserving China's integrity and trying to insure the 
peace of the Orient. From 1899 to 1913 the United 
States government took an active interest in the prob- 
lem of forwarding American interests in China while 
at the same time safeguarding Chinese interests. We 
have considered in preceding chapters the circumstances 
of the enunciation of the open door and the integrity 
of China policies, and have traced some of the vicissi- 
tudes that have attended American efforts on behalf of 
those policies. 



386 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

The feature of the greatest permanent consequence 
in the history of our relations with China is to be found 
in the record of the contribution which Americans have 
made to education. Both in China and in the United 
States a very great number of the young men of China 
who have had a Western education have come under 
American teachers. The first students sent abroad by 
the Chinese government came to the United States. 
Now the Tsing Hua students, scholarship men from the 
provinces, and many privately supported students come 
to this country. There are at present between seven 
and eight hundred Chinese students in American uni- 
versities. There are more American missionaries and 
teachers in China than hail from any other single coun- 
try. Of the five thousand two hundred Protestant mis- 
sionaries in China more than two thousand are Ameri- 
cans — and the majority of these are engaged in med- 
ical or educational work. We have put into the educa- 
tion of new China more money, more plants, and more 
teachers than has any other foreign country. The great 
Chinese diplomat, Li Hung-chang, and the enlightened 
Manchu administrator, Tuan Fang, expressed their un- 
qualified approval of the work of American educators 
and educational establishments in China. It was an 
American who first translated International Law for 
the Chinese. It was an American who was the first 
president of the Imperial University at Peking. It 
was an American who established the school system of 
the province of Chili, the model for the rest of China, 
under Yuan Shih-kai as viceroy. An American has 
been the chief constitutional adviser to the Chinese gov- 
ernment during the period of the making of the new 
constitution. 

In 1907 we arranged for the return of that portion 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 387 

of our share of the Boxer indemnity which had not been 
required to meet claims presented. This reduced Chi- 
na's obHgations by some $10,000,000. The Chinese ap- 
plied this money to the founding and endowing of the 
Tsing Hua College at Peking, an institution which de- 
votes itself to the preparation of Chinese students for 
entrance to American universities, and to the endowing 
of scholarships to be held in the United States by stu- 
dents sent from that institution. There are now at 
Tsing Hua alone some twenty-five American instruc- 
tors and there are others in practically every other im- 
portant school in the country. 

Having thus deliberately taken a leading place 
among those who have placed Western thought and ideas 
at the disposal of the Chinese, we cannot escape the im- 
plication of moral obligations which follows. For what 
new China does we are in a sense responsible. To the 
confidence which the Chinese have in us we owe some- 
thing. Having assumed a position of informal guard- 
ianship it behooves us to realize that such a position 
creates an expectation of at least active sympathy when 
the ward has difficulties thrust upon him. And having 
fostered a disposition of good will on the part of this 
awakening nation toward ourselves, a disposition which 
is both a moral and a business asset, it becomes a matter 
both of duty and of common sense that we should not, 
by an attitude of indifference at moments of crisis, al- 
low all this to become for ourselves and for the Chi- 
nese so much labor lost. 

Numerous activities of non-political and non-relig- 
ious origin may be cited as illustrating the attitude of 
mutual cordiality which exists between the two coun- 
tries. Conspicuous among these in recent years stands 
the Famine Relief in the Hwai River region, and, grow- 



388 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

ing out of that, the making of plans for a huge conserv- 
ancy undertaking. There are parts of China in which 
famines have been of periodical recurrence. These fam- 
ines have almost invariably been due to floods. In the 
years 1911, 1912, and 1913 there were especially severe 
famines in what is known as the Hwai River area, em- 
bracing parts of the provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei. 
There was organized at Shanghai an International 
Committee for Famine Relief. The secretary of the 
committee was an American, and the majority of the 
more active workers on his staff were Americans. The 
greater portion of the money secured for relief came 
from the United States and Canada. More important, 
however, the American Red Cross Society sent out an 
engineer to make a study of the flooded region and see 
if the floods might be prevented. 

The survey of this engineer, Mr. C. D. Jameson, was 
reported to the Chinese government — with recommen- 
dations for conservancy measures. A project was started 
for raising $20,000,000 as a loan to China, the loan to 
be secured in the United States, for the construction 
of conservation works. At this point, a special engi- 
neering commission was sent from the United States 
in 1914 to go further into the engineering problem. 
The plans are not yet completed, but the project so far 
as it has gone is an American project, and if carried 
into effect should mean a big American interest, philan- 
thropically conceived but commercially carried out, in 
the Yangtse Valley. 

Of greater immediate consequence has been the as- 
sistance which the American government and people 
have given toward the consummation by the Chinese 
government of the great opium reform. This began in 
a way with the investigations made by the United States 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 389 

in 1904, looking to the suppression of opium consump- 
tion in the Philippines. In 1906 the Empress Dowager 
in China issued an edict contemplating the complete 
suppression of the use of opium in China within a period 
of ten years. Other edicts followed at intervals. An 
agreement was made with the British government in 
1908 looking to the ultimate discontinuance of the ex- 
port of opium from India to China. At the instance of 
the United States government an International Opium 
Commission met at Shanghai in 1909. After that the 
United States and the Dutch governments took the 
lead in a series of conferences which met at The Hague 
to devise means for international cooperation in regu- 
lating the opium trade. In the interval the Chinese 
government pushed the internal reform. In 1911, 
Great Britain agreed to a reduction of the annual ex- 
port from India which would mean total cessation of 
the trade in 1917. The Chinese government was so suc- 
cessful in its own measures that by the end of 1913 one- 
half the provinces had been cleared of opium. In this 
domestic campaign, the mainspring of the movement, 
the gadfly to the Chinese administration has been an 
American missionary. Finally, toward the end of 1913, 
the British government agreed to measures which meant 
the speedy termination of the trade from India, without 
which the Chinese efforts could never become completely 
successful. The success of China in suppressing the 
native growing and consumption of opium is the most 
striking bit of evidence which can be cited in support of 
the contention that China still retains the power to 
"come back," which she has repeatedly manifested, after 
a long period of stagnation and decadence. The re- 
form could not have been achieved, however, without 
the assistance of foreign nations, and in the giving 



890 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

of this the United States has taken a leading part. 

We were able to do China a valuable service in 1914. 
The various governments had presented to the Chinese 
government bills for damages sustained by their sub- 
jects during the revolution of 1911 and the rebellion of 
1913. Some of these nations filed accounts calling for 
compensation for indirect as well as direct damages. 
The American government secured the cooperation of 
the British government for supporting the resistance 
which the Chinese, not unnaturally, made to these lat- 
ter claims. This position won the day — and there were 
thus saved to the Chinese several milhon dollars which 
would otherwise have been charged against their al- 
ready empty treasury. 

In commerce we have not made the most of our op- 
portunities. We early developed a prosperous trade 
in which large consignments of American furs were 
exchanged for Chinese tea and silks. Later the cotton 
trade developed large proportions. The trade was car- 
ried in American ships, the fast sailing clippers which 
made the American merchant marine important before 
the Civil War. Since the war our merchant marine 
has faded away, and our trade has not kept pace, rela- 
tively, with that developed by several other coun- 
tries. 

There was a time when we were second — yielding 
place only to Great Britain — in the carrying trade with 
China. Now, much even of our own wares is carried 
in Japanese ships. British, German, and Japanese ves- 
sels greatly outnumber ours in all Far Eastern ports. 

In the early years of the nineteenth century we were 
second in the total import and export trade of China, 
which then centered at Canton. In 1905 we ranked 
third in imports to China and fourth in exports from 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 391 

China. In 1912 we ranked fifth in China's imports, 
Hongkong, Japan, the United Kingdom, and India 
outranking us. We were also fifth in China's exports, 
Hongkong, Japan, Germany, and Russia being ahead 
of us. There is no good reason why we should not, if 
our markets were properly pushed, rank consistently 
third in both. The proximity of Japan gives her, of 
course, an advantage over all competitors; but our own 
indifference to overseas markets and foreign interests 
generally is chiefly responsible for the fact that we lag 
behind. Although we are doing an increasing business 
in kerosene oil and related products, in tobacco products, 
and in sewing machines, our cotton piece goods trade 
has suffered greatly in the competition of recent years 
— and might be improved — and there are various other 
lines in which we might be developing a large Chinese 
trade. 

We might also, if we chose, find in China a great 
market for capital, both for private industrial enter- 
prises and > for governmental purposes. 

China first became a borrowing country at the time 
of the Chino-Japanese War, twenty years ago. Eng- 
land, France, Germany, and Belgium soon began to 
furnish her capital. American financiers first showed 
an interest in Chinese industrial development in the 
Canton-Hankow Railway enterprise,^ which was a com- 
mercial, not an official, financial undertaking. The 
United States government first showed a disposition 
to employ finance as an instrument for strengthening 
political influence and furthering commercial ends dur- 
ing the Taft administration. President Taft and Sec- 
retary Knox concluded that the most effective method 

^ The formation of the American China Development Company, 
1898. The rights of the company were sold back to China in 1905. 



392 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

by which to insure a hearing for the voice of the United 
States in questions affecting the integrity of the Chi- 
nese Empire, and to promote the cause of equal oppor- 
tunity, would be to secure for American capital an equal 
share with that of other foreign nations in loans to 
China. At that time, in 1908, China was planning to 
complete the Canton-Hankow Railway and to build an 
east and west line from Hankow to Chengtu, and for 
that purpose English, French, and German banking 
groups were, after much maneuvering and some wran- 
gling among themselves, preparing to advance China 
'the necessary funds. At the instance of President Taft 
and the Department of State an American financial 
group was formed for the purpose of making money 
available for foreign investment, and this group asked 
to be allowed to participate in the Chinese loan. The 
European groups objected, and then the American 
government took up the matter directly with the Chi- 
nese government. The Chinese, when they bought back 
the interests of the American China Development Com- 
pany, had promised that if money should subsequently 
be sought abroad to complete the Canton-Hankow line, 
application would be made for American capital. Upon 
being reminded of this, the Chinese government decided 
that the request of the American government on behalf 
of the American banking group must be recognized, and 
as a consequence the American group was included with 
the three European groups in the negotiation of the 
Four Powers Loan for the Hukwang railways. This 
loan agreement was concluded in May, 1911. At the 
same time the American group had been negotiating in- 
dependently with the Chinese concerning the furnish- 
ing of a loan for currency reform. Upon being ad- 
mitted to the Four Powers Group, the Americans 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 393 

shared this loan with the other powers, and the Currency- 
Loan Agreement was concluded in April, 1911. 

Admission to these financial groups and participa- 
tion in these loans marked the first victories for "dollar 
diplomacy." Our government had for the first time 
and with success insisted upon the opportunity being 
afforded for American capital to share along with that 
of other powers in supplying the needs of the Chinese 
government. Incidentally, Russia and Japan at this 
time gave some intimation of a desire to be admitted 
to the activities of the group. 

The Hukwang loan helped precipitate the revolution, 
and the revolution brought about a new condition of af- 
fairs. The new government planned to secure a gen- 
eral reorganization loan, and Yuan Shih-kai continued 
negotiations for that purpose. Russia and Japan made 
their way into the loan group, and the sum of $300,000,- 
000 was considered. The negotiations covered two 
years. Undoubtedly, the six banking groups contem- 
plated, as a unit, monopolizing the business of furnish- 
ing money to China. With their governments behind 
them they expected to exclude loans from independent 
sources. ^ The political ambitions of certain countries 
showed themselves clearly in the actions of their min- 
isters during the negotiations, particularly in a scramble 
on the part of some to secure control of various depart- 
ments of the Chinese revenue administration. In the 
spring of 1913 the wranglings among the members of 
the group had been adjusted and a completely revised 
proposal was submitted to the Chinese government — 
only to be rejected because of the dictation in Chinese 

■^ Not, however, money which might be contributed for loans ; they 
simply intended that all loans should be advanced through them, 
thus to accomplish certain administrative ends. 



394 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

affairs which it allowed to the representatives of the 
loaning powers. 

Such was the situation in China when the Taft ad- 
ministration came to an end in the United States and 
President Wilson, with Mr. Bryan as Secretary of 
State, assumed the direction of American policies. Two 
weeks after the inauguration, it was announced in Wash- 
ington that the American government would no longer 
support the American banking group in the Six Powers 
negotiations. President Wilson declared: 

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly 
the administrative independence of China itself, and this admin- 
istration does not feel that it ought, even by imphcation, to be 
a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part 
which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake 
the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy 
contingency of forcible interference in the financial and even 
the political affairs of that great Oriental state just now 
awakening to a consciousness of its power and its obhgation to 
its people. 

Upon this announcement, the American group at once 
withdrew from the Six Powers consortiimi. Such a 
move was to be expected, for the New York banking 
firms concerned had originally joined the consortium 
only upon the request of the Taft government, which 
had hoped through American participation in China 
loans "to give practical effect to the open door 
policy." 

Though the remaining five powers continued their 
negotiations with China and finally made a loan of 
$125,000,000, the defection of the United States marked 
the beginning of the dissolution of the group. Soon 
German and Japanese firms outside the group were 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 395 

making loans to China without opposition from their 
governments. The British government stood for some 
time by its pledges to the group, but finally it yielded 
to the pressure of British public opinion and lifted 
the embargo on the independent supplying of Brit- 
ish capital. The financial concert was thus at an 
end. 

According to the professions of the moment, the Six 
Powers group had been animated by the desire to in- 
sure China's credit and establish her finances upon a 
sound basis. Within the group, different powers were 
actuated by differing motives. Bussia and Japan had 
no money to loan; the reason for their presence must 
have been other than financial. The purposes of France 
were both financial and political. Great Britain and 
Germany both, though their immediate objects were 
financial, had to consider their substantial political in- 
terests in China. The United States had forced its 
way into the Chinese loan market in order, by means 
of investments, to strengthen the position of the gov- 
ernment for the defense of the open door policy and 
China's integrity. 

President Wilson conceived that the conditions which 
the group was seeking to force upon China were not 
consistent with the traditions of American policy, whence 
he concluded that the interests both of the United States 
and of China would be best conserved by the withdrawal 
of the American government from connection with the 
activities of the group. Whatever opinion we may en- 
tertain as to the soundness of this view and the advisa- 
bility of the policy which resulted, this surrender of a 
position in the financial council of the group put the 
United States at a disadvantage in Far Eastern diplo- 
macy, a disadvantage which would have become more 



396 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

evident had the group been able to proceed with its 
original policies. It constituted, also, a defection on 
our part from the policy of concerted action. 

We have seen how, earlier, American capital was pre- 
vented from securing a foothold in Manchuria. Within 
the past few years it has been meeting with substantial 
obstacles elsewhere. 

In 1913 the Bethlehem Steel Corporation began nego- 
tiations with the Chinese government looking toward 
the supplying by the former of money, materials, and 
technical assistance for the building of a Chinese naval 
base on the coast of Fukien Province. This project 
soon encountered the opposition of the Japanese — and 
ultimately our government accepted the Japanese ob- 
jections and gave assurance to Japan that it would not 
suj)port such an agreement. Then the Japanese se- 
cured a pledge from the Chinese (by the agreement of 
May, 1915) that no foreign capital would be sought for 
this project. 

In 1914 the Standard Oil Company entered into an 
arrangement with the Chinese government whereby the 
two were to form what would amount to a partnership 
for the development of China's oil fields. China was to 
furnish the potential oil fields. The Standard Oil Com- 
pany was to furnish the money and the business equip- 
ment. The business of this company represents the 
largest American financial enterprise in China today 
and is sufficient to be of very considerable importance. 
The Standard has invested over $20,000,000 in China 
since 1903. It has done over $100,000,000 worth of 
business with the Chinese in the past ten j^ears. The 
Standard Oil men know China, they have splendid busi- 
ness machinery established there, they have confidence 
in their own enterprise and in the business opportunities 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 397 

which lie before them. The Vice-President of the com- 
pany was quoted last year as having said: 

I believe that China offers the biggest field for commercial 
enterprise that exists today. ... It is to be feared that for- 
eign capital is going to get ahead of ours in the vast industrial 
and commercial expansion which is sure to come. ... I sin- 
cerely hope that our bankers may yet have the support of the 
Department [of State] in financial operations in China, and 
that, whether this support is given or not, American bankers 
will not hesitate to enter the field on their own responsibility. 

On the whole, the prospect of American business 
which this cooperative enterprise on a large scale be- 
tween the Standard Oil Company and the Chinese gov- 
ernment offers is the most encouraging feature in the 
history of American business relations with China durr 
ing the past few years. ^ 

Kecently, and as though to emphasize the decline of 
American interest in the Far East, the Pacific Mail 
Steamship Company, the only American company op- 
erating on a large scale in the Trans-Pacific carrying 
trade, has discontinued its Far Eastern service. Alleg- 
ing that the operation of the La Follette Seaman's Act 
made it impossible for it to continue its business at a 
profit, this company has taken off its ships — which for- 
merly plied between San Francisco and Japanese, Chi- 
nese, and Philippine ports — ^has withdrawn its agents, 
and sold its establishments and equipment in the Far 
East. At the same time the Northern Pacific Com- 
pany has diverted its one and only large liner, the Min- 
nesota, from the Far Eastern to the European trade, 

^ Various obstacles appear to have been put in the way of this 
enterprise, and it is not possible at present to estimate what success 
may be expected for it. 



398 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

while the vessels of the Canadian Pacific Company 
(British) are engaged in operations arising out of the 
war. Thus the commerce and carrying trade of the Pa- 
cific are left almost entirely to the Japanese companies, 
and the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
and the Osaka Shosen Kaisha are in a position to monop- 
olize the whole field. ^ Already rates have been raised, 
and it is being complained that Japanese freight is 
being given preference, in sailing, over other cargoes. 

As a suggestion of the terms in which the great po- 
tentialities of China as a field for investment and indus- 
trial undertaking may be estimated, a few sentences 
from a speech delivered in Shanghai on June 20, 1915, 
by Mr. J. Selwin Tait, Chairman of the Board of Di- 
rectors of the Washington and Southern Bank of Wash- 
ington, D. C, are worth careful consideration. Mr. 
Tait said: 

. . . China presents the greatest industrial and commercial 
opportunity not only of the world today, but the greatest which 
the world has ever seen. With a population of four hundred 
and fifty million people, according to the latest estimate of the 
Maritime Customs, it has a national debt amounting to, in 
round numbers, one dollar per head of its population,^ or less 
than one-twentieth, proportionately, of the debt of her neigh- 
bor, Japan. Were China to borrow up to the same figure as 
Japan, that is, over twenty dollars per capita, she could add to 
her debt the unimaginable sum of eight billion, five hundred and 
fifty million dollars gold, a total which would suffice to build 
one hundred and seventy thousand miles of railway, at the lib- 
eral estimate of fifty thousand gold dollars per mile. Some few 

^ Messrs. Norton^ Harrison & Co. of Manila are planning to put 
on a new service under the American flag. 

^ This somewhat underestimates China's debt, which is nearer 
$1.50 per head. 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 399 

years ago, an investigation of the effect which railroad develop- 
ment had upon the commercial growth of China showed that 
between the years 1900 and 1907 the increase of 45 per cent, in 
China's railroad mileage had brought about an increase in 
her net imports and exports amounting to 156 per cent, during 
the same period. Suppose we were to extend these figures and 
estimate the future business of China, on the basis of an ex- 
penditure on her railroads equal to twenty dollars per capita of 
her population. Can you form any idea what the volume of her 
business then would be? The result would, it must be con- 
fessed, be unintelligible to the ordinary mind if placed in plain 
figures. We may, however, put it in another form and say that 
with a per capita debt equal to that of Japan, China could build 
one hundred thousand miles of railway, could cover the country 
with permanent roadways, could improve her canals, so as to 
bring the products of her enormous population to her own 
markets at the lowest rates, and could still have enough to build 
up a merchant marine such as would have no superior on the 
face of the globe.^ 

A further quotation from an article of recent date 
by Mr. Julean H. Arnold, Commercial Attache to the 
American Legation in China, should command the at- 
tention of every American who has thought to give to 
the question of our relations with China. Mr. Arnold 
writes : 

There is one asset which Americans hold in China, the equal 
to which is not to be found in any other foreign country in the 
world. This is the good will of the Chinese people. I have 
traveled extensively all over this vast country and have found 
that no other people on the face of this earth occupy a warmer 
place in the hearts of the Chinese people than do the Americans. 
Our 2,500 American missionary population in China is par- 
tially responsible for this great asset, for with their numerous 
schools, hospitals, chapels and other uplifting institutions (all 

^ China Press, June 21, 1915. 



400 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

non-political in character) they are creating for us throughout 
the length and breadth of this vast country, in sections far re- 
moved from treaty port influences, as well as in the commercial 
centers, a spirit of friendship which means much to us. The 
fact that we have not had a hand in the billion dollar opium im- 
ports which came into this country from abroad, but have on the 
other hand used our influence to rid the country of this baneful 
drug, is also an item on the credit side of our account with 
China. Secretary Hay's staunch support of the open door pol- 
icy of equal opportunity which has received the backing of 
successive administrations is recognized by the Chinese people 
as a distinct act of friendliness towards this country. The 
remission of a substantial portion of the Boxer Indemnity has 
probably resulted, more so than has any other single act on the 
part of any foreign nation in its relation with China, in winning 
the esteem and respect of the Chinese people. These facts 
combined with the facts that the United States has never gone 
to war with China nor exacted from her territorial concessions 
have made for us a distinctly warm place in the hearts of the 
Chinese people. This good will is an asset which may and should 
mean much to us in a commercial way. In China business is done 
over the tea-cup rather than over the telephone and friendship 
counts for much. Hence we should not neglect to take advan- 
tage of the valuable asset which we possess in the good will of 
these people.^ 

China with an estimated population of 400,000,000 and with 
only 6,000 miles of railways as compared with America's 
100,000,000 people and 300,000 miles of railways ; China with 
1,000,000 spindles as compared with America's 32,000,000 
and England's 50,000,000, and China with an average wage 
scale about l/25th of that of the United States, off^ers a 
marvelous field for industrial and commercial expansion, espe- 
cially so when we consider that the country possesses un- 
limited undeveloped natural resources, combined with a peace- 
loving, industrious, hardy population. America now supplies 

^ China Press, Special Supplement, October 26, 1915, p. 69' 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 401 

only 8% of China's imports. Where else are there to be 
found brighter prospects for future development for American 
capital and enterprise than here in this oldest and most popu- 
lous of living nations and among the youngest in point of the 
development of her natural resources. . . . The Chinese people 
are anxious to do business with us and cordially invite Ameri- 
can capital and American brains to come to China, to take ad- 
vantage of the opportunities here presented. . . . The time is 
now opportune for the inauguration of big things in American 
trade in China, but it will require big men to do the work in a 
way commensurate with the opportunities presented, hence let 
the American manufacturers and financiers send their big men 
to this field to cooperate with those of experience already on the 
ground. However, before we can hope for any success in a 
large way in our trade in China we must have adequate Ameri- 
can shipping and banking facilities.^ 

Fifteen years ago the American government came 
forward as the champion of the open door policy, seek- 
ing to insure to all nations equality of opportunity in 
China's markets, and to secure from all the powers the 
common pledge that China's integrity should be re- 
spected. These two principles have since been the car- 
dinal features of our Far Eastern policy. President 
McKinley, Secretary Hay, President Roosevelt, Sec- 
retary Root, President Taft, and Secretary Knox stood 
clearly and firmly for these principles. Four succes- 
sive administrations contended for them. The present 
administration, though differing from its predecessors 
as to what methods are advisable, has declared that this 
government remains attached to the same principles. 

Between ourselves and China there exist mutual con- 
fidence and reciprocal good will. This is a practical as 
well as a moral asset. But, in addition to and beyond 

^ China Press, Special Supplement, October 26, 1915, p. 72. 



402 POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST 

this, there is needed something more. We have pleaded 
for the respecting of China's integrity. We do not be- 
Heve in the policy of partitioning or absorbing China. 
We profess to believe in China's powers of regenera- 
tion. We deprecate international aggressions. But 
what do we do when evidences of policies which run 
counter to these principles are laid before us? 

Any upsetting of the political status quo in the Far 
East becomes a menace to our interests, along with those 
of other nations. China is pledged to the equal treat- 
ment of all nations, the nations are pledged not to es- 
tablish inequalities against each other in China's mar- 
kets, and all nations have the right to equal opportuni- 
ties. It was special concessions demanded and received 
from China by particular nations that led to the scram- 
ble for concessions which marked the years 1895-1898, 
which led in turn, indirectly, to the Boxer uprising. The 
Chinese people are now developing a national patriot- 
ism; they are beginning to know something of inter- 
national affairs ; they have become alarmed at the men- 
ace of subjugation which threatens them. This means 
that they will not be ready to endure patiently any con- 
siderable invasion as a result of concessions which have 
recently been required of them. To prevent the estab- 
lishing of inequalities, to insure against the partition 
of China, to save China herself from internal disturb- 
ances and to guard against some new form of anti-for- 
eign agitation which may affect all foreign nations alike 
injuriously, should not every nation which is in a posi- 
tion to do so exert itself to restrain any other whose pol- 
icies appear likely to induce some or all of these unde- 
sirable consequences ? 

The Chinese look to the United States to exercise a 
positive and helpful influence in the solution of their 



CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 403 

problems of reconstruction. The American government 
in its official advocacy of the open door policy assumed a 
position of responsibility — responsibility towards the in- 
terests of every power and every people concerned. 
This responsibility makes imperative something more 
than mere reiterated protestations of friendly interest. 
It calls for most careful consideration and substantial, 
constructive political and economic effort. 

Finally, and quite independently of immediate ex- 
pectations or obligations, it must be recognized that the 
United States is a world power, destined increasingly 
to participate in world commerce and world politics. 
The fate of peoples, the disposition of territories and 
the determination of commercial policies in the Far East 
are bound to be of enormous consequence in world af- 
fairs. What occurs in the Pacific will have its effects 
upon the activities and policies of the major nations 
everywhere. The people of the United States already 
have large social and considerable commercial interests 
in the Pacific. They are entitled to increase, and in the 
natural course of events undoubtedly will increase their 
activities in these lines. We should endeavor in the 
present to safeguard the opportunities of the future. 
We should ask for nothing but what is just, giving 
due consideration to the rights and needs of all, de- 
manding no special privileges for ourselves; but we 
should, on behalf of our own interests and of the cause 
of peace, frame our policies and practices with a view 
to the defense of the principles upon which we, along 
with the other powers, have agreed. 

The international problems of the Far East are world 
problems. As such, they merit and demand the atten- 
tion of every nation which has a world outlook and 
world interests. 



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

YUAN SHIH-KAI 

Yuan Shih-kai was born to a distinguished Honan family in 
1859. Both his father and grandfather were high officials. He 
early showed an interest in and aptitude for athletics and mili- 
tary affairs, but he never qualified as a scholar. 

When only a little over twenty years of age, he was made 
an officer on the staff of the late General Wu Chang-ching, who 
was then commissioned to Korea to suppress local troubles. 
There Yuan first displayed unusual ability and attracted the 
favorable attention of the veteran statesman, Li Hung-chang, 
as well as of foreign officials. At the age of twenty-six, he was 
appointed Chinese Imperial Resident at Seoul. Before the out- 
break of the Chino-Japanese War, Yuan reported upon the 
situation, recommending against hostilities, but his suggestions 
were ignored, and when the Japanese invaded Korea he returned 
to China. 

He was soon made commander-in-chief of a "New Imperial 
Army" at Tien-tsin, a post in which he manifested high mili- 
tary and administrative qualities. His success as an organizer 
attracted nation-wide attention, and he rapidly rose in the 
favor of the Court and in official rank. By deliberately failing 
to carry out the orders of the Emperor Kwang Hsii just before 
the coup d'etat of 1898, he played an important part in the 
events which brought the Empress Dowager back to power. 
As a reward for his valuable service, he was made Junior Vice- 
President of the Board of Works. 

On the eve of the Boxer uprising. Yuan was appointed gov- 
ernor of Shantung. The decisions which he made during the 
Boxer uprising evidenced wisdom, courage, political sagacity, 

405 



406 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

and strong devotion to his country. He was too well informed 
to imagine that the foreigners could ever be driven out of China. 
Accordingly he made it his policy to restrain the Boxers and to 
protect the foreigners. At the risk of his own position and 
even of his life, he disregarded the orders of the Court and 
beheaded the most turbulent of the Boxers in his province. 
Thus, not a single foreigner was killed in Shantung through the 
period while Yuan was governor. But Yuan did more than 
this — he took an active part in the formation of a strong league 
of the major officials for the preservation of peace and order 
within the thirteen Southeastern provinces, which did more 
probably than any other one thing to save China from the dis- 
memberment which would have been the penalty had the attack 
on foreigners been general. 

In November, 1901, he was elevated to the viceroyalty of 
the metropolitan province, Chili — a post which Li Hung-chang 
had held for nearly thirty years. Here he showed unusual 
ability and made the most of his opportunity as a reforming 
and modernizing official. Not only did he continue organizing 
and drilling troops until he had at his command the best and 
most efficient contingents of China's "modern army"; but he 
devoted his attention to education and, with the help of well- 
chosen foreign advisers and assistants, established the most 
complete school system possessed by any of the provinces. The 
decision of the Empress Dowager, which led in 1905 to the 
abolition of the old literary examinations and the adoption of 
modern educational methods for all parts of the country, has 
been credited to the influence of Yuan and the great reforming 
Viceroy of Central China, Chang Chih-tung. 

Further, Yuan built and equipped hospitals, organized a 
savings bank, established cotton and paper mills, encouraged 
industries of various kinds, built roads and bridges, and showed 
himself thoroughly devoted to measures of material as well as 
political improvement. 

He naturally gained and held the respect of both the for- 
eigners and the Chinese among whom he was working. But his 



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 407 

efficiency and popularity drew upon him the suspicion and fear 
of the Court. He and Chang Chih-tung were summoned to 
Peking, where they might be kept under the eye of the govern- 
ment and would constitute each a check upon the other. Yuan 
was made a Grand Secretary and President of the Board of 
Foreign Affairs. 

With the death of the Empress Dowager and the Emperor in 
1908, Yuan was left at the mercy of the family of the latter, 
who had never forgiven him for his part in the coup d'etat of 
1898. He was relieved of his offices that he might have the op- 
portunity to nurse a "lame leg," and he retired to his estates in 
Honan. 

Two years later the day of terror came upon the Court, and, 
casting about for the ablest man whom they might summon to 
their defense, they requested Yuan to return to the Imperial 
service. Yuan deferred his acceptance of this precarious post, 
pleading that his leg was not yet quite well, until he was offered 
supreme command of all the armed forces in the North. He 
,was soon made premier, and it was he who persuaded the 
Manchus to abdicate. The Imperial Family bequeathed to him 
all of its political rights and authority. The Revolutionary 
Party accepted him as chief executive — and he has since de- 
voted himself to the threefold problem of restoring order, 
establishing a government, and defending the country against 
pressure from without. 

Whatever else Yuan has or has not done, he has restored 
peace and maintained reasonable order. He has set up a 
strongly centralized government suited to present needs. He 
has held the country together. He has had no opportunity so 
far to accomplish much in the way of constructive reforms and 
material improvement. He inherited an empty treasury. He 
has been hampered by rebellion and by unusual complications in 
foreign affairs. And in estimating what progress has been 
made it must be remembered that he has been in authority only 
four years. 

Whatever his personal ends, whatever may or may not be 



408 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

his ambition, Yuan Shih-kai is the ablest statesman in China 
today. 

LI YUAN-HUNG 

Li Yuan-hung was born in Hupeh in 1864. For six years he 
was a student in the Pei-yang Naval College, where he was an 
associate of (Admiral) Sah Chen-ping and (Dr.) Yen Fuh. 
He was a serious student and graduated in the first class. He 
served as a midshipman in the Chino-Japanese War, and after 
the war he was engaged in the service of the famous Viceroy 
Chang Chih-tung, at Nanking. On the latter's transfer to 
Wuchang, he was taken to assist in the organization of a new 
army there. Having been sent to Japan to make special mili- 
tary studies, he was, on his return, given a higher commission 
in the army and was ultimately made colonel of a brigade. 

At the outbreak of the revolution at Wuchang, Li was com- 
pelled by his comrades to accept command of the revolutionary 
forces. When the Nanking provisional government was formed 
he was made vice-president and commander-in-chief of all the 
republican forces. He was mainly instrumental in arranging 
for the Shanghai peace conference, which eventually led to the 
formation of the Republic. Upon the abdication of the Man- 
chus, he was elected national vice-president, but he remained for 
many months at Wuchang, where he displayed great strength 
and skill in the successful handling of an uneasy situation. He 
frequently stood as a mediator between President Yuan and the 
revolutionary leaders, and when the latter resorted to rebellion 
in 1913 he refused to join them. His loyalty and that of Tutuli 
Chi Jui of Chekiang Province defeated every hope which the 
rebels may have had of success. After the rebellion he removed 
to Peking, where, as vice-president, chief of staff, and chairman 
of the Council of State, he has actively supported the President. 
To the official connection a family tie has recently been added 
through the betrothal of a daughter of Li Yuan-hung to a son 
of Yuan Shih-kai. 



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 409 

During the agitation for the restoration of the monarchy 
General Li has maintained a neutral attitude. 



LIANG CH'I-CH'AO 

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao is a native of Sun-wai District in Kwang- 
tung Province. He early acquired a reputation as a scholar 
and became one of the foremost disciples of K'ang Yu-wei. He 
obtained a knowledge of Western subjects from books trans- 
lated by early missionaries. Gifted with a brilliant mind and 
enlightened by his studies, he was quick to perceive that if 
China was to retain her place in the world, she must change her 
methods, and, following the example of his master, he became an 
enthusiastic and an ardent reformer. Together with others he 
started a college in Hunan known as the Se-wu Shui-tong, 
where Western subjects were taught along with the Chinese 
classics. It was in this college that the now prominent leader 
of the Yunnan rebellion, Tsai-Ao, first came under Liang's in- 
fluence. 

When, after the Chino-Japanese War, K'ang Yu-wei became 
the confidential adviser to the Emperor Kwang-hsii, Liang was 
called to Peking and became editor of a daily paper, a small 
leaflet containing only editorials, intended to enlighten the con- 
servative officials. The reform program which the Emperor 
undertook became too radical and the Empress Dowager seized 
the reins of government and scattered the reformers. Liang 
escaped to Japan. There he established a periodical called 
Public Opinion, and later the Popular Enlightenment Maga- 
zine. Both of these papers were devoted to the cause of reform. 
They were widely read and were especially popular among the 
student class and the officials. 

When Yuan Shih-kai appointed his first cabinet under the old 
regime, Liang was off^ered, but refused to accept, the post of 
Vice-Minister of Justice. Returning to China after the revo- 
lution, he established and edited at Tien-tsin a paper called 
Justice. A member successively of the Pao Huang Hui, the 



410 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Ming-chu Tang, and the Kung-ho Tang, when the Chin-pu Tang 
(Progressive Party) was organized Liang became one of the 
directors. In Hsiung Hsi-Hng's cabinet of "talents" he became 
Minister of Justice. Having resigned from this position, he 
was made Chief of the Bureau for the Reform of the Currency, 
and later a member of the Council of State. He was in July, 
1915, appointed a member of the Committee of Ten for the 
drafting of the constitution. 

When the return-to-monarchy agitation began to make head- 
way Liang resigned his offices and came out in opposition to the 
movement. Although he had always, until the Republic was 
established, advocated constitutional monarchy, he objects to 
revolution. 

Brilliant and respected, but a philosopher and idealist rather 
than a politician or practical statesman, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao has 
probably done more toward the introduction of new ideas and 
Western learning to his people than has any other one man. 
Whatever his political attitude, his opinions always command 
intelligent and thoughtful consideration. 

SUN YAT-SEN 

Sun Yat-sen was born in Houng-shan, Kwang-tung, in 1867. 
His father, a humble Cantonese, migrated to the Hawaiian 
Islands, and thus Sun's boyhood was spent in Honolulu, where 
he began his education. He later continued his studies at Can- 
ton and Hongkong, taking his Doctorate in Medicine at Hong- 
kong. 

He early identified himself with the Young China party 
and became the leader In planning an uprising in 1895 at Can- 
ton. The conspiracy failed and Sun fled to Macao, whence he 
went abroad to promote revolutionary sentiment. In 1896 he 
was kidnaped in London at the orders of the Chinese Minister 
and was imprisoned in the Chinese legation, whence it was 
planned to send him home secretly ; but his release was effected 
through the intervention of the British government. He spent 



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 411 

the next fifteen years traveling among Chinese all over the 
world as a revolutionary propagandist. In Japan, he organ- 
ized the revolutionary party known as the Tung-meng Hui, of 
which he became the recognized leader. 

When the revolution broke out, he hastened back to China 
and, arriving at an opportune moment, he was made President 
in the provisional government at Nanking. In order to make 
peace with the North, he resigned, yielding the national presi- 
dency to Yuan Shih-kai. Soon after, he was appointed Chief 
of the National Railway Bureau "to consider and draft plans 
for a national system of railways," but as he participated in the 
rebellion of 1913 his office was then abolished. Upon the defeat 
of the rebels he fled to Japan, where he is said to be engaged in 
planning another revolutionary movement. 

HUANG HSING 

Huang Hsing was born in Hunan. He studied in the Liang- 
hu College established by the famous Viceroy Chang Chih-tung. 
Later he went to Japan. There he soon became closely asso- 
ciated with the revolutionary leaders. With Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 
he organized the Tung-meng Hui. By temperament a man of 
action, he was concerned in several abortive attempts to start a 
revolution. Soon after the outbreak at Wuchang in 1911, he 
was placed in command of the revolutionary forces at Han- 
yang, whence he made his escape when the place was about to 
be captured by the Imperial troops. 

In the provisional government at Nanking, Huang was made i 
Minister of War and Commander-in-chief of one of the divi- 
sions formed for the purpose of marching on Peking. When 
Yuan Shih-kai became provisional president, he was appointed 
Resident-General at Nanking. When, shortly, this post was 
abolished, he was given the directorship of the Szechuen, Canton 
and Hankow railways. He took a leading part in the rebellion 
of 1913, of which he assumed the direction; but upon the invest- 
ment of Nanking by the government forces, he fled to Japan. 



412 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Last year he made an extended tour of the United States. In 
exile, he, like Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is understood to be planning 
another revolution ; but the two leaders seem to be not entirely 
in accord as to policies and methods. 



APPENDIX I 

MEMORANDUM ON GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS, SUB- 
MITTED BY DR. FRANK J. GOODNOW, CON- 
STITUTIONAL ADVISER TO THE CHI- 
NESE GOVERNMENT, TO PRESI- 
DENT YUAN SHIH-KAI. ^ 

The determination in a given country of the form of govern- 
ment established therein has seldom if ever been the result of 
the conscious choice of the people of the country or even of the 
choice of its most intelligent classes. The establishment on the 
one hand of a monarchy or on the other haM of a republic has 
in almost all instances been due to influences almost beyond 
human control. The former history of the country, its tradi- 
tions, its social and economic conditions all have either 
favored the form of government which has been adopted, or, in 
case the form of government at first adopted has not been in 
harmony therewith, have soon brought it about that that form 
is replaced by one which is better suited to the country's needs. 

In other words, the form of government which a country 
usually possesses is for the most part determined by the necessi- 
ties of practical life. Among the contributing causes which fix 
forms of government, one of the most important is force. 
Almost all monarchies thus owe their origin in last analysis to 
the exertions of some one man who has been able to organize the 
material power of the country in such a way as to overcome all 
competitors. If he has able sons or male relatives, if he has 
ruled wisely and if the conditions of the country have been such 
as to favor monarchical rule, he may be able to establish a 

^ As printed in the Far Eastern Bevierv, August, 1915, pp. 
103-105. 

413 



414 APPENDIX 

dynasty which will during a long period successfully govern the 
country. 

Under such conditions one of the most perplexing problems 
of government is probably more satisfactorily solved than has 
usually been the case in republics. For on the death of the 
monarch there is no question as to the succession to the execu- 
tive power. No election or other method of choosing a suc- 
cessor is necessary. As the English law expresses it: "The 
King is dead, Long live the King." In order, however, that 
the desired result may be attained, it is absolutely necessary 
that the law of succession be clearly determined and practically 
universally accepted, else the death of the monarch will bring 
into being numerous aspirants for the throne whose conflicting 
claims can be adjudicated only by resort to civil war. 

History would seem to prove, furthermore, that the only per- 
manently satisfactory solution of the question of succession in 
monarchical states is that which has been reached by the states 
of Europe. This consists in fixing the succession to the throne 
upon the eldest son of the monarch or, in default of sons, upon 
the nearest oldest male relative. Under this method he who is 
by the law of succession entitled to the throne is permitted to 
waive his rights, in which case, if it is the eldest son who has so 
waived his rights, the next eldest son takes his place. 

If some such method of fixing the succession is not adopted, 
if, for example, the succession to the throne is left to the de- 
termination of the monarch, who may choose as his successor 
a son not the eldest, or some other relative not the nearest 
eldest male relative, the uncertainty as to the succession is 
almost certain to produce trouble. Palace intrigues in favour 
of the various claimants to the throne are sure to develop which 
both embitter the closing days of the monarch's life and often 
lead to confusion if not civil war after his death. 

The advantages which history would seem to show are at- 
tendant upon a monarchy as compared with a republic, so far 
as concerns this important question of succession to the execu- 
tive power, are thus, it would seem, conditioned very largely 



APPENDIX 415 

upon the adoption of that law of succession which experience 
has shown to be the best, that is succession in the eldest nearest 
male line. 

EUROPEAN REPUBLICS 

Until recently the accepted form of government both in Asia 
and Europe was monarchical. It is true that in Europe, con- 
trary to the usual rule, there were a few republics, such as 
Venice and Switzerland. But the states possessing a Repub- 
lican Government were few in number and small in- size. In 
almost all the important states of the world the government 
was monarchical in character. 

Within the last hundred and fifty years, however, there is 
noticeable among European peoples a distinct movement away 
from monarchical and in favor of Republican Government. 
The first attempt to establish Republican Government in any of 
the large European states was made in England in the 17th 
century. After a successful revolution Charles I, the English 
King, was tried by Parliament, convicted of treason and exe- 
cuted. A republic, the so-called "Commonwealth," was estab- 
lished with Oliver Cromwell as "Protector" or President, Crom- 
well obtained his power as a result of his control of the revolu- 
tionary army which had defeated the forces of the crown. 

This Early English republic lasted only a few years and fell 
as a result of the difficulties attendant upon the question of the 
succession to the Protectorate which arose on Cromwell's death. 
But either because the English people were not suited to a 
republic or because Richard Cromwell did not have the char- 
acteristics required of the possessor of executive power, this 
attempt to continue the English republic was a failure, and 
England abandoned the republican and reestablished the mon- 
archical form of government. Charles II, the son of the exe- 
cuted Charles I, was p'lt upon the throne, largely as the result 
of the support of the arm}'^ but with the almost universal ap- 
proval of the English people. 

The next attempt to form a republic among European peo- 



416 APPENDIX 

pies was made after the American revolution at the end of the 
18th century when the United States of America was formed. 
The American revolution was due not so much to an attempt 
to overthrow monarchical government as to a desire upon the 
part of the English colonies in America to obtain their inde- 
pendence of England. The success of this revolution brought, 
however, in its train, almost necessarily, the establishment of 
republican government. There was no royal family left in the 
country to which its government might be entrusted. There 
was, furthermore, in the country a distinct sentiment in favor 
of a republic due in large measure to the fact that quite a large 
number of those who had participated in the establishment of 
the ill-fated Enghsh repubhc in the preceding century had 
come to America and had exerted even after their death an in- 
fluence in favor of republican institutions. 

It is, however, possible that George Washington, who had 
led the American armies during the revolution, might have, if 
he had been so inclined, established himself as king. He was, 
however, in principle a republican rather than a monarchist. 
He furthermore had no son who, had he been crowned king, 
could have succeeded him. 

The result was that, when the United States obtained its 
independence, it definitely adopted the republican form of gov- 
ernment which has lasted during a century and a quarter. The 
unquestioned success which has attended the United States 
during most of its existence has done much to give to the 
republican form of government the prestige which it now pos- 
sesses. It is well, however, to remember that the United States 
inherited from England the principles of constitutional and 
parliamentary government and that these principles had been 
apphed in America for a century or more before the republic 
was established. The change from the form of government 
which was in force during the colonial period to the republic 
adopted in 1789 was not therefore anything in the nature of a 
change from autocracy to a republic. Such change as was 
made had been preceded by a long period of preparation and 



APPENDIX 417 

discipline in self-government. Furthermore, the American peo- 
ple even of that day possessed a high grade of general intelli- 
gence, owing to the attention which had from the very begin- 
ning of American history been given to the common schools, 
where almost every child could learn at any time to read and 
write. 

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

The establishment of the American Republic was followed 
almost immediately by the formation of the French Republic. 
The government of France prior to the declaration of the re- 
public had been autocratic. Almost all public powers were 
centered in the crown and the people participated hardly at all 
in the administration. The French people had thus had little 
experience in self-government and were therefore unable to 
carry on successfully the republic which th-^y endeavored to 
establish. Periods of disorder followed by military dictator- 
ships followed in rapid succession. The monarchy was re- 
stored after the fall of Napoleon largely as the result of foreign 
intervention. A revolution in 1830 brought into being a more 
liberal monarchy. This was overthrown by a revolution in 
1848, when a republic was again established. The President of 
this Republic, the nephew of the great Napoleon, overthrew it 
and declared himself Emperor. After the Franco-Prussian 
War in 1870, he was deposed and the present French Republic 
came into being. This republic has now lasted nearly half a 
century and gives every evidence of permanence. 

It is well to remember, however, that the present perma- 
nence of republican institutions in France was secured only 
after nearly a century of political change, if not disorder, and 
that during that century serious attempts had been made both 
to give the people generally that education upon which intelli- 
gent political action must be based and to accustom them by 
participation in public affairs to the exercise of powers of self- 
government. 

The French, like the Americans, would appear to have solved 



418 APPENDIX 

successfully the most difficult problem in republican govern- 
ment, that is, the succession to the executive power. In France 
the President is elected by the legislature. In the United 
States he is elected by the people. In both France and the 
United States the people have had long experience in self- 
government through participation in public affairs, while in 
both countries, during the past half century particularly, great 
attention has been paid to their general education through 
schools in many cases supported by the government. The re- 
sult is that the grade of intelligence of the people in both 
America and France is, comparatively speaking, high. 

THE LATIN REPUBLICS 

The examples given in the latter part of the 19th century 
by the United States and France were very largely followed in 
South and Central America at the time the former Spanish col- 
onies in this part of the world achieved their independence. As 
was the case in the United States when it became independent 
a repubhc seemed the only practicable form of government 
which could then be adopted. There was no royal family to 
which the people might look for guidance. 

The success which had been attendant upon the establish- 
ment of a republic in North America had caused the belief to 
be entertained by many thinkers, both that a republic was the 
best form of government and that its establishment and main- 
tenance were possible under all conditions and among all peo- 
ples. Republics were therefore established almost everywhere 
throughout South and Central America. But, either because of 
the disorders which were incident to the long struggle for inde- 
pendence or because of the difficulties inherent in a republican 
form of government among a low grade of intelligence, due to 
the lack of general education, and accustomed only to auto- 
cratic rule, the South and Central American republics have 
not been generally successful. For years after the independ- 
ence of the Spanish colonies was achieved South and Central 



APPENDIX 419 

America was the scene of continual disorder, incident for the 
most part to the struggles of military leaders for political 
power. At times there were periods of comparative peace due 
to the success of some extraordinarily strong man who was 
able to seize and keep in his hands political power. Little if 
any attempt was for a long time made by any of those who 
obtained political power to educate the people generally 
through the establishment of schools or to aid them in the 
acquisition of political experience by according them participa- 
tion in the government. The result was that when the strong 
hand which controlled the country was relaxed, owing either 
to the increasing age or death of him who possessed political 
power, disorder again appeared, due to the struggles of the 
claimants for the political succession — since no satisfactory 
solution of the question of succession was reached. Whatever 
progress the comitry had been able to make during its period of 
peace was arrested and not infrequently the anarchy and chaos 
which followed caused a serious deterioration in the economic 
and social conditions of the country. 

What has happened in Mexico recently has too often been 
the lot of the Central and South American States under a 
republican form of government not suited to their stage of 
economic and political development. Under the government of 
Diaz, who acquired political power through his control of the 
army, it seemed as if Mexico had successfully solved the prob- 
lem of government. Diaz, however, did little for the education 
of the people and discouraged rather than encouraged their 
participation in the government. When increasing age caused 
him to relax his control, revolution broke out again and he 
fell from power. Since his loss of power the country has been 
devastated by the contending armies of rival leaders, and at 
present it would seem that its salvation is possible only as the 
result of foreign intervention. 

It is, of course, true that in some of the South American 
countries progress is apparently being made in solving the 
problems of republican government. Such countries are par- 



420 APPENDIX 

ticularly Argentine, Chile, and Brazil. In both Argentine and 
Chile a long period of disorder and disturbance has been fol- 
lowed by a comparatively long period of peace. In Brazil the 
establishment of the republic, about twenty-five years ago, was 
accompanied by little trouble and the subsequent life of the 
republic has been a peaceful one. In all three countries con- 
siderable progress has been made in the establishment of con- 
stitutional government, in Argentine and Chile as one of the 
results of the struggles of the early part of the nineteenth 
century, in Brazil, partly, at any rate, during the Empire 
which preceded the present republic, and which encouraged the 
participation of the people in the government of the country. 

LESSONS FROM REPUBLICAN EXPERIENCE 

The experience of the South and Central American countries 
would seem to inculcate the same lessons which may be derived 
from the experience of the United States and France. These 
are : 

1st. — That the difficult problem of the succession to execu- 
tive power in a republic may be solved by a people which has 
a high general intelligence due to the existence of schools 
where general education may be obtained and which has learned 
to exercise political power through participation in the affairs 
of government; and 

2nd. — That little hope may be entertained of the successful 
solution of the question of Presidential succession in a country 
where the intelligence of the people is not high and where the 
people do not acquire political wisdom by sharing in the exer- 
cise of political power under some form of constitutional gov- 
ernment. Where such conditions do not exist a repubhcan 
form of government — that is, a government in which the execu- 
tive is not hereditary — generally leads to the worst possible 
form of government, namely, that of the military dictator. 
The best that can be hoped for under such a system is periods 
of peace alternating with periods of disorder during which the 



APPENDIX 421 

rival claimants for political power are striving among them- 
selves for the control of the government. 

GREAT POWERS WILL NOT PERMIT DISORDER 

At the present time, it may further be remarked, it is very 
doubtful whether the great powers of the European world will 
permit the government of the military dictator permanently to 
exist, if it continues to be accompanied by the disorder which 
has been its incident in the past. The economic interests of the 
European world have grown to be so comprehensive, European 
capital and European commercial and industrial enterprises 
have become so wide in their ramifications that the governments 
of the foreign countries interested, although caring httle what 
may be the form of government adopted by the nations with 
which they deal, are more and more inclined to insist, where 
they have the power, that conditions of peace shall be main- 
tained in order that they may receive what they consider to be 
the proper returns on their investments. This insistence they 
are more and more liable to carry to the point of actual de- 
struction of the political independence of offending nations and 
of direct administration of their government if this is necessary 
to the attainment of the ends desired. 

It is therefore becoming less and less likely that countries 
will be permitted in the future to work out their own salvation 
through disorder and revolution, as may have been the case 
during the past century with some of the South American 
countries. Under modern conditions countries must devise 
some method of government under which peace will be main- 
tained or they will have to submit to foreign control. 

CHINA'S NEEDS CONSIDERED 

The question naturally presents itself: How do these con- 
siderations affect the present political situation of China.'' 

China is a country which has for centuries been accustomed 



422 APPENDIX 

to autocratic rule. The intelligence of the great mass of its 
people is not high, owing to the lack of schools. The Chinese 
have never been accorded much participation in the work of 
government. The result is that the political capacity of the 
Chinese people is not large. The change from autocratic to 
republican government made four years ago was too violent to 
permit the entertainment of any very strong hopes of its imme- 
diate success. Had the Tsing dynasty not been an alien rule 
which it had long been the wish of the Chinese people to over- 
throw, there can be little doubt that it would have been better 
to retain the dynasty in power and gradually to introduce con- 
stitutional government in accordance with the plans outlined by 
the commission appointed for this purpose. But the hatred of 
alien rule made this impossible and the establishment of a re- 
public seemed at the time of the overthrow of the Manchus to be 
the only alternative available. 

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that China has during the 
last few years been attempting to introduce constitutional gov- 
ernment under less favorable auspices than would have been 
the case had there been a royal family present which the 
people regarded with respect and to which they were loyal. 
The great problem of the presidential succession would seem 
still to be unsolved. The present arrangement cannot be 
regarded as satisfactory. When the present President lays 
down the cares of office there is great danger that the diffi- 
culties which are usually incident to the succession in countries 
conditioned as is China will present themselves. The attempt 
to solve these (difficulties may lead to disorders which if long 
continued may seriously imperil the independence of the coun- 
try. 

What uniler these conditions should be the attitude of those 
who have the welfare of China at heart? Should they advocate 
the continuance of the Republic or should they propose the 
establishment of a monarchy.'' 

.These are difficult questions to answer. It is of course not 
susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is better suited than a 



APPENDIX 423 

republic to China. China's history and traditions, her social 
and economic conditions, her relations with foreign powers all 
make it probable that the country would develop that con- 
stitutional government which it must develop if it is to pre- 
serve its independence as a state, more easily as a monarchy 
than as a republic. 

But it is to be remembered that the change from a republic 
to a monarchy can be successfully made only on the condi- 
tions : — 

1st. — That the change does not meet with such opposition 
either on the part of the Chinese people or of foreign powers 
as will lead to the recurrence of the disorders which the pres- 
ent republican government has successfully put down. The 
present peaceful conditions of the country should on no ac- 
count be imperiled. 

2nd. — The change from republic to monarchy would be of 
little avail if the law of succession is not so fixed that there 
will be no doubt as to the successor. The succession should not 
be left to the Crown to determine, for the reasons which have 
already been set forth at length. It is probably of course true 
that the authority of an emperor would be more respected than 
the authority ' of a president. The people have been accus- 
tomed to an emperor. They hardly know what a president is. 
At the same time it would seem doubtful if the increase of 
authority resulting from the change from President to Em- 
peror would be sufficient to justify the change, if the question 
of the succession were not so securely fixed as to permit of no 
doubt. For this is the one greatest advantage of the mon- 
archy over the republic. 

3rd. — In the third place it is very doubtful whether the 
change from republic to monarchy would be of any lasting 
benefit to China, if provision is not made for the development 
under the monarchy of the form of constitutional government. 
If China is to take her proper place among nations greater 
patriotism must be developed among the people and the gov- 
ernment must increase in strength in order to resist foreign 



424 APPENDIX 

aggression. Her people will never develop the necessary 
patriotism unless they are given greater participation in the 
government than they have had in the past. The government 
never will acquire the necessary strength unless it has the 
cordial support of the people. This it will not have unless 
again the people feel that they have a part in the government. 
They must in some way be brought to think of the government 
as an organization which is trying to benefit them and over 
whose actions they exercise some control. 

Whether the conditions which have been set forth as neces- 
sary for such a change from republic to monarchy as has been 
suggested are present, must of course be determined by those 
who both know the country and are responsible for its future 
development. If these conditions are present there can be 
little doubt that the change would be of benefit to the coun- 
try. 



APPENDIX II 

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT YUAN SHIH-KAI TO THE 
COUNCIL OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 6, 1915. 

It is now four years since the people have entrusted me 
with the high office of President of the Chinese RepubHc. 
Moved by the fear that the task might be beyond my capacity, 
I have labored, during the past troublous years, under much 
anxiety and misgiving and have looked forward to the time 
when I might be relieved of the pressing burdens of the State 
and permitted to retire from the same. 

But while I occupy my present position, it is my imperative 
duty and responsibility to protect the country and the people. 
It is my special duty to maintain the Republic as the existing 
form of government. Many citizens from the provinces have 
been lately petitioning the Tsan Cheng Yuan in its capacity of 
the Li Fa Yuan calling for a change of the form of the present 
government of the country. But this is incompatible with the 
position that I hold as President. Since, however, the office of 
the President is conferred by the people, the same must depend 
on the will of the people. And since the Tsan Cheng Yuan in 
its capacity of the Li Fa Yuan is an independent body and is 
therefore free from external interference, I ought not — strictly 
considered — to express or communicate any views (on the issue 
raised by the aforesaid petitioners) to the people of the coun- 
try or to the Tsan Cheng Yuan in its capacity of the Li Fa 
Yuan. Inasmuch as any alteration in the form of government 
makes and involves an important and radical change in the 
Executive Power^ — and since I am the Chief of the Executive — 
I feel that it is impossible for me to observe silence, even though 
my speech may expose my motives to the risk of misinterpreta- 
tion, 

425 



426 APPENDIX 

In my opinion a change in the form of government carries 
with it such a momentous alteration in the manifold relations 
of the State that the same is a matter which demands and exacts 
the most careful and serious consideration. If the change is 
decided on in too great a haste, grave obstacles will arise. The 
duty being mine to maintain the general situation, I have to 
state that I regard the proposed change as unsuitable to the 
circumstances of the country. 

As to the aforesaid petition of the citizens, it is obvious 
that the object of the petitioners is precisely to strengthen and 
secure the foundation of the State and to increase the prestige 
of the country; and it is not to be doubted that if the opinion 
of the majority of the people of the country is consulted, good 
and proper means will assuredly be found. 

Furthermore, it is not uncertain that a suitable and prac- 
ticable law will be devised, if due consideration of the conditions 
of the country and careful thought and ripe discussion enter 
into the preparation of the Constitution of the Republic which 
is now being drafted. 

I commend this to your attention, gentlemen of the Tsan 
Cheng Yuan, in your capacity as acting members of the Li Fa 
Yuan. 



APPENDIX III 

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT YUAN SHIH-KAI MAKING 

PUBLIC A MEMORIAL FROM THE COUNCIL OF 

STATE, OCTOBER 11, 1915.i 

I, the President, have received the following document from 
the Council of State : — 

"Formerly, prompted by the petitions, amounting to 82 in 
number, from different organs and organizations throughout 
the country advocating a change of the present form of gov- 
ernment, the Council made a suggestion to the President re- 
questing that the convocation of the National Convention be 
accelerated, or another proper and adequate means be devised 
to consult the will of the people for the fundamental solution. 
In reply the President stated that, as this question was of 
grave importance, too much consideration could not be given 
to it, and it would be better to have the problem solved by the 
convocation of the National Convention so that the wishes of 
the people might be secured. 

"But since the receipt of the aforesaid 82 petitions, this 
Council has again received shower after shower of petitions 
from the representatives of the various bodies all over the prov- 
inces. . . . They are of unanimous opinion that as China has 
for more than 2,000 years been accustomed to the monarchical 
form of government, in the minds of the people the king is the 
only person who commands respect. The republican form of 
government adopted in 1911 is unsuitable to the needs and 
conditions of the country, and as a result the hearts of the 
people are in uncertainty and the country is in a wavering 
state. . . . China has not yet recovered from the injuries sus- 

^ Peking Daily News, October 12, 1915. 

427 



428 APPENDIX 

tained during the revolution, the means of livelihood of the 
people urgently call for improvement, and the political affairs 
of the country demand proper efficient administration. The 
adoption of a constitutional monarchy is the only means to 
remedy the situation and to secure permanent peace. 

"Numerous poKtical scholars of foreign nations also hold 
the view that China is not suited to a republican form of gov- 
ernment. The whole people are calling aloud for the establish- 
ment of a constitutional monarchy as a means of saving the 
country. Public opinion can not be ignored, and the funda- 
mental solutions should immediately be found. The time for 
the convocation of the National Convention is too far distant. 
Besides, this is an organ for the ratification of the Constitution, 
and, should the form of the state be not immediately settled, in 
what way can the New Constitution be drafted? This house, 
therefore, requests that a proper and large organ be devised at 
an early date for consulting the true desire of the people in the 
fundamental solution of this weighty problem. 

"In remembrance of the previous suggestions we made and 
the procedure recommended by the President, it seems not ad- 
visable for us to make any new suggestions, but owing to 
repeated petitions of the people, we have again held meetings 
for the discussion of the matter. The house is of opinion that 
this great question should be solved by a special organ. For 
the country belongs to the people and the opinion of the people 
regarding the form of the government should receive careful 
consideration. Since the people are now entreating for a 
speedy solution of the problem, it is natural that special means 
should be devised by the government for the purpose so that 
the opinions of the people may be respected. Moreover, this 
request of the petitioners is in conformity with our previous 
suggestion to the President that some other proper means 
should be devised to consult the will of the people. It is also 
consistent with the opinion of the President that deliberation 
should be exercised in solving this great question. 

"According to the Second Clause of the First Article of the 



APPENDIX 429 

Constitutional Compact, the question relating to the form of 
the government shall be decided entirely by the people. Now 
this Council has decided the regulations governing the forma- 
tion of the Citizens' Representative Convention, the members 
of which will be the successful candidates of the primary elec- 
tion for the National Convention, for the settlement of the 
fundamental question. In this way, representatives may be 
elected from all parts of the country, from the provinces as 
well as from the special administrative districts and Manchuria, 
Mongolia, and Tibet. By virtue of this Convention the true 
desire of the entire body of the citizens in connection with the 
solution of the problem can be satisfactorily ascertained. 
Herewith a number of petitions from various quarters and a 
copy of the regulations for promulgation." 

Besides the promulgation of the law on the organization of 
the Citizens' Representative Convention, I hereby promulgate 
the above document so that the people may iinow it. 



APPENDIX IV 

LAW FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CITIZENS' 
REPRESENTATIVE CONVENTION. ^ 

Art. 1.- — The question regarding the change in the form of 
government, which has been raised as a result of the petitions 
of the entire body of citizens, shall be decided by the members 
of the Convention of Citizens' Representatives. 

Art. 2. — The members for the Convention shall be elected by 
the system of single balloting with the name, and those who 
have secured the majority of votes shall be declared as elected. 

Art. S. — The Convention of Citizens' Representatives shall 
be composed as follows : — 

(a) The number of representatives from each province or 
each special administrative area shall be the same as the num- 
ber of districts the province or the special administrative area 
contains. 

(b) Outer and Inner Mongolia shall elect altogether thirty- 
two representatives, namely, two for each league. 

(c) Tibet shall elect twelve representatives. 

(d) Chinghai shall elect four representatives. 

(e) The Manchu, Mongolian and Han Banners shall elect 
altogether twenty-four (eight each). 

(f) The Mohammedan population shall elect four repre- 
sentatives. 

(g) The Chambers of Commerce in the country and Chinese 
residents abroad shall elect altogether sixty representatives. 

(h) Those who have rendered meritorious services to the 
country shall elect thirty representatives. 



^Peking Daily News, October 8^ 1915. 

430 



APPENDIX 431 

(i) Recognized learned scholars shall elect twenty repre- 
sentatives. 

Art. 4. — The members for the Convention of Citizens' Repre- 
sentatives for the provinces and special administrative areas 
shall be elected by the successful candidates of the primary 
election for the Citizens' Convention elected with the double 
balloting, system. 

Art. 5. — The representatives of the people in Mongolia, 
Tibet and Chinghai shall be elected from among the successful 
candidates of the single ballot election by the Combined Elec- 
torate of Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai for the Citizens' Con- 
vention. 

Art. 6. — The representatives of the Manchu, Mongolian and 
Han Banners shall be elected by the successful candidates 
elected with the single ballot by the princes, dukes, hereditary 
nobles and other privileged personages belonging to the Special 
Central Electorate in connection with the Citizens' Convention. 

Art. 7. — The representatives of the Chambers of Commerce 
and the Chinese residents abroad shall be elected by the suc- 
cessful candidates of the single ballot election which was par- 
ticipated in by merchants, artisans and industrial captains 
possessing a capital of $10,000 or more who belong to the 
Special Central Electorate for the Citizens' Convention or 
those Chinese residents abroad possessing a capital of $30,000 
or more. 

Art. 8. — The representatives of those who have rendered 
meritorious services to the country shall be elected by the 
candidates who were elected by the voters who have done distin- 
guished service, belonging to the Special Central Electorate for 
the Citizens' Convention. 

Art. 9. — The representatives of recognized learned scholars 
shall be elected by the successful candidates elected by the 
single ballot election by the special Central Electorate for the 
Citizens' Convention — men who are learned, graduates from 
high schools or colleges after completing a course of not less 
than three years, those possessing the qualifications similar to 



432 APPENDIX 

the graduates named above and teachers who have taught for 
two or more years in the High or Higher Schools. 

All voters as mentioned from Art, 5 to the first class in this 
article shall be examined by the National Examination Com- 
mission, and if their qualifications are found all right, they 
are eligible to be voters. 

Art. 10. — The following rules shall govern the action of the 
election superintendents : — 

(a) In the provinces the superior officials shall jointly super- 
vise the election. 

(b) In the special administrative area, all the high officials 
shall jointly act as election superintendents and supervise the 
election. 

(c) Respecting clauses b, c and d of Article 3 the Director- 
General of the Bureau for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs shall 
act as superintendent. 

(d) In reference to clauses e, f, g, h, of Article 3, the Min- 
ister of Interior shall act as superintendent. 

Art. 11. — The voting stations shall be located at the places 
where the superintendents live. When the appointed date ar- 
rives, the superintendent shall summon the electorate by gath- 
ering those who have reported themselves, and the election shall 
then proceed. 

The superintendents of the provinces and the special admin- 
istrative areas may, if circumstances require, empower the 
magistrates to supervise the election of members for the Con- 
vention of Citizens' Representatives. 

Art. 12. — The date for the election of representatives for 
the Convention shall be decided by the superintendents them- 
selves. 

Art. 13, — The question as mentioned in Article 1 shall be 
decided by the ballot system with the name. The results of the 
elections shall be reported by the superintendents to the Acting 
Li Fa Yuan, which shall add together all the votes and find 
out the consensus of opinion in regard to the question of the 
change in the form of government. 



APPENDIX 433 

The balloting papers shall be forwarded under sealed cover 
to the acting Li Fa Yuan after they have been checked. 

The date for voting upon the question of the form of govern- 
ment shall be decided by the superintendents themselves. 

Art. 14. — The text of the question regarding the form of 
government to be voted upon shall be drawn up by the Acting 
Li Fa Yuan, which shall forward same to the Government and 
through the Government to the election superintendents, after 
having passed it. The text of the question shall be announced 
on the balloting day by the election superintendents to the 
representatives of the people. 

Art. 15. — The Bureau for the Preparation of the Citizens' 
Convention shall manage all affairs in connection with the elec- 
tion as mentioned in this law. 

Art. 16. — This law shall come into force on the day of its 
promulgation. 



APPENDIX V 
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN 

1874 Japan secured by treaty China's relinquishment of the 
Loochoo Islands. 

1875 Japan obtained from Russia the Southern Kurile 
Islands in exchange for the southern half of Saghalin. 

1876 Bonin Islands incorporated as a part of Japanese 
dominions. 

1879 The Loochoo Islands not already included in Kago- 

shima Prefectorate incorporated. 
1895 Formosa and the Pescadores ceded by China, after war, 

to Japan. 
1905 Saghalin seized during Russo-Japanese War. The por- 
tion south of the 50th parallel was ceded to Japan by 

the Portsmouth Treaty. 
1905 Russia's rights over Port Arthur, the Kwangtung 

Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway 

transferred to Japan. 
1910 Annexation of Korea. 
1914 (October) Seizure of German insular colonies in the 

Pacific. 

1914 (November) Capture of Kiaochow and seizure of all 
German holdings in Shantung Province, China, 

1915 (January) Demands upon China. (May) Agreements 
extending Japan's interests and holdings in Manchuria ; 
confirming Japan's rights in her newly acquired position 
in Shantung; and conceding various privileges in China 
and in connection with the Chinese administration. 

434 



APPENDIX VI 

JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS ON CHINA, TWENTY- 
FOUR IN ALL, PRESENTED APRIL 26, 1915. 

Group 1 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, 
being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern 
Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good 
neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the 
following articles : — 

Art. 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent 
to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may here- 
after agree with the German Government, relating to the dis- 
position of all rights, interests and concessions, which Ger- 
many, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to 
the Province of Shantung. 

Art. 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of 
Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be 
ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext. 

Art. 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards 
the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lung- 
kow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Ger- 
many is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo- 
V^eihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to 
negotiate for a loan. 

Art. 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of 
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China 
herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Prov- 
ince of Shantung as Commercial Ports. 

435 



436 APPENDIX 

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes) 

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and 
the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, 
but the Japanese Minister must be cons\ilted before making a 
decision. 

Group II 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, 
with a view to developing their economic relations in South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following 
articles : — 

Art. 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that 
the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of 
the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Rail- 
way, shall be extended to 99 years. 

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes) 

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in 
the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restorii g 
the South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in the 
91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original 
South Manchurian Railway Agreement that it may be redeemed 
by China after 36 years after the traffic is opened is hereby 
cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall 
expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007. 

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease or 
purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for 
trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enter- 
prises. 

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel 
in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture 
of any kind whatsoever. 

Art. 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding 
two articles, besides being required to register with the local 
authorities passports which they must procure under the exist- 
ing regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances 
and tax regulations, which are approved by the Japanese con- 



APPENDIX 437 

sul. Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japa- 
nese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul; 
those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and 
adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer 
can be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But 
mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land 
shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations 
conjointly, in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. 
When the judicial system in the said region is completely re- 
formed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese sub- 
jects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts. 
Art. 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 
The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall 
be permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect 
for and open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, 
apart from those mining areas in which mines are being pros- 
pected for or worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely 
settled, methods at present in force shall be followed. 

Provmce of Feng-Tien 



Locality. 


District 


Mineral 


Niu Hsin T'ai 


Pen-hsi 


Coal 


Tien Shih Fu Kou 


Pen-hsi 


(( 


Sha Sung Kang 


Hai-lung 


(( 


T'ieh Ch'ang 


T'ung-hua 


a 


Nuan Ti T'ang 


Chin 


a 


An Shan Chan region 


From Liao-yang 


to Pen-hsi Iron 


Province of 


Kirin (Southern Portion) 


Sha Sung Kang 


Ho-lung 


Coal and iron 


Kang Yao 


Chi-lin (Kirin) 


Coal 


Chia P'i Kou 


Hua-tien 


Gold 



Art. 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 
The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter 
provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if 



438 APPENDIX 

foreign capital is required, the Chinese Government agrees to 
negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first. 
Art. 5a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 
The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a for- 
eign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of South 
Manchuria (not including customs and salt revenue on the 
security of which loans have already been made by the Central 
Government), it will negotiate for the loan with Japanese capi- 
talists first. 

Art. 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 
The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign 
advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police 
matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will 
be employed first. 

Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a 
fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan 
Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan 
agreements made heretofore between China and foreign finan- 
ciers. If, in future, more advantageous terms than those in 
existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign finan- 
ciers, in connection with railway loans, the above agreement 
shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes. 

All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to 
Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this 
Convention, remain in force. 

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a 
foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of East- 
ern Inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese 
Government first. 

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself 
provide funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia ; if foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with 
Japanese Government first. 

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade 
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, 
as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner 



APPENDIX 439 

Mongolia as Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be 
opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, 
by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be 
consulted before making a decision. 

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to 
undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental 
thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission. 



Group III 

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company 
being very intimate, if those interested in the said Company 
come to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for co- 
operation, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its con- 
sent thereto. The Chinese Government further agrees that, 
without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, China will not 
convert the Company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it, 
nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than 
Japanese. 

Group IV 

China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with 
the following principle : — 

No bay, harbor, or island along the coast of China may be 
ceded or leased to any Power. 

Notes to Be Exchanged 



As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang 
to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang- 
Hangchow railway, and the Nanchang-Chaochow railway, if it 
is clearly ascertained that other Powers have no objection, 
China shall grant the said right to Japan. 



440 APPENDIX 

B 

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang 
to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang railway, a railway 
from Nanchang to Hangchow and another from Nanchang to 
Chaochow, the Chinese Government shall not grant the said 
right to any foreign Power before Japan comes to an under- 
standing with the other Power which is heretofore interested 
therein. 

Notes to Be Exchanged 

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is 
to be permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, 
a dock-yard, a coaling station for military use, or a naval base ; 
nor to be authorized to set up any other military establish- 
ment. The Chinese Government further agrees not to use 
foreign capital for setting up the above-mentioned construction 
or establishment. 

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows : — 

1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever, in future, it 
considers this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese ad- 
visers. 

2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire to lease or 
purchase land in the interior of China for establishing schools 
or hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its 
consent thereto. 

3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the Chi- 
nese Government wiU send military officers to Japan to nego- 
tiate with Japanese military authorities the matter of pur- 
chasing arms or that of establishing a joint arsenal. 

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows : — 
As relates to the question of the right of missionary propa- 
ganda, the same shaU be taken up again for negotiation in 
future. 



APPENDIX VII 

TREATY CLAUSES WITH REGARD TO THE INTEG- 
RITY OF KOREA AND CHINA AND THE 
MAINTENANCE OF THE OPEN DOOR 

Treaties and Agreements with Reference to Korea. 

I. Treaty, Japan-Korea — Aug. 26, 1894. (At the begin- 
ning of the war between Japan and China.) 

Article 1. "The object of the alliance is to maintain the 
independence of Korea on a firm footing and ..." 

II. Treaty (of Shimonoseki), Japan-China — April 17, 
1895. (At the end of the war.) 

Article 1. "China recognizes definitely the full and complete 
independence and autonomy of Korea." 

III. Agreement, Japan-Russia — ^April 25, 1898. 
Article 1. "The [two governments] recognize definitely the 

sovereignty and entire independence of Korea and pledge them- 
selves mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the 
internal affairs of that country." 

IV. Treaty, Korea-China — Sept. 11, 1899. 

Article 1. "There shall be perpetual peace and friendship 
between the Empire of Korea and the Empire of China. . . ." 

V. Treaty, England- Jap an (making the Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance) — Jan. 30, 1902. 

Preamble. "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, 
actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and gen- 
eral peace in the Extreme East, being, moreover, specially inter- 
ested in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of 
China and the Empire of Korea," and in securing equal oppor- 
tunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of 
all nations, hereby agree ..." 

441 



442 APPENDIX 

Article 1. "The High Contracting Parties, having mutually 
recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare them- 
selves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies 
in either country." 

VI. Convention, France-Russia — March 3, 1902. 

The two Governments "have received a copy of the Anglo- 
Japanese agreement of Jan. 30, 1902, concluded with the ob- 
ject of maintaining the status quo and the general peace in 
the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and 
Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and indus- 
try of all nations. . . . 

"The two Governments consider that the observance of these 
principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special in- 
terests in the Far East." 

VII. Rescript, by the Emperor of Japan, Feb. 10, 1904, 
(declaring war against Russia). 

"The integrity of Korea is a matter of gravest concern to 
this Empire, . . . the separate existence of Korea is essential 
to the safety of our realm. 

"... the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would ren- 
der it impossible to maintain the integrity of China, and 
would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for 
peace in the Extreme East. . . ." 

VIII. Protocol, Japan-Korea — Feb. 23, 1904. 
Article 1. "For the purpose of maintaining a permanent 

and solid friendship between Japan and Korea and firmly 
establishing peace in the Far East, the Imperial Government of 
Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of 
Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improve- 
ments in administration." 

Article 2. "The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a 
spirit of firm friendship insure the safety and repose of the 
Imperial House of Korea." 

Article 3. "The Imperial Government of Japan definitely 



APPENDIX 443 

guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Korean Empire." 

IX. Treaty, Great Britain-Japan — Aug. 12, 1905 (re- 
newing THE alliance). 

Article 3. "Japan possessing paramount political, military 
and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the 
right of Japan to take such measures ... in Korea as she 
may deem proper . ., . provided that such measures are not 
contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations." 

X. Treaty (of Portsmouth), Japan-Russia — Sept. 5, 05. 

Article 2. "The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledg- 
ing that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, mili- 
tary, and economic interests, engage neither to obstruct nor to 
interfere with the measures . . . which the Imperial Japanese 
Government may find it necessary to take m Korea," 

XI. Convention, Japan-Korea — Nov. 17, 1905. 
Preamble, The two governments, "desiring to strengthen the 

principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have . . . 
concluded : 

Article 1. "The Government of Japan . . . will hereafter 
have control and direction of the external relations and aiFairs 
of Korea ..." 

In 1906 Marquis Ito was made (Japanese) Resident-General 
in Korea. 

In 1907 Japan prevented the representatives of the Korean 
Emperor from being given a hearing at the Hague Conference. 

XII. Convention, Japan-Korea — July 24, 1907. 

"The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring speedily 
to promote the wealth and strength of Korea and with the ob- 
ject of promoting the prosperity of the Korean nation, have 
agreed ..." 

"1. In all matters relating to the reform of the Korean 
administration the Korean Government shall receive instruc- 
tions and guidance from the [Japanese] Resident-General . . . 



444. APPENDIX 

"4. In all appointments and removals of high officials the 
Korean Government must obtain the consent of the Resident- 
General. 

"5. The Korean Government shall appoint to be officials of 
Korea any Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident- 
General. 

"6. The Korean Government shall not appoint any for- 
eigners to be officials of Korea without consulting the Resident- 
General." 

In 1908 Prince Ito declared publicly that it was no part of 
Japan's purpose to annex Korea. 

In 1909 Prince Ito declared that Korea must be "amalga- 
mated" with Japan. 

XIII. Treaty, Japan-Korea— Aug. 22, 1910. 

Article 1. "His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes com- 
plete and permanent cession to his Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea." 

Article 2. "His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the 
cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the 
complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan." 

On Aug. 29, 1910, Japan formally declared Korea annexed 
to the dominions of his Imperial Majesty the Japanese Em- 
peror. 

Treaties and Agreements with Reference to the Integrity and 

Sovereign Rights of China, the "Open Door" Policy 

and "Equality of Opportunities." 

I. Circular kote of Secretary of State John Hay, 
FOR THE United States, sent on Sept. 6, 1899, to the diplo- 
matic representatives of the United Stx^tes at London, 
Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, and in November to 
Rome and Tokyo, asking the governments of the countries to 
which they were respectively accredited to make a "formal 
declaration of an 'open door policy' in the territories held by 
them in China." 



APPENDIX 445 

The request made of each government was that it: 

"First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or 
any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or 
leased territory it may have in China. 

"Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being 
shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such 
ports . . . (unless they be 'free ports'), . . . and that duties 
so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government. 

"Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels 
of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' 
than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no 
higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated 
within its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or 
subjects of other nationalities transported through such 
'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging 
to its own nationals transported over equrl distances." 

Each of the governments so addressed gave its assent to the 
principles suggested, whereupon Secretary Hay, having in 
hand and having compared the replies, sent, on March 20, 
1900, instructions mutatis mutandis, to the ambassadors to in- 
form the governments to which they were respectively accred- 
ited that in his opinion the six powers in question and the 
United States were mutually pledged to the policy of maintain- 
ing the commercial status quo in China, and of refraining each 
within what might be considered its "sphere of influence" from 
measures "calculated to destroy equality of opportunity." The 
seven powers thus mutually pledged were France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States. 
(The United States had, however, no special "sphere of influ- 
ence.") 

II. Circular telegram sent by Mr. Hay to the diplo- 
matic REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UnITED StATES AT BeRLIN, 

Brussels, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Paris, 

Rome, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, and Vienna, July 3, 1900. 

"... the pohcy of the Government of the United States is 

to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and 



446 APPENDIX 

peace to China, preserve China's territorial and administrative 
entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by 
treaty and international laws, and safeguard for the world the 
principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the 
Chinese Empire." 

III. Lord Salisbury, English Prime Minister, in an inter- 
view with the United States Ambassador to England, July 7, 
1900, "expressed himself most emphatically as concurring" in 
the policy of the United States as set forth in the above tele- 
gram. 

In a statement made in the English House of Commons, Aug. 
2, 1900, regarding the policy of the British Government, it 
was declared: 

"Her Majesty's Government are opposed to any partition of 
China, and believe that they are in accord with other powers 
in this declaration." 

IV. Agreement, Great Britain-Germany — Oct. 16, 1900. 
"1. It is a matter of joint and permanent international 

interest that the ports on the rivers and the littoral of China 
should remain free and open to trade and to every other legiti- 
mate form of economic activity for the nationals of all coun- 
tries without distinction, and the two agree on their part to 
uphold the same for all Chinese territory so far as they can 
exercise influence. 

"2. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial 
German Government will not on their part make use of the 
present complication to obtain for themselves any territorial 
advantages in Chinese dominions and will direct their policy 
toward maintaining undiminished the territorial conditions of 
the Chinese Empire." 

V. Mr. Hay, Oct. 29, 1900. 

"When the recent troubles were at their height this gov- 
ernment, on the 3d of July, once more made an announcement 
of its policy regarding impartial trade and the integrity of the 
Chinese Empire and had the gratification of learning that all 
the powers held similar views." 



APPENDIX U7 

As the above Note indicates, the eleven countries addressed 
by Secretary Hay in his telegram of July 3 had all signified in 
one way or another their approval of the principles to which he 
asked attention in that telegram. 

VI. For the Anglo-Japanese treaty of Aug. 12, 1902, 
SEE ABOVE, UNDER "Treaties . . . Korea," V. 

VII. Mr. Hay to United States Ambassadors to Ger- 
many, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Great Britain, 
Italy, and Portugal, Jan. 13, 1905 (during the Russo- 
Japanese war). 

"... the United States has repeatedly made its position 
well known and has been gratified at the cordial welcome ac- 
corded to its efforts to strengthen and perpetuate the broad 
policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the 'open door' 
in the Orient. . . . Holding these views, the United States dis- 
claims any sort of reserved territorial rights or control in the 
Chinese Empire, and it is deemed fitting to make this purpose 
frankly known and to remove all apprehension on this score so 
far as concerns the policy of this nation. . . . You will bring 
this matter to the notice of the Government to which you are 
accredited, and you will invite the expression of its views 
thereon." 

By Jan. 23 replies had been received from the Governments 
of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, 
and Italy, entirely agreeing with the position taken by the 
United States and declaring their constant adhesion to the 
policy of the integrity of China and the open door in the 
Orient. 

VIII. Treaty, Great Britain and Japan — Aug. 12, 1905 
(renewing the alliance). 

Preamble. "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan 
. . . have agreed upon the following articles, which have for 
their objects: 

"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general 
peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India ; 

"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all the 



448 APPENDIX 

powers in China by insuring the independence and the integrity 
of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities 
for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." 

For reference in this treaty to Korea see above, under 
"Treaties . . . Korea," IX. 

IX. Dispatch (accompanying a copy of the foregoing) 
FROM THE Marquis or Lansdowne to His Majesty's Minister 
at St. Petersburg, Sept. 6, 1905. 

"Sir: I inclose ... a copy of a new Agreement. . . . The 
Russian Government will, I trust, recognize that the new Agree- 
ment is an international instrument to which no exception can 
be taken by any of the powers interested in the affairs of the 
Far East. You should call special attention to the objects men- 
tioned in the Preamble as those by which the policy of the con- 
tracting parties is inspired. His Majest3^'s Government be- 
lieve that they may count upon the good will and the support 
of all the powers in endeavoring to maintain peace in Eastern 
Asia and in seeking to uphold the integrity and independence 
of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity 
for the commerce and the industry of all nations in that 
country." 

X. Treaty (of Portsmouth), Russia-Japan — Sept. 5, 
1905. (At the end of the Russo-Japanese War.) 

Article 3. "Japan and Russia mutually engage ... 2. To 
restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration 
of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or 
under the control of [their troops], with the exception of the 
territory above mentioned [the Liaotung peninsula]. 

"The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have 
not in Manchuria any territorial advantage or exclusive con- 
cessions in impairment of Chinese sovereigntj'^ or inconsistent 
with the principle of equal opportunity." 

Article 4. "Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to 
obstruct any general measures common to all countries which 
China may take for the development of the commerce and in- 
dustry of Manchuria." 



APPENDIX 449 

XI. Treaty — China-Japan — Dec. 22, 1905. 
(Confirming arrangements made in the Portsmouth Treaty.) 
Article 12. The two governments "engage that in all mat- 
ters dealt with in the treaty signed this day or in the present 
Agreement the most favorable treatment shall be reciprocally 
extended." 

XII. Convention, France-Japan — June 10, 1907. 
"The Governments of Japan and France, being agreed to 

respect the independence and integrity of China, as well as the 
principle of equal treatment in that country ..." 

XIII. Convention, Japan-Russia — July 30, 1907. 
Article 2. "The two High Contracting Parties recognize the 

independence and the territorial integrity of China and the 
principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the com- 
merce and industry of all nations in that Empire, and engage 
to sustain and defend the status quo and respect for this 
principle by all the pacific means within their reach." 

XIV. Exchange of Notes, Japan and the United States 
— ^November, 1908. 

1. "It is the wish of the two Governments . . . 

2. "They are also determined to preserve the common in- 
terests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific 
means at their disposal the independence and the integrity of 
China and the principle of equal opportunity ... in that 
Empire." 

XV. Convention, Japan-Russia — July 4, 1910. 

The two governments, "sincerely attached to the principles 
established by the convention concluded between them on July 
80, 1907, . . ." 

Article 2. "Each . . . engages to maintain and respect the 
status quo in Manchuria resulting from the treaties, conven- 
tions, and other arrangements concluded up to this day be- 
tween Japan and Russia, or between either of those two Powers 
and China." 

XVI. Treaty, Great Britain- Japan — July 13, 1911 
(renewing the alliance for the second time). 



450 APPENDIX 

Preamble : [The two governments declare as among their 
objects] : "The preservation of the common interests of all 
Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of 
the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for 
the commerce and industry of all nations in China." 



INDEX 



Abdication, Edict of, in China, 

16 
Address, the right of, in Japan, 

137 
Administrative Conference, 

China, 48 fF 
AlexiefF, Admiral, 208 
Alliance, Anglo-Japanese, 
(1902), 208, 247 
renewed (1905), 255 
results of, 208, 209 
Anglo- Japanese (1905), 210, 
365 
influence of, in the Euro- 
pean War (1914), 285 
second renewal of (1911)^ 

257 
secret treaty provision with 
China contrary to princi- 
ples of, 259 
See also Alliances; Treaties 
Alliances, 441. See also Treaties. 
American China Development 

Company, 11, 391, 392 
American Red Cross Society, 

388 
Americans in the Far East, 380 
American trade with China, 401 
Anhwei Party, China, 31, 67 
Army, in Japan, 165 

appropriations for, i n- 

creased (1915), 179 
contest of, for increase, l60 
cost of, 124 
request for increase of, 175 



Army, sentiment against appro- 
priations for, 149 
size of, 123 
Arnold, Julean H., 399 
Asia, European interests in, 353, 

354 
Assembly, first, in Japan, 118 

Banking system, in Japan, 126 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 

346, 349, 396 
"Bill of Rights," Japan, 144 
Bonin Islands, 197 
Boshin Club, Japan, 159 
Boxer uprising, 7, 207, 221, 236 
Boxer indemnity, 238, 387, 400 
British-American Tobacco Com- 
pany, 265 ff 
Bryan, Secretary of State, 394 
Budget, Japan, 135, 136, 142 

Japan (1915-1916), 189 
Bureaucracy, Japan, 148 
Burlingame, Anson, 384, 385 

Cabinet, in China, 24, 53 
in Japan, 132, 135 
description of, 140 
establishment of, 130 
powers of, 140, 141, 142 
provision for, in constitu- 
tion, 139 
responsibility of, 143 
Japan (1914), 172 
Japan (1915), 184 
Cabinets, Japan, 148 



451 



452 



INDEX 



California controversies7 the^, 

368, 369 
California, land law of 1913, 

370, 371 
California question, the, 379 
Canton-Hankow Railway, 11, 12 

See also Hukwang railways. 
Canton Party, China, 31, 67 
Cassini Convention, the, 223 
Censorate, China, 28 
Chang Chien, 78 
Chang Hsun, 81 
Changli incident (1913), 269 
Chao Ping-ehun, 76-77 
Chang Ping-lin, 75 
Charter Oath, Japan, 118 
Chemulpo, Convention of 

(1882), 201 
China, acceptance of Japan's 
terms by (1915), 331 
area of, 20 

attitude toward Japanese de- 
mands shown by (1915), 
319, 324,325 
boycott of United States 

goods by (1905), 383 
Citizens' Convention in, 93 
Constitutional Compact Con- 
ference in, 55, 57 
Constitutional reform in, 8 ff 
Constitution Committee in 

(1915), 87 
coolie trade in, 385 
damage claims against 

(1914). 390 
debt of, 8, 10, 398 
European interests in, 357 
government suited to, 85 
government under old regime 

in, 18 fF 
history of, 6 
integrity of, 441 ff 



China, integrity of, treaty 
clauses concerning, 
444 ff 
See also Integrity, 
loans to, 222, 391 
needs of, 97 
Non-alienation declarations of 

(1898), 227 
opening of, 216 
opium reform in, 388, 389 
opportunity for investment in, 

397-401 
party government not suited 

to, 86 
party politics in, 66 ff 
political parties in, 66 ff 
political needs of, 86 
population of, 20 
question of returning to mon- 
archy in, 87 ff 
revolution in, 3 ff 
scramble for concessions in, 

216 
statistics concerning, 398 
tariff in, 238-239 
and treaty powers, list of, 

218-219 
and the United States, 380 ff 
China Press, 399 
China Year Book, 24 
China's reply to revised de- 
mands (1915), 323 
Ching, Prince, 9 
Chino- Japanese War (1894), 

10, 204, 220, 391 
Chin-pu Tang, 44, 80, 81 
actual, 84 
organized, 77 
Choshiu Clan, 111, 112, 156 
armed resistance of, to the 

West, 110 
army controlled by, 148 



INDEX 



453 



Choshiu Clan, insistence of, on 
military expansion, 160 
reconciliation of, to foreign in- 
tercourse, 112 
Chou Dynasty, 19 
Chu Jui, 81 

Chuo Club, Japan, 159 
Chusei-kai, 177 
Citizens' Convention, China, 93 

law for, 430 
Clans, Japan, 148 

See also Choshiu; Satsuma. 
Colquhoun, A. R., 18 
Concessions from China to 
France, Russia, England, 
Germany, 222 ff 
Confucius, 26 
Constitution, China, 43 ff 
draft of (1913), 46 

old, 28 ff 
provisional (1912), 40 
provisional (1914), 48, 52 
permanent, method of 
drafting, 54 ff 
Japan, 128 ff 

Commission to draft, 121, 

129 
contents of, 130 
in effect (1889), 151 
promulgation of, 122, 130 
provision for amendment 
of, 145 
Constitutional Compact Confer- 
ence, China, 51 ff, 55, 57 
Constitutional reform, China, 

8 ff 
Contemporary relations, China, 
Japan, and the United 
States, 193 
Corrupt practices in Japan, in 
elections, 177 
in government, 173 



Council of state, China, 49, 54, 

93 
bill providing for election 

of convention passed by, 

93 
Committee of Ten appoint- 
ed by, 87 
creation of, 55 
petition by, sent to Yuan 

Shih-kai, 96 
powers of, 55, 57 
recommendation of, as to 

presidential election law, 

56 
recommendation of, as to 

restoration question, 93 
Coup d'etat, China (1898), 7, 

229 
Currency Loan Agreement, 

China (I9II), 393 
Cushing, Caleb, 381, 382 

Dalny, 243, 313, 335 

Dairen, 264, 277, 278 

Damage claims, against China, 

390 
Debt, China, 8, 10, 398 

Japan, 173 ff 
Diet, Japan, 122, 147 
actual, 177 

dissolution of (1914), 303 
functions of, 131, 132, 135 
lower house, 151 
selection of members of, 133 
special session (1915), 177, 
178 
Doshi-kai, 173, 177, 188 
organized, 163 

Education, in Japan, 124 
Elder Statesmen, Japan, 129, 
164, 165, 171 



454 



INDEX 



Elder Statesmen, Japan, guid- 
ing influence of, in polit- 
ical development of, 1S9 
history of, 164, 165 
influence of, 129, l65 
prominent members of, 139^ 

165 
reduced in numbers, 165 
work of, 139 
Election, Japan (March 25, 

1915), 176-177 
Election law, in Japan, 133 
Elections, China, 58 fi" 
Electoral qualifications, in Ja- 

pajti, 170 
Emperor, China, 26, 27 
obligation of, 27 
philosophical idea of, 26 
powers of, 29, 30, 31 
religious idea of, 27 
succession to the office, 27 
theory of divine right of, 
27 
of Japan, 131, 132 
influence of, 145 
resumes power (1868), 117 
Empire, Japan, on the road to, 

195, 434 
Empress Dowager, China, 7, 8, 
70, 229, 235 
change of attitude of, 240 
coup d'etat effected by 

(1898), 7, 70 
edict of, in regard to opium, 

389 
encouragement of Boxer up- 
rising by, 7, 8, 235 
part played by (1898), 7 
England, concessions from China 
(1897), 222, 223 
concessions from China 
(1898), 227 



Era, enlightened (Meiji), in Ja- 
pan, 160 
Extraterritoriality, in China, 
314, 315, 384 
in Japan, 120, 123 
removed, 123 

Famine relief, China, 388 

Far East, the peace of the, 

285 ff, 356, 357 
Far Eastern problem, impor- 
tance of, 404 
Far Eastern Review, the, quot- 
ed, 180, 301, 344, 347 
Feudalism, Japan, 115, 147 

abolished, 115 
Finance, Japan, 142, 173, 192 
annual appropriation for 

debt redemption, 175 
army and navy expendi- 
tures, 166, 179 
banking system, 126 
budget, 142 
foreign trade, 126 
national, 126, 127 
national debt, 173 
per capita wealth, 174 
present condition of, 18S, 

189 
present program of, 189 
Financial system, Japan, 135 
Five Powers Loan (1913), 394 
Foreign trade, Japan, 126 
Formosa, 195, 196, 349 

acquisition of, by Japan, 204 
controversy with Japan, 196 
murder of Loochoo Island 
sailors on coast of, 195 
Four Powers Loan, 392 
France, concessions from China 

to 222 
Franchise, in Japan, 133, 191 



INDEX 



455 



Fukien Province, 231, 845, 396 
declaration with regard to, se- 
cured by Japan, 227 
Japan demands special privi- 
leges in, 304 
notes with respect to, quoted, 

340 
policy of Japan with regard 

to, 351 
projected loan for, 349, 396 
objections to, by Japan, 

349, 350 
reference to, in the Japan- 
ese demands, 350 
relinquishment of, 350, 396 
Fushun mines, 262, 276 

Genro, Japan, 148, 153, 183, 
188 
history of, 164, 165 
influence of, l65 
reduced in numbers, l65 
See also Elder Statesmen. 
"Gentlemen's agreement," Ja- 
pan-United States, SQ9, 
370 
Germany, enters Shantung, 224 
German fleet in the Pacific, 287 
and Japan (1914), 285 ff 
in Shantung, 295 fF 
Germany's policy in Shantung, 

345 
Goodnow, Dr. F. J., Adviser to 
Chinese Government, 44, 
48, 55 
Memorandum on government- 
al systems, 89, 90, 413 
Goto, Baron, 164 
Government, in China, 18 flf 
decentralized, 36 
under old regime, 18 ff" 
Japan, '129 3" 



Government, representative, in 
Japan, 149 

Government monopolies, in Ja- 
pan, 127 

Grand Council, in China, 20, 23, 
30 

Grand Secretariat, in China, 20, 
23 

Grant, General, 197 

Grey, Sir Edward, 323 

Hague, The, 389 
Hague Conference, 212, 443 
Hanlin (College), 30 
Hanyehping Company, 3l6, 321, 

339 
Hara, Takashi, 183 
Harris, Townsend, 108 

treaty with Japan, 108. 
Minister, 109 
Hart, Sir Robert, 202, 384 
Hay, John, Secretary, 249, S5S, 

359, 380, 401 
opinions of, 364 
suggestions of, accepted, 364 
Hay notes, 441 fF 
Hay notes (1899), 233 ff" 
Hay notes (1900), 236 
Hay notes (1902), 245, 246 
Hay notes (1905), 253 

policy of "open door" and 

"equal opportunity," 382, 

385 
Hayashi, Count, 157 
Hayashi, Prof. K., 179 
Hayashida, K., 182 
Hawaii, 368, 377 
Heintzleman, P. S., 267 
Heney-Webb Bill (1913), 370, 

371 
Hideyoshi, Shogun, 103 
Hirata, Viscount, 183 



456 



INDEX 



Hirth, F., 18 ff 
Hongkong, 21 6, 218, 220 
House of Peers, in Japan, 133, 

134, 152 
House of Representatives, in Ja- 
pan, 132, 133 
dissolved (1914), 176 
Hsien magistrate, China, 34 
Huang Hsing, 41, 75, 79, 91, 99, 
319 
activity of, in Japan, 14 
biographical note, 411 
consultation with Yuan Shih- 

kai, 41 
failure of rebellion of, 81 
flight to Japan, 43 
leader of the Kwo-ming Tang, 

42 
proclamation issued by, 80 
in rebellion against Yuan 

Shih-kai, 43 
union of parties proposed by, 
76 
Hukwang loan, 393 
Hukwang railways, 12 
Hunan Party, China, 31 
Hwai River Famine Relief, 
China, 387, 388 

Immigration problem, the Jap- 
anese-United States, 373 
Imperial Commission on consti- 
tution, China (1905), 70 
Imperial influence, Japan, l60 

See also Emperor. 
Indemnity, from China (Boxer), 
238, 387, 400 
from Japan, 110 
Industrial development, Japan, 

126 
Inouye, Count, quoted, 205, 206 
Marquis, 182 



Inouye, advocate of foreign in- 
tercourse, 111 
career of, l64 

one of Elder Statesmen, 139, 
164 
Inouye, Mr. K., 183 
Inspector-General of Maritime 

Customs, China, 227 
Integrity of China, 256, 395, 
441 ff", 444 ff" 
See also Hay Notes. 
Integrity of Korea, treaty 
clauses, 210, 211, 212, 
441 ff 
Integrity, territorial, 342, 351 
Interpellation, Japan, 136, 141 
Inukai, K., l63, 172 
Ishii, Baron, 183, 184 
Itagaki, Taisuke, 139, 150, 15i 
leader of the Jiyu-to, 149 
made Minister of the Interior, 

152 
organizer of the Risshisha 

(1874), 149 
policy of, 151 
resignation of, as Minister of 

the Interior, 152 
second time Minister of the 
Interior, 153 
Italy, concessions desired 

(1899), 229 
Ito, Prince, 139, 157, 159, 185 
advocate of foreign inter- 
course, 111 
attitude of, toward parties, 

152 
author of Japanese constitu- 
tion, 64, 132, 133 
head of Bureau for Constitu- 
tional Investigation, 130 
member of Commission of 
1871, 120 



INDEX 



457 



Ito^ premier^ 151 

one of Elder Statesmen, l64 
organizer of the Seiyu-kai, 

154, 155 
plenipotentiary (1885), 201 
public declarations of, with re- 
gard to Korea, 213, 444 
reentered Privy Council 

(1903), 157 
Resident-General in Korea 

(1906), 212, 443 
resignation of, as premier, 152 
sent to Europe to study gov- 
ernment and constitution 
(1882), 129 
Iwakura, Tomomi, 120 
lyeyasu, Shogun, 104 

Jameson, C. D., 388 
Japan, advantage to, in trade 
with China, 348 
and China, 346, 366 
and China (1915), 246 

negotiations and agree- 
ments (1915), 301 ff 
publicity, 305, 306 
commercial policies in South 

Manchuria, 263 
constitution of, 128 ff 
constructive developments in 

Manchuria by, 272 ff 
Count Okuma and the present 

regime in, 171 ff 
debt of gratitude of, 360 
Declaration of War on Ger- 
many (1914), 287 
defeats China (1894-1895), 7 
demands on China (Jan. 18, 
1915), 245, 302, 304 
Group I, 312, 313 

method of presenting, 304 
Group II, 313 



Japan, demands on China (Jan. 
18, 1915), Group III, 
316, 317 
Group IV, 317 
Group V, 317, 318 
text of, compared with later 
statement, 307 ff 
early foreign intercourse of, 

103 ff 
exclusion policy of, 314 
expansion of, chronological 

table, 434 
first embassy to United States 

from, 108 
and Germany, 285 ff 
government of, 128, 129 
grounds of complaint of, 
against the United States, 
366 
immigration to United States 

from, 368 
imperial influence in, 170 
as interpreter of the West to 

the East, 355, 356 
in Korea, 214 

Korean and Manchurian poli- 
cies of, 365 
methods of, in presenting de- 
mands to China (1915), 
304 
"Monroe Doctrine for Asia," 

344 ff, 851 
opening of, 360 
party politics in, 147 ff, l69 
policy of, 347, 348, 363 
political parties in, 147 ff 
See also parties under indi- 
vidual names, 
present regime in, 171 
problems of, 127, 145, 146, 

188, 191 
reforms in, 1 1 8 ff 



458 



INDEX 



Japan, progress in, 123 

revised demands on China 
(April 26, 1915), 323, 326 
text of, 435 
rise of, as a modern power, 

103 iF 
and Russia, cooperation of,366 
sends troops to China (1915), 

322, 326 
situation of, 363 
in South Manchuria, 243 
statement of, concerning de- 
mands (1915), 328, 329, 
330, 331 
steps to empire, 195 
tariff, 120, 159, 214 
ultimatum to China (1915), 

325, 326, 327, 328 
ultimatum to Germany from 

(1914), 286, 287 
and the United States, 360 
change of attitude since 
1905, 362 
Japan Daily Mail, 187, 188 
Japan- Russia negotiations 

(1903-1904), 251 
Japanese, in Korea, 205, 206 
Japanese-American relations, 

problem of, 377-378 
Japanese bills, anti-, 370 
Japanese - Chinese agreements 
and disagreements (1914- 
1915), 230 
Japanese chivalry, 367 
Japanese government tobacco 

monopoly, 265 E 
Japanese legation in Korea at- 
tacked, 201 
Japanese police in Manchuria, 

269 
Japanese policy, immigration 
problem, 373, 374, 375 



Japanese sensitiveness, 367 
Jenks, Prof. Jeremiah W., 355, 

359 
Jernigan, T. R., 18 ff 
Jiyu-to, 149, 151 
Jones, J., 301 
Judiciary, Japanese, 143 

Kaishin-to (1882), Japan, 150 
Kagoshima, bombardment of, 

109, 111, 114 
Kamio, General, 291 
Kang Yu-wei, 7, 68 
Kato, Baron, 164, 181, 183, 
321 
communication to the United 

States from, 288 
declaration of, with regard to 
the demands on China, 
351 
on Group V, 302 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

180 
negotiations with China con- 
ducted by, 181 
speech by, quoted, 379 

statement of concerning 
Shantung, 290 
Katsura, Prince, 139, 158, l6l, 
185 
death of, 164 
in first cabinet, 156 
forms new party, l62, l63 
policies of, 157 
as Premier, 155 
tariff policy of, 159 
Kawakami, General, 156 
Keiki, Shogun, 114-115 
Kensei-to, 153 

Kiaochow, territory leased, 295 
296 
See also Shantung. 



INDEX 



459 



Knox, Secretary, 39 1^ 401 

neutralization of railways, 
policy o£, 260 
Kokumin-to, I6I 
change in, 170 
comparison of, with the Kwo- 

ming Tang, 172 
loss of members of, to the 

Rikken Doshi-kai, 163 
opposition of, to the govern- 
ment, 180, 181, 185 
organization of, 159 
principles of, 173 
Kokusai News Agency of Tokyo, 

323 
Komura, Baron, 253, 358 
Komura Treaty (1905), 254, 

257, 259 
Korea, 348, 358, 361 
annexation of, 213 
annexed by Japan (I9IO), 

159, 213, 444 
attack upon Japanese legation 

in, 201 
factions at court of, 200 
history of, 198 IF, 257 
integrity of, 441 fF 
proclaimed annexed to France 

(1866), 198 
relations of, with Japan, 198 
treaty clauses concerning, 
210 ff, 441 fF. 
Korean queen, 206 
Kowloon, 218 
Kung, Prince, 198 
Kung-ho Tang, 74, 77 
Kurile Islands, 197 
Kwang-chow (Kwangchow 

Wan), 228 
Kwang HsU, Emperor, 8, 30, 

229 
Kwo-ming Tang, 42, 44, 73, 80 



Kwo-ming Tang, actual, 84 
attitude with regard to consti- 
tution, 44 
counterpart in Japan, 172 
disafFection of, 82 
dissolution of, 46, 47, 81 
domination of Assembly by 

(1913), 77 
organization of, 42 
platform of, 76 
unite with government to op- 
pose Japan, 319 

Lansdowne, Lord, 249 
Leased Territory (South Man- 
churia), administration 
of, 273 
expense of government of, 
273 
Legislature, China, candidates 
for, 60 
law for election to, 58 
See also National Assem- 
bly. 
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 68, 74, 78, 80 
biographical note, 409 
editor and publisher of the 
Popular Enlightenment 
Magazine, 69 
Ming-chu Tang party plat- 
form written by (1912), 
75 
opposes return to monarchy, 

92 
quoted, 49 

return of, from exile (1912), 
77 
Li Hung-chang, 67, 74, 200, 

201, 386 
Li Yuan-hung, 39, 40, 41, 45, 
76, 81 
biographical note, 408 



460 



INDEX 



Li Yuan-hung, leader of rebels, 
at Hankow, 14 
neutral on question of mon- 
archy, 92 
Loans, to China, 10, 12, 42, 360, 

392-394 
Longford, Prof., 200, 202 
Loochoo Islands 195 
Looehooans, I96 

Maekay Treaty (1902), 239 
Manchu Dynasty, 6, 68 
Manchuria, 22, 25, 204, 207, 
210, 221, 223, 242, 248, 
249, 254, 255, 257, 267, 
322, 334, 336, 337, 338, 
339, 345, 347, 364, 375, 
396 
Manchuria, Japan in, criticisms 
of, 280 
problems of, 281 
Japanese administration of, 

256 fF 
Japanese colonization of, 

270 ff 
Japanese demands concerning 

(1915), 304, 313, 314 
Japanese investments in, 279 
Japan's entrance into, 243 fF 
Koreans in, 268 
natural outlet for population, 

271 
population of, 272 
treaty with, made by Japan 

(1876), 199 
railways in, 273, 274 

See also" South Manchuria 
Railway. 
Russian aggressions in, 226, 
243 fF 
Manchuria, South, Japanese ad- 
ministration of, 256 ff 



Manchuria Daily News, 269 

Manchus, 4, 5, 20 

Matsukata, Marquis, 139, 152, 
161, 165, 182, 183 

Maxim, Hudson, 352 

Mayers, W. F., 18 fF 

McCormick, Frederick, 355, 
358 

McKinley, President, 401 

Meiji (Enlightened Era), Ja- 
pan, 160, 171 

Mencius, 26, 27 

Merchant marine, Japan, 125 

Military service, Japan, 119 

Ming-chu Tang, 75, 77 

Ming Dynasty, 4, 5, 19 

Missionaries, American, in 
China, 399 

Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, 263, 266, 
276 

Mongolia, Eastern Inner, 313, 
334, 336, 337, 338, 339 

Monarchy, China, 65 
China, plans, 98 
question of return to, in 

China, 87 ff 
Powers make inquiry as to, 94 
vote on, 95 

Monroe Doctrine, 347, 351, 352, 
354, 357, 358, 359 
Japanese and American, dis- 
tinction between, 352 ff 
Japan's for Asia, 344 ff 

Morgan, J. P., 11 

Morse, Hi B., 18 ff 

"Most-favored-nation" clauses, 
218, 243, 357 

"Most-favored-nation" treat- 
ment, 372 

Motono, Baron, 183 

Mutsuhito, Emperor, 113, 170 
death of, I60 



INDEX 



461 



Nanking government^ China^ 15, 

39 
National Assembly, China 

(1913), 8, 24, 38, 42, 44, 

65, 77 
dissolution, 49, 50 
opened, 78, 79 
National Convention, China, 55 
duties, 63 
law for organizations, 62, 

430 
Naturalization, United States, 

368 
Naval program, Japan, 189 
Navy, Japan, 123, 124, 149, 

165, 179 
Navy scandal, Japan, l66, 173 
Negotiations, the Japanese-Chi- 
nese (1915), 319, 320 
"Nineteen Articles," China, 38 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 398 
Nobility, in China, 25 

in Japan, 130 
Nobunaga, Shogun, 103 
Nogi, family, Japan, 188 
Nogi, General, 164 
North China Herald, 52 
Norton, Harrison and Company, 

of Manila, 398 

Okuma, Count, 122, 150, 151, 
152, 153, 155, 159, 171, 
176, 184, 286, 371 
declaration of policy concern- 
ing entering the war 
(1914), 302 
on Japanese policy, 302, 303 
message to the United States, 

288, 289 
opposition to, 187 
platform of (1914), 172 
present policies of, 187, 190 



Okuma, Count, problems of, 
178, 188, 190, 192 
and responsible government, 

185 ff, 191 
result of 1915 election, 177 
Okuma Cabinet (1914), l63, 
167, 172, 183, 184 
program of, l67, I68 
resignation of (1915), 182 
new, 183 
Old regime, China, 18 if 
Open door, the, 208, 253, 255, 
256, 257, 261, 299, 441 ff 
Open door and equal opportu- 
nity, the, 382 
Japan's pledges of, 285, 441 ff 
to Korea, 215 
Open door policy, 207, 231 ff, 
342, 349, 351, 364, 395, 
441 ff 
enunciated by the United 
States, 233 
Opposition, in China, to Yuan 
Shih-kai, 83-84 
in Japan, to Japan's China 
policy, 179, 180, 181 
to Japan's present policies, 

187 
to Okuma Ministry, 189 ff 
Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 398 
Oura Scandal, 181, 182, 183 
Oura, Viscount, 164, 167 
Oyama, Prince and Marshal, 
139, 165 

Pacific Mail Steamship Com- 
pany, withdraws from 
Far East carrying, 397 
Pacific Ocean, the, 375, 380, 385 
Japan in the, 189 
United States interest in, 232j 
403 



462 



INDEX 



Pao Huang Hui, 68, 77 
Parkes, Sir Harry, 112, 117 
Partition of China, 220, 221 
Party history, Japan, 149 
Party politics, Japan, 147 ff 

absence of concrete and de- 
tailed program in, l68 
inferences as to, 168 
personal element in, l68 
"Peace of the Far East," 285 ff, 

299, 300 
"Peace Planning Society," 

China, 89 
Peace protocol (1901), 7, 237, 

238 
Peking Daily News, 62, 91 
Peking Gazette, 89 
Perry, Commodore, 106, 109, 
114, S6l 
mission of, to Japan, 106 
treaty of, with Japan, 107 
Petitions, power of, in Japan, 

137 
Philippines, 231, 376 
Philosophers, Chinese, 4, 26 
Political campaigning, Japan, 

176 
Political parties, China, 42, 66 ff 

Japan, 147 ff 
Population, China, 271 

Japan, 271 
Port Arthur, 207, 224, 225, 278, 

279, 313, 335 
Portsmouth Treaty (1905), 253 
Japan-Russia, 158, 197, 201, 
253-254, 257, 365 
Presidency, China, 45, 53 
law for election, 56 
Privy Council, China, 23, 24 

Japan, 130, 139, 140 
Prorogation, of Diet, in Japan, 
141 



Provincial government, China> 

21, 32, 34 
Provisional Constitution, China 
(1912), 40 
China (1914), 52 ff 
Public opinion, in Japan, 138 

Railway, Canton-Hankow, 392 
Chinchou-Aigun, 260 
Hsinmintun-Fakumen, 2 4 3, 

259 
Hukwang, 392 

Railways, Japan, 125 

Hsinmintun-Mukden and Ki- 

rin-Changchun, 262 
South Manchurian Antung- 

Mukden, 335 
Trans-Siberian Chinese East- 
ern, 247 

Railway policies, Japan in Man- 
churia, 256 ff 

Railway Zone, South Manchuria, 
262, 265, 268, 269, 273, 
278, 279 

Rea, George Bronson, 301, 344, 
345 

Reaction, in China, 66 

Rebellion, China (1913), 38, 43, 
80 
China (1915), 98 

Reforms, in Japan, 1 1 8 ff 

Representative government, Ja- 
pan, 138 

Republic, China, 45, 97 

Responsible government, 178 

Restoration, the, in Japan, 115 ff 

Renter's Telegraph Agency, 328 

Revolution, the Chinese, 3 ff, 
37, 66 

Revolution, Japan, 105 

Richard, L., 18 

Rockhill, Hon. W. W., 384 



INDEX 



463 



Roosevelt^ President, 253, 401 
.Root, Secretary, 358, 359, 401 
Russia, 3, 260 

Russia, aggressions of, in Korea, 
203, 209 
interference in Korea, 203 
Port Arthur, 225 
special concessions to, from 
China, 222, 223 
Russian aggressions in Man- 
churia, 226, 243 fF 
Russo-Japanese War, 156, 210, 
243, 252 

Saghalin, 197 

Saigo, Takamori, 119 

rebels, 119 
Sa-in, Japan, 129 
Saionji, Marquis, 155, 156, 158, 
159, 160, l6l, 162, 163 
leader of Seiyu-kai, 157 
Sakurada Club, 188 
San Francisco School Question, 

368 
Satsuma Clan, 109, HO, 111, 

112, 148 
Scramble for concessions, China, 
221, 385 
cumulative, 240 
ended, 230 
Secret Societies, China, 14 
Seiyu Club, l64 

Seiyu-kai, 157, 158, l6l, l62, 
163, 165, 166, 180, 181, 
185 
favor navy, 172, 173 
program of, 155 
Seward, Secretary, 380 
Shanghai, settlement, 217 
Shantung Province, 220, 224, 
242, 258, 289, 290, 304, 
312, 332, 333, 376 



Shantung Province, German 
policy in, 296, 297, 298, 
299 
Germany in, 231 
Germany's holdings in, 295 
leased territory, statistics of, 

297, 298 
precedent of Japanese policy 
in, 304 

S h e n g Hsuan-huai (Sheng 
Kung-pab), 13 

Shimonoseki, bombardment of, 
110, 111, 114 
Treaty of (1895), 204 

Shimpo-to, 150, 153 
party dissolved, 159 

Shin Nippon, 302 

Shogun, Japan, 103, 107, 112, 
118 
Keiki, resigns, 114, 115 

Shogunate, 104, 113 

Six Powers Loan Group, 42, 
393, 395 

Six Powers Negotiations, 394 

South Manchuria, Japanese ad- 
ministration of, 256 fF 

South Manchuria Railway, 256, 
263, 264, 267 

South Manchuria Railway Com- 
pany, 262, 267, 274 fF, 
275, 276, 277, 278 

South Manchuria Railway Zone, 
area and population of, 
268, 269, 278, 279 

Spanish- American War, 231, 
385 

Spheres of influence, 241 

Spheres of influence policy, 346, 
349 

Standard Oil Company, invest- 
ment in China, business 
of, 396, 397 



464 



INDEX 



Sung Chiao-jen, 43, 73, 76, 78, 
80, 82 

Sun Yat-sen, Dr., 14, 16, 1 6, 39, 
41, 42, 43, 68, 71, 75, 
76, 79, 91, 99, 172 
biographical note, 410 

Suzuki, Mr., 289 

Szechuen Province, 13 



Taft, President, 12, 391, 392, 

394, 401 
Taiping Rebellion, 5 
Tait, J. Selwin, 398 
Takahashi, Mr. H., 174 
Tang Shao-yi, 15, 72 

premier, 72 
Tariff, China, 238-239 

Japan, 120, 159, 214 
Tax, "consumption," Chinese, 
266 
production, on tobacco, Chi- 
nese, 265 
Taxes, Japan, 174 
Terauchi, Count and General, 

161, 183 
Tien-tsin Convention, Japan, 

China (1885), 201 
Tokyo, capital, 118 

University of, 119, 125 
Toyo Kisen Kaisha, 398 
Trans-Siberian Railway, 224 
Treaties, China's, list of pow- 
ers, 218, 219 
Treaties, conventions, agree- 
ments and notes, China, 
non-alienation declara- 
tions (1898), 227 ff 
China-France (1885), 220 
China-France (1886), 220 
China-F ranee, Convention 
(1898), 228, 229 



Treaties, China-Germany, Con- 
vention (1898), 224, 225 
China-Great Britain (1842), 

216 
China-Great Britain (1898), 

228-229 
China-Great Britain, Mackay 

Treaty (1902), 239 
China-Great Britain, France, 

Russia, United States, 

Treaties (1858), (I860), 

217, 218, 219 
China-Japan (1871), 195 
China- Japan (1874), 196 
China-Japan (1885), 202 
China- Japan, Treaty (1895), 

204 
See also Shimonoseki. 
China- Japan (1903), 250 
China- Japan (1915), 178, 

257, 312 ff, 331 
Text, 332 
China- Japan, Komurg Treaty 

(1905), 254, 257 
China and the Powers, Peace 

Protocol (1901), 7, 237, 

238 
China-Russia (1896), 223- 

224 
China-Russia (1901), 208, 

245 
China-United States (1844), 

217, 381, 384 
China-United States (1858), 

360, 384 
China-United States (1868), 

383, 384 
China-United States (1903), 

250 
France-Great Britain (1896), 

222 
France-Russia (1902), 248 



INDEX 



465 



Treaties, Germany-Great Brit- 
ain (1900), 237 

Great Britain-Japan, alliance 
(1905), see Alliances. 

Great Britain-Russia (1899)^ 
243 

Hay notes, "integrity of 
China" (1900), 236, 
445 fF 
"open door" (1899), 256, 
444 if 

Japan-Great Britain, alliance 
(1902), 157, 208, 209 
See also Alliances. 

Japan-Korea (1876), 199 

Japan-Korea (1882), 201 

Japan-Korea (191O), 213, 214 

J a p a n-Russia, Portsmouth 
(1905), 158, 197, 210, 
253-254, 257, 365 

Japan-Russia (1910), 261 

Japan-United States (1854), 
107, 360 

Japan-United States (1858), 
108 

Japan-United States (1878), 
121, 360 

Japan-United States (1886), 
122 

Japan-United States (I91I), 
SQ9, 370, 372 

Korea, treaties with various 
Powers (1882-1884), 200 

Russia-China (1898), 225 
See also Manchuria. 

See also China, Japan, Korea, 
Integrity of China, In- 
tegrity of Korea, Hay 
notes. Open door. 
Treaty Revision, Japan, 120, 

121 
Tsai Ao, party leader, 74 



Tsai Ao leads rebellion, 98 
Tseng Kwo-fang, 67 
Tseng, Admiral, 98 
Tsinanfu, 291 

Tsing Hua College, 386, 387 
Tsingtao, 291 

agreement, 294, 295 

customs dispute (1914-1915), 
292 S, 2^3 
Tsung-li Yamen, 22, 238 
Tuan Fang, 386 
Tung-meng Hui, 42, 70, 71, 72, 

74, 75 
Tung-yi Tang, 75 
Tyler, President, message to 
Emperor of China, 381 



United States, 368 

attitude toward education in 

China, 385, 386 
attitude toward Far East, 381 
first embassy from Japan, 36l 
and Korea, 199 
proposes neutrality of China, 
in Russo-Japanese War, 
252, 253 
trade with China, 390, 391 
United States-Chinese immigra- 
tion, 383 
United States' future interests, 

403 
United States Immigration Act 

(1907), 369 
United States' interests in the 

Far East, 402 
United States- Japan negotia- 
tions (1913-1914), 371 
United States- Japan traditional 

friendship, 361 
United States notes to China and 
Japan (1915), 342 ff 



466 



INDEX 



United States policy (1915), 
S40, 341, 344-, 350, 403 

declaration of (1915), 341 

regarding China, 402 
United States' responsibility, 403 
United States' responsibilities, 

387 
Universities, Japan, 124 
Uyehara, Dr., 134 
Uyehara, Baron, l60 

Village organization, China, 35, 
36 

Wai-ehiao Pu, 22 

Wai-wu Pu, 22, 238 

War in Europe, the, 285 

War on Germany (1914), Ja- 
pan, 175 

War zone, in China (1914), 291, 
301 

Waseda University, 172 

Webster, Secretary, letter of in- 
struction to Cushlng, 382 

Wilhelm, Kaiser, 253 

Wilson, President, 394 
China policy of, 395 
withdraws support from 
American banking group, 
394 

Witte, Count, 253 

Wu Ting-fang, 15, 78 

Yamagata, Prince and Marshal, 
139, 153, 154, 155, 156, 
165, 183 



Yamamoto, Admiral, 163 
ministry of, 165 
program of, 166 
Yokohama Specie Bank, 263, 

264, 276 
Yuan Koh-ting, 92 
Yuan Shih-kai, 15, l6, 17, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 
55, 64, 67, 71, 72, 80, 83, 
86, 89, 90, 91, 98, 99, 
201, 202, 319, 325, 386, 
393 
authorized to act as provision- 
al president, l6 
biographical note, 405 
controls vote on monarchy, 

question, 96 
elected president, 81 
first cabinet of, 72 
message of Sept. 6, 1915, 

425 
message of Oct. 11, 1915, 

427 
offered throne, 96 
task of, 17, 47 
Yukio, Ozaki, 163 
Yunnan, French sphere of in- 
fluence in, 231 
rebellion in (1915), 98, 99, 
100 
Yushin-kai, 159, 173 

Zone, Railway, South Man- 
churia. See Railway 
Zone 

Zone, war. See War zone 



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